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This thesis aims at answering the question why there was a secessionist conflict in Donetsk region, 
eastern Ukraine, by offering a comparative case study of Kharkiv city and Donetsk region. Drawing on 
the literature on political opportunity for protest, I argue that to explain the different trajectories taken by 
these two structurally similar regions, we need to focus on the behaviour of the local elites and activists in 
the period before the arrival of external agents and the macro-process of escalation to war in one region.  
In contrast with the history and identity approach, which – implicitly or explicitly – argues for the primacy 
of history, local ordinary people and their identities and emotions, I offer my own approach, which 
focuses squarely on the two groups of actors – the local elites and activists – and their rational action and 
interaction. Both regions in my story display a comparatively similar propensity to protest and violence, 
with Kharkiv city being more prone to protest violence, as demonstrated through protest cataloguing and 
process tracing.  
What contrast the two regions are, firstly, the starkly different stances taken by the local elites towards the 
local protest and changes in Kyiv, and how pro-federal and pro-Russian activists used political 
opportunities for protest. In my story, the local elites created political opportunities for these activists. I 
treat the radical changes in the centre in Kyiv in February 2014 as the exogenous shock that informs the 
local elites’ behaviour. I borrow conceptual insights from the literature on patronage, clientelism and, 
more specifically, Henry Hale’s book Patronal Politics to explain the divergent behaviour of the local elites 
following the change in the governing network in the centre. I distinguish the city of Kharkiv and 
Donetsk region by the type of patronage that applies to their elites. These are diffused and concentrated 
types of patronage. I argue that in the city of Kharkiv, moderate pro-federal protest developed because 
the regional elites were functioning under a diffused patronage system. By contrast, in Donetsk, a 
concentrated patronage region, pro-Russian radicals took centre stage from the start. The result of these 
pre-war processes is that in one region, political opportunities for the intervention of foreign actors are 
closed off, whereas in the other they remain open. Therefore, an external actor might start an insurgency 
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On 1 March 2014, Donets’k city council passed a unanimous vote for a referendum to be held on the 
future of the Donbas region. Surrounded by agitated pro-Russian protestors, Donets’k mayor Oleksandr 
Luk’yanchenko issued the following statement: “We support the people’s initiative on holding a 
referendum on the territory of Donets’k Region about the future fate of the Donbas and we ask the 
deputies of Donets’k regional council to immediately call a referendum on the territory of Donets’k 
region”.1 He also proclaimed Russia a strategic partner of Donets’k region. As one of the pro-
federalisation protest organisers in Kharkiv revealed to me in an interview, in 2014, the elites in Donets’k 
engaged in strategic bargaining with Kyiv: “In 2014, the oligarchic structures were trying to do the same 
thing that they did in 2004 when they proclaimed the Ukrainian Federative Republic”. According to the 
organiser, this bargaining could have continued and spawned a local conflict, with protests and the 
storming and occupation of important state buildings, had it not been for the appearance of Igor Strelkov 
who disrupted the local elites’ bargaining plans. The bargaining was supposed to extract certain privileges, 
such as decentralisation or the referendum on federalisation, from the centre, and then the insurgency 
would have died a natural death (Protest Organiser 1; 24 09 2018). This observation was also confirmed 
in my interview with Journalist 1, an expert on Donets’k region, who stated that Donets’k regional elites 
bargained with the centre “to preserve their money, freedom, and status” (Journalist 1; 19 07 2019).  
In the meantime, in Kharkiv, Luk’yanchenko’s counterpart, Hennadiy Kernes, in an interview with a 
Russian journalist, stated that “calls for Kharkiv to join Russia are a "provocation". He repeatedly stressed 
that “Kharkiv is part of Ukraine”.2 On 3 March, Kernes made even stronger worded comments: “If we 
are law-abiding citizens and do not let our emotions overwhelm us, we will not allow our meetings to 
become a coup for the benefit of Russia”.3 Kernes followed these statements through with a ban through 
a local court on the meeting demanding a referendum on Ukraine’s federalisation on 13 March. He 
 
1 “Pro-Russian rallies in south, east Ukraine demand referendums”, BBC Monitoring Newsfile, 1 March 2014. 
2 “Programme summary of Russian REN TV "Nedelya" 1 March 2014”, BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, 2 March 
2014. 
3 “Gennadii Kernes: my zhivem i rabotaem po zakonam Ukrainy”, Khar’kovskie Izvestiia, 3 March 2014.  
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continued to state in his interviews that “Kharkiv is and will be part of Ukraine”4 and never budged on 
the referendum issue with the activists in Kharkiv.   
These seemingly disparate events form the larger narrative of what was to become a major political 
protest in Ukraine and then, from spring 2014, the largest conflict within Europe’s borders after the 
breakup of Yugoslavia (Strasheim, 2016). The Euromaidan revolution achieved the dramatic change of 
government, with the ousting of President Viktor Yanukovych, and heralded major political and societal 
changes.5 The revolution also resulted in the most devastating military conflict in modern history of 
Ukraine in the Donbas area that has now been ravaging both the country itself and its breakaway regions 
for more than six years.6 The conflict started locally, when numerous anti-government protests in the 
Donbas were sparked by the radical changes of government and the new government’s actions in Kyiv in 
February 2014. In April 2014, the protests morphed into an insurgency, with the help of Russian military 
reserve officers, military intelligence operatives, and various non-state actors. In response, the Ukrainian 
government launched several offensives, some of which were successful, but, later, it was repeatedly 
repulsed by the separatist and Russian state forces. The conflict has “calcified” since then and become 
relatively low-scale.  
The origins of the Donbas conflict have been widely discussed in the literature. The theories that have 
addressed the causes of the conflict fall into two broad paradigms. The first set of theories focuses on the 
role of history and identity in causing the Donbas conflict. Scholars working with these theories argue 
that the people in the Donbas developed an identity specific to the region. They cite sociological surveys 
and interviews demonstrating that, historically, the Donbas stood apart from other regions in Ukraine and 
its residents were particularly prone to support separatism. Following the eruption of violence in Kyiv in 
January – February 2014 and the sudden change of government in February 2014, the people in the 
Donbas protested and then mobilised for conflict because their identity was threatened by this change. 
To a certain extent, therefore, the conflict was bound to occur in the Donbas. The empirical literature 
 
4 “Kharkiv was, will be part of Ukraine – mayor”, Interfax: Russia & CIS General Newswire, 13 March 2014. 
5 S. Charap, E. Giuliano and M. Alexeev, “How changing Ukrainian Society impacts the chances for peace”, Ponars 
Eurasia, 6 March 2017.  
6 “RFE/RL: UN says nearly 10,000 people killed in eastern Ukraine conflict since 2014”, Kyiv Post, 15 March 2017.  
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within this approach is based on the larger theoretical literature on the roles of identities and emotions in 
conflict.  
The other set of theories focuses on the role of foreign actors in causing conflicts. These theories are 
based on the larger literature which argues that “third parties,” usually neighbouring states, often get 
involved in conflicts. The overt purpose of this involvement is usually the protection of ethnic kin. As a 
result, we can expect a neighbouring state to be involved in a conflict in another state if the latter’s state is 
populated by the neighbouring state’s ethnic kin. Other theories within the same paradigm argue that a 
minority threatened by the government’s policies in the host state is likely to mobilise and radicalise if the 
ethnic kin state offers leverage to that minority. These findings have been applied to the conflict in 
Ukraine and it has been demonstrated empirically and beyond reasonable doubt that Russian non-state 
actors were indeed involved in escalating what appeared to be a local conflict at first.  
At the same time, the most recent research on popular attitudes towards the changes in Kyiv and 
separatism in the Donbas demonstrates that these attitudes were complex and that they did not easily 
translate into popular mobilisation for war. My own empirical research also demonstrates that protest 
dynamics were very uneven in Donets’k region and that overt political protest did not lead to conflict. 
Most importantly, if Donets’k region is considered in a comparative perspective with a structurally similar 
city and region (such as Kharkiv), the history and identity approach is inadequate in explaining why 
conflict occurred in the Donbas. Kharkiv city and Donets’k region shared history, proximity to Russia, 
broad Anti-Maidan and pro-Russian popular preferences, and the decade-long domination of one political 
party (the Party of Regions). The approach focusing on the foreign actors does not account for the period 
prior to the appearance of foreign agents and how political opportunities were opened for specific type of 
activism that led to the appearance of those agents.   
Based on the review of the two major approaches to the study of the Donbas conflict, I 
formulate the following research questions: 
- Why would two regions with similar structural conditions predisposing them to similar 
protest dynamics take different trajectories? 
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- Why did the region with a greater general protest potential and greater propensity to protest 
violence choose a peaceful trajectory?  
- Why would two regions geographically proximate to the “external patron,” or “ethnic kin 
state,” take two different trajectories?  
- Who creates political opportunities for specific types of activists? 
- Why do the local elites create political opportunities for these specific types of activists? 
- How do the specific types of activists use the political opportunities for protest?7  
My own explanation of the Donbas conflict revolves around the comparison between Donets’k 
region and Kharkiv city. Drawing on the literature on political opportunity for protest, I argue that to 
explain the different trajectories taken by the two structurally similar regions, we need to focus on the 
behaviour of the local elites and activists in the period before the arrival of external agents and the macro-
process of escalation to war in one region. That is, we need to focus on the pre-war period when 
outcomes were by no means certain (Tarrow, 2007; Shesterinina, 2014). In my argument, the 
phenomenon of the “Russian Spring” emerges out of the local Anti-Maidan contention in both regions.  
In contrast with the history and identity approach, which – implicitly or explicitly – argues for the 
primacy of history, local ordinary people and their identities and emotions, I offer my own approach, 
which focuses squarely on the two groups of actors – the local elites and activists – and their rational 
action and interaction. Both regions in my story display a comparatively similar propensity to protest and 
violence, with Kharkiv city being more prone to protest violence, as demonstrated through protest 
cataloguing and process tracing.  
What contrast the two regions are, firstly, the starkly different stances taken by the local elites 
towards the local protest and changes in Kyiv, and how pro-federal and pro-Russian activists used 
political opportunities for protest. In my story, the local elites created political opportunities for these 
activists. I explain that in Kharkiv city they did so in response to the Euromaidan protest that aimed to 
 
7 According to Stathis Kalyvas, insurgencies often witness “the lightning transformation of small, politically marginal 
groups into state structures” (Kalyvas, 2006, 258).  
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unseat them, while in Donets’k region the elites opened political opportunities for the Anti-Maidan 
because they wanted to stay loyal to Yanukovych’s government course.  
Following the radical changes of the “informal governing network” in the centre in February 
2014, when Yanukovych and his network of the Party of Regions ceased to govern the country and the 
rival networks of Yulia Tymoshenko and other parties antagonistic to the Party of Regions came to 
power, while the Party of Regions found itself significantly diminished in government, it is the exogenous 
shock of this change that informs the local elites’ subsequent behaviour. I adapt conceptual insights from 
the literature on patronage, clientelism and, more specifically, Henry Hale’s book Patronal Politics to 
explain the divergent behaviour of the local elites following the change of the governing network. I 
distinguish the city of Kharkiv and Donets’k region by the type of patronage that applies to their elites. 
These are diffused and concentrated types of patronage. I argue that in the city of Kharkiv, moderate pro-
federal protest developed because the regional elites were functioning under a diffused patronage system. 
By contrast, in Donets’k, a concentrated patronage region, pro-Russian radicals took centre stage from 
the start. The result of these pre-war processes is that in one region, political opportunities for the 
intervention of foreign actors are closed off, whereas in the other they remain open (Activist from 
Donets’k, Interview 27 07 2019). Therefore, an external actor might start an insurgency in one region only 
after exploring options in all the regions susceptible to conflict (Protest Organiser in Kharkiv 1, Interview 
24 09 2018; Protest Organiser in Kharkiv 2, Interview 28 09 2018; Yudaev, 2015; Strelkov’s interview 
(Prokhanov and Strelkov, 2014)). 
I treat the type of patronage in the region as the independent variable. I start with the basic 
assumption that regional elites are motivated by several concerns: they want to keep their power, protect 
their assets, and have access to resources to distribute to their region and possibly themselves. Bearing 
this assumption in mind, the polities that they inhabit can be characterised by diffusion or concentration 
of patronage. In diffused patronage polities, regional elites from rival networks are placed next to each 
other by their patrons. Diffused patronage polities are “plugged into” various patronage channels through 
which resources are delivered and their elites are constantly engaged in close interaction with each other. 
This interaction leads to the process of elite learning thereby the elites acquire skills of negotiation with 
the members of rival networks. The elites in diffused patronage polities do not invest heavily in any 
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particular patron, which enhances their ability to survive under any network. By contrast, the elites in 
concentrated patronage regions are heavily dependent on one political patron (Activist from Donets’k, 
Interview 27 07 2019). Resources are delivered to the region and the elites’ assets are protected only when 
this patron has access to power in the centre. The elites in these regions rarely interact with the members 
of other networks. Instead, when the governing network changes in the centre, these elites rely on stable 
bargaining ploys, such as encouraging political protest and separatism, in order to keep their concentrated 
patronage system. These systems of patronage are conditioned by the centralised nature of Ukraine and 
the political economy of the regions.  
The intervening variable in my theory is the type of protest. Broadly, the type of protest is the 
protest that is either in the regional elites’ interest or not. The elites therefore encourage the types of 
protest that are in their interest and they discourage the types of protest that are not in their interest. 
Empirically, I distinguish between the moderate pro-federal type of protest and radical pro-federal and pro-
Russian types of protest. The elites in diffused patronage regions would discourage radical types of 
protest because these kinds of protest disrupt their relations with the centre and the rival networks. The 
elites in concentrated patronage regions would encourage radical types of protest because these types of 
protest have historically been part of their bargaining strategy with the centre. The outcome variables in 
my theory are peace or conflict. I argue that the elites send signals to external agents from the 
neighbouring states by opening political opportunities for specific types of protest. External agents from 
the neighbouring states, therefore, usually appear in concentrated patronage polities where radical protest 
is encouraged.  
I therefore offer an interactive theory in which the main mechanism is the type of patronage in a 
clientelistic polity. Whether a political protest would develop along radical or moderate lines depends on 
the type of patronage.  
Based on this brief review of the literature and my main argument, I draw the following testable 
hypotheses: 
H1: the more intense the protest and protest violence in the region, the more likely it is to become the site of a violent conflict.  
H2: political opportunities for protest that leads to war are created externally by ethnic patrons.  
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H3: the local elites would encourage or discourage specific types of protest depending on the regional patronage system.  
To operationalise the type of polity, I look at the following indicators: 
1. The networks to which the people occupying high-ranking positions in the local government, 
such as governors, mayors, and the regional and city councils’ deputies, belonged.  
2. The nature of the regional political economy. I look specifically at whether the major 
enterprises in the regions were state-owned or private.  
3. The frequency and nature of interactions between the clients in the regions and their patrons 
in the centre and between the clients of the different networks within the regions.  
4. The kinds of resources that were delivered to the regions.  
5. The nature of political conflicts in the polities and how the local elites dealt with those 
conflicts.  
6. Historically, how the local elites recoordinated themselves around the emerging patrons 
when the governing network changed in the centre. 
To operationalise the protest dynamics, I look at the following indicators: 
1. Frequency of political protest in both regions prior to 2013.  
2. Frequency of the Euromaidan and Anti-Maidan protests.  
3. Frequency and nature of protest violence in 2013 - 2014.  
4. The pro-federal and pro-Russian protestors’ demands.  
5. Local elites’ actions and attitudes towards the protests.  
In this book, I use the methods of process tracing and protest cataloguing. Process tracing allows to 
discover the causal mechanism at work in the process of protest. It usually points to the underlying 
patterns explaining events. On the other hand, protest or event cataloguing describes the aggregate 
patterns of protest. I have therefore used protest cataloguing to test the hypotheses about the political 
protest potential and protest intensity in the regions. I found that there were certain aggregate patterns of 
protest that could only be explained by using process tracing. For example, event cataloguing revealed 
that Russian flags, the flags of the radical movements such as Donets’k Republic, and chants “Russia” 
were present at almost all protest events of the “Russian Spring” in Donets’k (Interview with Journalist 1 
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19 07 2019), whereas in Kharkiv the chants “Russia” and Russian flags gradually disappeared after 16 
March 2014. In all, radical protest and clandestine armed mobilisation failed to emerge in Kharkiv. This 
was not because of the signals from the external patron Russia who, according to my interview with an 
activist in Kharkiv, sent signals to all the eastern regions (Interview with Activist in Kharkiv, 16 07 2019). 
Process tracing revealed how the political opportunities for radical protest were opened by the local elites 
and how these were used by the activists in Donets’k region. Similarly, the aggregate patterns of attacks 
on ordinary people and violence against the elites can be explained by the inter-elite conflict, which 
process tracing also pointed to.  
In the following chapter, I position the Donbas conflict in the broader empirical and theoretical literature. 
I analyse the major approaches to the conflict, such as history and identity and the role of foreign actors 
approach. I also examine Donets’k region and Kharkiv city comparatively and offer my own theory based 
on the interaction of the two key actors – the local elites and activists. I provide the definitions of the 
local elites and then engage with the concepts derived from the literature on patronal politics and 
clientelism, as well as political opportunity, in order to elucidate my theoretical stance towards the 
conflict. In the second chapter, I discuss the methodology used in this book in more depth. I provide the 
analysis of the major sources of information and, when it came to interviewing people, how I managed to 
get access to them. In the following chapter, I test the first hypothesis developed in the theoretical 
introduction to the study. Using protest cataloguing and process tracing, I reveal that Kharkiv city had 
greater protest potential than Donets’k region, which predisposed the city to further destabilisation. 
Moreover, the dynamics of the Anti-Maidan and Russian Spring protests were similar in both Kharkiv 
city and Donets’k region, with Kharkiv city being more prone to protest violence. In the next chapter, I 
look at the systems of patronage in Kharkiv city and Donets’k region and discuss my independent 
variable in more depth. I engage with the key concepts derived from the literature on patronage, such as 
actual acquaintance and past success of exchange, when discussing the independent variable. I 
demonstrate that the city of Kharkiv and Donets’k region developed as diffused and concentrated 
patronage regions respectively. In the fifth chapter, I use the process tracing method to reveal the 
interaction of the independent and intervening variables in my main mechanism. More specifically, I 
process trace the Anti-Maidan contention in both regions and then demonstrate how two different types 
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of protest - radical pro-Russian protest and moderate pro-federal protest – developed in the concentrated 
patronage and diffused patronage regions respectively. In the conclusion, I draw the lines of my main 






















Chapter 1: Explaining the Donbas conflict 
1. Introduction  
Given the long-standing Western security interests in Ukraine and the disputed role of Russia in 
the Donbas conflict, media and scholarly attention to the conflict has been intense. Journalists and 
academics present opposing views of its origins and nature. The explanations of the Donbas conflict have 
gone through several stages, from simpler (or monocausal) to more complex (or multi-causal). Earlier 
accounts are concerned with the comparative extent of the involvement of the locals, Russian citizens, 
and Russia as a state, in the conflict. The Ukrainian government, media, and, to a large extent, their 
Western counterparts describe the conflict as having been “initiated, directed, supported and organized” 
(Umland, 2014) by Russian military intelligence operatives (GRU) and, later, regular Russian military 
units. Ukrayinska Pravda, the major online newspaper in Ukraine, portrayed the early protests in the south-
east in spring 2014 as being led by Russian “tourists,” that is people bussed in to Ukraine from over the 
border (A. Wilson, 2014, 128).8 This makes the insurgency appear as lacking popular support 
(Katchanovski, 2016, 2). The Russian government and media, by contrast, present the conflict in the 
Donbas as a civil war that was sparked by the Ukrainian government’s attempt to suppress the Russian 
language and the popular uprising of the Donbas’ residents (Katchanovski, 2016, 4).  
Scholarly works show similar differences in defining the origin of the Donbas conflict. A few 
scholars depict the conflict as a Russian invasion, from the start led by Russian military intelligence agents 
and ideological “volunteers” (Czuperski et al., 2015; Mitrokhin, 2014; Sutyagin, 2015). By contrast, in his 
book “Frontline Ukraine,” Richard Sakwa adopts a more cautious approach and argues that the 
provenance of the insurgents in Donets’k region was unclear, “but they were certainly not the “little green 
men” who had operated so effectively and clinically in taking over the Crimea” (Sakwa, 2015, 155). He 
consequently characterises the conflict as local, with “genuine ‘popular support’” (Sakwa, 2015, 149). The 
exchange among Serhiy Kudelia, Andreas Umland and Yuriy Matsiyevsky in 2014 develops along similar 
lines, with Kudelia arguing that the conflict had primarily domestic sources, while Umland and 
 
8 “V Donetske “turisty” s flagami RF mitinguiut za krymskii referendum”, Ukrayinska Pravda, 15 March 2014.  
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Matsiyevsky depict it as Russia-led (Kudelia, 2014a; Kudelia, 2014b; Kudelia, 2014c; Matsiyevsky, 2014; 
Umland, 2014). Ivan Katchanovski (2016, 9) examines various live broadcasts, videos, and media reports, 
which show that the leaders of the insurgency and members of their armed units were mostly residents of 
the Donbas and other regions of Ukraine (a similar argument is also made by Anna Matveeva (Matveeva, 
2016)). Katchanovski cites the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2015) statement on the conflict, which 
characterises it as intrastate, having started primarily because of domestic factors (Katchanovski, 2016, 4). 
Katchanovski thus characterises the conflict as “a civil war with both direct and indirect military 
intervention of a foreign state” (Katchanovski, 2016, 11), that is Russia, as do Dominique Arel and Jesse 
Driscoll,9 and Lucan Way.10  
In the scholarly literature, a great multitude of approaches have been taken to explain the conflict 
in the Donbas. Each assigns the primary importance to a different factor or a combination of factors. The 
approaches fall under several broad explanatory paradigms:11 the role of identity and history (Charap et 
al., 2017; Giuliano, 2015a; Giuliano, 2015b; Kuromiya, 2016; Loshkarev and Sushentsov, 2016; Matveeva, 
2016; Matveeva, 2018; Sakwa, 2015; A. Wilson, 2016; A. Wilson, 2014); the role of the local political and 
business elites (Buckholz, 2019; Carroll, 2014; Hattori, 2014; Kazanskiy, 2014; Matsuzato, 2017; A. 
Wilson, 2016); the role of the regional socio-economic problems (Zhukov, 2016);  and the role of Russia 
(Bowen, 2019; Davies, 2016; Kashin, 2014; Kuzio, T.,2015; Kuzio, 2017; Robinson, 2016; Shkandrij, 
2014; A. Wilson, 2016; A. Wilson, 2014). Because of its exceptionally well-documented nature and the 
relatively easy access to the area before the start of the serious hostilities in summer 2014, it seems that 
the origins and nature of the Donbas conflict have been explained and no questions remain.  
Yet, certain questions are still unanswered, or they are answered intuitively by academics and 
journalists. The most pertinent of these questions is why, given their similar structural conditions, such as 
shared history, proximity to Russia, broad Anti-Maidan and pro-Russian popular preferences, and the 
decade-long domination of one political party (the Party of Regions), did the city and region of Kharkiv 
 
9 ‘’Arel D & Driscoll J Conceptualizing the War in Donbas”, YouTube, 23 October 2015, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BfQ9IgTNu-M .  
10 Lucan Way Why Ukraine is in Civil War, YouTube, 30 October 2014, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hqCmd3xD1vQ.  
11 For other paradigms, see (Kuzio, 2017).  
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and the region of Donets’k take such starkly different trajectories? Having looked closely at the history of 
the general political protest and the Euromaidan and “Russian Spring” protest waves in the city of 
Kharkiv and Donets’k region, I continue to posit this question.  The strong argument offered in the 
academic literature and journalists’ accounts is that the appearance of Igor Strelkov in Slov’’ians’k, 
Donets’k region, on 12 April 2014, and the Ukrainian government’s decision to launch the Anti-Terrorist 
Operation on 13 April 2014 to remove Strelkov and his squad, explains why there is war in one region 
and no war in the other. According to my interview with a (former) Ukrainian journalist (Journalist 1), 
this decision was guided by high politics and, more specifically, the Ukrainian government’s view that the 
events in the Crimea and the Donbas were part of “one Russian scenario” (Interview 19 07 2019). 
However, this answer clouds our understanding of the pre-war dynamics and processes (Shesterinina, 
2014), which might have figured in the mind of this external actor when choosing where to start the 
insurgency (Prokhanov and Strelkov, 2014). It effectively conflates the micro-level and macro-level 
processes leading to war (Kalyvas, 2006; Shesterinina, 2014). By micro-level processes, I understand the 
decisions made on the ground by the local elites and activists and the extent of popular mobilisation. 
Macro-level processes involve the decisions made at the state level and by external actors. More 
concretely, Strelkov’s appearance was highly contingent. This external actor might have well appeared in 
any other region in south-eastern Ukraine (for example, in Izium or Kupiansk in Kharkiv 
region)(Interview with Journalist 2 15 08 2018) (Prokhanov and Strelkov, 2014).12 I demonstrate in the 
empirical chapters that the reasons why Strelkov appeared in Donets’k region rather than in Kharkiv were 
connected to the decisions made by the local elites and activists in both regions. In effect, I provide an 
explanation of why Strelkov appeared in one region and not in the other.   
In this chapter, I offer a discussion of the major approaches to the Donbas conflict,13 focusing 
especially on the history and identity approach and the “role of foreign actors” approach. I position the 
approaches within the larger literature, including the literature on civil wars14 and emotions and politics, 
 
12 See the former governor of Kharkiv region Ihor Baluta’s interview from 2016, “Eks-gubernator Khar’kovshchiny 
Igor’ Baluta: “Dlia menia reshayushchim stalo 22 Aprelia – likvidatsiia separatistskogo gorodka vozle pamiatnika 
Leninu”, Censor.net,  7 April 2014.  
13 For the narratives of the conflict (in Russian), see (Polikarpov, 2014; Polikarpov, 2015; Severskii, 2015).  
14 For reviews of the major approaches in the vast study of civil wars, see (Blattman and Miguel, 2010; Souleimanov, 
2013; Toft, 2012; Wallensteen, P.,2014; Zurcher, 2007).  
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and the literature on the role of elites in conflict. I introduce the city of Kharkiv as the comparative case 
that serves to underline the complexity of the Donbas conflict’s origins.  
Drawing on the literature on political opportunity for protest, I argue that to explain the different 
trajectories taken by the two structurally similar regions, we need to focus on the behaviour of the local 
elites and activists in the period before the arrival of external agents and the macro-process of escalation 
to war in one region. That is, we need to focus on the pre-war period when outcomes were by no means 
certain (Tarrow, 2007).15 In my argument, the phenomenon of the “Russian Spring” emerges out of the 
local Anti-Maidan contention in both regions.  
In contrast with the history and identity approach, which – implicitly or explicitly – argues for the 
primacy of history, local ordinary people and their identities and emotions, I offer my own approach, 
which focuses squarely on the two groups of actors – the local elites and activists – and their rational 
action and interaction. Both regions in my story display a comparatively similar propensity to protest and 
violence, with Kharkiv city being more prone to protest violence as demonstrated through protest 
cataloguing and process tracing.  
What contrast the two regions are, firstly, the starkly different stances taken by the local elites 
towards the local protest and changes in Kyiv, and how pro-federal and pro-Russian activists used 
political opportunities for protest. In my story, the local elites created political opportunities for these 
activists. I explain that in Kharkiv city they did so in response to the Euromaidan protest that aimed to 
 
15 The focus on the pre-war period is important because, as the voluminous literature on repression and dissent and 
repression and insurgency shows, once the state engages in fighting the rebel group, contention usually quite 
dramatically spirals into a full-fledged war, as more and more people become disillusioned with the state and are 
more likely to join the insurgency (Lichbach et al., 2003; Walter, 1997). As Barbara Walter writes, “once fighting 
begins, plans are set in motion and attitudes toward the enemy become fixed in ways that are not easily reversible” 
(Walter, 1997, 336). Elise Giuliano writes on popular attitudes to separatism in the Donbas: “well-attended separatist 
rallies, statements made by ordinary citizens, as well as popular opinion polls all provide evidence that genuine local 
support for separatism had developed by the time popular referenda on sovereignty were held in Donets’k and 
Luhansk” (Giuliano, 2018, 2). As it is known, the popular referenda were held on 11 May 2014, after the ATO 
operation began in Slov’’ans’k. As communicated to me by an academic studying the conflict, popular attitudes in 
the Donbas hardened after the launch of the ATO operation in Slov’’ians’k, drawing more and more people into the 
ranks of the insurgents (Personal Communication, 10 03 2017). If we employ the bargaining theory to the study of 
this conflict, we need to ask what leads to the processes when negotiation between the state and challengers 
becomes impossible (Strasheim, 2016; Walter, 1997). 
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unseat them while in Donets’k region the elites opened political opportunities for the Anti-Maidan 
because they wanted to stay loyal to Yanukovych’s government course.  
Following the radical changes of the “informal governing network” in the centre, it is the 
exogenous shock of this change that informs the local elites’ subsequent behaviour. I adapt conceptual 
insights from the literature on patronage, clientelism and, more specifically, Henry Hale’s book Patronal 
Politics to explain the divergent behaviour of the local elites following the change in the governing 
network. I distinguish the city of Kharkiv and Donets’k region by the type of patronage that applies to 
their elites. I argue that in the city of Kharkiv, moderate pro-federal protest developed because the 
regional elites were functioning under a diffused patronage system. By contrast, in Donets’k, a region with 
a concentrated patronage system, pro-Russian radicals took centre stage from the start. The result of 
these pre-war processes is that in one region, political opportunities for the intervention of foreign actors 
are closed off, whereas in the other they remain open. Therefore, an external actor might start an 
insurgency in one region only after exploring options in all the regions susceptible to conflict (Protest 
Organiser in Kharkiv 1, Interview 24 09 2018; Protest Organiser in Kharkiv 2, Interview 28 09 2018; 
Yudaev, 2015; Strelkov’s interview (Prokhanov and Strelkov, 2014)).  
2. History and identity approaches  
The scholars who seek to explain the Donbas conflict from the history and identity point of view 
argue that the people in the Donbas mobilised to defend their regional identity, their linguistic rights,16 
and in response to the relative deprivation17 they felt after the change of government in Kyiv (Giuliano, 
2015a; Kudelia, 2014a; Loshkarev and Sushentsov, 2016; Nicoara and White, 2016; Sakwa, 2015; A. 
 
16 There is a vast literature that argues that divisions along ethnic lines, polarisation, and political exclusion of entire 
ethnic groups causes grievances and hence civil war (Cederman et al., 2010; Dyrstad et al., 2011; Horowitz, 1985; 
Horowitz, 2000; Maney, G.,2007; Toft, 2006; Toft, 2012). It shows that the lack of consensus in such societies can 
easily propel them to violence. Horowitz argues that violence occurs when ethnic minorities are dissatisfied with 
how resources are distributed in the country (Horowitz, 1985). Research on post-Soviet conflicts, for example, in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, lends credence to this view. It is argued that Georgia’s rejection of the proposals 
pertaining to the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and their languages was one of the most significant causes of 
violence (Souleimanov, 2013). For the discussion of what distinguishes non-ethnic from ethnic civil wars see (J. 
Fearon, 2004a; J. Fearon, 2004b; J. Fearon and Laitin, 2011). 
17 On the role of the deterioration in social life leading to conflict, Gurr writes: “the greater the intensity of [relative] 
deprivation, the greater the magnitude of violence” ([1970]: (Gurr, 2015, 9). To Gurr, “mass revolutionary and 
secessionist movements are most likely to develop … if discontent is widespread and intense among both elite and 
mass, the result of relative or absolute deterioration of many conditions of social existence” ((Gurr, 2015, 343). 
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Wilson, 2016; A. Wilson, 2014). Andrew Wilson (A. Wilson, 2016; A. Wilson, 2014) views this identity 
within the historical context and accounts for what gave rise to the peculiar political beliefs held by the 
residents of the Donbas. Anna Matveeva characterises the conflict as an identity one in that “different 
sections of Ukraine’s population developed conflicting perspectives of the past, the role of Russia in 
Ukraine’s history, and of how relations with the West should evolve. These differences laid the 
foundations for what became polarised identities and mutually exclusive ideologies” (Matveeva, 2016, 25). 
These scholars cite numerous sociological surveys conducted both prior to the “Russian Spring” protests 
and as the protests were underway,18 which demonstrate a higher propensity of the Donbas’ residents to 
separatism. They also discuss the various facets of this identity, such as localism conditioned by the poor 
integration of the Donbas into the rest of Ukraine, post-Soviet nostalgia, and the fear of fascism, that 
might have contributed significantly to the anti-government feeling in the Donbas and, subsequently, to 
the war onset (Giuliano, 2015a; A. Wilson, 2016).  
Some scholars argue that the mobilisation in the Donbas occurred because of various popular 
emotions involved.19 The work by Olga Nicoara and D. White (Nicoara and White, 2016), for example, 
focuses on the emotion of fear galvanised by the Russian propaganda and how important it was for the 
mobilisation in the Donbas. In his contribution, harkening back to the work of Roger Petersen, Serhiy 
Kudelia (Kudelia, 2014a) devotes some consideration to the argument that the people of the Donbas 
mobilised because they experienced intense group emotions, “specific to the region,” such as fear and 
resentment. According to Serhiy Kudelia and Andreas Umland, the violence perpetrated in Kyiv in 
 
18 The most important and most cited of these surveys is “Mneniya i vzglyady zhitelei Yugo-Vostoka Ukrainy Aprel 
2014” (“The opinions and views of the people of the South-East of Ukraine April 2014”) conducted by Kyiv 
International Institute of Sociology between 8 and 16 April 2014. 
19 The approaches to the Donbas conflict generally have not engaged the literature on emotions and political 
violence in a systematic fashion. Recent developments in social science have stressed the importance of emotions in 
politics in general (Ahmed, 2004; Brader, 2006; Engelken-Jorge et al., 2011; Lakoff, 2008; Nussbaum, 2013) and for 
mobilisation and protest, in particular (Aminzade et al., 2001; Baele et al., 2016; Clough, 2012; Goodwin et al., 2001; 
Jasper, 1997; Jasper, 1998; Jasper, 2011; Jasper, 2014; Jennings, 2016; Kaufmann, 2005; Pearlman, 2013; Petersen, 
2002; Petersen, 2011; Wood, E.,2001; Wood, 2003). If prior to this “emotional turn” (to paraphrase the “cultural 
turn”) in mobilisation studies,  protesters were often portrayed as irrational agents driven by emotions (Le Bon, 
([1895] 2012) (Smelser, 1962) and their protests were, therefore, seen as not worthy of a serious scientific enquiry 
(Weber, 1968), the scholars of new social movements have demonstrated that emotions occupy a rightful place in 
the repertoire of contention of many social movements and do indeed merit serious study (Goodwin et al., 2001). It 
is now taken for granted that emotions matter and that people participate in political movements not only because 
of material benefits but (sometimes predominantly) due to their pursuit of collective identity, attachment to ties 
connecting them with the wider group and what Wood has called “the pleasure in agency” (Wood, 2003, 235). For 
the definition of emotions, see (Damasio, 1994; Elster, 2007; Elster, 1998; Elster, 1999; Frijda, 1986; Solomon, 1981; 
Zajonc, 1980).  
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January – February 2014 by both the Right Sector and other radical groups was approaching a scale 
Ukraine had never witnessed before (Kudelia, 2014a; Umland, 2014). For Kudelia (Kudelia, 2014b), 
Dominique Arel and Jesse Driscoll,20 the conflict in the Donbas started with the violence erupting on 
Hrushevskiy street in Kyiv on 19 and 20 February 2014, when the elites lost control over the radical 
forces and ultranationalist parties became more visible. The numerous marches held in honour of the 
Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and Stepan Bandera during the Euromaidan provoked 
fears in the Donbas. According to one survey, Stepan Bandera was viewed in negative terms by 79% of 
the Donbas residents (Kudelia, 2014c). Sakwa cites similar findings, showing some 60% of Donets’k 
residents fearing “Bandera’s followers,” or “Banderovtsy,” and 71% of Donets’k and 60% of Luhans’k 
residents believing that “the Maidan events represented an armed change of government organised by the 
opposition and the West” (Sakwa, 2015, 149). According to the local political elites in Donets’k, the 
"chaos and highhandedness (proizvol) on the Maidan" were the main causes of the pro-Russian resistance 
in Donets’k.21 
Further, both the legitimacy and the composition of the new government announced on 27 
February 2014 caused much consternation among the people of the Donbas, as, in contrast with the 
previous government, composed mostly of the Party of Regions’ politicians loyal to Yanukovych, the new 
interim government consisted of politicians from Bat’kivshchina and Svoboda parties which were 
historically antagonistic to Yanukovych and the Party of Regions.22 As Nicolai Petro argues, with the 
ousting of Yanukovych and advent of the new government, “the Faustian pact” between the elites in 
Kyiv and the population was broken (Petro, N.,2015, 31). These sudden changes consequently resulted in 
the emotions of mistrust. It can also be said that there was a degree of “ethnic exclusion” (Cederman et 
al., 2010) causing a further sense of deprivation among the people of the Donbas because there were no 
representatives of the Party of Regions in the new government. The surveys conducted in early April 
2014 (widely cited by scholars) show that approximately half of all respondents in Donets’k and Luhans’k 
regions expressed strong confidence in the illegality of the interim president Turchynov and the new 
 
20 Arel and Driscoll, “Conceptualising”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BfQ9IgTNu-M.  
21 “Donets’kii gorsovet reshil shchitat’ RF strategicheskim partnerom”, RBC UA, 1 March 2014.   
22 See “Who is governing Ukraine”, Guardian, 4 March 2014. 
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government, compared to about a third or fewer respondents in other south-eastern regions (KIIS poll, 
April 8 – 16, 2014).23 The new government therefore spelled threat to the population of the Donbas, as it 
violated their cognitive beliefs, that is their beliefs about how the country should be governed. The advent 
of the new government, therefore, was, to an extent, “a moral shock” (Jasper, 1997) and a “threat to the 
quotidian” (Snow et al., 1998). In contrast to the year 2004, when the Orange Revolution similarly spelled 
threat to the Donbas residents, this time Yanukovych had little chance of coming back to politics, while 
the Party of Regions suffered major defections and eventually ceased to exist. I elaborate on this in the 
empirical chapter on the local elites and the chapter on the Anti-Maidan and Russian Spring.   
Three powerful arguments emerge from this literature. In what follows I seek to situate these 
arguments in the larger literature, provide some analysis, and introduce the city of Kharkiv as the 
comparative case. Firstly, it is argued that the violent trajectory taken by the Donbas was determined by 
its history. Andrew Wilson (A. Wilson, 2016; A. Wilson, 2014) gives a nuanced account of the Donbas’ 
history and argues that this history – partially, as he emphasises in the 2016 article – contributed to the 
conflict. The second powerful argument within the history and identity approach is based on the 
sociological surveys24 cited by scholars that demonstrate a greater propensity of the Donbas residents, and 
particularly of ethnic Russians, to separatism (Giuliano, 2018).25 Therefore, it is assumed that, due to this 
greater propensity to separatism (a minority opinion nonetheless (Giuliano, 2018), the conflict was bound 
to occur in the Donbas (Gentile, 2015). The third argument is implicitly based on the literature on 
emotions and political violence and states that the emotions of fear and resentment galvanised by the 
violence and changes in Kyiv provided grounds for mobilisation and subsequent conflict in the Donbas. 
 
23 “Mneniia i vzgliady zhitelei yugo-vostoka Ukrainy: Aprel’ 2014”, Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, 18 April 2014.  
24 Beissinger points to some problems inherent in sociological surveys: “In periods of political upheaval researchers 
face a very different problem: Public beliefs change so quickly that they are almost impossible to capture. In such an 
environment public opinion poll merely reflect a frozen moment in time. Even when polls are conducted repeatedly, 
pollsters rarely frame questions that systematically capture attitudes relevant to a period of momentous change, since 
issues once beneath the surface of politics become explicit, and the practice of polling is itself affected by the 
discursive transformations society is experiencing” (Beissinger, 2002, 43).  
25 As such, support for separatism was always the highest in the Donbas. According to an all-nation poll conducted 
by “Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Fond” from 16 to 30 March 2014, the separatist idea was supported mostly by 
the people in the Donbas, at 18% of respondents; by comparison, 10% supported such an idea in the east in general; 
the idea of the independence of the south-east and unity with Russia was supported by 11% of the east and 27% of 
the Donbas. See “Chy vlastyvi ukrayintsiam nastroyi separatyzmu – zahal’nonatsional’ne opytuvannia”, Fond 
Demokratychni initsiatyvy imeni Il’ka Kucheriva, 11 April 2013. However, there is no evidence that separatism was a mass 
phenomenon (Giuliano, 2015a; Kudelia, 2016; A. Wilson, 2016). 
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The argument based on the history of the Donbas provides us with the helpful background 
knowledge of the region and its ethno-linguistic make up. It gives us a sense of how the Donbas was 
integrated into the rest of Ukraine, without however specifying the exact nature of this integration. It also 
gives us an understanding of some of the major rhetorical devices, concepts and myths used by the agents 
of mobilisation in the Donbas, such as, to name a few, Novorossiia, “a variable Russian term”, as Andrew 
Wilson calls it, which the Donbas belonged to in the Tsarist times (A. Wilson, 2016, 633 – 634), and 
Donets’k-Kryvyi Rih Republic (Donets’ko-Krivorozhskaia Respublika in Russian), an entity formed out 
of Donets’k and Luhans’k regions that enjoyed a brief independence in 1918 (Gilley, 2015; Kornilov, 
2017; Laruelle, 2016; A. Wilson, 2016, 635). Yet, it can also be argued that the historical approach – taking 
us back to the Tsarist times and beyond – is too “deep,” in that it cannot account for the behaviours of 
the two groups of actors we are concerned with – the local elites and activists – that have been 
conditioned by a more recent past and the process of protest, and how these contributed to the onset of 
the war. More importantly, when considered in a comparative perspective with a region that had a very 
similar history, such as Kharkiv region, the historical approach to the Donbas conflict provides an 
insufficient answer to the questions posed.  
The identity approach to the Donbas conflict implies that identity has to be sufficiently strongly 
felt and cohesive to provoke people to commit violent actions.26 For example, the research by Anastasia 
Shesterinina on Abkhazia demonstrates that the Abkhaz developed a strong identity around the norms of 
“patriotism, heroism, and masculinity” (Shesterinina, 2014, 88), which eventually came into conflict with 
the Georgians. The Abkhaz experienced real threats in the past, due to the turbulent history of Abkhazia. 
“The history of war,” Shesterinina (2014, 91) writes, “which subordinated Abkhazia to various powers 
and greatly reduced the Abkhaz population in Abkhazia, sharpened a sense of existential threat, 
attachment to the Abkhaz nation, and belonging to the land”. In the case of the Donbas, the picture is 
more mixed. The most recent research on attitudes in the Donbas has demonstrated how nuanced the 
attitudes of the Donbas’ residents were both to the changes in Kyiv and to the pro-Russian protest. The 
 
26 There is also a certain bias in the “identity and history” literature. Kuzio (2017) describes what appears to be a 
highly dysfunctional society in the Donbas that was perpetually in the grip of centrifugal forces and always ripe for 




new research by Elise Giuliano (2018) demonstrates that ethnicity does not map easily into political 
attitudes, and that people with a defined ethnic identity can be divided on certain key political issues.27 
Her research into attitudes in the Donbas also demonstrates that the residents of the Donbas were “most 
concerned with economic issues, as well as with the threat of violent unrest and rise of radical extremism, 
rather than with geopolitical issues concerning Russia and cultural issues, such as language and media” 
(Giuliano 2018, 8).28 Furthermore, as Giuliano (2018, 2) writes, “well-attended separatist rallies, 
statements made by ordinary citizens, as well as popular opinion polls all provide evidence that genuine 
local support for separatism had developed by the time popular referenda on sovereignty were held in 
Donets’k and Luhans’k,” that is after the launch of the Anti-Terrorist Operation on 13 April 2014. This 
fluidity of identity and gradual hardening of attitudes after the launch of the ATO further highlights the 
need to consider the pre-ATO period, when the Donbas residents’ attitudes towards the issues were not 
contaminated by the repressive state action and were similar to the attitudes of the people in Kharkiv.  
The identity approach implicitly engages the broader literature on emotions and politics and 
points to the primacy of ordinary people and their emotions in conflict. The voluminous literature on 
emotions and politics directs our attention to the importance of popular emotions for social movements, 
more generally ((Aminzade and et al, 2001; Goodwin et al., 2001) and conflicts, in particular (Baele et al., 
2016; Bar‐Tal et al., 2007; Petersen, 2002; Petersen, 2011; Petersen, 2001; Wood, E.,2001; Wood, 2003). It 
can be argued that structural conditions, such as shared history, as well as the presence of certain 
ethnicities and linguistic groups, predispose localities to certain emotional climates or orientations (Bar‐
Tal et al., 2007; Elster, 1999; Williams, 1977).  Bar-Tal, Halperin, and de Rivera (2007, 443) introduce the 
concept of ‘‘collective emotional orientation’’ and define it as ‘‘the tendency of a society to express a 
particular emotion.’’ To Baele et. al, “members of any given group are characterized by a common 
particular way of apprehending and understanding the social world through a particular overarching 
logic,” which is called “emotional worldview” in their model (Baele et al., 2016, 723-724). They (2016: 
724) define the emotional worldview as “an all-encompassing and coherent logic of understanding the 
 
27 Also see (Giuliano, 2011). 
28 The prevalence of local concerns over international or geopolitical ones has been documented by Kalyvas in his 
study of the Greek region of Argolid (see the empirical chapter 9 in (Kalyvas, 2006)).   
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social world that is based on the group’s collective memory itself made of socially constructed axioms … 
and myths … that are reproduced in language.” Emotions, in this way, are constitutive of social relations 
and action, and are not simply individual psychological reactions; they are intersubjective, collective 
experiences. These collective emotional experiences predispose people to react in certain ways to the 
change in their environment, be it social, economic, or political change, in order to ensure their own 
survival (Newhagen, 1998). Empirically, we would, therefore, expect people with shared history and 
emotional orientation to react to the changing environment in a similar way.  
If we further engage with the literature on particular emotions, such as fear, resentment, and 
anger – as hinted in the approaches taken by Nicoara (2016) and Kudelia (2014a) on the Donbas conflict 
- and apply its findings to conflict settings, we would find that both Kharkiv city and Donets’k region 
were similarly predisposed to conflict, due to the emotions their residents were experiencing. The 
literature on emotions and conflicts suggests several pathways to violence. The emotion of fear, for 
example, arises when “a breakdown of the quotidian” (Snow et al., 1998, 1) or “suddenly imposed 
grievances” (Snow et al., 1998, 7)  or a “moral shock”  (a “moral shock,” as defined by Jasper, is “a 
reaction to an unexpected event or a piece of information that creates a sense of outrage to such an 
extent that an individual becomes inclined toward political action” (Jasper, 1998, 409)) occur by 
themselves or in different combinations. An event which “penetrates and disrupts, or threatens to disrupt, 
taken-for-granted everyday routines and expectancies,” the so-called quotidian (Snow et al., 1998, 2), can 
cause fear. When the quotidian breaks down, “routines and understandings associated with everyday 
patterns of making do,” Snow et al. (1998, 5) write, “are now matters of doubt, uncertainty, and 
sometimes even confusion” (Barbalet, 1998, 168). Fear can also occur in reaction to “suddenly imposed 
grievances” (Snow et al., 1998), which captures the sense of immediate threat that an accident or some 
change in the social order poses to the communities. In short, the emotion of fear arises as a result of 
unexpected and sudden changes in one’s surroundings, when the quotidian is disrupted or when there is a 
strong moral shock (Frijda, 1986).  
Sudden changes in the environment, particularly when the status hierarchies are rearranged, with 
one ethnic group being suddenly downgraded, also cause the emotions of anger and resentment 
(Aminzade and et al, 2001; Barbalet, 1998; Horowitz, 2000; Kemper, 1978; Petersen, 2002). Scholars 
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highlight that the emotions of anger make people less risk averse, whereas the emotions of fear make 
them more risk-averse (Bodenhausen et al., 1994; Bodenhausen, G.,1993; Frijda, 1986; Lerner and 
Keltner, 2000). The action tendency of fear, as defined by Frijda (Frijda, 1986, 72), is the urge to separate 
oneself from aversive events and preserve the self. Under the influence of anger, by contrast, particularly 
righteous anger, for example, in the face of blatant injustice, individuals begin to value their own security 
less and engage in risky behaviour, such as engaging in direct political action against economic and 
political status quo and assaulting government forces (Gamson, 1992; Lerner and Keltner, 2001; Lerner 
and Keltner, 2000; Pearlman, 2013). 
If we look closely at the Anti-Maidan, pro-federal and pro-Russian protest dynamics in the two 
regions of Kharkiv and Donets’k, we discover that the people in those two regions were animated by 
similar emotions. The Euromaidan and the sudden change of government in Kyiv were the events of 
paramount, for some, life-changing importance. As Fillipova and Giuliano (2018) demonstrate in their 
research on opinions in Kharkiv, many Kharkivites harboured strong anti-Maidan attitudes, as did their 
Donets’k counterparts (anger and resentment) (Giuliano and Filippova, 2018). Many were equally 
concerned about the economic situation in Ukraine (fear) (Giuliano, 2018, 22). We would, therefore, 
expect both regions to be strongly emotionally affected by the violence and sudden changes in Kyiv. As a 
result, we would expect the people of Kharkiv and people of Donets’k, who resided in regions with 
arguably similar “emotional climates,” to be willing to engage in protest with similar intensity and 
predisposition to violence. We would expect them to take to the streets with similar slogans, display a 
similar propensity to violence and occupation of central streets. In short, if we proxy the strength of the 
emotions of fear, anger, resentment, and perceived grievance by the level of protest and protest violence, 
then we should expect to see similar protest dynamics in both regions.  
Based on this theoretical discussion we can formulate the first testable hypothesis: 
H1: the more intense the protest and protest violence in the region, the more likely it is to become the site of a 
violent conflict 
As I demonstrate through process tracing and protest cataloguing in Chapter 3, regions can 
demonstrate comparable protest dynamics and protest violence. In fact, the region that does not in the 
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end become the site of conflict can demonstrate greater propensity to protest violence; the violence there 
can be more systematic.  The protest violence by itself, therefore, does not explain why one region 
evolves along a conflictual path and the other does not. It is not the scale of violence and the strength of 
popular emotions, but strategic actions by two distinct groups of actors – the local elites and activists – 
which determine peace or conflict outcomes. Additionally, from the methodological point of view, it is 
extremely hard to test the theories of emotions and politics because all the events in question took place 
in the past and the participants’ memories of these events can be faulty. Before developing my theoretical 
framework further, I highlight the geographical and historical similarities between the two regions of 
Kharkiv and Donets’k. Moreover, I demonstrate, that Kharkiv region was considered “strategic” by the 
Ukrainian government.  
3. Kharkiv and Donets’k compared  
Kharkiv and Donets’k regions share the border with Russia. Kharkiv region’s border with Russia 
extends to 315,5 kilometres, while Donets’k region’s border with Russia is 178,5 kilometres long. It takes 
approximately 30 km to reach Kharkiv city from Russia. Both regions share a similar historical trajectory. 
From the late 17th century, the areas around Kharkiv were being populated by both Ukrainians and 
Russians (Matsuzato and Yakushik, 2002, 7, 9). Later on, Kharkiv city became one of the “heartland 
cities” of the Russian Empire and remained so for two hundred years (Timofeev and Wade, 1994; 
Westrate, 2014, 46 -48). Westrate (2014, 52) writes on Kharkiv: “By the late nineteenth century, many 
people considered Kharkiv a “Russian” city; others considered it a “Russified” city (different opinions of 
the same trend). The population was predominantly Russian-speaking; no more than a quarter of the 
city’s residents considered Ukrainian their native language” (emphasis in the original). He further explains 
the borderland orientation of Kharkiv city (43): “Kharkiv’s history is that of a city between, a Russian-
speaking city surrounded by mixed-ethnicity villages, shifting over time between being a military 
stronghold on the edge of empire and being a heartland city, a center of economic and cultural activity” 
(emphasis in original). Kharkiv was the capital of the Ukrainian SSR between 1920 and 1934 and 
remained one of the biggest cities in the Soviet Union. 
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Similarly, Donets’k region, as part of the Donbas (Donets’k and Luhans’k regions combined), 
was one of the leading industrial regions of the Russian Empire and then of the Soviet Union (A. Wilson, 
1995, 267). With the early history of the Donbas being bitterly contested (A. Wilson, 1995, 271), and with 
the debates on the relative influence of Zaporizhzhian (Ukrainian) and Don (Russian) Cossacks in the 
Donbas in the 16th to 18th centuries still not settled, by the late 19th century, the Donbas was being 
thoroughly Russified (A. Wilson, 1995, 273). As Wilson (1995, 274) writes, “it was only with mass 
industrialization and urbanization from the 1860s onwards that the region began to take on a pronounced 
Russian character,” so that Russians speakers constituted over 50% of the Donbas by 1900 (Pirie, 1998, 
48).  Russian peasants formed the overwhelming majority of the Donbas’ labour force and population 
(Friedgut, 1994, 71). Most of the Donbas’ numerous working-class was Russian (Wynn, 1992, 3), with the 
Russian language dominating the big cities of Donets’k and Luhans’k (Friedgut, 1994; Kuromiya, 1998). 
Ukrainians were more prevalent in the countryside. In 1907 – 1908, 80% of the 180,000 miners in the 
Donbas-Dnepr Bend were migrants, mostly from the black-soil villages of central Russia (Wynn, 1992, 
45). Like Kharkiv, Donets’k became one of the leading industrial centres of the Russian Empire 
(Subtelny, 1994, 267). The Donbas enjoyed a brief autonomy in 1918 when Donets’k-Kryvyi Rih 
Republic was proclaimed (Journalist 1, Interview 19 07 2019) (Friedgut, 1994, 352 – 359) (it became one 
of the foundation myths of what is now Donetsk People’s Republic). This autonomy was forcibly ended 
by Lenin and the region became part of the Soviet Union. Following the demise of the Ukrainisation 
policies in the 1930s (Liber, 1992; Liber, 1998), the region continued to be populated mostly by Russian 
speakers. Under the Soviet Union, both Kharkiv and Donets’k regions became heavily industrialised, and 
by 1991, they were two of the most industrialised regions in Ukraine. The rapid industrialisation of 
Ukraine led to the continuing influx of Russian speakers in both regions, so that by 1989 Russian was the 
dominant language in both regions, more so in Donets’k. By the mid-1990s, both regions featured high 
on the index of russification (Hesli, 1995).  
These similar historical trajectories shaped both regions’ broad Russophone identity. During the 
20th century, both regions witnessed a decrease in the number of ethnic Ukrainians (Dnistryans’kii, 2008, 
75), while the number of Russians increased steadily (Dnistryans’kii, 2008, 76; Pirie, 1998, 94 – 95). 
Linguistically, in Kharkiv, the number of people who regarded Ukrainian as their native language 
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decreased from 61%29 in 1959 to 50% in 1989 (Dnistryans’kii, 2008, 78). In Donets’k, the decline was 
comparable, from 44% to 30%. By contrast, the number of people who regarded Russian as their native 
language increased in Kharkiv from 37% to 48% and in Donets’k from 53% to 67% during the same 
period (ibid.). After 1991, in Donets’k 67% of residents identified themselves as Russians (Matveeva, 
2018, 28). In the Donbas overall, the proportion of Russian speakers was over four-fifths at the end of 
the 1990s (Smith and Wilson, 1997, 847). By 2001, the ethnic composition of both regions in comparative 
perspective was as follows.  
Table 1. Number and composition of the population of Ukraine by All-Ukrainian population census, 
2001  
Region Population (in thousand) Actual population (in %) 
  2001 1989 
Dniepropetrovs’k 3561.2 100 100 
    Ukrainians  2825.8 79.3 71.6 
    Russians  627.5 17.6 24.2 
Donets’k 4825.6 100.0 100.0 
    Ukrainians 2744.1 56.9 50.7 
    Russians  1844.4 38.2 43.6 
Zaporizhzhia  1926.8 100.0 100.0 
    Ukrainians 1364.1 70.8 63.1 
     Russians  476.8 24.7 32.0 
Luhans’k 2540.2 100.0 100.0 
    Ukrainians  1472.4 58.0 51.9 
     Russians  991.8 39.0 44.8 
Mykolaiv 1262.9 100.0 100.0 
    Ukrainians  1034.5 81.9 75.6 
      Russians  177.5 14.1 19.4 
 
29 The decimals are omitted here.  
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Odesa 2455.7 100.0 100.0 
     Ukrainians  1542.3 62.8 54.6 
      Russians  508.5 20.7 27.4 
Kharkiv  2895.8 100.0 100.0  
     Ukrainians  2048.7 70.7 62.8 
     Russians  742.0 25.6 33.2 
Source: Ukrainian Census 2001 http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/. 
As one can see, both Kharkiv and Donets’k are comparable by population and proportion of Russian 
speakers.  
Nicolai Petro calculated the percentage of Russians and Russian speakers in the regions that 
supported Yanukovych in 2004, thus further illustrating the ethnic make up of both regions.  
Table 2. Percentage of Russians and Russian speakers in regions that supported V. Yanukovych in 2004  
Region % who consider 
themselves Russian 
% of Russian 
speakers 
Kharkiv 24% 74% 
Donets’k 39% 93% 
Odesa 11% 85%  
Dnipropetrovs’k 16% 72% 
Mykolaiv  26% 66% 
Zaporizhzhia 30% 81% 
Luhans’k 55% 89% 
 
Source: (Petro, N.,2015, 21) 
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Interestingly, in 1996, Kharkiv city and Moscow signed an agreement of economic cooperation,30 
and in 2002, the city of Kharkiv was dubbed “the capital of Russian-Ukrainian relations”.31 The city 
hosted various Ukrainian-Russian business forums, and there was a lively economic cooperation between 
Belgorod region in Russia and Kharkiv, particularly in aviation.32 Under the governor Yevhen 
Kushnaryov (2002 – 2005), there was a veritable boom of economic cooperation between Russian regions 
and Kharkiv.33 Due to these trade links, geographical proximity, ease of travel and other links, therefore, 
we might expect a high number of ethnic Russians in the region. 
By 2012, in Donets’k, 38.2% of people were ethnic Russians (Moser, 2013, 40), and 74.9% of 
people preferred using Russian publicly and privately (Moser, 2013, 42). According to Margrethe Søvik’s 
research on language practices in Kharkiv, in 2010, the city was regarded as primarily Russian-speaking 
(Søvik, 2010, 5) (Protest Organiser 2, Interview 28 09 2018), so that by 2014, Kharkiv became the largest 
Russian-speaking city outside of the Russian Federation (Westrate, 2014, 3). Russian identity was more 
pronounced in Kharkiv in the 1990s than later. Timofeev and Wade write on Kharkiv as of 1994: “As a 
result of its location and population mix, Kharkivites have a peculiar relationship to both Russian and 
Ukrainian authorities. Many residents feel a strong cultural identity with Russia. About 600,000 
Kharkivites have relatives and close friends on the Russian side of the nearby border. Many who are of 
Ukrainian or part-Ukrainian nationality are to greater or lesser degree Russian or ‘Soviet,' by culture and 
are not particularly interested in a Ukrainian cultural or political revival (although not necessarily hostile to 
it either)” (Timofeev and Wade, 1994, 88).  
At the same time, identity in these Ukrainian regions is famously blurred and uncertain. Nearly a 
decade of sociological research has demonstrated that Russian and Ukrainian identities were fused in 
Ukraine and, by all means, coexisted peacefully (Fournier, 2002; Giuliano, 2015a; Pirie, 1998; Polese and 
Wylegala, 2008; Weller, C.,2002).  As Paul Pirie demonstrates, by the early 1990s, due to widespread 
 
30 “Tovarooborot mezhdu khar’kovskoi i moskovskoi oblastiami cherez dva goda mozhet sostavit’ 500”, Status Quo, 
10 November 2004. 
31 “Khar’kov iavliaetsia stolitsei rossiisko-ukrainskikh otnoshenii – B. Gromov”, Status Quo, 22 March 2002. 
32 “Khar’kovskaia oblast’ zainteresovana v tom, chtoby na zasedanii mezhpravitel’stvennoi komissii byl podpisan 
riad ukrainsko-rossiiskikh dogovorov – E. Kusharev”, Status Quo, 6 June 2002. 
33 “Khar’kov dolzhen stat’ tsentrom edinogo ekonomicheskogo prostranstva s Rossiei, Belarus’iu i Kazakhstanom – 
V. Yanukovich”, Status Quo, 11 October 2004. 
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intermarriage in Ukraine, the identities of many Ukrainians became very blurred or “hybrid” (Pirie, 1998). 
According to Kerstin Zimmer’s research, many Ukrainians and Russians in the Donbas, in particular, 
identified themselves as “Soviet” (Smith and Wilson, 1997; Zimmer, K.,2007, 116), which can be regarded 
as a supra-national identity. According to Søvik’s research in Kharkiv in 2010, “half of the total 
respondents (50.5%) claim to feel both Ukrainian and Russian and say they use Russian as their home 
language, and an additional 11% claim to feel Ukrainian and speak Russian. Only 14.1% of these 
respondents may be categorized as either Ukrainian-speaking self-defined Ukrainians (5.3%) or Russian-
speaking self-defined Russians (8.8%)” (Søvik, 2010, 13).  
Sociological surveys have demonstrated that the issues involving language worried few people in 
Ukraine. According to a poll conducted by GFK Ukraine in March 2010, the so-called “forced 
Ukrainisation and the ousting of the Russian language” concerned 4.8% of respondents overall, with the 
percentage in the east of Ukraine being slightly higher, at 6.6%. The vast majority of respondents worried 
about inflation and unemployment (Moser, 2013, 61). The survey conducted by the Razumkov Centre in 
May – June 2012 revealed that the majority of the respondents were concerned about the economy, high 
prices, and unemployment. The status of the Russian language ranked 31st on the list of 33 issues (ibid., 
61). Other sociological surveys demonstrate that during the crisis engendered by the Euromaidan and the 
change of government in Kyiv, the language issue worried very few people (Giuliano, 2015b).34 Another 
problem is that, since Ukrainian independence, the language issue has been politicised to such an extent 
that it is difficult to substantiate the idea that it was a major issue for many people.35 Overall, it is 
 
34 Even local elites debated the relevance of this issue. In September 2002, Kharkiv governor Yevhen Kushnaryov, 
in a conversation with a Russian human rights lawyer Oleg Mironov, stated that “there is no language problem in 
Kharkiv”. See “Iazykovoi problemy v Khar’kove net – E. Kushnarev”, Status Quo, 16 September 2002. Following 
the introduction of the Language Law on 5 June 2012, Donets’k mayor Oleksandr Luk’yanchenko stated that there 
was no language problem in Donets’k. His response was echoed by the governor of Donets’k Andriy Shyshatskiy 
and his vice Andriy Fedoruk. See Vitaly Sizov, “Rukovodstvo Donets’koi Oblasti o polozhenii russkogo iazyka”, 
Novosti Donbassa, 8 June 2012.  
35 During his presidential campaign in 1994, Leonid Kuchma (1994 – 2004) made a pledge to make Russian the 
second state language, which brought ample political dividends in the form of votes in regions where Russian was 
most widely spoken, that is the east and south of Ukraine. The language issue was a gambit – or rather a useful PR 
ploy, as a number of analysts maintain – used by Viktor Yanukovych and his Party of Regions during the 
presidential and parliamentary elections in 2010 and 2012. Some journalists argued that the Kivalov-Kolesnichenko 
law of 2012 that gave Russian the status as an official language of the east and was repealed in February 2014 was a 
useful PR ploy promulgated to distract attention of the electorate from the more pressing issues, such as the state of 
the Ukrainian economy. One journalist writes: “we have to admit first and foremost that the language issue is raised 
primarily during election campaigns, when it receives the highest attention, gets thrown into the society by 
politicians, and is used by them in order to receive political dividends”. He pointed out that the people understood 
these political tactics very well: a poll conducted in June 2012 showed that most citizens (65,1%) thought of the then 
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exceedingly difficult to disentangle the Russian language issue from politics and demonstrate its 
paramount relevance to the people because it has always been used as a major rallying cry by some 
political parties in Ukraine.36  
In both regions, the Party of Regions dominated since its rise to the national prominence in 2002 
(Katchanovski, 2010; Kuzio, 2015). In Donets’k, the Party of Regions’ members took over the offices of 
mayor and deputies in the regional council by 2003 (Zimmer, K.,2007, 101). By 2004, almost all of the key 
regional actors belonged to the Party of Regions in the Donbas (Kovaleva, E.,2007, 76; Swain, A., and 
Mykhnenko, V. 2007).  Throughout the 2000s, most Donbas residents staunchly voted for Viktor 
Yanukovych, the leader of the Party of Regions, who served as Prime Minister and then became President  
(Clem and Craumer, 2008; Colton, 2011; Copsey, 2008; Marples, D.,2015, 12 -13; Osipian, 2006; Petro, 
N.,2015; Romanova, 2013).  During the 2010 presidential elections, Yanukovych won up to 90% of the 
region’s votes (Zhukov, 2016, 3).  
Similarly, Kharkiv city was considered as having played a key role in the ascendance of the Party 
of Regions, with the governor Yevhen Kushnaryov arguably being its most famous and most respected 
member before his death in January 2007.37 The Party emerged as the dominant party in Kharkiv, with 
the key actors, such as the city council secretary and later mayor Hennadiy Kernes and the city mayor and 
later regional governor Mykhailo Dobkin, joining the Party from around 2006.  
Table 3. Kharkiv regional council election results, March 2006 (number of seats) 
    
 
draft bill of Kivalov-Kolesnichenko as a PR move. See Nikolay Mel’nik, “Zakon o iazyke: osnovy iazykovoi politiki 
ili zasada?”, Dzerkalo Tyzhnia , 27 July 2012. 
36 Also, as Kuzio (2017) and various journalist accounts have demonstrated, many of the fighters on both the 
Ukrainian and pro-Russian side in the Donbas conflict spoke Russian and identified themselves as of mixed Russian 
and Ukrainian heritage. Kuzio (2017), for example, documents the participation of Russophones from Kherson and 
Dniepropetrovsk in the Ukrainian army fighting the separatists. 
37  “Regionaly” zaiavliaut o pobede vo vsekh mazhoritarnykh okrugakh Khar’kovskoi oblasti,” LB.UA, 29 October 
2012.   
Party of Regions Yulia Tymoshenko 
Bloc (BYUT) 
Our Ukraine Communist Party 
83 21 12 12 
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Source: “Party Of Regions Initiating Vote Of No-Confidence In Kharkiv Region's Governor Avakov In Regional 
Council”, Ukrainian News, 29 May 2006.  















Our Ukraine Communist Party 
54 14 8 8 6 5 
 
     
      
Source: “Partijnye otsenki nashego vybora god spustia”, Status Quo, 26 March 2007. 
The Party of Regions continued to benefit from the stable voting behaviour displayed by 
Kharkivites, and in 2010 it won 54% of votes in the regional and city council elections.38 The city council 
was composed of 70 of the Party of Regions deputies and 13 deputies from Bat’kivshchina;39 there were 9 
deputies from other factions, such as Strong Ukraine and the Communist Party. By 2012, the Party of 
Regions consolidated its grip on power in the region, winning 35% of votes on party lists during the 
parliamentary elections. By contrast, Bat’kivshchina won 20% on party lists.40  
The political preferences of the residents in both regions were consistent and not dissimilar. Polls 
cited by scholars across the entire span of the 1990s and 2000s demonstrate broadly similar tendencies. In 
the 1990s, around half of the population to the east and south of the river Dnieper (including the 
Donbas) spoke in favourable terms about some form of political unity between Ukraine and Russia 
(Smith and Wilson, 1997, 855). Throughout the 1990s, a general pro-Russian orientation remained in 
both Donets’k and Kharkiv (Smith and Wilson, 1997; Timofeev and Wade, 1994; A. Wilson, 2014). 
Rodgers’ research conducted in 2006 in Kharkiv shows that many of his respondents (granted these were 
 
38 Anna Romanenko, “Mutnye vody “russkoi vesny””, 62.ua, 23 March 2014;  Oksana Ermolenko, “Khar’kovskii 
gorsovet: kto est’ kto v novom sostave deputatov”, Segodnya, 10 November 2010.   
39 “U kharkivskyi miskyi rady stvoreno riad fraktsij”, Archived website of Kharkiv city. 
40 Pavel Kogachenko, Lilia Angorskaia, “Mazhoritarshchiki-regionaly pobezhdaiut po vsem okrugam v Kharkove”, 
Gorodskoi Dozor, 28 October 2012. 
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children and teenagers in 2006) held some negative views about Western Ukraine. Also, “from the 
interviews with the older generation,” Rodgers writes, “emerged a dislike of efforts to “artificially” divide 
Ukraine and Russia” (Rodgers, 2006, 167).  
This orientation remained constant through to 2014. As Quentin Buckholz demonstrates, prior 
to 2014, the preferences of Kharkiv and Donets’k residents were not that dissimilar (Buckholz, 2019, 3). 
They were inclined towards Russia and the Customs Union and disliked what was going on the Maidan in 
Kyiv. According to the research on attitudes in Kharkiv conducted by Filippova and Giuliano, many 
Kharkivites opposed the Euromaidan strongly (Giuliano and Filippova, 2018). The most widely cited poll 
“Mneniia i vzgliady naseleniia yugo-vostoka Ukrainy: Aprel 2014” (Views and opinions of the residents of 
the south-east of Ukraine) conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology on 8-16 April 2014 
presented the following breakdown of opinions: 
Table 5. Should your region secede from Ukraine and become part of Russia? Percentage of 
positive responses.  
 














Should your region secede from Ukraine and 
become part of Russia?
42 
 
Table 6. In the event of an invasion by Russian forces of south-eastern Ukraine, do you intend to 
welcome the entry of Russian forces or join the army of the Russian Federation? Percentage of positive 
responses.  
 
Source: (ibid.: 3).  
According to another poll conducted by the same institute in 2015, Kharkiv residents were quite 
accepting of the “Russian media narrative” concerning the annexation of Crimea and the Maidan 
uprising. 55% of Kharkiv respondents had a negative view of the Maidan uprising, while in Donets’k it 
was 63% (Buckholz, 2019, 3). As many in Kharkiv as in Donets’k favoured membership in the EEU 
(Eurasian Economic Union) and as many were concerned about “the rupture of economic relations with 
Russia” (ibid. 5). In Kharkiv, according to the survey conducted by the group “Cooperation” from 2 to 
14 of April 2014, most of the people wanted some questions of territorial integrity to be discussed at a 
referendum. 29% of Kharkivites were supporting Ukraine’s ascension to the EU, with 47% against, and 
65% were against Ukraine joining NATO. By contrast, 37% of people wanted Ukraine to join the 
Customs Union.41 According to a 2016 interview with the former Kharkiv governor Ihor Baluta, in spring 
2014, 8% of people in Kharkiv wanted Kharkiv to join Russia, while 25% wanted federalisation. 
 














Welcome or join the Russian army
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Interestingly, according to the same survey conducted among the police in Kharkiv, 34% wanted Kharkiv 
to join Russia.42 
Both regions became home to pro-Russian organisations, which existed on the margins of 
Ukrainian politics but, nonetheless, held strong views. According to an article widely distributed on the 
Internet in 2014, there were 8 registered and 8 unregistered organisations of broadly Anti-Maidan 
orientation (these included pro-Russian and pro-federal organisations) in Kharkiv, such as Velikaya Rus’ 
(Great Rus’), Rus’ Triedinaia (Three-Some Rus’), Yuriy Apukhtin’s Grazhdanskiy Forum (Civic Forum) 
and others (confirmed in interviews with the protest organisers in Kharkiv). The same article lists 10 
registered and 7 unregistered organisations espousing similar, but mostly pro-Russian views, in Donets’k 
in 2014.43 In March 2014, one of the leaders of the pro-federal resistance in Kharkiv, Yuriy Apukhtin, 
reported to have united over 40 organisations in a movement dubbed “South East”.44 In the same month, 
Ihor Massalov, a deputy of Kharkiv regional council supporting Anti-Maidan, said that the pro-federal 
movement united more than 100 organisations.45  
A pro-Russian activist Serhiy Buntovskiy charts the development of pro-Russian activism in the 
Donbas from the onset of Ukrainian independence and lists roughly 8 organisations with pro-Russian 
orientation (Buntovskiy, 2016, 14). Many of them entertained the ideas of federalisation of Ukraine in the 
1990s. These pro-Russian organisations, according to Buntovskiy, were generally more popular, more 
numerous, and advanced more radical ideas in the 1990s (Buntovskiy, 2016, 12 - 13). Smith and Wilson 
identify such pro-Russian political parties as Civic Congress, which, however, had very little success in 
local elections (Smith and Wilson, 1997, 849). Pirie identifies the Inter-movement of the Donbas, Civic 
Congress, Congress of Russian Communities, and the Party of Slavic Unity as pro-Russian organisations 
(Pirie, 1998, 228), with their own niche support, active in the 1990s. Litvinenko lists at least three pro-
Russian organisations active in Donets’k since 2004, including the Russian Bloc (Litvinenko, 2004), which 
 
42 “Eks-gubernator Khar’kovshchiny Igor Baluta: “Dlia menia reshaiushchim stalo 22 Aprelia – likvidatsiia 
separatistskogo gorodki vozle pamiatnika Leninu”, Censor.net.ua, 7 April 2016.  
43 “Separatistskie organizatsii na Vostoke Ukrainy (spisok, infografika)”, 4 November 2014, 
https://old.flot2017.com/posts/new/separatistskie_organizacii_na_vostoke_ukrainy_spisok_infografika; 
http://archive.is/wQDCg.   
44 “V Kharkove zaiavili o namerenii sozdat’ Iugo-vostochnuiu respubliku”, Ukrayinska Pravda, 30 March 2014. 
45 “V Kharkove provedut narodnyii veche-referendum”, Nahnews.org, 12 March 2014. 
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participated in the protests in spring 2014, and the “Slavic Party”. These organisations had similar 
strategic aims, such as to give the Russian language the status of state language, integrate Ukraine into a 
union with Russia and Belarus, and resist anything they considered “Western” or “Galician” (Litvinenko, 
2004).  
Litvinenko writes that pro-Russian parties and organisations remained marginally popular in 
Ukraine.46 At the 2002 parliamentary elections, the Russian Bloc party won 0.73% of the votes nationally. 
In Donets’k, they won 0.51% and in Kharkiv 0.77% (Litvinenko, 2004). In 2012, the Russian Bloc won 
only 0.4% of the votes in Donets’k (A. Wilson, 2014, 123). As Litvinenko writes, “The character of the 
relations between Ukraine and Russia … do not allow these parties to promote their typical slogans, such 
as a “disjointed cultural space”, “disunited people” etc. It leads these parties to create problems where 
such problems do not exist, so that they can divert the attention of voters to themselves” (ibid.).  
Litvinenko, Fournier and Pirie argue that these “Russians” lacked political identity and clearly articulated 
demands throughout the 1990s. Pirie’s detailed research into these organisations characterised their 
identity as “marginal,” that is weakly identifying with both Ukrainians and Russians. Smith and Wilson 
write that, for a good part of the 1990s, these organisations did not have enough resources to mobilise 
effectively in Donets’k (Smith and Wilson, 1997, 861). Such factors force us to consider the behaviour of 
these organisations in 2014 in more detail and look for a combined effect of the local political elites’ and 
these organisations’ behaviours.   
Finally, to reinforce the relevance of Kharkiv case even further, from 2014, Kharkiv was 
recognised as a “strategic region” in Ukraine, in that a strategic significance was attributed to the fact that 
it shared the border with Russia and, later, 300km with the breakaway republics of Donets’k and 
Luhans’k.47 In spring 2014, a military and political analyst Dmytro Tymchuk assigned Kharkiv to the third 
place after Donets’k and Luhans’k respectively on the “Extremism Threat” scale.48 As late as 2015, the 
 
46 Civil war research generally focuses on self-determination movements that develop over a long-time and pursue 
their self-determination aims through legitimate means, such as lobbying and participation in elections (Sambanis 
and Zinn, 2003; Sambanis and Zinn, 2006) . These movements are well-organised, with well-articulated aims and act 
on behalf of populations with highly developed national consciousness.  
47 “Glava AP: V Khar’kove sohraniaetsia ugroza destabilizatsii situatsii”, Ukrayinska Pravda, 12 October 2016. 
48 Dmitry Tymchuk, “Dmytro Tymchuk’s military blog: rating the extremist threat in Ukraine’s oblasts”, Kyiv Post, 23 
April 2014.  
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head of the regional administration Ihor Rainin claimed that the region risked becoming destabilised due 
to the Russian propaganda and migration from Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s 
Republic.49 There were several violent attacks in Kharkiv at that time, such as on 22 February 2015, 
during the march for united Ukraine.50 These were quickly labelled “terrorist attacks”;51 the regional 
authorities were adamant that these attacks were levelled by local Ukrainians trained in Belgorod and 
Rostov under the guidance of the Russian secret services.52 As late as March 2015, it was claimed that the 
Russian propaganda beyond Donets’k and Luhans’k had its greatest impact in Kharkiv and Odesa: the 
same old tropes were recited, such as the fear that the Kyiv government threatened Russian speakers of 
these two regions.53 Despite this, Kharkiv’s top elites held highly ambivalent attitudes towards Russia. As 
late as March 2015, for example, the deputies of Kharkiv regional council did not even want to put the 
question of recognising Russia as “the aggressor country” on the agenda at one of the council sessions.54 
Similarly, Kharkiv mayor Hennadiy Kernes staunchly opposed raising this debate in the city council. The 
council recognised Russia as the “aggressor country” only in July that year, presumably after being put 
under pressure by the regional administration (Activist in Kharkiv, Interview 16 07 2019).55 
To summarise this section, the most recent findings within the history and identity approach 
point to the fact that ethnicity does not easily map into political attitudes and action, while people can be 
motivated by local rather than geopolitical concerns; in addition, separatism was not a mass phenomenon 
in the Donbas, while it became more prevalent as macro-processes of escalation to war (after the ATO 
began) were underway. Additionally, as I have demonstrated through historical, ethnographic, and 
political comparison of the two regions, both regions can be prone to similar levels of protest and protest 
violence, if their “emotional worldviews” that emerge from their shared historical and ethnolinguistic 
experiences are disturbed by significant external events. Therefore, if we were to focus on the history of 
the regions and their pro-Russian proclivities as explanatory variables, we would not receive adequate 
 
49 “Khar’kovskii gubernator: risk destabilizatsii est’, no podderzhki u separatistov vse men’she”, Ukrayynska Pravda, 7 
April 2015.  
50 “Vnaslidok teraktu u Kharkovi dvoe zahyblykh ta 11 poranenykh – ODA”, Ukrayinska Pravda, 22 February 2015. 
51 Ibid. 
52 “Khar’kovskii gubernator: risk destabilizatsii est’, no podderzhki u separatistov vse men’she”, Ukrayynska Pravda, 7 
April 2015.  
53 “Sotsiologi b’yut trevogu: rossiiskaia propaganda atakuet Khar’kov i Odessu”, Ukrayinska Pravda, 25 March 2015. 
54 “Khar’kovskii oblsovet ne schitaet Rossiiyu agressorom”, Ukrayinska Pravda, 5 March 2015. 
55 “Khar’kovskii gorsovet taki priznal Rossiiyu agressorom”, Ukrayinska Pravda, 10 July 2015. 
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answers as to why one region became a site of a violent conflict and the other witnessed a peaceful 
outcome. The outcomes were by no means certain due to the extent of protest violence and systematic 
protest activities in both regions. 
4. The role of foreign actors  
The debate about the transnational dimension of the Donbas conflict and the role of Russia in it 
is based on a broader theoretical literature on the role of other states in internal conflicts. Firstly, 
empirical research on what appear to be internal conflicts demonstrates that “third parties,” usually 
neighbouring states, often get involved in these conflicts, affecting their escalation and settlement 
(Gleditsch and Beardsley, 2004; Gleditsch, 2007; Harbom and Wallensteen, 2005; Rauta, 2016; Regan, 
2002; Walter, 1997). States provide overt and covert support to both rebel groups and governments, with 
covert support being offered more often (Harbom and Wallensteen, 2005). Secondly, it is argued that 
geographical proximity of states and the presence of transnational ethnic kin make one state more likely 
to intervene in and escalate internal disputes in other states (Gleditsch, 2007). As Gleditsch writes, “the 
risk of civil war is not determined just by a country’s internal or domestic characteristics, but differs 
fundamentally, depending on a country’s linkages to other states”  (Gleditsch, 2007, 293). The research by 
Salehyan analysing various civil conflicts lends further support to the view that we should consider 
internal conflicts in their international rather than purely domestic context. In particular, he demonstrates 
the importance of diasporas in supporting rebels (Salehyan, 2006). Thirdly, it is assumed that states would 
intervene when their ethnic kin is threatened in the neighbouring state. Gleditsch (2007: 297) cites 
research that shows that “external interventions in conflicts often seem motivated by efforts to support 
ethnic kin in other states” (Saideman, 2001). Therefore, several general assumptions are made in this 
literature: states are the key actors in the process of conflict (Harbom and Wallensteen 2005, 628); states 
do get involved in internal disputes of other states; geographical proximity and the presence of an ethnic 
kin make another state’s intervention in conflict more likely; in some cases, states intervene when their 
ethnic kin is threatened. In other words, we should observe similar dynamics of covert or overt 
intervention in geographically proximate countries - or regions – and those in which particular ethnic kin 
straddles borders.  
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Another set of theories within the literature on transnational dimensions of internal conflicts 
revolves around the interaction between the rebel group in the conflict state and the state populated by 
the group’s ethnic kin. It is argued that the rebel group is likely to radicalise and “militarise” when it has 
palpable external support from the ethnic kin state. According to Erin Jenne’s theory (Jenne, 2007) (built 
around the concept of the “triadic nexus” first theorised by Roger Brubaker (Brubaker, 1994; Brubaker, 
1996)), the presence of an external actor that leverages the ethnic minority engaged in challenging the 
central government complicates the government’s bargaining with that group. This can lead to conflict. 
Following from her analysis of Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia in the interwar period and other 
cases, she concludes that “group radicalization is driven by shifting perceptions of relative power against 
the center. These perceptions are informed both by changes in the institutional opportunity structure and 
by the actions of the group’s external patron (if one exists)” (Jenne, 2007, 43). In other words, if the 
minority is sufficiently leveraged by its external patron, it is likely to radicalise its demands, even when the 
host state is willing to accommodate it. Jenne’s model is built around perceptions of the balance of power 
and signalling: it predicts that “when the minority’s external patron credibly signals interventionist intent, 
minority leaders are likely to radicalize their demands against the center” (Jenne, 2007, 2).  
In a similar vein, David Laitin (Laitin, 2001) proposes the “commitment theory,” which posits 
that for ethnic violence to break out, two conditions must be present. Firstly, “the leading elites in the 
national homeland … make credible commitments to the minority population that they will pay 
extraordinary costs to support their compatriots in post-independence conflicts” (853). The “national 
homeland” is where the minorities in the host or conflict state have historically come from. Secondly, the 
homeland must make “an offer” to these minorities, which must be of a much higher quality than the 
offer made by the host state. Laitin does not specify what kind of offer this is, but it can be an offer of 
economic and political nature, and it is linked to the homeland’s “attractiveness” for the minorities. That 
is, the homeland must show that if the minorities decide to rebel against their host state and will want to 
become part of the homeland, the homeland will offer much better economic and social “packages” to 
these minorities than those being offered by the host state. Conversely, if the homeland is “uncommitted” 
and fails to produce any offers to the minorities, ethnic violence is unlikely to break out and the host state 
will be stable. Thus, the major assumption made in this literature is that the rebel group would radicalise 
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when the external patron sends credible signals to it. Based on this review of the literature, I formulate 
the following hypothesis:  
H2: political opportunities for protest that leads to war are created externally by ethnic patrons 
Some of these insights have been applied to the study of the Donbas conflict. In fact, one of the 
major views on the Donbas conflict, strongly supported and promoted by the Ukrainian government and 
media, is that the conflict has been “manufactured in Moscow”. In some scholarly accounts espousing 
this view, agency is largely denied to the local Ukrainians. Instead, many analysts focus on the role of 
Russians as individuals and Russia as a state (this distinction is important) in causing the conflict 
(Czuperski et al., 2015; Mitrokhin, 2014; Sutyagin, 2015; A. Wilson, 2016; A. Wilson, 2014). In these 
accounts, Russia as a state assumes a role that is described in the theoretical literature cited above: a state 
that is concerned with the fate of its ethnic kin in the neighbouring state Ukraine, and is therefore 
extremely likely to get involved in what seems to be a local conflict. Wilson (2014) (2016) depicts the 
conflict as lacking popular backing in the region and being organised and fomented by Russia almost 
single-handedly, with the help of the Ukrainian elites who moved to Russia for fear of political 
persecution. The absence of prior ethnic strife in the region makes these researchers look beyond the 
local factors that played out in the Donbas insurgency and argue that it was primarily Russian 
involvement that aggravated the insurgency and turned it into a full-fledged war. Wilson, for example, 
argues that the protests and demonstrations in the Donbas were “smouldering away” already in March 
and April 2014, and, if it wasn’t for the Russians involved, they would have eventually tapered off and a 
peaceful settlement would have been made (Wilson, 2016, 633). 
Nikolay Mitrokhin divides the conflict into three phases, with the first two being propelled by the 
“Russians”. In Mitrokhin’s account, “Russians” are pro-Russian forces in eastern Ukraine. They are 
represented by various individuals with either Russian roots or connection to Russia through military 
service or family. They also include nationalists from Russia (Mitrokhin, 2014). Mitrokhin argues that it is 
this “military wing” that quickly supersedes the “political wing” of the pro-Russian protest in the 
Donets’k region and initiates the conflict (221). Mitrokhin’s account is subtle and compelling, yet it does 
not account for why and how the “military wing” gained the upper hand over the “political wing,” and 
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who opened political opportunities for the pro-Russian activists in Donets’k region in the first place. It is 
also notable that the external signals from the ethnic patron Russia were sent to all the regions of the 
south-east (see Putin’s press conference on Ukraine on 4 March 2014)56 (Activist in Kharkiv, Interview, 
16 07 2019).  
The last phase of the conflict, in Mitrokhin’s account, begins in August 2014, and is propelled by 
the regular Russian troops. In his detailed report on this phase, Igor Sutyagin writes: “The first phase of 
large-scale incursions by regular Russian troops commenced on 11 August 2014 and has involved a 
substantial array of forces” (Sutyagin, 2015, 1). Sutyagin dates the presence of the Russian spetsnaz 
groups in Donets’k region since 14  July at the latest, yet the vast majority of detail he provides comes 
between mid-August 2014 and February 2015. Similarly, the Bellingcat report’s claim that “Kremlin-
directed Russian military personnel, intelligence operatives, and public relations consultants began to 
organize a so-called separatist movement to oppose the Ukrainian government by force” (Czuperski et al., 
2015, i) is not borne out by data, as the report focuses overwhelmingly on the events after 11 May 
referendum on Donetsk People’s Republic’s independence. 
While the evidence that Russian non-state actors helped the insurgency to get off the ground is 
quite compelling (German and Karagiannis, 2016; Kashin, 2014; Matveeva, 2018; Mitrokhin, 2014), since 
2016, more evidence has appeared confirming that Russia as a state did not cause the war. Paul Robinson 
(2016, 507) argues that Russia has been reacting to the events rather than masterminding them. Moreover, 
Russian nationalists have been blaming Russia for inaction in relation to the Donbas (Robinson, 2016, 
507). Strelkov and others regularly complained that they did not receive enough support from Russia 
(Sakwa, 2015, 156). As Robinson writes on Strelkov, “despite allegations that he was acting on behalf of 
the Russian intelligence services, Strelkov himself claims that he came to Ukraine in response to an appeal 
from Donbass activists. According to Strelkov, the Russian intelligence services may have been aware of 
his plans and did nothing to stop him, but he did not carry his actions out under their instructions 
(Prokhanov & Strelkov, 2014)” (Robinson, 2016, 511). This quote highlights two important points: firstly, 
Strelkov acted in response to an appeal from the Donbas’ activists and secondly, these activists had an 
 




opportunity to appeal to him. These points will be discussed further. Robinson’s and Davies’ analyses of 
the Russian response to the Donbas insurgency point to the complexity of the Russian strategy in the 
Donbas. Davies attributes this complexity to the divisions within the Russian elite (Davies, 2016).  
Therefore, we cannot attribute the responsibility for the war to the Russian state. Sakwa argues 
that “Russia may well have stirred the pot at the beginning, and thereafter held regular consultations with 
the resistance leaders, but the scale of its initial materiel support was greatly exaggerated by the Kyiv 
government and its Western supporters” (Sakwa, 2015, 156). He further writers: “what is incontrovertible 
is that two elements developed in parallel: a genuine regional revolt adopting the tactics of the Maidan 
against the “Ukrainising” and anti-Russian policies pursued by the Kyiv authorities, and the strategic 
political considerations of Moscow, which exploited the insurgency to exercise leverage against Kyiv 
government to achieve defined goals” (Sakwa, 2015, 156). So, for Sakwa, the primary cause lies with the 
locals. Similarly, Kudelia contends that Russia “did not act in a vacuum,” but rather exploited the local 
conflict (Kudelia, 2016, 5). The recent evidence on the role of Russia in the conflict confirms that Russian 
state actors, such as Putin’s aide Vladislav Surkov, stepped into the insurgency later57 and were not 
welcome by some insurgents, such as the leader of “Vostok” battalion Aleksandr Khodakovskiy.58  
There is also the time factor, that is the sequence of the events, which leads one to discredit 
Russia’s responsibility in stirring the insurgency from the beginning. It forces us to take the agency of the 
local Ukrainians into account. The Anti-Maidan demonstrations and protests were held in various cities of 
Ukraine almost simultaneously with the Euromaidan protest, that is from November 2013 to February 
2014. The clashes between the Euromaidan supporters and Anti-Maidan forces took place from the 
beginning of the Euromaidan, before the Russian annexation of Crimea. The first “self-defence” units to 
protect local people from “neo-Nazi” threats began forming throughout the east and south and especially 
the Crimean Peninsula from December 2013. These were local People’s Councils and self-defence units 
that took on themselves the functions of law-enforcement agencies in the absence of a viable police force 
 
57 Anton Zverev, “Ex-rebel leaders detail role played by Putin aide in east Ukraine”, Reuters, 11 May 2017.  
58 Aleksandr Khodakovskiy, Vkontakte, 10 December 2018, 
https://vk.com/id410606173?w=wall410606173_48405; http://archive.is/rLOmq.  
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(Kudelia, 2014a). This means that the political opportunity for these Anti-Maidan forces was coming not 
from Russia but from elsewhere.   
Finally, from my interviews conducted with Kharkiv’s pro-federal activists, it emerges that all of 
them sought help from Russia, yet they failed to receive it (Protest Organiser 2 interview 28 09 2018; 
Protest Organiser 1 interview 24 09 2018; (Prokhanov and Strelkov, 2014; Yudaev, 2015) . In Donets’k, 
for a long time, there was a situation of great uncertainty as to whether Russia would indeed help the 
insurgents and intervene (Prokhanov and Strelkov, 2014) (Activist from Donets’k Interview 27 07 2019). 
Yet, the pro-Russian contention in Donets’k was radical from the start (Protest Organiser 1 in Kharkiv 
Interview 24 09 2018). This empirical reality contradicts the propositions in the literature on external 
patrons, credible signals, and radicalisation in response to the signals from the external actors. 
5. Why local elites? 
In the previous sections, I have established that in the case of the Donbas conflict the role of the 
people, their identities and emotions in generating the conflict is uncertain, while structurally similar 
regions can experience similar protest dynamics and, therefore, both be susceptible to conflict. I have also 
argued that empirically, political opportunities for protest and foreign actors’ intervention are created 
internally. In this way, I questioned the viability of the argument that attributes primary responsibility for 
conflict to external actors. This is because from late 2013 to spring 2014, eastern Ukraine already 
experienced a significant level of the Anti-Maidan, pro-federal, and pro-Russian protest activity. In both 
Kharkiv city and Donets’k region, political opportunities for these types of political protest were created 
largely by the local elites. This was particularly pronounced in Kharkiv. The local elites in Kharkiv were 
vehemently against the Euromaidan, as this protest was not in their interest and threatened to unseat 
them. The Euromaidan protest stood in the long line of political protests organised by opposition parties 
and ordinary people that the local Party of Regions’ elites confronted over the previous decade. There is 
some indirect evidence that these elites sponsored or were connected to the Anti-Maidan forces. The 
creation of the Ukrainian Front on 1 February 2014 to counter the Euromaidan and the Congress of the 
Deputies of All Levels on 22 February, both organised by Kharkiv top elites, signalled to the Anti-Maidan 
and pro-federal activists in Kharkiv that the elites were on their side. In response to these opening 
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political opportunities, on 23 February, the pro-federal activists began gathering on Lenin Square (Protest 
Organiser 1 interview 24 09 2018; Protest Organiser 2 interview 28 09 2018). Similarly, the Euromaidan 
protest in Donets’k region was not in the local elites’ interest. They responded to it by endorsing some 
Anti-Maidan protestors and creating political opportunities for pro-Russian contention and mobilisation 
of spontaneous armed groups. Therefore, prior to the “Russian Spring”, the initial conditions in the two regions were 
similar: political opportunities for pro-federal and pro-Russian contention were opened by the local elites. 
When the governing network changed in Kyiv in February 2014, the local elites took different 
stances towards that change, and this shaped their attitudes towards the local political protest. The period 
of the “Russian Spring” was characterised by the interaction between the elites and activists and the 
activists’ attempts to mobilise resources in response to the opening and closing political opportunities. At 
the same time, the “Russian Spring” cannot be described as “elite-managed” (Robertson, 2011, 4) in that 
the “Russian Spring” protests and meetings were not organised and led by the local elites, except in a few 
cases. Graeme Robertson’s characterisation of protest activity in Russia in late 1990s – early 2000s 
corresponds to the empirical reality in Ukraine in spring 2014: “in most cases, influence over protest 
levels was indirect, less a matter of directly organizing protests, so much as one of deciding when to 
permit them and when to prevent them” (Robertson, 2011, 78).  
Not only is the importance of local elites for protest outcomes described in retrospective activist 
testimony59 and interviews with protest organisers (Journalist 1, Interview, 19 07 2019; Protest Organiser 
1 Interview 24 09 2018). In broad terms, local elites are the most immediate state actors with whom 
activists come in contact (Journalist 1, Interview 19 07 2019). In concrete ways, local elites create or close 
political opportunity for protest by allowing protestors to gather or banning protest through the local 
courts; by influencing protest action directly and personally; by endorsing or denouncing activists; and by 
refusing or agreeing to act on the key demands put forward by the activists. In highly clientelistic 
societies, protest activity that is considered to be congruent with the local elites’ interests can be financed 
in “indirect and concealed fashion” (Kitschelt, H., and Wilkinson, S. 2007, 19). Thus, the elites can 
provide certification and legitimation to the kinds of protests that are in their interest, while directly or 
 
59 https://vk.com/donbass_res?w=wall-3223620_1486410; http://archive.is/tTGa2.  
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indirectly targeting protest that is not in their interest. So we can distinguish between the types of protest 
that are in the local elites’ interest and those that are not in their interest.  
In their turn, the activists recognise that local elites are the intermediaries or mediators between 
themselves and the centre: they therefore make claims on local elites. For example, the activists may 
appeal to local elites to direct their political proposals to the central government or to challenge the 
central government. This is consistent with the empirical reality in Ukraine in spring 2014 when pro-
federalisation and pro-Russian activists made numerous and consistent claims on the local elites, 
demanding them to proclaim the central government as illegitimate, to disobey its orders, and to conduct 
a “federalisation referendum”.  
In this interactive process, local elites send signals to external actors who are planning an 
intervention with the view of launching an insurgency. Holding constant the regions’ geographical 
proximity to the ethnic patron, the presence of the ethnic kin, or other structural conditions, as well as the 
regional protest dynamics, external actors’ calculations as to the success of the intervention are dependent 
on the local elites’ behaviour and the relative openness of political opportunities for radical protest.   
In this section, I build the theory of why the local elites open political opportunities for specific 
types of protest and why in some regions opportunities remain open and in others they are gradually 
closed.60 Before I proceed with the theory building, I review the most recent literature on the role of the 
local elites in the Donbas conflict and position it within the larger literature on the role of elites in 
conflicts.  
5.1. Elites in the Donbas conflict  
Andrew Wilson (2016), Andriy Portnov (2016) and Quentin Buckholz (2019) first drew attention 
to the role of the local elites in the Donbas conflict.61 Wilson (2016, 631) writes that the history and 
identity approach does not provide a wholly adequate explanation of the conflict’s origins: “historical and 
identity factors, economic fears and alienation from the new government in Kyiv were only part of the 
 
60 See (Brockett, 2005) on central America for variations in the openness and closure of political opportunities.  
61 Matsuzato (2017)  and (Matsuzato, 2018) further elaborated on the ambiguous role of the local elites in the 
Russian Spring in the Donbas.  
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reason for the rise of the separatist movement in the Donbas, Ukraine, in the spring of 2014. They set a 
baseline, but one not high enough to account for the creation of two mini-‘Republics’ and a prolonged 
war, without considering the effect of Russian sponsorship and the role of local elites, mainly from the 
literal and metaphorical ‘Family’ of former President Viktor Yanukovych”. In Wilson’s account the elites, 
such as Yanukovych’s son Oleksandr and various oligarchs, such as Viktor Nusenkis and Oleksandr 
Yefremov (in Luhans’k), provided material support, channelled through their enterprises, to the 
separatists (645). During the Euromaidan phase of political protest, they hired the so-called titushki 
(groups of young men) to disperse the Euromaidan protestors, so as to keep the south-eastern regions 
under control. During the “Russian Spring” phase of political protest, they secured key appointments in 
the law enforcement sector for their supporters, thus channelling the pro-Russian protest in their desired 
direction (645). More specifically, the “intentionally” paralised police force in Donets’k region made the 
local people’s participation in the pro-Russian protests and eventual insurgency less costly. Finally, the 
elites manipulated the “baseline factors” to their own advantage (646), although Wilson’s evidence is less 
clear for this argument, and it is not clear how this manipulation worked. All of these factors, including 
the Russian support, helped the largely unpopular separatist insurgency get off the ground and become a 
“mass phenomenon,” as Wilson contends (644). 
Certain empirical gaps have emerged in this approach to the Donbas conflict. For example, the 
media articles that Wilson cites when he argues that the elites provided financial support to the separatists 
were published in late 2014- early 2015. These articles do not cite evidence of this support in the early 
2014.62 The question arises whether these elites became active in their support of the separatists before or 
after the conflict began. According to my interview with Journalist 1, the leaders of the nascent DNR 
vowed to “shoot” any local elites if they participated in the local elections (19 07 2019). Kudelia (Kudelia, 
2014a) similarly argues that when it comes to the elites, there is no conclusive evidence that the local 
oligarchs supported the insurgency financially. Neither has it been clear whether the elites organised the 
insurgency. Some scholars, like Anna Matveeva (2016), call the Donbas insurgency a “leaderless” one: 
most elites, particularly those with strong pro-Ukrainian views, fled the region and left the local people 
 
62 “Yanukovych i Nusenkis finansuiut’ dial’nist’ ohrupyvannia DNR—ZMI”, Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, 18 June 
2015; “Pechers’kyi sud zniav aresht iz rakhunkiv Arbuzova—ZMI”, Tyzhden.ua, 29 November 2014. 
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“to fend for themselves” (Matveeva, 2016, 37). As Matveeva shows, the social background of the 
insurgents, with most being “local men, poorly educated and often unruly, with a background in private 
security, skilled labour, small business; and low-level administrators” points to the absence of a 
professional middle class which could have led the insurgency (Matveeva, 2016, 36). 
 The role of the richest oligarch in the Donbas and Ukraine, Rinat Akhmetov, is also not entirely 
clear. During both the Euromaidan and the Russian Spring phase, Akhmetov kept his political stance 
largely to himself and issued a few conciliatory statements towards the beginning of May 2014.63 
Journalists maintained that Akhmetov’s principle was “having balance and being further away from both 
conflicting sides”.64 On the other hand, due to the far-reaching ends of his sprawling commercial empire 
and control over the local security forces,65 Akhmetov was perceived as a key actor in the region, and 
there was an ever-present expectation that he would come out strongly against separatism (Activist from 
Donets’k Interview 27 07 2019).66 Denys Kazanskiy argues that, if Akhmetov sought to use the 
insurgency for a bargaining purpose, he quickly lost control of it (Kazanskiy, 2014)(Personal 
communication with an academic 10 03 2017)(Matveeva, 2016).67 According to my interview with 
Journalist 1, it took Akhmetov and his advisors too long to assess the situation in Donets’k properly and 
make the right decisions (Interview 19 07 2019).  
According to my interviews with Protest Organiser 1 and Protest Organiser 2, the Anti-Maidan 
and pro-federal protest organisers in Kharkiv, the logic of the argument that the local elites in Donets’k, 
including Akhmetov, were responsible for the conflict is “iron” (Protest Organiser 2 interview 28 09 
2018), despite the fact that it is hard to find concrete data on the financing of separatism by these elites. 
 
63 Yevhen Shybalov, “Zapiznile prozrinniia Akhmetova”, Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, 22 May 2014; “Rinat Akhmetov 
prizyvaet vlast’ ne nakaliat’ situatsiiu na yugo-vostoke Ukrainy”, Novosti Donbassa, 11 March 2014.  
64 “Separatyzm v Ukrayyni: khto kontroliiuie prorosijs’ki syly v Donets’ku”, Deutsche Welle, 11 April 2014.  
65 “Rinat Akhetmov otobral Donbass u Ukrainy”, Novosti Donbassa, 19 April 2014.  
66 “Ukrainian richest businessman's stance on events in Donets’k region examined”, BBC Monitoring Ukraine & 
Baltics, 19 March 2014. 
67 Also, many pro-Russian activists, such as notably Pavel Gubarev, harboured strong anti-elite sentiments and 
fought hard against being co-opted into elite-organised demonstrations (Which is corroborated in one of the sources 
cited by Wilson (2016) http://m-kalashnikov.livejournal.com/2391622.html; http://archive.is/ZQWbs).  Other 
separatist activists and fighters, such as Aleksey Mozgovoi in the LNR and those of the Donetsk Republic 
movement were equally opposed to the Party of Regions and the oligarchs. This is evident, for example, in the 
interviews by Vyacheslav Ponomarev, the former “people’s mayor” of Slov’’ians’k (Ponomarev, 2014) and in 
Gubarev’s memoir (Gubarev, 2016).  The early rhetoric of the “Russian Spring” was in many ways built around the 
liberation struggle, that is the liberation from both the oligarchs and the local political elites. 
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Protest Organiser 1 is convinced that the pro-Russian protest in Donets’k was taken over by the 
“oligarchic structures” from early March. To him, the insurgents’ spokesman Denis Pushilin was a man 
beholden to these oligarchic structures (Interview 24 09 2018). Further, the oligarchs planned to 
manipulate the protest to bargain with Kyiv, until enough privileges, such as decentralisation or even 
federalisation, were extracted from the centre. This bargaining could have continued and spawned a 
centre-region conflict. Then the insurgency would have died a natural death, had it not been for the 
appearance of Strelkov, a foreign agent, who disrupted the local elites’ bargaining plans, Protest Organiser 
1 maintains.  
The difference between the trajectories of Kharkiv and Donets’k, intuited by journalists and 
discussed in some academic literature (Buckholz, 2019), has been attributed to the difference in the 
stances taken by the regional elites towards the pro-federal and pro-Russian protest. Journalists and 
scholars widely cite the example of Dniepropetrovs’k (now Dniepro), where the powerful local oligarch 
Ihor Kolomoiskiy nipped the protest in the bud. According to my interview with Activist from Donets’k, 
Kolomoiskiy also promised security to the Berkut officers: “He gathered them all together and said “This 
is my Berkut”,” therefore making their participation in pro-Russian protests and eventual insurgency 
more costly (Interview 27 07 2019). Following a very brief hiatus, in Kharkiv, the local elites took a 
strongly pro-Ukrainian stance after the change of government in Kyiv and did not allow the pro-federal 
protest to develop into a conflict (Buckholz, 2019). In Donets’k, on the other hand, the local elites 
supported the aims of the pro-Russian protest and even endorsed some of the most radical activists early 
on.   
The largely circumstantial data offered by the scholars on the role of the local elites in the 
conflict and the conviction of the Anti-Maidan protestors that these elites had an interest in manipulating 
the protest, especially in Donets’k, point in one direction: we must demonstrate the relevance of the local 
elites’ behaviour for the protest outcomes and we must explain why the local elites took different stances 
towards the change in the centre and the local protest. This requires a more systematic approach to the 
study of the local elites in Ukraine. If the role of the people in the Donbas conflict is so uncertain, as 
demonstrated in the sociological research by Giuliano (2018) and others, we should look at the interaction 
between the local elites and activists and how this led to the outcomes of interest.   
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5.2. Elites in civil war research  
The approaches focusing on the role of elites in internal conflicts can broadly be described as 
“instrumental” (de Figueiredo, M., and Weingast, B. 1999; Gagnon, 1994; Jones, B.,1999; Woodward, 
S.,1999). Wilkinson succinctly summarises the main argument advanced in this literature: “ethnic violence 
has often been portrayed as the outcome of a rational … strategy used by political elites to win and hold 
power” (Wilkinson, 2004). This is echoed in Petersen (2011, 6): “violence is often viewed as a matter of 
very small numbers of actors, either elites or criminals, making rational decisions to initiate and sustain 
violence to achieve narrow ends”. In his work on the civil wars in Transdniestria and Yugoslavia, Stuart 
Kaufman documents the role of national elites in instigating violence (Kaufman, 1996; Kaufman, 2001). 
He argues that civil war violence was initiated by the national leaders to serve their own interest and also 
because they wanted to “distract attention from their own past sins and their countries’ present economic 
and social problems” (Wilkinson, 2004, 2). In Souleimanov’s account of post-Soviet wars in the Caucasus, 
ethnicity per se does not cause an ethnic war; rather, ethnic rifts are exploited by the elites who react to 
new nation-wide political opportunities, such as the liberalisation of the ruling regime, the change of 
government or the weakness of the centre (Souleimanov, 2013). Souleimanov demonstrates that the 
nationalist elites exploited the situation of extreme uncertainty and the central government’s weakness in 
Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh (Souleimanov, 2013).  It was they who transformed sporadic conflicts 
into large-scale ones. “Established large-scale violence,” he writes (Souleimanov, 2013, 49), “is a product 
of a conscious decision of an actor or actors to turn to conflict”. Therefore, instead of being the causes of 
these wars, the narratives associated with “ancient hatreds” are constructs invoked and manipulated by 
the elites to increase the level of social mobilisation along ethnic lines. 
The national elites, therefore, emerge as exploiters of the population’s fears and anxieties in the 
rationalist pursuit of power. In Kaufman’s account, ethnicity and the fears and anxieties associated with it 
provide a foundation for the leaders of mass-led protests. Leaders manipulate one ethnic group’s negative 
stereotypes about the other. They do so in order to achieve or maintain power. In Kaufman’s account 
(1996), these elites compete with – or “outbid” – each other in promoting increasingly more extreme 
nationalist discourse, which leads to conflict. National elites can also exploit the so-called security 
dilemma, that is, a situation, in which one ethnic group starts arming itself in response to the other ethnic 
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group’s threatening behaviour (Posen, 1993). Posen argues that this was the case in the Serbo-Croatian 
war (1991 – 1995). According to Kalyvas, this argument “usually implies two distinct motivations: elites 
act instrumentally in pursuit of power, while the followers act emotionally, out of fear” (Kalyvas, 2006, 
61).  
This “instrumentalist” approach to the role of elites has been applied to contemporary conflicts. As 
Chris Wilson writes on Indonesia, “collective violence appears incited by powerful individuals, seemingly 
in the pursuit of their own political or economic interests” (C. Wilson, 2011, 2). Similarly, Azmeh writes 
on the conflict in Syria: “the multisectarian ruling elite’s decision to activate this vanguard role by 
invoking historical discrimination (the return of a Sunni-dominated state) and by raising fears of revenge 
for use of excessive force, drove the descent of a protest movement into a sectarian conflict. This 
decision not only has led to the ongoing disaster in Syria but will also make maintaining the unity of the 
country and normal relations between different groups extremely challenging in the future” (Azmeh, 
2016, 520). 
Wilkinson (2004, 3) argues that the problem with this literature is that it focuses 
disproportionately on national leaders at the expense of local or regional elites.68 He also points out that 
too often the scholars adopting this approach look at cases where politicians incited violence and ignore 
those cases where they prevented it (ibid.,2). By looking at town-level statistics on Hindu-Muslim riots in 
India, Wilkinson documents the role of regional elites and their electoral incentives in instigating or 
preventing violence.69 Additionally, in most of these accounts, especially Kaufman’s, the national elites 
have to be quite active in their belligerence by engaging in nationalist discourse.     
 
68 Within the broader study of civil wars, the attention is disproportionally paid to the state-insurgent dyad, that is to 
the relationship between the central government and the insurgents (Cunningham, 2013; Cunningham, 2014; 
Lichbach et al., 2003; Sambanis and Zinn, 2003; Sambanis and Zinn, 2006). In the literature on escalation and 
repression (Demirel-Pegg, 2011; Demirel-Pegg, 2014; Garrison, 2002; Regan and Norton, 2005) it is argued that 
repression by the central government leads to the escalation of violence and civil war. In the literature on bargaining 
failures and civil war, the attention is also paid to the state and the insurgents (Walter, 2009a; Walter, 2009b). The 
middle layer – the local elites – is missing. As (Kalyvas, 2006, 10) points out, in the literature on civil wars the focus 
is usually on “the interactions between unitary (state and nonstate) political actors [or] the interaction between 
political actors and the populations they rule [or] on interactions within small groups and among individuals”. Most 
research on civil wars either conflates these levels or focuses on just one, usually the first.  
69 Shesterinina demonstrates that the theories centring on the elites’ behaviour do not show how the mechanism of 
civil war onset exactly works. For example, they do not show how information “trickles down” to the population 
that these elites purport to arouse. Theories provided by Kaufman do not distinguish between various levels of 
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 If we take these caveats into consideration and focus instead on the local elites and their 
divergent behaviours (clandestinely fostering separatism in one case and dampening it in the other), we 
need to ask what explains these behaviours and how they lead to conflict in one case and peace in the 
other. The central paradigm offered by the civil war literature and the literature on riots adopts a 
rationalist approach: elites act in pursuit of power, whether it is to keep power or to acquire more power 
(such as securing votes (Wilkinson, 2004)). If we measure power by economic and political assets that the 
local elites have acquired in their constituencies and discover that these elites had similar stakes, we would 
expect them to behave in a similar fashion. In other words, if an elite actor in the region A and an elite 
actor in the region B have significant political and economic stakes in their regions and stand to lose from 
the political change in the centre, they would respond to that change in a similar fashion. For example, 
they would attempt to change the politics in the centre by bargaining with the centre. They bargain by 
fostering the local protest movements. However, the situation in Ukraine contradicts this argument. 
Contrary to what has been argued (by Buckholz, 2019, in particular), I demonstrate that the stakes 
cultivated by the local elites in their regions mattered only to a certain extent. All the elites under 
consideration cultivated strong political or commercial ties with their respective regions. Both the 
Minister of the Interior and the ex-governor of Kharkiv Arsen Avakov and the incumbent mayor 
Hennadiy Kernes cultivated strong commercial and political ties in Kharkiv region.70 Avakov was the 
founder of various banks and commercial structures in Kharkiv, as was Kernes. Their commercial 
interests dated back to late 1990s. Equally, their political ties with the region were strong, with Kernes 
occupying positions of power from 1998 and serving as the secretary of the city council since April 2002, 
while Avakov entered Kharkiv politics slightly later. Kernes became the city mayor in 2010. Similarly, in 
Donets’k, the long-serving mayor Oleksandr Luk’yanchenko (since 2002) enjoyed unbeatable popularity71 
for more than a decade,72 while, not unlike their political counterparts in Kharkiv, the oligarch Rinat 
 
authority in the population and how information travels between and among these levels (she aims to fill this gap) 
(Shesterinina, 2014).  
70 Here Avakov is described as one of the richest people in Ukraine: “Ia s udivleniem uznal, chto vklyuchen v sotniu 
samykh bogatykh liudei Ukrainy – A. Avakov”, Status Quo, 29 March 2007; and here as the most influential 
Kharkivite in Ukraine: “A. Avakov priznan samym vliiatel’nym khar’kovchaninom 2006 g. – rezul’taty oprosa”, 
Status Quo, 25 January 2007; “Weekly profiles new governor of eastern Ukrainian region”, BBC Monitoring Ukraine & 
Baltics, 25 February 2005. 
71 “Luk’yanchenko ostanetsia na postu mera Donets’ka”, Novosti Donbassa, 16 February 2010.  
72 Luk’yanchenko continued to serve as mayor in Donets’k until October 2014. By that time, Donets’k was torn by 
what one might call after Kalyvas a “dual sovereignty” situation.  
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Akhmetov and the incumbent governor Serhiy Taruta had strong commercial stakes in Donets’k region, 
dating back to late 1990s, albeit Taruta’s stakes were much weaker than Akhmetov’s, according to my 
interview with Journalist 1 (19 07 2019).73  
In both regions, the local elites opened political opportunities for the Anti-Maidan protest in late 
November 2013. When the governing informal network changed in Kyiv in February 2014, despite the 
strong stakes in their respective regions, the elites in Kharkiv and Donets’k demonstrated starkly 
divergent behaviours. The elites in Kharkiv refused to budge on the issue of federalisation with the pro-
federal protestors; they methodically removed the radical streak from the pro-federal protest and 
cooperated with the security services in targeting individual protestors. In Donets’k, by contrast, the local 
elites supported some of the radical pro-Russian protest, refused to ban the protest, and, as has been 
attested in some scholarly studies and statements by activists, they engaged in clandestine financing of the 
protest because it helped them in bargaining with the centre.  
Another approach to explaining the behaviour of elites argues that divisions and conflicts within 
and among elites create political opportunity for unrepresented groups to engage in collective action. As 
Tarrow (1998, 88) notes, “divisions among elites not only provide incentives to resource-poor groups to 
risk collective action; they encourage portions of the elite that are out of power to seize the role of 
“tribunes of the people”. By contrast, when elites are cohesive and united, this prevents protest. In the 
case of Russia in late 1990s and early 2000s, the political elite’s unity and cohesion prevented protest 
(Robertson, 2011, 8). Elite competition, by contrast, promoted protest as elites mobilised the publics as 
part of their competition (ibid., 34). In Robertson’s interpretation, the division among elites leads those 
lacking a strong hand in the current arrangements to mobilise the people.  As Akin has argued in his 
research on elite networks, if elites are cohesive, as was the case in Ukraine on the eve of the Soviet 
Union’s break up, armed conflicts are unlikely to occur when central state structures disintegrate. On the 
other hand, if elites are fragmented, as in the case of Georgia during the same period, there is likely to be 
 
73 It could be argued that Donets’k regional governor Andriy Shyshatskiy and Slov’’ians’k mayor Nelia Shtepa had 
much weaker interests in Donets’k and Slov’’ians’k respectively. This conditioned their behaviour in spring 2014, 
when Shyshatskiy first resigned and then left the ranks of the Party of Regions in late March 2014. Nelia Shtepa 
became rather infamous for endorsing the storming and occupation of the police station in Slov’’ians’k by what later 
transpired to be Igor Strelkov’s “Slavyansk” squad. Her behaviour spurred a drawn-out litigation against her.  
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a conflict (Akin, 2013). Using the social networks approach, he writes (ibid., 12): “Networks that coalesce 
or consolidate through bargaining and contraction tend to avoid violent conflict; networks that expand or 
extend tend to fail and to incite conflict.” In a similar vein, in his review of post-Soviet conflicts, Zurcher 
(2007) has argued that the elites’ ability to form compacts with each other could forestall conflict. 
Similarly, according to Kilavuz’s research on Tajikistan, civil wars can begin as a result of conflicts within 
elites and not as a result of polarisation of regional identities (Kilavuz, 2009; Kilavuz, 2011).   
 The situation in Ukraine prior and during the “Russian Spring” protests of 2014 contradicts the 
argument on elite cohesion and elite fragmentation and their respective roles in fostering violence and 
conflict. On the one hand, despite the domination of the Party of Regions in Kharkiv, the elites in 
Kharkiv were highly fragmented and competed with each other fiercely prior to the events of 2014. The 
opposition parties of Bat’kivshchina and Our Ukraine were small but mighty in Kharkiv, initiating the 
dismissal of the mayor Dobkin and the city council secretary Kernes on many occasions, by citing alleged 
violations of Ukrainian laws and participation in what they called “banditry”. Moreover, both Dobkin and 
Kernes were at loggerheads with the entire law enforcement apparatus in Ukraine and the governor Arsen 
Avakov prior to 2014. Both Dobkin and Kernes held strong anti-Maidan views before the pro-federal 
protest began in 2014. We therefore would expect them to act in a highly conflictual manner and use the 
pro-federal protest to bargain with the centre in Kyiv. Surprisingly, when the governing structures both in 
the centre and in the region changed and his political rivals were appointed to the key positions in the 
region, Kernes put his rivalries aside74 and sided with the new Ukrainian government and the new 
regional appointees, while Dobkin run for president, thus acknowledging the legitimacy of the new 
government (Protest Organiser 2 interview 28 09 2018). None prevented the security apparatus in 
Kharkiv from targeting pro-federal protestors. By contrast, the elites in Donets’k were cohesive and had 
almost no conflicts with each other, apart from commercial ones, prior to the events of 2014. However, 
in 2014, the Party of Regions disintegrated in Donets’k, and the local elites fragmented into those who 
 
74 In October 2012, prior to the Rada elections, Ihor Baluta, a Bat’kivschina deputy, who became Kharkiv regional 
governor in spring 2014, filed an appeal against Hennadiy Kernes on the grounds of unlawful political campaigning 
during the session of Kharkiv city council. See Pavel Kogachenko, “Kernes vyigral sud u politicheskikh 
opponentov”, Gorodskoi Dozor, 26 October 2012.  
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supported the aims of the radical pro-Russian protestors, albeit not consistently, and those who opposed 
them, such as the governor Taruta.  
This leads us to the broader issue of political competitiveness75 and its inability to explain why 
the elites in the regions acted in the way they did. Kharkiv can be characterised as a more competitive 
polity than Donets’k but being a more competitive polity tells only half of the story. Political 
competitiveness and elite fragmentation do not explain the cohesiveness of the elites’ behaviour in 
Kharkiv in spring 2014. Why would one polity become extremely cohesive in its attempts to eliminate 
political opportunities for radical activism and the other polity would become fragmented? The relatively 
insulated and closed nature of politics in Donets’k region does not explain the behaviour of Donets’k 
region’s elites. This is because in 2014 Donets’k region, previously considered to be politically 
impregnable, with the domination of the Party of Regions, emerged as a site of the most radical pro-
Russian contention. The more competitive region of Kharkiv, on the other hand, witnessed the gradual 
closure of political opportunities for the radical and then, later, moderate pro-federal activism. In late 
February – early March 2014, radical activists, such as the members of “Oplot,” were detained, and the 
elites methodically confronted the radicals and removed their flags from government buildings. Moderate 
activists came to the forefront of the Russian Spring protest wave in Kharkiv and headed all protests. 
Some activists complained that the radical activists “worked for [Kharkiv mayor] Kernes,” and there were 
persistent disagreements in all camps. The Security Service of Ukraine worked methodically and 
unhindered in neutralising the radical separatist threat in Kharkiv throughout the period.  
Political monopolisation or competitiveness are complex processes that do not happen overnight but 
develop over a long period of time. They are influenced by a variety of factors, such as the nature of the 
political economy (put simply, if a region has a more diversified economy, more people are engaged in 
varied productive activity, therefore, there are more chances for them to join different political parties; in 
regions where there are constant wage arrears at the enterprises, people dissatisfied with one party could 
 
75 Describing the conflict as a centre-periphery one is also not sufficient. Firstly, the concept of “centre-periphery” is 
not very precise in that it does not define the relations between the region and the centre in precise terms. The 
concept also fails to explain the behaviour of the regional elites at the start of the Anti-Maidan contention when the 
governing network in the centre was the same. Finally, as documented in the vast literature on federalism and 
conflict, the “centre-periphery” argument is more applicable to federal rather than unitary polities, to which Ukraine 
belongs.   
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always join another party), regional people’s preferences, certain institutional path-dependencies, 
psychological and historical factors. In keeping political opportunities open for a radical protest when the 
governing network changes, the elites are not motivated by these processes. After all, in Kharkiv people 
voted uniformly for the Party of Regions for a very long time, whereas there was plenty of intra-elite 
conflict taking place in between elections. Therefore, the local elites are motivated by more immediate 
concerns, such as their relations with different networks that govern the state. The question to ask, 
therefore, is what explains the puzzling behaviour of the local elites towards the local protest once the 
governing network in Kyiv changed?  
6. Definitions of elites  
I start with the definition of my key term “local elites”. In his book Patronal Politics, Henry Hale relies on 
Higley and Burton’s broad definition of elites as “persons who… “are able, by virtue of their authoritative 
positions in powerful organizations,” networks, and “movements of whatever kind, to affect… political 
outcomes” at the local and national level regularly and substantially.”76 Adapted to the post-Soviet 
context, Hale’s definition of elites is still quite broad and encompasses “the country’s machine bosses, 
oligarchs, and officials” (Hale, 2015, 11).   
As documented in numerous studies, in the post-Soviet context, the line between political and economic 
elites is extremely blurred (Interview with Journalist 1, 19 07 2019). Political and economic actors are 
tightly connected in the complex webs of clientelism, while political parties act as vehicles of specific 
economic interests (D'Anieri, 2006; Hale, 2015, 101; Sabic, C., and Zimmer, K. 2004, 116). In her detailed 
study of Donets’k region in late 1990s- early 2000s, Kerstin Zimmer argues that there was “[a] low degree 
of differentiation of political and economic system[s] and the predominance of personal networks over 
legal rules” (Sabic, C., and Zimmer, K. 2004, 112). She shows that there existed “strong relations between 
political decision-makers and economic actors [and] the direct political engagement of many oligarchs” 
(Zimmer, K.,2004, 290). She applies the term “administrative-economic groups” to describe the key 
groups of political and economic actors in the region (Zimmer, K.,2004, 308), which encapsulates the 
 
76 (Higley and Burton, 1989, 18) cited in (Hale, 2015, 11).  
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intimate links between these actors. In simple terms, this connection can be described as follows. Often 
the administrative actors in this relationship would protect the local business elites and promote their 
interests both in the region and nationally. In return, the local business elites would demonstrate a tax-
compliant behaviour and support the region’s social and cultural infrastructure financially (Interview with 
Journalist 1 19 07 2019) (Zimmer, K.,2004).  
In his discussion of the role of the elites in the Orange Revolution, Paul D’Anieri includes security 
personnel in his definition of the elites. According to D’Anieri, the actions of the security personnel who 
are able to control protests “are far more significant than previously appreciated “in determining whether 
protests ever grow beyond a small size, and therefore whether repressing them ever becomes a major 
issue” (Lynch, T.,2010). Putting security forces under the umbrella of “elites” poses a challenge to the 
major alternative explanation of the Donbas conflict that emphasises the Ukrainian state weakness as the 
primary cause of the conflict. It essentially means that state weakness is mediated through the behaviour 
of the local elites and that the local elites’ varying reaction (permissive or forbidding) to the local protest is 
still the most important explanatory variable. Given that in Ukraine the police and the security service are 
“separate structures” (Protest Participant in Kharkiv, Interview 28 08 2018), security forces and the police 
can be considered as “local elites,” if the local bureaucrats maintain identifiable links to them and in any 
way influence their behaviour. 
Based on these definitions and findings, in this study, local elites include political elites: these are regional 
bureaucrats such as governors, mayors, regional and city council secretaries and other members of the 
regional and city councils. These political elites were directly involved in the local Anti-Maidan, pro-
federal, and pro-Russian protest in Ukraine in 2013 – 2014 (Interview with Elite Member 1, 22 07 2019). 
The local courts are also included in the definition as they played a vital part in banning or allowing 
protests. The role of the economic elites in the protest is much harder to determine; however, given their 
tight connections with the local political elites, they are also included in the definition. The local economic 
elites are local enterprise directors with a significant stake in the region. It should be noted that most 
political elites in question had business interests in their respective regions. This is despite the fact that the 
Ukrainian law does not allow an office-holder to maintain a business (Ukrainian Constitution 22.02.2014, 
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Article 78). Finally, if the regional bureaucrats influenced the behaviour of the security personnel, the 
latter is also included in the definition.  
7. Political opportunity  
To explain why and how one region becomes a site of a violent conflict, I start with the discussion of 
political opportunity for protest. Sidney Tarrow defines political opportunities as “dimensions of the 
political environment that provide incentives for collective action by affecting people’s expectations for 
success or failure” (Brockett, 2005; Tarrow, 1998, 76 - 77). He further refines the definition of political 
opportunities in “Power in movement” (2011): they are “consistent – but not necessarily formal, 
permanent, or national – sets of clues that encourage people to engage in contentious politics” (Tarrow, 
2011, 32). It follows from this definition that political opportunity for protest can be a national as well as 
a regional phenomenon. It also follows that political opportunity for protest is inherently unstable.  
Researchers working within the social movements literature emphasise the external nature of 
political opportunity for protest (Tarrow, 2011, 163; Tilly, 1978, 133). According to Charles Tilly, political 
opportunity is “the relationship between a group and the world around it” (Tilly, 1978, 7). It is the 
“environmental cues” that drive groups to push forward new demands and seek the extension of existing 
benefits (Almeida, 2008, 13). Opportunities for protest come from outside of movements and are 
independent of their resources and level of organisation. In broad terms, political opportunities can 
include changes in the external environment, the weakness of the state, shifting domestic support for the 
regime, and the emergence of incoherent state policies (Goldstone, J., and Tilly, C. 2001, 183; McAdam, 
1982, 42).  
As political opportunities are external by nature, even weak or disorganised challengers can take 
advantage of them (Tarrow, 2011, 33); in this way, the opportunity structure includes opening 
institutional access to new actors (Tarrow, 2011, 165). In their work, Tarrow and Almeida highlight the 
fact that contending groups do not have to possess significant organisational resources in order to take 
advantage of the opening political opportunities. They can be weak and disempowered (Almeida, 2008, 
15). This corresponds strongly (with some caveats) to the empirical reality in Ukraine, as I demonstrate in 
the dedicated chapter on the process of protest in 2013 - 2014. The Anti-Maidan, pro-federal and pro-
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Russian activists had no prior experience in conducting large scale protests and confronting the 
authorities. Prior to 2014, some of them were operating on the margins of Ukrainian politics or even 
outlawed. The opening political opportunities for contention raised the level of their confidence in 
affecting the desired change and, in some cases, brought about radical contention (Goldstone, J., and 
Tilly, C. 2001, 180).  
Who creates political opportunities for protest? McAdam et al. (1996) provide a “highly consensual list” 
of four dimensions of political opportunity. Among these of interest is one dimension, namely “the 
presence or absence of elite allies” (Brockett, 2005, 16 - 17). In Brockett’s empirical account of 
contention in El Salvador and Guatemala, the “presence of elite allies” is one of the “crucial determinants 
of the success of contentious movements…” (Brockett, 2005, 33). Elites provide allies to the challengers, 
increasing their belief in a potential success (Almeida, 2008, 26). Similarly, the presence of elite allies is 
considered to be an important dimension of political opportunity structure by Goldstone and Tilly 
(Goldstone, J., and Tilly, C. 2001, 182; Tarrow, 2011, 165).  For Tilly and Tarrow and McAdam et al. 
(2001), certification, that is “an external authority’s signal of its readiness to recognise and support the 
existence and claims of a political actor” (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007, 34), is one of the mechanisms that 
explain the emergence of contention (McAdam et al., 2001). If it is interpreted as a signal, it means that 
certification is available not only to domestic actors but also to foreign actors.  
What concrete steps do the elites take in order to signal the opening of political opportunities for 
certain types of activism? In the context of liberalising regimes, Almeida, for example, includes “resource 
commitments and symbolic gestures emitted by liberalising states” (Almeida, 2008, 15). Not only emitting 
symbolic gestures, those who open political opportunities for protest can take concrete steps such as 
“officially registering and legalising non-governmental entities,” thereby sanctioning contention (Almeida, 
2008, 15). This account is highly congruent with what we encounter in Ukraine empirically in spring 2014. 
The local elites in both regions opened political opportunities for the Anti-Maidan contention in 2013 – 
early 2014 by sanctioning sporadic Anti-Maidan groups, establishing their own Anti-Maidan 
organisations, appealing to the Anti-Maidan groups for help against the Euromaidan, and generally not 
preventing them from engaging in contentious action. In Kharkiv, local political elites provided the major 
rhetorical devices, such as the federalisation argument, to the Anti-Maidan protestors. I therefore 
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consider political opportunity within the vein of most recent research on the nature of political 
opportunity, which highlights its interactive nature: it essentially focuses on the interaction between 
political actors, such as elites and activists. In her book on mobilisation in Argentina and Ukraine, Olga 
Onuch defines “the concept of “political opportunity structures” … [as] opportunities that are derived 
from the interaction of activists and political actors or institutions” (Onuch, 2015b, 36). In Tilly’ 
formulation, political opportunity also emerges through an interactive process. It is an action-and-
response process: “a contender which finds the government increasingly responsive to its overtures 
anticipates further responsiveness” (Tilly, 1978, 133).   
8. Why local elites open political opportunities for protest  
In both regions, the opening of political opportunities for the Anti-Maidan contention in 
November 2013 can be considered as a region-specific process. This process unfolded under the same 
informal governing network in Kyiv, that is Viktor Yanukovych’s Party of Regions network. Greater 
political protest potential generates an empirical expectation that the more challenged the elites are by 
opposition parties or ordinary people, the more virulently they would react to protest that is not in their 
interest.77 The Euromaidan protest therefore threatened to unseat the local elites, especially in Kharkiv. In 
line with the empirical expectation, owing to greater political protest potential in Kharkiv, its top political 
elites acted more aggressively towards the Euromaidan than did their Donets’k counterparts (Activist in 
Kharkiv, Interview, 16 07 2019). In this way, they opened political opportunities for alternative protest or 
Anti-Maidan. In some cases, the local elites used this alternative protest to directly counter the protest 
that was not in their interest, as it happened in Kharkiv.  
The opening of political opportunities for the Anti-Maidan activists in 2013 – early 2014 in both regions 
(and especially in Kharkiv) can therefore be interpreted in a classic instrumental sense as the regional 
elites’ attempt to fight against the loss of power.78 Charles Tilly writes in this regard: “members of the 
polity resist changes which would threaten their current realization of their interests even more than they 
seek changes which would enhance their interests. They fight tenaciously against loss of power, and 
 
77 Interest therefore is key, although Slater does allow for emotion to influence the elites’ actions (Slater, 2010).  
78 For some researchers, mass politics is considered the key variable. Slater, for example, argues that “mass politics 
threatens to introduce newly organised threats to property rights” (Slater, 2010).  
68 
 
especially against expulsion from the polity” (Tilly, 1978, 135). According to Tilly, the elites “would work 
against admission to the polity of groups whose interests conflict significantly with their own” (ibid.). 
Tarrow further highlights the key role elites’ interest plays in protest and the process of policy changes: 
“elites are unlikely to be persuaded to make policy changes that are not in their interest” (Tarrow, 2011, 
168).  Regional elites fight against the loss of power even more tenaciously because they are more 
proximate to their constituents than national elites. 
Additionally, as the local elites, especially in Donets’k, were used to one network – that is the network of 
Viktor Yanukovych and the Party of Regions - dominating the state, this created a set of expectations that 
this one network would continue to dominate (I discuss this below). Therefore, it could be argued that 
the local elites, especially the elites in Donets’k, opened the political opportunities for the Anti-Maidan 
because they were expecting Yanukovych to stay in power.79  
As alluded in Tarrow’s definition, political opportunities for protest are inherently unstable and even 
fleeting. Moreover, their relative openness and closure varies from polity to polity. For example, in his 
book on protest in Central America, Brockett demonstrates the inherently unstable nature of political 
opportunities. In the case of Ukraine, whether political opportunities for a radical pro-federal and pro-
Russian protest were opened or closed depended on the behaviour of the local elites, which, in turn, was 
conditioned by the change of the governing network in Kyiv.  
As the pro-federal and pro-Russian protest potential was rising in both regions (that is, we can control for 
protest potential), the main puzzle to explain is why in one region the local elites attempted to control the 
protest and resisted the radicals, while, in the other, they endorsed some of the radical protest’s aims and 
allowed the protest to slip out of control. If both regions begin with similar political opportunities open 
for protest – and in one region the elites react even more aggressively to a protest that is not in their 
interest – with the change in the governing network in the centre, the local elites’ behaviours begin to 
diverge. In one region, the opportunities for radical protest and, by extension, for the foreign actors’ 
 
79 There is some indirect evidence that due to the deference to their patron-in-chief Yanukovych, the local elites in 
Donets’k refused to engage in the talks on federalisation in November 2013 through to February 2014. In the past, 
the regional governor Anatoliy Blizniuk lodged federalisation proposals with Yanukovych. He was later reprimanded 
for doing so. In Kharkiv, the local elites engaged in the talks on federalisation due to to the long tradition of 
commenting openly on the politics in the centre.  
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intervention, were closed. In the other, they remained open. In this way, the local elites sent signals of 
their intentions to both the protestors and the external actors who had an interest in stoking the pro-
federal and pro-Russian protest. An external actor therefore might get involved in the conflict only after 
exploring options in all the regions susceptible to conflict. 
In this way, direct and radical protest action, such as storming and occupation of an important 
government building (such as the Security Service building from which weapons can be acquired), are not 
some primordial aspects, inherent in the nature of activists themselves and emerging independently of 
their political environment. These are highly contingent, as they emerge through the process of protest 
and opening and closing political opportunities. If activists are given reasonable confidence that they can 
achieve something by making radical claims, they will proceed with making radical claims. If they are not, 
then their claims will be moderate. The local elites give them that confidence. They send signals to both 
activists and foreign actors.  
In answering the question why the local elites react differently to the changes in the centre and how this 
impacts their actions towards the local protest - that is to explain the elites’ behaviour in more precise 
terms - I supplement the conceptual insights offered in the social movements literature by the concepts 
derived from the literature on patronage, political clientelism80 and, specifically, Henry Hale’s book 
Patronal Politics. This literature, in turn, derives its insights from the bigger literature on informal politics. 
According to the literature on informal politics, polities in the post-Soviet world are governed according 
to the rules of informal rather than formal politics (Grzymala-Busse, 2010; Hale, 2015).81 This is a very 
broad context within which politics in these countries function.  
I argue that the local elites encourage specific types of protest under certain conditions. Regional elites’ 
aspirations and calculations do not differ from those of the national elites. They are based on two 
fundamental considerations. Firstly, political elites want to remain in power (Easter, 2000; Hale, 2015, 47; 
Sabic, C., and Zimmer, K. 2004, 116), while business (or economic) elites want to keep their assets. As 
 
80 “Clientelism can be defined as a mode of social stratification in which clients and patrons are tied to one another 
in a mutually beneficial but unequal exchange” (Taylor-Robinson, M.,2006, 109).  
81 According to Grzymala-Busse, informal institutions are “the unwritten, unofficial rules that generate shared 




Paul D’Anieri has argued, “… it is certainly plausible to build our understanding of Ukrainian politics on 
the generalization that the vast majority of Ukrainian politicians are self-interested and concerned with 
gaining and holding power” (D'Anieri, 2006, 152).  
Secondly, as they are regional or local and not national elites, they want to continue accessing resources 
(Grzymala-Busse, 2010; Hale, H.,2007, 228 – 229; Robertson, 2011) to distribute to their constituents 
(Easter, 2000) and possibly themselves. The elites’ success in these endeavours does not hinge upon the 
abstract concepts of regional political competitiveness or centre-periphery relations but on the concrete 
past success of remaining in power and getting resources under different governing networks. 
Paradoxically, the more challenged Kharkiv elites unwaveringly sided with the new Bat’kivshchina-
dominated governing network in Kyiv in 2014, despite having had turbulent relations with it in the past. 
This was first alluded to me by a prominent Ukrainian journalist who argued that now late Kharkiv mayor 
and a (former) Party of Regions member Hennadiy Kernes “can survive under any regime” (Ukrainian 
institute, 2017).  
To put this in a broader context, I argue that the fundamental characteristic of the Ukrainian state is “a 
state of networks,” or, more specifically, a state governed by informal networks with significant regional 
bases. Political patronage and clientelism are the fundamental aspects of the informal politics that govern 
post-Soviet states such as Ukraine (Hale, 2015, 21). Within the early Soviet context, Easter defines a 
“personal network” as “a nonkinship, informal association, within which exists group feeling and 
intimacy as well as group norms of behaviour” (Easter, 2000, 12). Vadim Kononenko defines the 
networks governing Russia as “a means of social interaction which is less formal than those between and 
within state institutions (Steen 2003: 141). As such networks can be found both outside the state 
institutions but also incorporated within and passing through institutional divisions such as ministries and 
administrative hierarchies. In this regard, networks are always personal and link up individuals or groups 
that share similar interests, allegiances, and identification” (Kononenko, V.,2011, 6). These definitions 
point to the crucial aspects of networks, such as their personal nature and the shared background of the 
members of these networks.82  
 
82 See also (Sharafutdinova, 2010). 
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9. Concept of patronal politics  
To explain why the local elites in Kharkiv and Donets’k took different stances towards the changes in 
Kyiv and the local pro-federal and pro-Russian protest, I adapt Henry Hale’s concept of patronal politics 
and demonstrate that there are certain aspects of this concept that explain the behaviour of the regional 
elites. Hale defines “patronal politics” as “politics in societies where individuals organize their political 
and economic pursuits primarily around the personalized exchange of concrete rewards and punishments 
through chains of actual acquaintance, and not primarily around abstract, impersonal principles such as 
ideological belief or categorizations like economic class that include many people one has not actually met 
in person” (Hale, 2015, 9- 10). Hale then defines patrons and clients more precisely: “the most powerful 
people in these relationships can be called patrons, and more subordinate ones clients. Politics in 
patronalistic societies therefore revolves chiefly around personalized relationships joining extended 
networks of patrons and clients, and political struggle tends to take the form of competition among 
different patron-client networks” (ibid., 21). In the post-Soviet context, “patrons can be barons of 
business or the bosses of territorially circumscribed political machines” (ibid., 29). This corresponds to 
the empirical reality in Ukraine, where Viktor Yanukovych emerged as “the boss of [a] territorially 
circumscribed political machine,” that is the Party of Regions.   
At the basis of Hale’s concept of patronal politics is “actual acquaintance”. One, therefore, can 
expect “the core of many networks to be groups of people with long-standing and intense personal ties” 
(ibid., 36). Patrons are connected to clients through shared background. Moreover, the members of the 
same network can be acquainted with each other for a long time. In Ukraine, the Donets’k clan can be 
described as such a group, in which the ties between the core members of the group, such as Viktor 
Yanukovych, Rinat Akhmetov, Mykola Azarov and others, were long-standing and intense.  In Hale’s 
formulation, such acquaintance is part of “investment in one network”. Hale writes extensively on this 
investment that takes place primarily within one network: “networks in reality are “sticky”, with some 
people adhering to their own networks more strongly than others. This is because people have different 
degrees of investment in networks, which impacts their expected gains from staying or leaving” (ibid.). 
Hale highlights the importance of investment in a network and the density of interaction with other 
network members: “Investment has several forms. Sometimes it reflects the sheer amount of time one 
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has already been part of the network, or the density of interactions with other network members. Over 
time and with dense interaction, one can develop assets that enhance the gain one can expect from a 
network, assets like trust, reputation, clout, mutual understandings, and knowledge about how best to 
induce the different personalities in the network to do what you want them to do” (ibid.).   
Therefore, in Hale’s framework “investment” is primarily investment in one particular network. His 
definition of investment is also laden with certain cognitive aspects, such as knowledge and reputation, 
which apply across inter-network and intra-network elite relations. I discuss these below in the section on 
concentrated and diffused patronage.83 However, dense interaction with the members of competing 
networks can also be considered as a legitimate type of investment. It means that elites at the regional 
level are closely acquainted not only with the members of their preferred network but also with the 
members of competing networks. Additionally, investment can also be regional rather than national. At 
the regional level, in fact, sometimes the survival of the region and its political elites depends on the 
density of this interaction among the members of competing networks. This dense interaction contributes 
to the process of elite learning. Through this process, elites learn how to negotiate with the competing 
networks, how to use the resources of their preferred networks distributed across the political system, and 
what the competing networks prefer. Therefore, when the governing network suddenly changes in the 
centre, and no electoral contest precedes this change, the elites who have acquired the necessary 
negotiating skills through such process of iteration and learning start with a better negotiating capacity. 
Gzymala-Busse writes on elite learning, the iterative process in which different networks are engaged, and 
how these worked for the elites in Poland and Hungary: “The more elites are advanced on the basis of 
pragmatic competence rather than ideological orthodoxy … and the more these parties engage in 
informal negotiation with opponents and policy experimentation, the more diverse and useful the skill 
sets and reputations of elite actors”(Grzymala-Busse, 2010, 327).84 The section on concentrated and 
diffused patronage provides the discussion of elite learning under diffused and concentrated patronage.85  
 
83 For other types of patronage in the Russian regions, see (Sharafutdinova, 2010) 
84 The literature on authoritarian learning also offers some insights as to the information aspects of elite learning (for 
bibliography, see (Hall, 2017). 
85 Whether a polity evolves around diffusion or concentration of patronage depends largely on the nature of its 
political economy. As Hale observes at the national level in Russia: “divergence among post-communist countries 
… is likely to involve variation in levels of political competitiveness and control over the political economy” (Hale, 
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How do patrons build loyalty? Hale emphasises that patrons need to continue having access to valuable 
resources to reward those who remain loyal, to have a capacity for enforcement of punishments of those who 
are disloyal, and to monitor clients and “subpatrons” (Hale, 2015, 31). There are, however, situations when 
the patrons are absent from the centre. The regional elites, depending on their position within the system 
of patronage, react differently to the absence of a patron in the centre. For the elites who operate within 
the system of concentrated patronage, the absence of the patron presents problems because it cuts off 
their access to resources and endangers their positions in local government, unless they negotiate a viable 
deal with the centre. In our empirical case this was important for the elites in Donets’k region. For the 
elites in Kharkiv, who were operating within the system of diffused patronage, the absence of the patron 
meant that their disloyalty could not be monitored and punished. When they refused to endorse the 
radical pro-federal protest, Kharkiv elites ceased to be loyal clients of their former patron Yanukovych.  
10. Concentrated vs diffused patronage  
I argue that the local elites find themselves operating within a complex web of a specific regional 
patronage system. This system of regional patronage broadly describes the lines along which resources are 
delivered to the region and the “safeguards” that keep the elites in their seats and their assets protected. 
These lines (or personal networks) connecting the centre and the region are described by Easter as “a 
power resource [providing] an informal social structure by which information [is] exchanged, resources 
[are] obtained, and collaborative actions [are] planned” (Easter, 2000, 11). Holding constant other 
structural conditions, such as shared history and the presence of Russian speakers, as well as the aggregate 
pattern of the rising protest potential in both regions, we can argue that the main difference between the 
two regions of Donets’k and Kharkiv is the type of patronage that applies to their elites.  
As I demonstrate in Chapter 4, the centralised nature of Ukraine, in which governors have been 
appointed by the President, and its evolution into a state of networks acted as structural constraints on 
the regional elites. The second set of structural constraints is the nature of the political economy in the 
regions. These two structural constraints shaped the regions into diffused or concentrated patronage 
 
H.,2007, 247). As a result of privatisation deals in the 1990s, Donets’k emerged as a concentrated patronage region, 
whereas Kharkiv became a diffused patronage one because the enterprises there were mostly state-owned. Kharkiv 
was historically more pluralistic and more controlled by the centre, whereas Donets’k was not.  
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regions. The elites therefore functioned within a set of tight constraints shaped by the combination of the 
centralised nature of Ukraine and the nature of the regional political economy. Actual acquaintance of the 
elites at different levels through patronage eased these structural constraints.  
We can therefore distinguish between two types of patronage: diffused and concentrated. For 
one group of elites, their success in remaining in power and securing resources is premised upon their 
preferred network’s continuing presence in the centre (Zimmer, K.,2004, 290). These elites invest heavily 
in their preferred network, never switch to other networks86 and interact with the members of other 
networks only in cases of “political emergencies” (Kudelia, S.,2010; Kudelia and Kuzio, 2015). That is, 
these elites are placed within the concentrated patronage system. The other group of regional elites, by 
contrast, has been historically placed within the diffused patronage system, the resources of which it can 
successfully exploit. This group of elites is never strongly attached to one patron, even when this patron is 
ideologically allied with these elites or is known to have provided them with considerable resources.   
10. 1. Diffused patronage 
Under diffused patronage, the region benefits from access to two or more competing networks. 
It is effectively “plugged into” various patronage channels, through which resources are delivered. 
Predominantly state-owned regional enterprises do not depend on the largesse of any particular network 
but rather on how the key regional elites manage to utilise their political clout and extract resources from 
the centre. Elites in these regions exploit the links with their preferred networks. Ongoing conflicts 
between the members of competing networks are resolved by accessing resources of the preferred 
network distributed across the political system, including in the judiciary. Through the iterative process of 
confrontation with competing networks and cooperation with the preferred network, the regional elites 
acquire the knowledge of other networks’ preferences and loopholes in the political-judiciary system that 
they can exploit. This ensures the elites’ continuing access to resources and power. The centre is able to 
monitor the region more closely, that is information flows between the centre and the region are more 
transparent. Such transparency of information flows is ensured when the patrons of competing networks 
 
86 Rinat Akhmetov, the member of the Donets’k clan and the Party of Regions, was not known to switch to any 
competing network (Hale, 2015, 333) and was extremely cautious when negotiating with the main rival network of 
Bat’kivshchina  (Kudelia and Kuzio, 2015). 
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appoint their own clients to the top positions in the region. In Ukraine, Kharkiv region can be described 
as a classic “diffused patronage” region in which the regional governor Arsen Avakov (2005 – 2010) came 
from the network of President Yushchenko, Our Ukraine, and then switched to Bat’kivshchina, the two 
networks competing with the Party of Regions’ network which dominated the region. In Kharkiv, 
enterprises were state-owned and received subsidies and government contracts regardless of which 
network was in power.   
Diffused patronage regions can benefit from multiple, and not just one, patrons’ career rise to the 
centre. Easter writes on this in the context of the early Soviet state: “For the members of regional 
personal networks, prospects of advancement became linked to the careers of core network members. 
Core members who made it to the centre could play the role of patron much more effectively. Regionally 
placed clients benefitted from a patron’s proximity to the wellsprings of organizational resources. For this 
reason, the powers and resources allocated to particular regional organizational positions fluctuated with 
the political fortunes of centrally located patrons” (Easter, 2000, 34). When the governing network 
changes, the regional elites who were placed under the diffused patronage system are able to adjust to the 
change very quickly and use their clientelistic capital, such as negotiating skills and more transparent 
centre-region information flows, without having to resort to extended bargaining with the centre for 
preferential treatment. The elites operating within the system of diffused patronage are building resilience 
to survive under any network without having to negotiate major deals with the victorious network. In 
essence, the regional elites are not investing heavily in any patron, therefore, if a preferred network’s 
patron is ousted and the competing network becomes dominant, the regional elites in diffused patronage 
systems are able to adjust more quickly.87  
As under concentrated patronage, diffused patronage creates certain cognitive conditions for the 
members of competing networks. The iterative processes involved in elites’ confrontation and 
cooperation create expectations about the behaviour of other networks.  To paraphrase Kitschelt and 
Wilkinson, “the repeated [conflict] in exchange relations … makes the behaviour of the exchange partner 
appear predictable” (Kitschelt, H., and Wilkinson, S. 2007, 8). The cognitive expectations about the 
 
87 In fact, as one journalist noticed, there was no such thing as “Kharkiv clan”. See “Budushchie nardepy-
khar’kovchane: khar’kovskoe lobbi ili lobbisty iz Kharkova”, Status Quo, 5 October 2007. 
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behaviour of competing network members include the fact that network changes would almost invariably 
be followed by punishment of the disloyal and the marginalisation of alternative networks. If the elites do 
not learn that they would be marginalised if they resist the now-dominant network, they can expect 
appropriate punishments (Hale, 2015). In Ukraine, the diffused patronage region of Kharkiv witnessed a 
long-standing conflict between the representatives of the Party of Regions and the governor Avakov. 
After Avakov’s rise to the centre in February 2014, the Party of Regions members, such as Kernes and 
Dobkin, could expect retribution from Avakov had they encouraged radical pro-Russian protest in 
Kharkiv.  
Hale also argues that the changes in the constitution and formal electoral laws have effects on 
informal networks. He writes: “the most important function of a constitution … is ... to signal who (if 
anyone) is most likely to be patron-in-chief and to provide other focal points that help structure the way 
all these networks arrange and rearrange themselves”. “Constitutions,” he continues, “that declare a single 
dominant chief executive … shape expectations as to who wields ultimate power in a country” (Hale, 
2015, 10). Hale therefore distinguishes between the “divided-executive” constitutions when the Prime 
Minister is, by and large, independent from the President and is beholden to Parliament and “dominant 
chief executive”, when the President wields disproportionate power in the country. 
At the regional level, these periods of divided-executive and dominant chief executive affect local 
elites differently. For those who find themselves within the system of diffused patronage, the period of 
divided-executive is not a period of discoordination, pace Hale (Hale, 2015, 238), but a period when the 
region can “plug into” and exploit the resources of different networks. Through conflict with the 
competing networks, the elites learn about the preferences of the competing networks and the resources 
of their preferred networks that they can exploit. This ensures their political survival and the overall 
survival of the region. The elites in these regions therefore would discourage radical protest because it 
threatens their relations with the centre and rival networks.  
10.2 . Concentrated patronage  
Under concentrated patronage, regional elites’ investment is heavily concentrated in one network. Regional 
elites are able to remain in power and keep access to resources only when their preferred network 
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maintains constant access to power in the centre, be it in government or opposition. Political elites in 
concentrated patronage systems are isolated from other networks,88 while private enterprise is 
personalised and geared towards one network. Its owners have no experience of switching to and are 
extremely reluctant to cooperate with other networks. Due to the network members’ isolation from other 
networks and little inter-elite conflict, there are no iterative processes of elite learning taking place.  In the 
past, if the networks in the centre were reconfigured unfavourably, the network’s continuing access to 
power was ensured through the process of elite bargaining with the centre. 
Based on the insights from Kitschelt and Wilkinson on electoral clientelism, the system of concentrated 
patronage creates certain cognitive conditions, that is certain expectations about the behaviour of others 
within the network. As Kitschelt and Wilkinson write, “ongoing network of social relations generates widely 
held cognitive expectations about appropriate behaviour that in turn reduce monitoring efforts” 
(Kitschelt, H., and Wilkinson, S. 2007, 18). Through the iterative process of learning, “the repeated 
success of exchange relations” certain knowledge is created, including “the knowledge of the other side’s 
motivations and payoffs from alternative courses of action” (ibid., 8). This is consistent with Hale’s 
description of patronal politics in that it creates knowledge about the actions of others. In concentrated 
patronage regions, the behaviour of network partners is “predictable and low risk” (ibid.). The network 
members can therefore expect low transaction costs when exchanging with each other. Under 
concentrated patronage, the behaviour of other networks appears high risk, unless there are certain 
safeguards in place which are negotiated through bargaining. These cognitive conditions mean that the 
regional elites are always concerned that under a competing network, their access to resources can be cut 
off.  
When the networks are expected to change and there is an electoral contest preceding the change,89 the 
regional elites under concentrated patronage take time to adapt to the new networks, as history 
demonstrates. They might engage in the mobilisation of people for protest and bargaining to extract 
 
88 As Robertson alludes in his book on protest in Russia, elites in some regions can be isolated and not very well-
connected (Robertson, 2011, 16). 
89 Here I borrow the key insight from Hale on electoral contest: “a victory in a head-to-head high-stakes contest 
between rival networks can be among the most powerful shapers of expectations as to which network is likely to be 
dominant in the future” (Hale, 2015, 342). 
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preferential treatment from the centre90 or force a political change in the centre (D'Anieri, 2006, 139). In 
essence, they buy time in order to coordinate themselves in the new system. Over time, elites operating 
under concentrated patronage come to use certain stable bargaining ploys. If the network is completely 
ousted from power, and there is no electoral contest that allows the elites to bargain, re-coordinate 
around the emerging patrons and negotiate viable deals with these emerging patrons, then the regional 
elites fall back on the old bargaining ploys but the time lag between the ouster of the network and 
prospective success of bargaining extends.91 This is further aggravated if under the dominant chief 
executive, the regional elites’ preferred network acquired considerable power before the ouster of the 
chief patron and the collapse of the network.92 Hale writes on the situations when the formerly powerful 
network weaken, those who invest into these networks most heavily can fall into despair, but there are 
“creative entrepreneurs” (Hale, 2015, 97 - 98). In this regard, the Donets’k clan can be described as a 
network most prone to despair, while Kharkiv region as a “creative entrepreneur”.  
For the elites that find themselves within the concentrated patronage system, the periods of 
divided-executive are characterised by heavy investments into one network which continues to access 
power, be it in government or opposition. However, contrary to what Hale argues it is one network’s 
ascension to unlimited power and not the periods of divided-executive that truly discoordinates networks. 
If their preferred network acquires disproportionate power, the elites who are placed within concentrated 
patronage invest into this network even more. In fact the network’s acquisition of disproportionate power 
creates expectations among the regional elites that their preferred network will dominate in the future.93 
In this way, it disrupts the delicate balance of regionalism and creates a disequilibrium.  
 
90 Donets’k regional elites’ demand for federalisation in spring 2014 masked the desire to retain as much leverage 
over the regional affairs as it was under the old Party of Regions network; to continue operating under reduced 
transaction costs; to continue enjoying budgetary resources and be relatively isolated from other networks politically 
and economically; to avoid the danger of retaliation through the prosecutors and the Security Service of Ukraine. 
91 In the empirical literature on the Donbas conflict, this is referred to most commonly as “they overplayed their 
hand”, “they lost control of protest” (in Russian, “zaigralis”).  
92 Sabic and Zimmer describe a situation of concentrated patronage in the following terms: “the komanda cutting 
across all kinds of formal institutional differentiation: it links administration and parliament, different political 
parties, the media, and economic organisations and corporations”; “the komanda depends on the patron in the 
political centre and when he loses influence the komanda tends to dissolve” (Sabic, C., and Zimmer, K. 2004, 116)  
93 As Hale writes on expectations more specifically: “expectations, in fact, turn out to be a more fundamental 
determinant of patrons’ power than their resources or organization” (Hale, 2015, 34). If the regional elites expect 
one network to dominate, they will obey it.  
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In this way, Yanukovych’s presidency (or the period of one dominant chief executive)94 provided 
resources for Yanukovych’s most important constituents, such as Donets’k and Kharkiv regions, but it 
did irreparable damage to the inter-network relations. In essence, it disrupted the delicate balance of 
regionalism that served Ukraine so well in the past,95 in that it developed a sense of entitlement among 
the regional elites in Donets’k, lengthened their expectations about the network’s staying power and 
caused them to invest heavily into one network.96 When the network changed, the elites attempted to fall 
back on their old bargaining ploys but they miscalculated the time lag needed to adjust to the new 
dominant network. During this time lag the radical contention developed in the region.  
Finally, a word is in order on the Ukrainian government’s decision to launch a military operation 
in Donets’k region in mid-April 2014. This decision can also be explained by the reference to the local 
elites’ behaviour. In diffused patronage regions, the patrons of competing networks can monitor the 
clients of other networks by appointing the governors from their networks to these regions. It means that 
the information exchange is much more open in these regions (the leash is short); while in the closed 
configuration of concentrated patronage regions, the information flows are closed and it is impossible to 
monitor the region and the actions of the elites. This means that popular armed mobilisation can take 
place without much monitoring and with the complicity of the local elites. It means that the bargaining 
between the centre and the region will necessarily break down and that the military action would be 
necessary because the elites in concentrated patronage regions are not operating in a transparent fashion. 
It means that, to an extent, it is not the people who are the true rebels but the elites.  
H3: the local elites would encourage or discourage specific types of protest depending on the regional patronage system  
 
94 Under Yanukovych, Ukraine moved closer to the patrimonial type of polity. Easter writes on patrimonial polities: 
“… a patrimonial infrastructure refers to a personalistic arrangement, distinguished by the appropriation of state 
resources by those entrusted with their use” (Easter, 2000, 14). As opposed to the Weberian arrangement of 
bureaucracy, in this system the agents of the state are selected on the basis of patronage rather than on the basis of 
formalised administrative law and standardised procedures (14).  
95 Specifically, in the case of Ukraine, “regionalism” has had mostly a positive effect in the past. In the past, this 
resulted in a state of equilibrium, as noted by Ukrainian experts Gwendolyn Sasse and Paul D’Anieri. In fact, 
personal networks can help build and sustain state capacity, as has been demonstrated in Gerald Easter’s book on 
the early Soviet state.  
96 D’Anieri and Kuzio and Kudelia converge on the idea that eastern Ukrainian forces were leading Ukraine for a 




11. Conclusion  
The differences between the trajectories taken by Donets’k and Kharkiv regions have been intuited but 
not studied systematically. Scholars have overwhelmingly focused on the origins of the conflict in the 
Donbas and not considered comparatively the regions where conflict could have taken place but in the 
end did not. The major alternative approaches that have emerged from this discussion are the history and 
identity approach and the role of foreign actors approach. These approaches lie within the larger literature 
on civil wars, emotions and politics, and the role of foreign actors in instigating conflicts. I have 
demonstrated that the history and identity approach does not explain the occurrence of conflict in the 
Donbas because of the complexity of attitudes of the Donbas people to the events in 2014. This 
approach also does not take into account a structurally similar region where similar strong emotions were 
present and the propensity to protest violence was even greater. The role of foreign actors approach 
assumes too quickly that a foreign actor would get involved in the conflict straightaway. In this way, the 
causality is reversed and the foreign actor is blamed for the conflict. I have demonstrated that, with the 
role of certain Russian individuals at the incipience of the conflict being largely established, the 
involvement of the Russian state in the conflict was by no means assured. More importantly, Igor 
Strelkov, the external actor who arrived in mid-April in Donets’k region, could have appeared in a 
different region, provided the political opportunity was opened there for him. I therefore focused squarely on 
those who open the political opportunity for protest in the regions and those who exploit it before foreign 
actors arrive on the scene. These are the local elites and local activists. I have argued that we need to 
focus on the local elites, and I have built the theory of why the local elites would open political 
opportunities for activists. This theory posits that political opportunities for specific types of protest are 
inherently unstable. Local elites open these opportunities when they are challenged by a protest that is not 
in their interest. The main puzzle to explain, however, is why some local elites close political 
opportunities for a radical protest, whereas others keep them open. I have argued that the regional elites’ 
main objectives are to remain in power, to keep their assets, and continue accessing resources in the 
centre. In relation to these objectives, the regional elites find themselves positioned in the different 
systems of regional patronage. Under diffused patronage, the region benefits from access to a variety of 
networks, while the local elites come into conflict with competing networks through which they learn 
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about the preferences of these competing networks and how to negotiate with them. State ownership of 
regional enterprises ensures that the region is “plugged into” a variety of networks. The local elites 
therefore do not invest in any particular patrons and when their preferred patron is absent from the 
centre, they are able to adjust to the new networks more easily. Under concentrated patronage, by 
contrast, the regional elites invest more heavily into one network. When this network acquires 
disproportionate power, it lengthens these elites’ expectations and leads them to develop a sense of 
entitlement. When the network suddenly changes, the local elites are unable to adjust quickly to the new 
reality, taking time to bargain with the centre. It is precisely during this period of bargaining when the 
























Chapter 2: Tools of Trade: The Methodology  
1. Justification of a comparative case study 
Patton defines a case study as “an exploration of a “bounded system” or a case … over time through 
detailed, in-depth data collection, involving multiple sources of information rich in context. This bounded 
system is bounded by time and place, and it is the case being studied – a program, an event, an activity, or 
individuals” (Patton, 2014, 259). In more specific terms, as Yin puts it, “case studies are the preferred 
strategy when “how” or “why” questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over 
events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context” (Yin, 2003, 
1). 
My research project complies fully with Yin’s and Patton’s definitions of case studies. In my case studies, 
I look at the factors that have been missing in the literature - the local elites and activists. I pose the 
question “why and how a protest turned into a war97 in one case and not in the other”; I have no control 
over the events, as all of them happened in the past and the people who have been involved in these 
events reside in a different country; I also focus on a contemporary phenomenon. I have developed 
certain theoretical propositions to guide the research and I rely on multiple sources of evidence, such as 
newspaper reports, government documents, social media, blogs, videos, and interviews. According to 
Yin’s classification of different types of case studies, my case study is explanatory in that I seek out the 
mechanism that led to a war in one case and not in the other.  
My original intention was to compare Donets’k and Luhans’k regions. However, to avoid sampling on the 
dependent variable, I selected Kharkiv city, where no conflict took place, as the comparative case. In 
theoretical terms, the cases of Kharkiv city and Donets’k region warrant the use of a “most similar 
systems design” because of their similar initial conditions. In such a design, one looks at cases which 
share most characteristics, such as political (the governing system) and cultural (for example, linguistic) 
(Przeworski and Teune, 1970, 32). More specifically, in such designs, “common systemic characteristics 
are conceived as “controlled for,” whereas intersystemic differences are viewed as “explanatory variables” 
 
97 I deliberately omit calling the war in Ukraine an “internal” or “inter-state” war in this chapter, as explained in the 
theory chapter. The best definition of this war that has been offered in the academic literature seems to be Vladimir 
Rauta’s definition - an “internationalised civil war” (Rauta, 2016).  
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(ibid., 33). As a result, the factors shared between the two systems are omitted from the analysis and the 
researcher looks for variables that differentiate these systems as explanatory variables (ibid., 34). Kharkiv 
and Donets’k do indeed share similar structural conditions, such as history, the number of Russian 
speakers, and geographical proximity to Russia. The case of Kharkiv has been touched upon in the 
academic literature and journalistic reports, but it has not been studied systematically. Upon my own 
investigation, I observed similar protest dynamics in both Kharkiv city and Donets’k region during the 
“Russian Spring”. When investigating the “Russian Spring” in Donets’k region at the early stage of this 
project, I found some references to Kharkiv’s local elites and activists in pro-Russian activists’ testimony. 
Finally, one of the protest organisers in Kharkiv told me in an interview that there was always a possibility 
of an armed conflict in Kharkiv (Protest Organiser 1 Interview 24 09 2018). I therefore decided to select 
Kharkiv city as the “negative case”.  
Why did I choose Donets’k rather than Luhans’k region to compare with Kharkiv? There are several 
reasons for bounding the case geographically to Donets’k region rather than Luhans’k. Donets’k was the 
first city in the Donbas where a major pro-Russian protest took place on 1 March 2014, with around ten 
thousand people gathering on Lenin Square between 1 and 6 March. It was also the first city in the 
Donbas where pro-Russian protesters seized a government building, managed to stay there for nearly a 
day, and elected a people’s governor. After this, pro-Russian contention diffused very quickly in Donets’k 
region. It was in the town of Slov’’ians’k in Donets’k region where important government buildings were 
seized by the local separatists and Russian non-state actors on 12 April, making way for the first military 
action by the state from 13 April 2014.  My units of analysis therefore are the geographical units of 
Kharkiv city, Donets’k city, and various smaller towns in Donets’k region, where the Euromaidan, Anti-
Maidan, and Russian Spring protests took place (e.g. Slov’’ians’k, Mariupol and Horlivka); local elites; and 
pro-federal and pro-Russian movements.  
There are some inherent issues with case studies. For example, they have been criticised for having little 
generalisability potential. Yin, for example, writes that the goal of a case study should be a “generalising” 
and not a “particularising” analysis (Yin, 2003). Patton (2015, 424 – 426) advocates the following safe 
strategy of generalising from case studies: “we generalise most confidently when we can specify 
completely and exactly a. which parts of one variable b. are related to which parts of another variable c. 
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through which mediating processes. d. with which salient interactions, for then we can transfer only those 
essential components to the new application to which we wish to generalise. The strategy here is breaking 
down the finding into competent parts and processes so as to identify the essential ones”. In other words, 
we can break down the mechanism we are interested in into its constituent parts and see if these parts 
work to produce an outcome in other political settings. This can work particularly well across cases within 
the same country. In my case, the key mediating processes are elites’ and activists’ behaviours and the 
salient interactions are the interactions between these actors.  
2. Mixed methods research design 
I use qualitative research design with some quantitative elements, such as protest cataloguing and 
content analysis. I do not use complex statistical methods, such as regressions, due to the small-scale 
nature of the protest under study and the limited number of cases (small-N). Creswell and Plano-Clark 
describe a mixed methods research design as “the type of research in which a researcher … combines 
elements of qualitative and quantitative … approaches … for the purposes of breadth and depth of 
understanding and corroboration” (Creswell and Plano-Clark, 2011, 4). The advantages of a mixed 
methods research derived from this definition therefore are: 1. The inclusion of multiple points of view; 
2. The depth and breadth of analysis; 3. Triangulation and corroboration.  
Creswell defines qualitative research as “an approach for exploring and understanding the meaning 
individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem” (Creswell, 2014, 42) and how this is related 
to participants’ views and experiences. In quantitative research design, researchers bring their own 
meaning into the research process, the main aim being to test theories from which such meanings may 
emerge. By contrast, in qualitative research, the subjects of research – interview participants, social media 
users – create meaning, which researchers are there to uncover and report in their research. More broadly, 
qualitative research designs help uncover the intricacies of the key actors’ behaviour, how their 
interpretations of the given information influence their behaviour, and how the aggregation of the key 
actors’ behaviour brings about the outcome of interest. Not only seeking meaning that participants 
ascribe to a certain phenomenon or situation, qualitative research design is also usually used if a concept 
or phenomenon needs to be explored and understood because little research has been done about it. 
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Qualitative approach may be needed because the topic is new, and existing theories do not apply with the 
particular sample or group under study (Creswell, 2014). For my purposes, the reason why I use 
qualitative research design is because the topic under study has not been explored in enough detail. There 
are academic articles and journalist reports about it, but no one, to my knowledge at least, has examined 
the Donbas conflict comparatively.  
In accordance with the traditional qualitative research design, I apply both deductive and inductive types 
of logic to the research design. The deductive logic uses certain theoretical propositions derived from the 
empirical and theoretical literature that guide the data collection and analysis. In my case, such 
propositions are concerned with the specific patterns in the key actors’ behaviours. These are derived 
from my reading of the theoretical literature. Deductive logic helps sift through the data to look for 
patterns and themes, so it stops being the case that “everything is relevant”. 
It is very important, however, to stress that deductive logic is not sufficient. It needs to be constantly 
refined, as one goes systematically through the data. Some theories of mobilisation and wars tend to be 
highly rigid and even too simplistic, as they do not allow for variation of experiences, chance, and the 
general “messiness” of social reality, particularly in such complex circumstances as war onset. It is very 
important therefore to be open to “inductive insights,” that is insights not predicted by theories, as they 
introduce complexity to the discussion and, via this complexity, draw us closer to the reality. For this, 
inductive logic is adopted (Blaikie, 2007, 9). Thus, I observe data as I go along and then establish patterns 
or themes emerging from the data that refine or even refute the theoretical propositions derived 
deductively.  
2.1 Process tracing method  
Process tracing is one of the methods within the qualitative research tradition. According to George and 
Bennett, “the process-tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal 
chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the 
dependent variable” (George and Bennett, 2005, 206) or, more specifically, it is “… the analysis of 
evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within a case with the purposes of either 
developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might actually explain the case” (Bennett, 
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A., and Checkel, J. 2015, 7). Causal mechanisms can be defined as “ultimately unobservable physical, 
social, or psychological processes through which agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific 
contexts or conditions, to transfer energy, information, or matter to other entities” (George and Bennett, 
2005, 137). In other words, a causal mechanism can be conceptualised as composed of entities or actors 
that undertake activities, which produce change (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, 29). In its analytic template, 
process tracing identifies who the relevant actors are, how their preferences are formed, how they choose 
their action, and how their behaviours are aggregated to produce an outcome (Schimmelfennig, F.,2015, 
106). 
The main distinguishing characteristics of process tracing are theoretical “eclectism”, the use of multiple 
sources of evidence, consideration of biases in the sources (Bennett, A., and Checkel, J. 2015, 21), and the 
engagement with alternative explanations (also called “equifinality”).  “Theoretical eclectism” is essentially 
an assembly of propositions gathered from different theories (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, 35). As outlined 
above, processes or mechanisms consist of parts, and different theories can offer different predictions 
about the behaviour of each part. Therefore, a certain degree of such “eclectism” is necessary to achieve a 
fuller explanation. This is particularly relevant to the present case, since there is no single theory about 
why protests turn into a war. Different theoretical propositions will have to be amalgamated to see if they 
predict the behaviour of the key actors and how this behaviour contributes to the outcome of interest. 
The best works using process tracing have used written, oral and video (or media) data to substantiate the 
processes they sought to describe. In these works, such sources were constantly combined and checked 
for congruity and incongruity, rather than used on their own (Checkel, 1997; Onuch, 2015b; Shesterinina, 
2014; Wood, 2003) . They were “equally tough” on the potential biases in their sources, such as editorial 
or personal biases.  
With regard to its attention to alternative explanations, process tracing “casts the net widely for alternative 
explanations, including theoretical explanations in the academic literature, the more context-specific 
arguments that historians or regional or functional experts have offered, the implicit theories of 
journalists or others following the case, and the understandings participants have about what they are 
doing and why they are doing it” (Bennett, A., and Checkel, J. 2015, 18 - 21).  
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Beach and Pedersen (2013) distinguish between theory-testing, theory-building, and explaining-outcome 
types of process tracing. I follow Elizabeth Wood (2003) and Anastasia Shesterinina (2014) and use the 
explaining-outcome type of process tracing. This is justified on the grounds that the case is very recent 
and has not been explored in enough depth to test theories. Only certain theoretical predictions about the 
behaviours of the key actors and how they bring about an aggregated outcome can be tested.  
Overall, the use of the process tracing method is justified on several grounds. Process tracing is 
particularly suitable for accounting for and explaining a complex phenomenon (George and Bennett, 
2005, 206). Protests and wars are inherently complex phenomena, especially now, as there are not only 
much greater number of actors with complex behaviours involved in them, to whom much greater access 
can be gained than before, but there are also infinite streams of information that run between and among 
these actors and shape their reactions to the events and behaviours. These make modern conflicts 
inherently complex to study.  Process tracing also helps us avoid making sweeping generalising or 
probabilistic statements, as, for example, is practice in international relations research (George and 
Bennett, 2005); thus it makes the research output more fine-grained. Finally, because the transition from 
protest activity into a war is a process in itself, then this conceptualisation invites the use of process 
tracing.  
Some scholars criticise process tracing for being essentially a narrative account of a process, with all the 
pitfalls of narrative accounts, such as being too descriptive and paying little attention to theory (George 
and Bennett, 2005). With the study of wars and protest, it is more problematic to avoid narrative, as 
processes unfolding before our gaze are highly dependent on the temporality and sequence of events. 
Avoiding narrative in an account of a war onset would result in unnecessary repetition and omissions of 
key explanatory variables, based on such temporality and sequence.  
Finally, it is important to offer some discussion of the “critical juncture,” as identifying critical junctures is 
part of the practice of using the process tracing method. There can be major differences in the views of 
the researchers and the actors who are in the midst of the events on what the critical junctures in any 
given process are. In my interviews with some protest participants and activists in Kharkiv, the events of 
6 to 8 April 2014, when the attempt to establish Kharkiv People’s Republic was aborted and the pro-
88 
 
federal protestors were evicted from Kharkiv regional administration building, were identified as the 
critical juncture. Activist from Donets’k identified 26 May “when the war came to Donets’k” as the 
critical juncture. However, as a researcher looking very closely at the process of protest and the behaviour 
of the regional elites and someone who is not affected by the subsequent events, I identify the change of 
the governing network in Kyiv in February 2014 as the critical juncture from both the theoretical and 
empirical point of view. I elaborate on this in the dedicated chapter.  
2.2. Protest or event cataloguing  
Process tracing usually points to the underlying patterns explaining events. On the other hand, protest or 
event cataloguing describe the aggregate patterns of protest. I have therefore used protest cataloguing to 
test the hypotheses about political protest potential and protest intensity in the Ukrainian regions.98 I 
found that there are certain aggregate patterns of protest that can only be explained by using process 
tracing. For example, event cataloguing pointed that Russian flags, the flags of the radical movements 
such as Donetsk Republic, and chants “Russia” were present at almost all protest events of the “Russian 
Spring” in Donets’k, whereas in Kharkiv the chant “Russia” and Russian flags gradually disappeared after 
16 March. Radical protest as such failed to emerge in Kharkiv. This was not because of the signals from 
the external patron Russia, which sent signals to all the regions in the south-east of Ukraine. Process 
tracing revealed how the political opportunities for radical protest were opened by the local elites in 
Donets’k and how these were used by activists. Similarly, aggregate patterns of attacks on ordinary people 
and violence against the elites can be explained by the inter-elite conflict.  
3. Why do Internet research  
Contrary to what I originally thought, for Kharkiv, there is a plethora of websites, of different ideological 
hues, which reported on the events of the Euromaidan and Russian Spring. There are fewer Internet 
resources on the Donets’k region. The two major Internet newspapers for Donets’k are Novosti Donbassa99 
 
98 The codebook is based on all the codebooks found in (Ketchley, 2017) and Neil Ketchley’s lecture notes. See 
(della Porta, 1995); Tilly, Charles. 1966. “Disturbances in France, 1830-1860 and 1930-1960,” Interuniversity 
Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor: Michigan; McAdam, Doug, John McCarthy, Susan Olzak 
and Sarah Soule. 2009. “Dynamics of Collective Protest in the U.S. 1960-1995.” 
99 http://novosti.dn.ua/.  
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and Ostro.org.100 Both reported prolifically on the events in 2013 – 2014, albeit, due to their strong pro-
Ukrainian stance (Oleksiy Matsuka, the chief editor of Novosti Donbassa, was a member of Bat’kivshchina 
for a long time),101 they might have underreported the extent of radicalism in Donets’k. For example, 
after the storming and occupation of the regional administration building on 6 April, they cited numerous 
sociological surveys demonstrating that the people of the Donbas wanted to remain in Ukraine and that a 
potential for radical separatism in the Donbas was small. I therefore had to corroborate their data with 
the data on Vkontakte (Vk.com), blogs and interviews. Novosti Donbassa provide an excellent archive 
(dating back to 2003), which I perused for the chapter on the elites. Some other substantive detail on the 
elites had to be corroborated with the Ukrainian laws, other Internet archives, as well as the interviews 
with the elites and activists.  
Internet newspapers, such as Status Quo and MediaPort, provided good archives dating back as far as 2000, 
which I used for the chapters on Kharkiv. Using key word search and corroborating on key words eased 
research efforts. As someone with a solid experience of painstakingly leafing through printed press in 
physical archives, I must say using the Internet allowed me to cover greater date range and greater variety 
of subjects. I also took advantage of the recent move towards transparency in government in Ukraine and 
corroborated specific data on the local elites and statements by the elites across with the government 
publications, such as Holos Ukrayiny102 and the Verkhovna Rada website.103  
For all its flaws, social media platform Vkontakte (Vk.com) proved to be an excellent source of 
information and a medium to get access to people. For example, I was able to get information about the 
views of and the events organised by the “younger movements”, such as Donetsk Republic and Pavel 
Gubarev’s Narodnoe Opolchenie Donbassa (People of Donbas’ Self-Defence) via Vk.com. Vk.com proved 
indispensable when collecting information about the events organised by and views of the various pro-
federal and pro-Russian movements in Kharkiv as well. Some recruitment into these movements was 
 
100 https://www.ostro.org/.  
101 “Donchane uchatsia nenavidet’ svoego mera”, Novosti Donbassa, 31 July 2006.  




undertaken via Vk.com. In the absence of contacts in Ukraine, Vk.com and Facebook became my main 
gateways to activists, local elites, political scientists, and ordinary people.  
4. Internet newspapers  
Journalist reports have been extensively used both in historical and sociological research. Often, 
however, such research focuses on the study of representations of certain phenomena, situation or 
individual in the news. For example, in a book about British Muslims in the news, Elizabeth Poole 
examines the representations of British Muslims and Islam in several leading broadsheet newspapers after 
the two major world events, the 9/11 and the 2003 war in Iraq (Poole and Richardson, 2010). The logic 
and strategy of such research is often critical discourse analysis (Baker et al., 2013).  
In this book I do not use critical discourse analysis, although my reading on critical discourse 
analysis has helped me to approach newspaper reports more critically. My use of newspaper reports is 
limited to establishing the chain of salient events that occurred in the Ukrainian regions between 2002 and 
early 2014 that involved the local elites and activists. Newspaper reports are useful primarily because they 
help establish such key events on the ground. Reports can help structure interviews with protest 
organisers, participants, and elites and do further triangulation with the social media. At the same time, it 
does not mean that I accept news reports uncritically. In fact, Beach and Pedersen 2013 argue that 
newspaper reports on their own should not be used for the purposes of process tracing, and the 
information in them has to be triangulated with the information derived from other data sources. This is 
corroborated with the insight derived from the critical discourse analysis described above. The main 
premise of critical discourse analysis in relation to news is the fact that news reports are often carriers of 
certain ideologies. Representations in the media are restricted by space and time limitations; journalists 
prioritise certain events, as well as certain people’s perspectives or opinions, over others (Baker et al., 
2013). This is especially relevant to the current conflict during which we have witnessed editorial bias and 
thinly veiled propaganda in newspaper reports. Newspaper reports can also be too general or too 
imprecise. Finally, on a deeper level, reports can be skewed or clustered towards certain events, which are 
deemed key to the participants or journalists, depending on their political affiliation. This can actually 
influence the course of protests, as reports influence- or not - the behaviour of people who read them, 
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depending on how aware the people are of other, less known, events. To illustrate, there was a lot of 
reporting about the murder of Dmytro Cherniavskiy, a member of Svoboda party and pro-Ukrainian 
protester, by a group of (presumably) pro-Russian protestors in Donets’k on 13 March 2014. This murder 
received much attention in the press and was considered as one of the pivotal events in the escalation to 
the internal war by many journalists and activists (Interview with Activist from Donets’k 27 07 2019). 
Yet, according to pro-Russian activists, the clamp down on by the National Guard on pro-Russian 
protestors in Mariupol on 16 April, when allegedly more than 40 people were killed, failed to receive any 
reporting on the scale of that of Cherniavskiy’s murder.104  
Taking into account editorial biases in the press, this is how I dealt with them: 
- An Internet newspaper was deemed to be “pro-government” (Yanukovych government) or 
strongly “pro-status quo”, if it did not report any significant protest action and if it reported too 
much entertainment and news about other countries, thus directing the readers’ attention away 
from the current problems. This meant that I had to either reject this newspaper or corroborate 
the evidence provided in the newspaper across with other newspapers;   
- If there was too much focus on the protest action in a newspaper, and some of this reporting was 
of questionable quality (for example, 057 reported that one of the Euromaidan protest 
organisers, Dmytro Pylypets, was attacked and “12 knife wounds,” which is clearly lethal, was 
inflicted on him, but he survived)105, then I had to corroborate across with other newspapers and 
Youtube videos to establish the veracity of claims;  
- Locally-based journalists, such as those of Novosti Donbassa, command sufficient amount of detail 
to present a more nuanced picture, therefore their output was most trusted;  
- A newspaper was judged as relatively impartial if it contained articles presenting different points 
of view; if the actions of the members of competing networks were reported proportionately to 
each other; if the newspaper did not shy away from dealing with technical matters, such as the 
budget. In this regard, Status Quo for Kharkiv was the best source; 
 
104 “Yuriy Lutsenko i storonniki federalizatsii v Donetske”, YouTube, 22 April 2014, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8OE6cStoFks. 
105 “Ocherednoe napadenie na khar’kovskii “evromaidan”: Dmitrii Pilipets s nozhevymi raneniiami popal v 
“neotlozhku” (video)”, 057, 25 December 2013.  
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- Some national newspapers, such as Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, published excellent, detailed articles on the 
Donbas;  
Below I present a detailed account of the sources I have used for each of my cases.  
4.1. Kharkiv 
According to an article published in February 2014, Kharkiv was “a city of electronic means of mass 
communication,”106 therefore it was logical for me to make use of local Internet newspapers. The list of 
these newspapers was taken from the article.107 Below I present a table of the local, national, and 
international Internet newspapers I have used for protest cataloguing and qualitative process tracing for 
Kharkiv. I have included only those with the archive function.  
Table 7. Kharkiv Internet newspapers 
Source Archive function Dates Language Value Used?  










Slobids’kiy Kraii Yes 2013 - 2014  Ukrainian Enough detail; a 
lot of 
information 
about the  
actions of and 
statements by 
the local elites  
Yes  
 
106 Lilia Angorskaia, “Chto proishodit s khar’kovskoi pressoi i skol’ko v nei “dzhinsy”. Rezul’taty issledovaniia”, 
Gorodskoi Dozor, 20 February 2014.  





Yes 2014 Russian  Yes, to a 
limited extent  
Status Quo Yes 2002 - 2014 Russian Used for the 





Yes 2002 – 2014 Ukrainian Reporting on 
local events is 
sparse 
Yes  




Censor.net Yes 2013 - 2014 Russian Very anti-elite Yes  







Many Ukrainian Internet newspapers are characterised by either a strong pro-social movement 
(Euromaidan) or pro-elite bias. Therefore, each newspaper had to be considered in its own right.  
Thankfully, most of the basic data on protests, such as dates, demands, and organisations participating in 
protest, except for the number of protestors (discussed below), were mutually corroborated in the 
newspapers, which meant I did not have to triangulate data for each single protest event. As the Russian 
Spring went on, with some newspapers adopting a strongly anti-Russian stance, others being more 
faithful to good standards of reporting, and still others taking a pro-elite stance, these biases exacerbated. 
More concretely, it meant that some events were included, others omitted, and yet others were occupying 
a disproportionate amount of space. As a result, with some newspapers, I had to “trawl through” the 
entire archive to make sure I did not miss anything. Such “trawling through” process was also inevitable 
due to the inadequate nature of the search engines on some of the sites and the ubiquitous 
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“entertainment”, Russian108  and, in some instances, prolific pro-Yanukovych,109 news, which practically 
“drowned” the news pertinent for the research. Below I discuss each newspaper in turn.  
To protest catalogue the Euromaidan phase and partially the Russian Spring phase in Kharkiv, I chiefly 
relied on the 057 Internet newspaper. The source espouses strong pro-Ukrainian views and is sceptical 
towards the local elites. It faithfully reported the Euromaidan protests but could have easily exaggerated 
the viciousness of the Anti-Maidan action in Kharkiv, such as the number of titushki (groups of young 
men) who attacked the Euromaidan protesters and the seriousness of their attacks. Violence against 
journalists might have been exaggerated too.110 In order to discredit the local elites, the actions by the 
police might have not been reported properly either. For example, it was reported by the 057 that on 2 
December 2013 during the provocations and violence against the Euromaidan, no one was detained. Yet 
two other sources maintain that 4 people were detained.111 More importantly, in the 057 the events of the 
Russian Spring were inadequately reported,112 which necessitated corroboration with the evidence from 
other newspapers, social media platforms, and interviews. For example, I interviewed one of the activists 
in Kharkiv who confirmed to me that the aggressiveness of titushki was substantial. He described a great 
number of titushki (as many as 200) participating in the Anti-Maidan protest and pointed that many of 
them were bussed in from Russian regions adjacent to Kharkiv (Interview with the Activist in Kharkiv, 16 
07 2019).  
By contrast, Khar’kovskie Izvestiia, and Slobids’kii Kraii espoused strongly pro-elite113 and pro-status quo 
views, hence the vast majority of the local elites’ statements made during both phases of political protests 
were taken from these sources. They also completely abstained from reporting on the Euromaidan in 
Kharkiv, although their reporting on the Russian Spring phase was quite satisfactory, with information on 
the number of protesters, organisations participating, their demands, and their repertoire of contention. I 
 
108 “V Sochi startovali pervye sorevnovaniia Olimpiady”, Vechernii Kharkov, 6 February 2014. 
109 “Kompromis potryben i vladi i opozytsii – holova Kharkivs’koii oblrady”, Slobids’kiy Kraii, 31 January 2014; 
“Kievskii politolog Yuri Gorodnenko: Nadezhda na Yugo-Vostok”, Kharkovskie Izvestiia, 28 January 2014. 
110 “Marsh evromaidanovstev, vzryvy petard, izbitye zhurnalisty i tolpa “titushek” s bitami na ploshchadi: kak 
Kharkov perezhil Den’ studenta (foto)”, 057, 26 January 2014. 
111 “Sud vynes prigovor parniam, zapustivshim feiierverki vo vremia mitinga na ploshchadi Svobody”, Vechernii 
Kharkov, 3 December 2013. 
112 The anti-Russian bias of 057 and somewhat dictatorial editorial policy can be gauged from the fact that the 
journalists banned commenting in March 2014.  
113 “Kompromis potriben i vladi i opozytsii – holova Kharkivs’koii oblrady”, Slobids’kiy Krai, 31 January 2014.  
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witnessed a veritable evolution of the reporting in these newspapers, thereby they gradually became 
“more serious”, eliminating entertainment, Russian and Soviet style what-aboutist world news almost 
completely by the time the Russian Spring reached its peak in early April.  
  With regard to the comments on news made by readers, I discovered during the early stage of 
the research that reading those comments yielded some useful local information, especially when people 
commented on what they saw and tried contradicting journalists. This was however very inconsistent and 
I came across such comments extremely rarely. The vast majority of the comments contained empty 
rhetoric (see the coding manual) and aggression (srach). Due to the extremely large amount of comments 
(on Colonel Cassad’s blog, comments could run up to 500 pages), I either sifted through the comments 
very quickly, read only the first couple of pages, or omitted them entirely.  
Numbers of protesters could have often been exaggerated or underreported according to whichever bias 
– pro-Russian or pro-Ukrainian – the newspaper exhibited.114 During the Russian Spring phase especially, 
pictures would often show a lot more people than was reported in the newspaper. An example of the 
deficient reporting on numbers can be seen from an article published on 25 November 2013 in 
Khar’kovskie Izvestiia, where it claimed that Kharkiv Euromaidan was attended by several hundred of 
people, while according to the organisers’ data, it was attended by 2000 people and according to the 
police, by 300.115 
4.2 Donets’k  
Below is the list of local and international Internet newspapers with the archival functions used for this 





114 See for example here LiveJournal user mikle1 attempting to count the numbers of protesters in Kharkiv and 
blaming the Ukrainian media for under-reporting https://mikle1.livejournal.com/3869876.html; 
http://archive.is/il5M5.  
115 “Kharkovskii Evromaidan sobral neskol’ko soten chelovek”, Khar’kovskie Izvestiia, 25 November 2013.  
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Table 8. Donets’k Internet newspapers 
Source Archival 
function 
Dates Language Value Used?  
Novosti 
Donbassa 


















on the actions 
and statements 









on the actions 
and statements 









on the actions 
and statements 
of the local 
elites 
Yes  




on the actions 
and statements 




Novosti Donbassa116 and Ostro.org117, both (formerly) based in Donets’k, were my most extensively used 
sources of information on the local events in Donets’k and the region. For the Euromaidan phase, I 
relied heavily on Novosti Donbassa, as it contained most reports (granted the vast majority of the 
Euromaidan protests took place in Donets’k). Both sources were noted for their high level of journalistic 
standards but also for their pro-Ukrainian bias.118 Novosti Donbassa was indispensable for the Russian 
Spring equally.119 Despite its advantages, however, sometimes the Novosti Donbassa reporters did not treat 
the pro-Russian protests and the ensuing insurgency seriously enough. For example, when Donets’k 
governor Taruta’s office was attacked in late March 2014, they cited a printed newspaper that offered a 
 
116 http://novosti.dn.ua/ . 
117 http://www.ostro.org/ . 
118 Novosti Donbassa is financed by the Freedom House.  
119 The editor in chief Oleksiy Matsuka, for example, says in this video that they went to all the anti-government 
meetings in Donets’k region from the beginning of the Maidan. See “V Donets’ke neskol’ko chelovek otkryli 
“Vostichnyi Front” – video”, Novosti Donbassa, 22 February 2014.  
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truly Bakhtinian interpretation of the events as if they were a festival or a spectacle, with no lasting 
importance (the headline read “[In Taruta’s office] they’ve eaten all the candies”- “V offise ISD s’eli vse 
konfety”).120  
I have also used Factiva database of newspapers.121 Most of these sources were English language, 
although I set the search for German and Polish, as there were reporters in Donets’k from Germany and 
Poland, especially during the Russian Spring phase. Most specialised and trusted newspapers, such as the 
Reuters, BBC Monitoring Ukraine & Baltics, Interfax-Ukraine, Financial Times, Unian, Ukrainian News 
Reports, Radio Free Europe, were consulted, while less specialised (some of which are perhaps more 
sensationalist) ones, such as the Daily Mail and various national newspapers (Iran, Vietnam, Philippines) 
were omitted. Some reports were quite detailed, although most did not contain a lot of detail on the 
meetings and activists. I had to triangulate the data with the reports from other newspapers, social media 
accounts and interviews.  
I also used the local Internet newspapers for Mariupol, Slov’’ians’k and Horlivka. All displayed pro-
Ukrainian bias. All of these continue to function, as all these towns (or parts of them) were wrested from 
the insurgents’ control. The newspapers had better search engines, therefore I used keyword search 
“Euromaidan”, “Antimaidan” when doing search for the Euromaidan phase. I “leafed through” each day 
for the Russian Spring phase.  
I continually encountered some interesting problems of purely linguistic nature which biased me against 
certain newspapers. Many headlines reporting on how the Euromaidan meetings were allegedly disrupted 
by the Anti-Maidan activists featured words such as “sorvali” (disrupted), “napali” (attacked) and the like. 
These words presuppose the use of serious violence against people. However, upon reading the articles, I 
discovered that “sorvali” simply meant a minor disruption via loud music or making noises while “napali” 
would often turn into “nearly attacked” (“chut’ bylo ne nabrosilis”), which meant that someone prevented 
violence, be it the police or the attackers themselves. This all indicated to me that some newspapers 
continually exploited tensions in the region to show the Anti-Maidan protesters in the worst possible 
 
120 “Donets’kie separatist prodolzhaiut razvlekat’sia – obzor pressy”, Novosti Donbassa, 25 March 2014.  
121 http://www.proquest.com/products-services/factiva.html.  
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light. This is congruent with the injustice frame that circulated among pro-Russian protesters during the 
Russian spring phase, according to which they were unjustly slighted and portrayed in the worst possible 
light by Ukrainian journalists.  
5. Social media  
Social media presents a new platform for the expression of political views and beliefs. It also 
allows activists to disseminate information about protests (Gerbaudo, 2012). Inspired by this “cyber-
optimism,” there has been much research recently on how social media is used to express political views, 
recruit people into protest movements, and even stage revolutions (for example, during the Arab Spring 
(Pearlman, 2013; Salem, S.,2015) and the Ukrainian Euromaidan revolution of 2013 – 2014 (Onuch, 
2015a)).  When it comes to protest participation, however, the relationship between social media and 
protest is highly context-bound. Some researchers, such as Steinert-Threlkeld et al. (Steinert-Threlkeld et 
al., 2015) conclude that social media use increases protest participation.  Others, such as Olga Onuch 
argue that social media plays a lesser role in recruitment compared to that of close networks, such as 
family and friends (Onuch, 2015a).  
This literature poses one key question: are there continuities between a person’s online and 
offline identities and behaviours? This is critical for my research, as movements and conflicts simply 
cannot take place online; they happen in the physical world. At the same time, the question whether there 
are continuities between people’s online and offline identities has been an object of some scholarly 
attention. For example, by interviewing individuals offline, Doutsou seeks to discover cases where online 
identities are congruous with offline identities (Doutsou, 2013). After Doutsou, as I discuss below, I 
originally intended to interview certain individuals in order to establish whether there was congruity 
between what they said online and what they did offline: for example, whether they said they were going 
to participate in the protest and followed this through or not.  
Social media as a source for research has some distinct advantages, if used with caution. First, 
social media can cover local events which are not covered either in the local, national, or international 
press, such as activists’ meetings and people’s actions. Secondly, it has the potential to replace extensive 
interviews on the ground as a source of information about beliefs, expectations, and some actions in real 
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time. These remain valid because they were expressed at the time of the events in question, without the 
influence of hindsight, memory loss, or researcher impact, which post hoc face-to-face interviews are always 
hampered with, unless, of course, it has been determined with sufficient evidence that the user’s or 
interlocutor’s account is fake or the user did not post the comment in the first place (triangulation with 
interviews can help in this case). Thirdly, the Internet itself is a decentralised space, in contrast to 
newspapers, and there is little chance for the “editorial bias,” unless there are moderators who 
systematically remove offensive, excessively controversial (such practices are present in the popular 
British online newspaper Guardian, for example) or “off-topic” content. Such practices are (fortunately or 
unfortunately) absent from the social media platforms I will use.  
Now let us turn to the discussion of the specific social media websites popular in Ukraine. For 
the conflict in the Donbas the social media platform Vkontakte (Vk.com) has been crucial. Vk.com is the 
most widely used social media platform in Russia and Ukraine (Greene and Robertson, 2015).122 It was 
created by Pavel Durov in 2007.123 Since then, it has registered 369 million accounts.124 The platform was 
very popular in Ukraine. According to the research conducted in Ukraine in April 2014, 65% of people 
regularly used the Internet. Others did not use the Internet at all and the majority of these people were 
older than 70. The majority of those using the Internet used it to communicate via social media (61%). 
The most popular websites for this purpose were Vk.com, with 48% users, while Facebook was used only 
by 12%.125 Despite the all-Ukrainian “boycott” of Vk.com announced on 27 March 2014, the platform 
did not stop functioning126 and a great number of pro-Russian groups continued to proliferate.  
 In relation to the Donbas conflict, Vk.com has been popular with pro-Russian movements, such 
as Donetsk People’s Republic, Donbass People’s Militia, Anti-Maidan and their various local versions.127 
Such groups were created on Vk.com to recruit people into the protest movements, to help military 
volunteers enter Ukraine,128 and to send humanitarian aid to the Donbas once the Ukrainian government 
 
122 http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/vk.com  
123 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VK_(social_networking)#cite_note-alexa_traffic-8  
124 https://vk.com/catalog.php; http://archive.is/Aeg1q.  
125 “Kakie sotsseti predpochitaiut khar’kovchane”, Khar’kovskie Izvestiia, 15 April 2014. 
126 “Ukraina – Rossiia. Boikot sotssetei”, Khar’kovskie Izvestiia, 27 March 2014. 
127 In fact, I created a (very) long list of these. Most of them have been taken offline now.  
128 Gubarev was recruiting Russians into his movement via his Vk.com page. See http://archive.is/f2H5D.   
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launched the ATO in mid-April 2014. An article published as early as 3 March 2014 on Censor.net testified 
to the online recruitment attempts of Russians for political protests in the Donbas, Odesa and Kharkiv.129 
Censor.net reported that a group called “Grazhdanskaia Samooborona Ukrainy” (Civil Self-Defense of 
Ukraine) was created on Vk.com to recruit Russians and collect financial help “to fight for Ukraine”. In 
Donets’k, the extent of the proliferation of these groups in a very short period of time was truly 
astonishing. Gubarev’s Narodnoe Opolchenie run multiple pages of recruitment and is still running them. 
I found the most relevant groups and added myself to these groups as a participant to receive their 
updates.  
There are significant differences between Facebook and Vk.com, which create certain problems 
for the researcher. In her research on Facebook, Doutsou writes that users are likely to reveal their real 
names, so there is congruence between the users’ online profiles and their offline identities (Doutsou, 
2013). By contrast, on Vk.com there is much less user accountability and emphasis on real social ties, and 
there is more emphasis on the unbridled user self-expression. Therefore, it is not easy to verify whether 
the person behind a post or comment on Vk.com is real. That is, it is difficult to establish whether the 
person commenting or posting is of the gender, age, and in the location they state they are on their profile 
page. These issues are discussed in more detail below.  
In addition to Vk.com, I also originally intended to use another social media platform, called 
Odnoklassniki (translated as “Classmates”), which was created later than Vk.com and caters primarily to 
the older generations (40+) in Ukraine and Russia. Odnoklassniki users seem to be more concerned with 
building social connections, especially with people they know, and there is less emphasis on commenting. 
In terms of its functionality, this platform is more limited, as I discuss below.   
Using these two social media platforms presents certain issues when it comes to building a 
representative sample. Vk.com tends to be used by younger people (16 – 30), while Odnoklassniki is 
more popular among the older population. In fact, according to an academic studying the conflict, 
Odnoklassniki has a larger community of both pro-Russian sympathisers and insurgents of different ages 
 




than does Vk.com (Personal communication 10 03 2017).  The best way to overcome the issue of 
representativeness is to triangulate across the social media platforms to achieve greater representativeness 
of the sample. For example, one can search for the same groups, such as Narodnoe Opolchenie 
Donbassa across the platforms, and establish connections with their participants. This is hampered by the 
limited functionality of Odnoklassniki, thereby it is not possible to search for participants from certain 
locations from the group lists. One possible strategy to overcome this problem would be to look at the 
pictures of the participants and identify those who are linked to the DNR in some way (for example, 
some people put DNR’s coat of arms or themselves in a uniform on their profile pictures). 
For the Russian Spring phase of research, I used the archival function called “wall” on Vk.com. 
Due to the sheer volume of posts in some groups that might have taken weeks or months to go through 
and because the vast majority of these posts presented no value to the research, I sometimes did a word 
search using the words “miting” (meeting), “Evromaidan,” and “Antimaidan”. The number of groups in 
Kharkiv was more limited than in Donets’k region; the archives of these groups often began functioning 
only with the beginning of the Russian Spring; the number of posts on their walls was often limited. 
Therefore, for some groups, I could afford taking time to go through each post. Many groups in Kharkiv 
functioned for a limited period of time and then were suppressed. Much of the data, sadly, became 
unavailable as a result.  
The amount of comments on the websites where moderation was liberal (057 up to a point, 
Censor.net, and particularly LiveJournal and Vk.com) was astonishing, sometimes running up to 500 pages. 
By mid-March, the journalists from 057 had to disable the commenting function because of a steady 
stream of comments invoking slaughter. According to them, a great number of these comments were 
made from computers with Russian IP addresses.130    
At the early stage of this research, I compiled an exhaustive list of the archived walls of the early 
Anti-Maidan, pro-federal and pro-Russian movements in Donets’k and Kharkiv. The list was compiled 
using primarily snowball sampling, that is I looked for a movement’s vk.com page when it was referred to 
in an academic or newspaper article or its name figured on another movement’s or user’s Vk.com page. 
 
130 “057 zakryli vozmozhnost’ kommentirovat’ Novosti, chtoby ne razzhigat’ konflikty”, 057, 15 March 2014.  
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For a small number of movements, archived walls did not exist due to the limited functionality or content 
deletion. Some “movements”, such as the “Antimaidan”, were just news outlets, without any details on 
protest, recruitment practices or demands of protesters and offline actions. I omitted them. Later on, I 
discovered that groups advocating unity with Russia, such as “Federalisation of Ukraine. Unity With 
Russia”131 or “Donbass. Referendum. Unity with Russia,”132 were deleted.  
For the Euromaidan phase, I used the walls of the numerous Anti-Maidan groups,133 although many 
turned out to be mostly news outlets. To find these, I did word search for “Evromaidan”, “Antimaidan”, 
“miting”, “aktsiya”, “Gorlovka”, “Mariupol” and “Slavyansk”. I have also used two dedicated Anti-
Maidan websites.134 I have also used the walls of the Donetsk Republic movement and the Russian Bloc 
party, which contained constructive posts and comments and not that many news items.  
I used the Narodnoe Opolchenie Donbassa’s (Donbass People’s Self-Defence) (Pavel Gubarev135) wall136 
extensively for this research. It helped me chart the relatively short evolution of the movement and find 
out about its organisation, recruitment practices, and, more importantly, its attitude towards the local 
elites. The wall contained comments providing precious local knowledge and detailing people’s attitudes 
and reactions to the unfolding events. Many comments were highly constructive and useful for the 
research purposes, especially during the early phase of the Russian Spring. Due to the high popularity of 
the movement, by 3 March, its posts attracted more than 2 thousand likes and more than two thousand 
comments. By 28 February 2017, the number of subscribers was 116,082. I was mindful that the wall 
could have been gradually infiltrated by Russia-based sofa clickactivists (“divannye voiska”) and FSB 
 
131 https://vk.com/wall-69306360?own=1&offset=700.  
132 https://vk.com/wall-69095455?own=1&offset=640 . 
133 https://vk.com/wall-68705740?offset=50920&own=1; http://archive.is/Mix2Q; https://vk.com/wall-
41232698?offset=84700&own=1; http://archive.is/1Wtdf;   https://vk.com/wall-65540286?offset=9900&own=1; 
http://archive.is/V7H04; https://vk.com/wall-65409107?offset=3180; http://archive.is/scaJH;  
; https://vk.com/wall-68705740_2342 ; http://archive.is/nyylQ;  https://vk.com/wall-68881228?offset=3940; 
http://archive.is/iMsam; https://vk.com/wall-65250330_938?f=replies ; http://archive.is/lrsRm; 
https://vk.com/antimaydan; http://archive.is/PG22t; https://vk.com/wall-63378961?offset=2500; 
http://archive.is/5kzlS; https://vk.com/wall-65186358?offset=10720&own=1 ; http://archive.is/OMsYp. 
134 http://antimaydan.info/antimajdan_v_harkove.html ; http://archive.is/qC0rJ; http://amdn.news/ ; 
http://archive.is/41cBx.  
135 Pavel Gubarev (referred variously in the mainstream English-speaking media as Hubaryev / Hubarev) was 
proclaimed people’s governor of Donets’k region on 1 March. 
136 https://vk.com/wall-67059574?offset=32400&own=1; http://archive.is/RDLEN.  
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agents. This could be detected by observing the lack of local data and presence of empty rhetoric in the 
comments (see the coding manual).  
LiveJournal accounts137 were equally indispensable for the triangulation practice, especially during the 
Russian Spring phase. LiveJournal (ZHZH) blogs I have used for this research are run by people with a 
wide variety of views, from the strongly anti-Russian and anti-DNR “frankensstein” to adamantly pro-
Russian Colonel Cassad and donbassrus user. The most prolific reporters were frankensstein and Cassad, 
providing reports on the local events every day. They also posted pictures and videos, and a few 
comments from fellow bloggers on their posts led me to other bloggers and even Vk.com pages and 
movements. This level of local reporting was hard to obtain from newspaper reports. Bloggers sometimes 
commented on the behaviour of the local elites but most of their comments were on movements. 
Cassad’s blog was more limited in that he was highly selective in his reporting of events (for example, he 
reported that the Party of Regions was absent during the pro-Russian mobilisation phase in early March, 
while Gubarev complained that the Party was too active in the mobilisation process). He could not have 
possibly known much about the local events in Donets’k due to his residence in Sevastopol. From late 
January onwards, bloggers attempted to recruit people online for the pro-Russian movements.138 
6. YouTube videos 
For Kharkiv, Youtube videos were of limited value as most of the videos were deleted and the 
streaming service stopped being available in 2014, straight after the events.139 I used YouTube videos to 
find out what organisations were present at the protest events (usually by looking at their flags), who 
instigated violent episodes, and whether the demands of protesters changed. For the demands, however, 
 
137 The list includes: http://frankensstein.livejournal.com/; http://archive.is/LlWIA; 
http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com;  http://archive.is/xSgQP; http://donbassrus.livejournal.com/ ; 
http://archive.is/Ef8sl; http://alexlotov.livejournal.com/581239.html; http://archive.is/u4z5I; 
http://aloban75.livejournal.com/595222.html; http://archive.is/7XMzJ; http://peter-
slyadek.livejournal.com/2014/02/23/; http://archive.is/hOH03;  http://pauluskp.livejournal.com/497706.html; 
http://archive.is/5g2pG; http://nikitatimka.livejournal.com/ ; http://archive.is/3qDQU; 
http://lunin812.livejournal.com/267637.html; http://archive.is/mHyw7; 
http://andreyvadjra.livejournal.com/341668.html; http://archive.is/g0bvH; http://putnik1.livejournal.com; 
http://archive.is/6diFy;  https://yadocent.livejournal.com/; http://archive.is/fBZuF. 
138 https://yadocent.livejournal.com/531512.html; http://archive.is/LqHJp.  
139 http://www.ustream.tv/channel/kharkov-antimaidan; http://archive.is/od1fL.  
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text based resources were more useful. Videos were more extensively used for the Russian Spring phase 
than for the Euromaidan phase.  
Many videos from Donets’k were deleted shortly after the end of the Russian Spring. I used these 
videos in a similar fashion to how I used videos for Kharkiv – to corroborate some evidence, such as who 
participated in the meetings, who perpetrated the violence, and what demands were made. The 
advantages of using YouTube videos are that some of these can be good substitutes for interviews. For 
example, there was a string of videos providing a unique insider view of the early DNR meetings in April 
in the captured regional administration building in Donets’k.140 One can also observe the interaction 
among people, activists and elites, as well as the police on some of the videos. The disadvantages were the 
highly selective nature of the videos location-wise, little reportage from locations, such as Horlivka and 
Slov’’ians’k, except after the beginning of the armed phase of the conflict in April 2014.  
7. Triangulation practice  
As I went along looking at the data, I gradually discovered how to do triangulation.  
1. A statement by an elite member should be confirmed with the elite member via an interview, if 
possible. I was able to do this with Elite Member 1 who provided me with some brief comments 
on several of his public statements in an email. I contacted Oleksandr Feldman from Kharkiv 
and the director of Kharkiv regional finance department Tetiana Takuesheva via Facebook but, 
unfortunately, they did not engage.  
2. The content of a statement made by a political scientist has to be discussed with him or her.  
3. A statement made in the press about an official document, such as the Constitution, should be 
cross-checked with the content on the Rada website and, when necessary, with the Ministry of 
Finance’s archived website. I have also been advised to contact the World Bank and Ukrainian 
Commerce Chamber to clarify my understanding of certain figures, particularly in relation to the 
regional budgets.  
 




4. Claims made on Vk.com had to be corroborated with claims in newspapers and, where possible, 
with activists themselves, other Vk.com posts, and with videos. 
5. The reports in Novosti Donbassa had to be triangulated with the posts on Vk.com. 
6. Activist testimony had to be cross-checked with other activists’ testimony, newspaper reports and 
plain logic.  
7. In line with my original intention to interview ordinary people, I attempted to confirm the 
statements made on social media with those who made those statements. I discuss below the 
problems I came across.  
8. Interviews, emotional trauma, and ethical considerations 
I originally intended to conduct extensive interviews with ordinary people living in Donets’k and Kharkiv 
via social media. I have developed several methods of getting access to these people and had some 
successes at the different stages of this project. As I explain below, I then decided not to interview them. 
As my theories and understanding of the data improved, at the latter stage of this project, I made a 
decision to interview local elites, political scientists, commentators, and activists in Kharkiv and Donets’k.  
There are two types of interviews that can be used for this project: semi-structured and episodic. As the 
name suggests, semi-structured interviews are “conversations with a purpose,” in that they are centred 
around the list of questions a researcher has drawn up. Semi-structured interviews are guided by the 
research questions and the empirical data derived from other sources. Episodic interviewing is 
interviewing around a situation or an event rather than with an aim to elicit a continuous narrative. Both 
episodic interviews and semi-structured interviews are guided by questions, but at the same time are 
flexible enough to allow interviewers to gauge interviewees’ beliefs and experiences that go beyond pre-
defined questions. The theoretical background of studies using both semi-structured and episodic 
interviews is mainly the analysis of subjective views, activities and experiences (Flick, 2014). 
Interviews can be done concurrently or after a significant amount of data has been collected from other 
sources, so I have an understanding of what kind of questions to ask my interviewees. My main research 
questions guide the interview questions but do not replicate them exactly. Questions asked at interviews 
would need to be adapted, their language simplified, and technical language and jargon removed, so the 
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participants can understand the questions. For example, I did not use the word “mobilisation” 
(“mobilizatsiya”) in interviews in Russian or Ukrainian, because in these languages it means military 
mobilisation rather than mobilisation for political protest.   
The several ordinary participants in the pro-federal protest in Kharkiv were accessed in the following way. 
I read all the comments made by the people on the few extant archived walls for Kharkiv’s pro-federal 
and pro-Russian groups on Vkontakte. I then selected the profiles of the people who made the most 
constructive comments (see the coding manual) and went on their profile pages. I assessed the profile 
pages as to their quality and the likelihood that the commentator was indeed a Kharkivite. I then 
contacted the commentator and asked him – there were two men who agreed to be interviewed – the 
questions that interested me.  
I encountered several ethical issues during this process. As the war in the Donbas is still going on, most 
importantly, I did not want to inflict an emotional trauma on the ordinary people. As someone who lives 
in relative safety in London, I thought it would be very unfair and even wanton to ask them 
uncomfortable questions. At the early stage of my project, in August 2014, I happened to travel on a train 
to Murmansk with a refugee woman from Donets’k. My mother and I were deeply affected by her story 
and her extremely haggard and worn-out appearance. The woman recalled her experience of being 
bombed in her apartment flat. We were, therefore, careful not to ask too many questions. Later on, when 
I was trawling through Odnoklassniki looking for the Russian Spring protest participants, I came across a 
woman who presented as a refugee from Donets’k living in Kharkiv. When I invited her to participate in 
an interview, she responded in a very emotional way and sent me a long message detailing her experiences 
of being a refugee from Donets’k. She said her husband was shot. She blamed the EU and “also 
England” for putting pressure on Ukraine and causing the conflict. This affected me too and from then 
on, I decided not to interview ordinary people. At different stages of this project, I came across several 
men on Vkontakte, who refused to participate in an interview because they were afraid for their safety.  
I was told not to interview activists because they rarely provide “killer insight”. However, in the end, I 
decided to interview activists because I needed to understand the inner dynamics of the movements they 
led. In my interviews with the three activists from Kharkiv, I did come across claims that had to be 
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triangulated with newspaper reports, testimony by other activists, and information on social media. Prior 
to conducting these interviews, I made sure I prepared very thoroughly so I asked the most relevant 
questions. My main objectives were to find out the aims of the movements, why they failed, the role of 
the local elites in the protest, and whether the organisers were involved in any political protest prior to 
2014.  
I was fortunate to interview two Russian Spring protest organisers in Kharkiv. Luckily for me, both 
organisers turned out to be very engaging, all the geographical and, above all, ideological, barriers 
notwithstanding. I learnt about them from Internet newspapers and a blog. I must say getting to interview 
them was a difficult process that took several months. I used several social media platforms to get access 
to them. With the second protest organiser, I trawled through his entire friends and guests list on his 
blog, to look for anyone who seem to have participated in or organised protests. I checked specifically for 
people who reside or used to reside in Ukraine (and not, say, Russia or Russian regions) and who had 
been posting on their blogs recently. I wrote messages to them inviting them to participate in an 
interview. I got two responses from two people, who very helpfully directed me to the second protest 
organiser saying that he is the authority on the subject. I then contacted him and was able to ask all the 
questions that interested me.  
9. Conclusion  
In summary, I have outlined the main methods and the implications of the use of different sources in this 
project. My research project complies fully with the leading definitions of case studies in that I look at the 
factors that have been missing in the empirical literature on the Donbas conflict - the local elites and 
activists. I have also discussed the rationale behind bounding the case study to Kharkiv city and Donets’k 
region, as they warrant the use of a “most similar systems design”. I have assessed critically the pitfalls of 
using case studies and the mixed methods research design. The mixture of qualitative and quantitative 
methods allows the researcher to consider the question posed in the necessary depth and breadth, as I 
have shown. I have also discussed the main qualitative method used in the study, that is process tracing, 
as well as the concept of causal mechanism. Process tracing allows the researcher to answer the question 
in exhaustive detail and is theoretically eclectic, which aids theory development. Process tracing is 
particularly suitable for accounting for and explaining a complex phenomenon, such as war, which I have 
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also discussed. Determining a critical juncture is part and parcel of using process tracing, which has also 
figured in the discussion. I then proceeded by discussing protest cataloguing as the main quantitative 
method used in the study. I then demonstrated the merits of doing the Internet research and discussed 
the main newspaper sources I have used for the project. I then considered the advantages and 




















Chapter 3: Protest and Violence in Kharkiv and Donets’k, 2003 – 2014 
1. Introduction  
In this chapter I test the first hypothesis developed in the theoretical introduction to the study. 
To restate the hypothesis, the more intense the protest and protest violence in the region, the more likely it is to become 
the site of a violent conflict (H1). I demonstrate empirically that in both Kharkiv city and Donets’k region the 
protests in late 2013 – early 2014 were widespread and often violent. Moreover, the overall protest 
potential in Kharkiv city was higher than in the entire Donets’k region in the years prior to the 
Euromaidan. However, despite the similarities between the 2013 – 2014 protest waves in the regions, we 
observe no war outcome in Kharkiv. I therefore conclude that the intensity of protest and the degree of 
protest violence do not explain the incidence of war in Ukraine.  
In some theoretical literature on escalation it is found that widespread demonstrations and strikes often 
lead to an internal war. Such dynamics have been observed in the lead-up to the civil wars in Guatemala 
(1960-96), Nicaragua (1978-90), and El Salvador (1981-92) (Almeida, 2008; Brockett, 2005; Demirel-Pegg, 
2014, 304; Lichbach et al., 2003). Using the example of the civil war in Nicaragua, Lichbach et al. argue 
that a civil war starts when more people become involved in contention and when the country becomes 
ungovernable. To put it simply, the greater the intensity of protest and the greater the protest violence, 
the harder it is to control the outcomes. Admittedly, some countries which were on the verge of a civil 
war due to their high protest potential and the intensity of protest, such as Macedonia and Kenya, did not 
have a civil war (Shesterinina, 2014, 127).  
The history and identity approach to the Donbas conflict pays close attention to the widespread 
dissatisfaction of the Donbas’ residents with the new government’s policies and the systematic and often 
violent protest that ensued in the Donbas as a result (Giuliano, 2015a; Kudelia, 2014a; Loshkarev and 
Sushentsov, 2016; Matveeva, 2016; Nicoara and White, 2016; Sakwa, 2015; A. Wilson, 2016; A. Wilson, 
2014). Scholars within this approach link this protest with the region’s history and the peculiar political 
beliefs held by its residents (A. Wilson, 2016; A. Wilson, 2014). The broader literature on emotions and 
politics demonstrates how people engage in protest, protest violence and conflict as a result of 
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experiencing the emotions of different valence (fear or anger) (Pearlman, 2013; Petersen, 2011). These 
emotions are intersubjective experiences arising from shared historical and cultural conditions or 
“emotional climates” (Baele et al., 2016; Bar‐Tal et al., 2007). It can be argued, therefore, that areas 
characterised by similar “emotional climates” are predisposed to similar protest dynamics and, by 
extension, to similar conflict outcomes. The “foreign actors” approach to the conflict attributes the 
responsibility for the Donbas conflict to the actions of Russian non-state and state actors, who acted with 
the connivance of some local actors (Czuperski et al., 2015; Mitrokhin, 2014; Sutyagin, 2015; A. Wilson, 
2016; A. Wilson, 2014). What is left to be explained, however, is why these actors chose to start the 
insurgency in one region rather than the other.  
In this chapter, I demonstrate through the empirical analysis that protest intensity and the degree of 
protest violence should not be automatically linked with armed conflict outcomes. More specifically, 
through protest cataloguing and the analysis of the dynamics of protest, I first demonstrate that 
historically Kharkiv city had greater general protest potential than the entire Donets’k region. This 
predisposed the region to further political instability. I also demonstrate that during the Euromaidan and 
Russian Spring protest waves, protest intensity and protest violence were similar in both regions. Kharkiv 
showed a greater propensity to protest violence during the Euromaidan protest phase. Such similarities 
point to the theoretically important conclusion that the people in both regions were animated by similar 
emotions. Moreover, both regions could have potentially become sites of an armed conflict if the Russian 
non-state actors were guided by these protest dynamics when choosing where to start the insurgency. 
Ultimately, however, as I demonstrate in the subsequent chapters, it is not the intensity of protest and 
protest violence per se that are responsible for conflict outcomes but the political opportunities opened 
by the local elites for radical activists and how these activists used political opportunities.  
2. General protest potential in both regions compared  
2.1. Kharkiv 
Protest cataloguing for the years 2002 to 2013 highlights several patterns of protest in Kharkiv city. 
Overall, it indicates that political protest potential was greater in Kharkiv city than in the entire Donets’k 
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region. Here I have catalogued all political protest, meetings and pickets141 reported in the regional 
internet newspaper Status Quo; I have also included some socio-economic protests that threatened to 
dislodge the local elites. These included protests around the issues of land sale and the rise in the prices of 
public utilities initiated by the mayor Dobkin. If a protest was reported as “continuous” (“bessrochnyi”), I 
catalogued it when it was reported. All protests took place in the city of Kharkiv, with no protests in the 
neighbouring towns or villages reported.  







Source: Status Quo142  
In total, there were 112 separate political protests from 2002 to November 2013. Most of these protests 
were organised by political parties, which underscores, firstly, the city’s highly challenging political 
environment for the local elites and, secondly, the presence of competing networks, that is the city’s 
“diffused patronage” nature. At least 10 of these protests were organised by more than three political 
 
141 Here are some examples of demands that I have coded as “political”: anti-Kuchma, fair elections, dismiss 
Dobkin and Kernes, dismiss Avakov, better budget for Kharkiv, make Russian a regional language, support 
Yanukovych/Yushchenko, Dobkin to fulfil his election promises. I have excluded the regular 1 May meetings 
organised by the Communist Party across the entire Ukraine. I averaged “several thousand” (“neskolko tysyach”) to 
5000; “several hundreds” (“neskol’ko soten”) – to 500.  
142 This is a serious underestimate of the protest potential in Kharkiv city. According to Status Quo journalists, there 
were around 100 meetings and pickets in the Kharkiv region in 2010. Those were mostly socio-economic meetings 
and pickets, such as protests of workers at state-owned enterprises demanding to cancel wage arrears and protests 
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Protest potential in Kharkiv, 2002 - 2013
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parties, which indicates a vibrant political culture in the city. For example, on 17 September 2002, the 
Communist Party of Ukraine protested together with 9 other parties (Socialist party, BYUT, Sobor, 
Ukrainian Nationalist Party, Liberal-Democratic party, Republican Christian party, “Reforms and Order” 
party, Kharkiv committee “for Truth”) against Kuchma. The number of protestors reached 10 thousand 
on that day. On 3 and 16 October 2006, after the Party of Regions-dominated regional council voted no-
confidence in the governor Arsen Avakov (the representative of Our Ukraine), 6 parties conducted a 
meeting to support the vote, while 5 other parties demanded the resignation of Avakov’s antagonist, the 
mayor Dobkin.   
Certain political parties, such as the Communist Party and the small but vocal opposition party Bloc of 
Yulia Tymoshenko (BYUT), developed a stable and strong presence in the city’s protest politics. In this 
period, BYUT held at least 19 protests and meetings, with more protests in the years 2007 – 2009, when 
there was a tangible possibility of their antagonists, the city council secretary Hennadiy Kernes and the 
city mayor Mykhailo Dobkin, being dismissed from their posts. The protests organised by BYUT 
numbered 5,000 people at most. By contrast, out of 112 protests I have catalogued, Kharkiv’s dominant 
party, the Party of Regions, organised only 15. The party mustered the greatest number of protestors 
(50,000) on 26 November 2004, during the Orange Revolution.  
The Communist Party of Ukraine, which became instrumental in protest organisation in spring 
of 2014 (Protest Organiser 1 interview 24 09 2018; Protest Organiser 2 interview 28 09 2018), organised 
18 protests between 2002 and 2013, excluding the regular 1 and 9 May demonstrations. An anti-NATO 
protest in February 2008 organised by the party reportedly numbered 8000 people, the highest number of 
protestors over these years. It participated in many other meetings and protests organised by fellow 
parties and put forward a stable assortment of wide-ranging socio-economic and socio-political demands. 
For example, during the meeting on 7 November 2006, the party demanded “general political and local 
self-government reform, greater state support to agricultural enterprises, and accessible education.”143  
 
143 “Predstaviteli khar’kovskikh organizatsii KPU proveli miting na pl. Svobody v Kharkove po sluchaiu 89-ii 
gorovshchiny Oktyabr’skoi revolutsii”, Status Quo, 7 November 2006. 
114 
 
Smaller, openly pro-Russian parties, such as the Russian Bloc, organised 7 protests in total, usually held 
together with other small parties, such as Slobids’kiy Vybor (Kharkiv Region’s Choice); most of the time, 
their protests gathered no more than 50 people. For example, in April 2003, the Russian Bloc and 
Hennadiy Makarov, who later became involved in the pro-federal protest in March – April 2014, held a 
meeting demanding Russian to become the official language in the region.144 The number of protests and 
meetings organised by these smaller parties and the number of attendees were still higher than those in 
Donets’k.  
The geographic location and wide outreach of political protests and meetings in Kharkiv support the 
argument that the region became a place where a variety of networks competed with each other and the 
general political environment was highly challenging for the local elites. The vast majority of protests 
tended to take place in central Kharkiv, with others embracing a wide variety of other locations. 72 out of 
112 separate protests took place on the Freedom Square, right in the centre of Kharkiv and next to the 
regional administration building (HOGA). Out of these, 37 were pickets of the HOGA. Significant 
blocking of the central Sumska street occurred during a pro-Yushchenko march on 24 November 2004, 
when the protest numbered between 10 thousand and 70 thousand people, according to different 
estimates.145 Otherwise, blocking of streets occurred rarely. There were 36 protests in other locations, 
such as the Constitution Square, where the city council building is located; and next to the Security 
Service of Ukraine building (SBU) and Kyiv district court buildings.   
2.2. Donets’k 
In the entire Donets’k region, political protest potential was weaker than in Kharkiv city. Such weak 
protest potential was partially the result of the Party of Regions’ political monopoly in the region but 
could also have been the result of political apathy (Kudelia, 2014d, 24). I have catalogued 50 political 
protests from the years 2002 to 2013, including marches and meetings organised by small radical 
 
144 “Russkii Blok budet piketirovat’ zdanie gorsoveta v den’ aprel’skoi sessii”, Status Quo, April 2003.  
145 “Miting Protesta po povodu fal’sifikatsii rezultatov vtorogo tura vyborov proshel 23 noyabrya”, Status Quo, 24 




organisations such as Donetsk Republic and the regular protests held by the Progressive Socialist Party of 
Ukraine (or Natalya Vitrenko’s Bloc) (PSPU) on anti-NATO and anti-Yushchenko themes.  




Source: Novosti Donbassa  
To get an understanding of just how unpopular political protest was in Donets’k region, one should 
consider that a protest conducted on 15 October 2010 by Serhiy Tihipko’s party “Strong Ukraine” in 
Donets’k mustered around 400 participants and was described as “the most numerous meeting in 
Donets’k region for the past two years”.146 Similarly, the biggest protest since 2004, with around 1500 
protestors, held on 3 November 2011, can be characterised as mostly socio-economic, demanding the 
government’s reconsideration of its policies on subsidies and putting forward an admixture of not very 
well articulated political demands.147 In two investigative articles on all meetings and protests in Horlivka 
and Mariupol published on Novosti Donbassa, my main source for protest cataloguing, the journalists 
estimated 10 protests of all types in Horlivka from March 2010 to September 2011, numbering no more 
than 400 people.148 There were 12 protests in Mariupol from April 2010 to October 2011, numbering up 
 
146 “V Donets’ke “Sil’naia Ukraina” ustroila rekordnuiu aktsiyu protesta foto”, Novosti Donbassa, 15 October 2010.  
147 Aleksei Matsuka, “Miting za spinoi”, Novosti Donbassa, 03 November 2011. 
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to 500 people.149 The authors of the article categorised these protests as “social” (for example, those held 
by pensioners and by parents against the closures of schools); “political,” mounted against the regional 
governor’s policies or those organised by political parties such as PSPU and Communists; and the so-
called “civic” protests, against rising public utility prices, organised by political parties such as 
Bat’kivshchina (Yulia Tymoshenko’s party).  
Overall, a great number of protests in Donets’k region put forward mostly socio-economic demands, 
such as the timely payment of pensions and the resumption of subsidies.150 Political protests were 
comparatively rare. They were conducted by small unpopular parties, such as Progressive Socialists, and 
their demands remained the same over the years: radical change in the government policies towards the 
EU and NATO, revision of the language policy, and protection of the Russian language.  
Paradoxically, once Yanukovych became President, political protest potential in Donets’k region 
increased dramatically (Interview with Journalist 1, 19 07 2019; Activist from Donets’k interview 27 07 
2019). Yet, these protests were conducted mostly by “pro-status quo” parties. The year 2013 was 
punctured with “anti-fascist” protests conducted by the Communist Party and the Party of Regions 
across the region. The previous two years witnessed the protests by the Chernobyl Victims’ Union, 
demanding the resumption of subsidies to the victims of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster living in Donets’k 
region. The Chernobyl victims’ protests were directed against the regional administration and became the 
most politically resonant protests. They were also the most violent: one protest ended with the ransacking 
of the Pension Fund building; another with the death of one person; the local elites periodically issued 
threats to use force against the protestors.151 According to Journalist 1, the protests that involved ordinary 
people were directed against the local elites who were siphoning off subsidies intended for the local 
population. Journalist 1 puts it this way: “On the official documents, the people were shown gigantic 
numbers [of subsidies] but this money failed to reach them” (Interview 19 07 2019).  
 
149 Ibid. ; Vitaly Ovcharenko, “Donbass protestuet. Mariupol”, 31 October 2011. 
150 Aleksei Matsuka, “Yanukovich teriaet Donbass”, Novosti Donbassai, 22 March 2011.  
151 Vladimir Ishchenko, “Khronika protivostoiania v Donets’ke: kak absurdnoe ubezhdenie vlasti ubilo cheloveka. 
Spetsial’nyi obzor”, Novosti Donbassa, 30 November 2011.  
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The regions therefore differed in their overall protest potential, which generates a theoretical expectation 
that Kharkiv city was predisposed to greater political destabilisation and a potential conflict in spring 
2014. In contrast, general protest potential was weak in Donets’k region as compared to Kharkiv city. 
Political protests there were comparatively rare and, in the years following the Orange Revolution, 
protesters put forward an assortment of nearly unchanging anti-Yushchenko and anti-NATO demands. 
Socio-economic protests were more frequent. Under Yanukovych’s presidency, both socio-economic and 
political protests in Donets’k region intensified, with many being conducted by the Party of Regions. 
Therefore, this brief overview of the general protest potential in both regions allows us to conclude that 
greater protest potential should not be associated with a greater escalatory potential for war.  
3. Euromaidan and Anti-Maidan protest waves in Kharkiv 
Kharkiv’s Euromaidan started on 24 November 2013 on Taras Shevchenko Square. The movement 
quickly gained momentum, and by 30 November, it numbered at least 2,000 participants, which made it 
one of the largest Euromaidan movements in the south-east. It was certainly larger than the Euromaidan 
in Donets’k.152 The protestors gathered every day,153 only to stop briefly in late January, due to the 
increasing attacks. The demands of Kharkiv’s Euromaidan protestors were consistent with those in Kyiv: 
they first protested against Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the EU Association Agreement and then 
demanded his resignation (Interview with Journalist 1 19 07 2019).154  
Anti-Maidan emerged in Kharkiv155 as a reaction of some local people, Kharkiv’s top elites, the Party of 
Regions’ members, and some other political parties and organisations to the Euromaidan. It was not a 
unified movement but rather a collection of individuals and organisations who professed their support for 
the course taken by President Yanukovych and were critical and fearful of the events occurring on the 
Maidan in Kyiv, especially when those events took a violent turn in late January 2014.  
 
152 “Po Ukraine prokatilas’ volna Evromaidanov: vo L’vove vyshlo 10,000 Foto”, Censor.net, 23 November 2013.  
153 “Kak Kharkovchane k evromitingam priobshchalis’”, Vechernii Khar’kov, 25 November 2013. 
154 “Kharkovskii Evromaidan sobral neskol’ko soten chelovek”, Khar’kovskie Izvestiia, 25 November 2013. 
155 Note that Anti-Maidan existed prior to the Euromaidan as primarily an Internet movement (Filippova, O.,2009). 
Here I refer to this specific Anti-Maidan that rose in reaction to the Euromaidan.  
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Anti-Maidan rallies were comparatively few. In fact, using opposition (057), neutral (Slobids’kiy Krai), and 
pro-elite Internet newspapers (Izvestiia), I was able to catalogue only 10 distinct (that is not “continuous” 
or “bessrochnye”) Anti-Maidan rallies, compared to 24 Euromaidan rallies, in Kharkiv city.  Anti-Maidan 
rallies can be divided into three types: those organised by the local elites, which were the most numerous 
and most well attended (on this below); those organised by the Communist Party (which I was unable to 
catalogue systematically, due to the closure of the Communist Party’s online archive and the poor 
reporting on these rallies in all of my sources); and those organised by local Anti-Maidan organisations.   
These Anti-Maidan rallies were not violent. Instead, the systematic and increasingly more violent attacks 
on the Euromaidan were perpetrated by groups of young people (titushki), most of whom did not seem to 
belong to any political parties. Yet, these violent attacks on Euromaidan protestors took centre stage in 
the media reports on Kharkiv’s Euromaidan156 and predisposed the region to further violence. I 
interviewed one of the activists in Kharkiv who confirmed to me that the aggressiveness of titushki was 
substantial. He described a great number of titushki (as many as 200), participating in the Anti-Maidan 
protest and pointed that many of them were bussed in from Russian regions adjacent to Kharkiv. He put 
it this way: “I often saw them in small groups, always with a girl… There were as many as 200 of them 
sometimes… Very aggressive… They could have beaten us with their bats” (Interview 16 07 2019).  
Thus, in the section that follows, I focus on the “titushki”. These were groups of athletically built young 
men, reportedly hired by both the government and opposition157 to disperse Euromaidan protests. They 
were named after Vadym Titushko, a professional athlete, who was hired to and eventually prosecuted for 
attacking journalists in Bela Tserkva, near Kyiv, in May 2013 (Interview with Activist in Kharkiv, 16 07 
2019).158 Titushki not only dispersed protestors but also damaged their equipment and vehicles.159 
Reports claimed that titushki were being paid for attacking Euromaidan protestors because many of them 
were unemployed. According to these reports, some were paid 100 dollars per day, with an additional fare 
 
156 Neutral and pro-elite Internet sources were largely silent about the Euromaidan in Kharkiv.  
157 “Avakov soobshchil, kto rukovodil “tutishkami”, Khar’kovskie Izvestiia, 3 April 2014. 
158 Olena Goncharova, “Titushki”, Yanukovych supporters take over Kyiv’s Mariinskiy Park”, Kyiv Post, 14 February 
2014.  
159 “Ispoved’ “titushki””, Khar’kovskie Izvestiia, 26 February 2014. 
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for beatings.160 There were, however, others, who held strong Anti-Maidan convictions and considered 
Euromaidan protestors to be “traitors and hooligans”.161 One of my interviewees, who participated in the 
Anti-Maidan and pro-federal protests in early spring of 2014, argued that titushki “rose up for a cause, 
not for money”; “they were angry at the Euromaidan” (Interview participant 23 08 2018). Titushki were 
often members of local boxing and fight clubs, and it was reported that coaches and entire clubs 
participated in the attacks on the Euromaidan, especially in Kyiv. There was some evidence that the 
members of the fight club Oplot, based in Kharkiv, were bussed in to Kyiv as titushki in late February 
2014, when violence took an upturn there.162 Oplot fighters and their leader Yevhen Zhilin were later 
included in the self-defence organisation “Ukrainian Front” established by the city mayor Hennadiy 
Kernes and the governor Mykhailo Dobkin. Again, it is difficult to find conclusive evidence about Oplot 
fighters’ motivation to attack Euromaidan protestors. According to one of my interviewees, Zhilin 
presented a committed and formidable Anti-Maidan force and was not concerned with monetary rewards 
(Interview participant 23 08 2018).  
Regardless of the personal convictions of the attackers, Anti-Maidan violence in Kharkiv was greater and 
more systematic than in Donets’k. The protest cataloguing indicates that 12 out of 24 Euromaidan rallies 
were attacked by people who were overwhelmingly described as “titushki” in the press. These included 
physical attacks on the former Minister of the Interior Yuriy Lutsenko and a Batkivchshina deputy Ivan 
Varchenko, who came to speak at some of the Euromaidan rallies.  Attacks increased over time and 






160 “Moi milyi “titushka””, Ukrayinska Pravda, 13 December 2013. 
161 “Ispoved’ “titushki””, Khar’kovskie Izvestiia, 26 February 2014. 
162 “Na stolichnykh pozniakakh zamecheny kharkovskie “titushki” Kernesa vmeste s militsiei – “patruliruiut””, 
Censor.net, 19 February 2014.  
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The qualitative process tracing indicates that the attacks perpetrated by titushki were consistent and 
followed a deadly trajectory: first, titushki attacked property of the Euromaidan protestors, then the 
groups of “unknowns” – a label which often described titushki – attacked individual organisers such as 
Dmytro Pylypets, and then they began attacking entire groups of protesters using more sophisticated 
equipment. 
Table 12. Patterns of titushki’s violence against people 
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Attacks on the Euromaidan by titushki
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As the Euromaidan protest was underway, at first, protestors reported their equipment and cars damaged 
or stolen, presumably by titushki. On 18 December, activists claimed that groups of titushki stole their 
equipment and vandalised their office.163 By early January, five cars owned or hired by Euromaidan 
protestors were damaged or burnt.164  
From late December, titushki began attacking individual Euromaidan protestors, and two activists were 
reported taken hostage.  On 25 December, one of the Euromaidan organisers Dmytro Pylypets was 
severely attacked, with knife wounds inflicted on him.165 On 25 January, the Bat’kivshchina deputy Ivan 
Varchenko claimed that two Euromaidan activists, Oleksandr Kutianin and Oleksiy Riapolov, were taken 
hostage.166  
From mid-January, titushki began attacking entire groups of protestors systematically, using more 
sophisticated equipment. If during their early attacks on people, titushki used only basic equipment, such 
as cuts of ice, over time they acquired more sophisticated equipment, such as Molotov cocktails, clubs 
and detonators. As can be seen on the videos, they might have been trained by someone to use this 
equipment, especially Molotov cocktails.167  On 11 January, when masked people stormed a church where 
the Euromaidan forum was held,168 an injured activist Oleh Kolotiy stated that the attackers “were clearly 
well-prepared and acted professionally”.169 By 27 January, titushki were being bussed in to attack the 
Euromaidan protestors. For example, it was reported that on 25 January they came on 5 buses.170 Dmytro 
Pylypets claimed that “these hired thugs were driven to the square on the local transport.”171 On 19 
 
163 “Opposition activist admitted to hospital with stab wounds in east Ukraine”, BBC Monitoring Ukraine & Baltics 25 
December 2013 
164 “Neizvestnye v ocherednoi raz sozhgli avtomobil organizatorov khar’kovskogo Evromaidana”, 057, 24 
December 2013. 
165 “Ocherednoe napadenie na khar’kovskii “evromaidan”: Dmitrii Pilipets s nozhevymi raneniiami popal v 
“neotlozhku”” (video)”, 057, 25 December 2013. 
166 “Ivan Varchenko: “V Khar’kove vziaty v zalozhniki dvoe aktivistov Evromaidana”, 057, 26 January 2014.  
167 “Marsh evromaidanovtsev, vzryvy petard, izbitye zhurnalisty i tolpa “titushek” s bitami na ploshchadi: kak 
Kharkov perezhil Den’ studenta (foto)”, 057, 26 January 2014.  
168 “Masked people reportedly storming pro-EU forum in Ukraine's Kharkiv”, BBC Monitoring Newsfile 11 January 
2014. 
169 “Injured activist describes attack on pro-EU forum in Ukraine's Kharkiv”, BBC Monitoring Ukraine & Baltics, 12 
January 2014 
170 “Kharkovskie ultras prishli pod okna obladministratsii. Miting edva ne zakonchilsia massovym poboishchem s 
“titushkami””, 057, 25 January 2014. 
171 “Tolpy titushek v maskakh i s bitami atakovali khar’kovskikh evromaidanovtsev. Napadavshikh privezli na 
gorodskikh marshrutkakh”, 057, 27 January 2014. 
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February, as the Euromaidan activists were blocking the entrance to the Academy of the Interior to 
prevent the troops from leaving Kharkiv for Kyiv to disperse the Euromaidan, they were attacked by a 
group of titushki under the cover of the Berkut police. The result was a standoff between titushki, 
policemen, and activists. The violence was described as very vicious: “Everyone was beaten. They beat us 
with equipment and burnt detonators. They injured a few journalists”. 172  
The attacks by titushki on the Euromaidan protestors predisposed the city to further violence. They also 
created a pool of potential fighters for the pro-Russian conflict mobilisation (Interview with Activist in 
Kharkiv, 16 07 2019), which, however, did not take place in Kharkiv. The systematic protest and violence 
during the Russian Spring in Kharkiv also created conditions for mobilisation, which I demonstrate 
below.  
4. Russian Spring protest wave in Kharkiv 
During the Russian Spring phase of political protest, the general political protest potential of the city 
remained high. According to my interview with the Activist in Kharkiv, the pro-federal protestors were 
“very aggressive” (16 07 2019). The aggregate pattern of protest demonstrates, however, that the radical 
protest was nearly absent and completely disappeared after 16 March. There were 17 protests on broad 
Euromaidan and anti-war themes, which I have catalogued as “Euromaidan”, “anti-Putin,” and “anti-
war” respectively. The number of attendees at these protests fluctuated between 50 and 15000 people. 
The protestors sometimes marched through the central Kharkiv, from Taras Shevchenko monument to 
the Constitution Square.  
Anti-Maidan and pro-federalisation protests were more numerous. There were 25 protests on broad Anti-
Maidan and pro-federalisation themes. All the Anti-Maidan and pro-federalisation protests from 23 
February to 16 March included an appeal to Russia for help. As Yuriy Apukhtin revealed in an interview, 
in this period, the rallying cry “Russia” was “shaking the windows of the nearby buildings,” creating a 
pervasive Anti-Maidan emotional climate in the city.173 Russian flags and St George ribbons were 
 
172 “Vozle Akademii vnutrennikh voisk “titushki” ustroili krovavuiu boiniu. Zhestoko izbity neskol’ko zhurnalistov”, 
057, 19 February 2014.  
173 “Politzaklyuchennyi Yuriy Apukhtin (Khar’kov). O sobytiiakh vesny 2014 v Khar’kove”, YouTube, 29 March 
2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RkVkE57sLp0  
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displayed at all protests. After 16 March, no direct appeals to Russia were reported, and the protestors 
focused on demanding the federalisation referendum and freedom for the detained Anti-Maidan activists 
such as Ihnat Kramskoi (nickname “Topaz”). The number of protestors at the pro-federalisation 
meetings fluctuated, with the mean of slightly over 3400 protestors (affected by the outlier of 20,000 
people on 1 March), the median of 2000 and mode of 3000. Compared to similar statistics in Donets’k, 
this highlights that the protests were better attended in Kharkiv. 
Table 13. Number of participants in the Russian Spring protests in Kharkiv, 23 February – 6 April 2014 
 
As can be seen from the two tables below, the pro-federalisation protest was at its most intense in the 
period between 1 and 6 March. A similar intensity of the pro-Russian protest in the same period can be 
observed in Donets’k (below). As in Donets’k, the pro-federalisation protest in Kharkiv did “smoulder 
away” after 28 March (Wilson, 2016, 633). 












































































































Table 15. Median number of protestors during the Russian Spring protests in Kharkiv, 23 February – 6 
April 2014 
 
The protest catalogue demonstrates that, compared to the Euromaidan protestors, who were largely 
confined to the Taras Shevchenko monument Square, Anti-Maidan and pro-federalisation protestors 
could protest on a larger scale and damage property. According to the protest catalogue, out of 25 Anti-
Maidan and pro-federalisation protests, 7 involved marching through the centre and blocking transport; 4 
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the headquarters of the regional SBU; 2 involved attacks on buildings such as the HOGA and Prosvita 
building on the Rymarska street. The start and end locations also varied a great deal, as illustrated by the 
table below: 
Table 16. The end and start locations of the Russian Spring protests in Kharkiv, 23 February – 6 April 
2014 
 
During 11 March meetings, the central streets of Sumska, Trinkler, Ivanov and Sovnarkom, that is the 
whole of central Kharkiv, were blocked for transport. On 15 of March and 16 March, pro-federalisation 
activists blocked the entire Sumska street and moved from the Freedom Square, where they usually 
gathered for their rallies, to the Constitution Square. Pro-federalisation activists first picketed the Russian 
consulate, then marched towards the Polish consulate, picketed it, and then nearly set fire onto the 
Prosvita office. On 16 March, the protestors carried a large 100-metre Russian flag and hanged it out 
from the window of the Prosvita office. They also smashed the windows of the building, burnt books, 
and wrote “Kharkiv – Russia” on the building.174 On 23 March, the Sumska was blocked for transport 
again; the protestors picketed the buildings of the Ministry of the Interior and the SBU, then moved 
towards the city council building.175 
Prior to the events of 13 March in Donets’k, protest violence in Kharkiv was more systematic than in 
Donets’k and caused significant damage. It was reported that 138 people were injured during the Anti-
 
174 “Tolpa prorossiiskikh aktivistov razgromila ofis khar’kovskoi “Prosvity” i razbila avtomobil”, 057, 16 March 
2014. 
175 “Na vykhidnikh u Kharkovi proishli prorosiis’ki mityngy”, Slobids’kiy Kraii, 24 March 2014. 
Date Claim or demands Street action Protest start location Protest end location
04-Mar
Help from Russia; 
referendum; anti-Baluta marching through the centre HOGA General Consulate of Russia
05-Mar
Help from Russia; 
referendum; anti-Baluta; 
anti-Kernes marching through the centre Freedom Square Freedom Square
08-Mar
referendum; help from 
Russia; Customs Union, 
anti-NATO marching through the centre HOGA city council
15-Mar referendum marching through the centre City council HOGA
16-Mar referendum marching through the centre; picketing Freedom Square HOGA
23-Mar Yanukovych; referendum blocked Sumska street; MVD, SBU, Rymarska Lenin monument SBU
30-Mar Free Topaz; referendum marching through the centre Lenin monument Polish consulate
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Maidan rally on 1 March.176 Out of 43 protest events during the entire period between 22 February and 6 
April, 33 were not followed by an attack; 5 were followed by attacks involving serious violence against 
people; 3 protest events were followed by an attack on property such as administration buildings. 
Violence was often perpetrated by groups of unaffiliated young people.177 On the night of 14 March, 
violence reached its peak, when 2 Anti-Maidan activists were killed in a shootout between the Right 
Sector and the Anti-Maidan on Rymarska Street.  
Protest violence seems to have been reciprocal.178 Following the storming and occupation of the HOGA 
building by the Euromaidan activists on 23 February, the city mayor Kernes decided to organise an Anti-
Maidan meeting on 1 March. Despite his invectives not to storm the HOGA,179 half way through the 
meeting, the Anti-Maidan crowds became incensed and decided to attack the building to evict the 
Euromaidan activists.180 As can be seen from the videos, the violence was largely reciprocal: the 
Euromaidan activists attacked the Anti-Maidan activists first, throwing bottles and sticks out of the 
building and spraying water. Kernes in a later interview stated that someone threw a smoke bomb and 
sticks out of the building to provoke the people.181 Vasil Homa also stated that violence was largely 
provoked by the Euromaidan activists barricaded in the building. According to another report, both sides 
threw sticks at each other and sprayed water, while the Anti-Maidan forces used incendiary devices filled 
with shrapnel.182 Gunshots were heard.183 Stones and stun grenades were thrown.184 The videos show that 
 
176 “Shturm – fakty”, Mediaport, 02 March 2014; “Chto proizoshlo v Khar’kove”, BBC Russian, 16 March 2014. 
177 “Khar’kov, “vynosy” i “zamesy””, 15 April 2014 http://liva.com.ua/kharkiv-fight.html; http://archive.is/Yuy4f.  
178 Such as the one on 1 March 2014: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JIprTU5s_Mg ; 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vgMxZ-c6dBI.  
179 “Rossiia – SOS” iili vsego dva ukrainskikh flaga na mnogotysiachnuiu tolpu: chto proishodit na ploshchadi 
Svobody” 057, 1 March 2014. 
180 “Kharkovchane vyshli na Svobodu zashchishchat’ rodnoi gorod. Zdanie HOGA osvobodili ot 
evromaidanovtsev. Est’ postradavshie”, Khar’kovskie Izvestiia, 1 March 2014 ; “Kharkivsku oblradu shturmovali ta 
zvil’nyly”, Slobids’kiy Kraii, 1 March 2014. 
181 “Gennadii Kernes: Vlasti neobhodimo sdelat’ vse vozmozhnoe chtoby uspokoit’ khar’kovchan”, Khar’kov. 
Novostnoe Agenstvo, 1 March 2014.  
182 “V Khar’kove aktivisty s georgievskimi lentami shturmovali zdanie oblgosadministratsii”, Khar’kov. Novostnoe 
Agenstvo, 1 March 2014.  
183 “Pro-Russian activists storm regional admin HQ in Kharkiv”, Interfax: Russia & CIS General Newswire, 1 March 
2014  
184 “Dozens hurt at pro-Russia protest in Ukraine's Kharkiv: AFP”, Agence France Presse, 1 March 2014  
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the police were letting the stormers in without resistance.185 The Anti-Maidan forces violently dragged out 
the Euromaidan activists from the building and beat them.186 As Protest Organiser 2 told me, “we then 
began taking out the captives and trying to make sure that the crowd didn’t tear them apart because the 
women were mad [at them]” (28 09 2018). As a result, around 138 people were injured, according to the 
reports.  
This trend of reciprocal violence continued throughout this period. In somewhat typical episodes of 
violence on 8 and 9 March, the pro-federalisation activists were attacked by “unknown armed people”; 
Serhiy Yudaev, one of the most radical Anti-Maidan activists, later claimed these were Right Sector 
activists (Yudaev, 2015, 24). The attackers arrived on a mini-bus and opened fire first and then attacked 
the pro-federalisation activists with sticks. Three people were injured as a result. Eye-witnesses were 
convinced that the attackers were Right Sector activists from Dniepropetrovs’k.187 Some pro-
federalisation activists perpetrated violence against people unprovoked, such as on 23 March, when a car 
with the Ukrainian flag appeared at the pro-federalisation meeting. Both the car and the woman driving it 
were attacked.188 The attacks on the Euromaidan activists also continued throughout the period: on 1 
April, a car with national flags was shot at by pro-federalisation activists. The Euromaidan activists stated 
that attacks on their property also continued.189 
A significant episode of violence occurred on the night of 14 March on the Rymarska Street, when two 
Anti-Maidan activists were shot. Different interpretations exist of this episode. According to a blog, the 
Right Sector or “Patriots of Ukraine” activists barricaded themselves, with a stock of weapons,190 in the 
Prosvita building on the Rymarska street a week prior to 14 March. On that day, they arrived to the 
Freedom Square on a mini-bus and attacked the Anti-Maidan activists, including Oplot fighters, 
encamped next to the Lenin monument. The regional governor Ihor Baluta claimed in a later interview 
 
185 “Mitinguiushchie vytashchili evromaidanovtsev na stsenu i postavili ikh na koleni”, 057, 1 March 2014; The flag 
on the building was put by a citizen of Moscow. See “Prorossiiskie nastroeniia i provokatsii v gorodakh-
“separatistakh” realizuiut zhiteli Rossii”, Censor.net, 1 March 2014.  
186 “Mitinguiushchie vytashchili evromaidanovtsev na stsenu i postavili ikh na koleni”, 057, 1 March 2014.  
187 “V Khar’kove napali na prorossiiskikh aktivistov”, Gorodskoi Dozor, 9 March 2014.  
188 “Na vykhidnykh u Khar’kovi proiishly prorosiis’ki mityngy”, Slobids’kiy Kraii, 24 March 2014. 
189 “V tsentre Khar’kova neizvestnye obstreliali mashinu evromaidanovtsev. Militsiia uvidela v sluchivshemsia 
“khuliganstvo”, 057 , 1 April 2014.  
190 https://mikle1.livejournal.com/2014/03/14/; http://archive.is/s2tsI.  
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that this was a very well-planned provocation by Russian chauvinists.191 The Oplot activists followed the 
mini-bus to the Prosvita building. The Right Sector activists opened fire on their antagonists and threw 
Molotov cocktails from the building. They also took several people hostage, including a police officer. 
According to all accounts, it was the Right Sector who opened fire on the Anti-Maidan activists first.192 
Yudaev, the regional governor Baluta and Kernes confirmed that the shootings were from the Prosvita 
building where the Right Sector activists were barricaded (Yudaev, 2015, 28 - 30). An international report 
stated that the building's security guard said the Right Sector shot out of the window at the Anti-Maidan 
activists gathered outside, an account matching that of three Anti-Maidan leaders.193The Oplot activists 
attempted to storm the building.194 As a result, two were killed and five, including a senior lieutenant, 
severely injured.195  
During the night, Kernes, the head of the Ministry of the Interior in Kharkiv Anatoly Dmitriev, and the 
governor Baluta, came to the building to conduct negotiations with the activists and make them release 
the hostages.196 According to the international reports, Kernes spoke to Andriy Beletskiy, the leader of 
the Right Sector in Kharkiv, asking him to release the hostages.197 In his chronicle, Serhiy Yudaev claimed 
that Kernes was instructed to be lenient with the Right Sector activists on the punishment by death: 
“Avakov and Makhnitskiy (the general prosecutor) called Baluta, Kernes and Dmitriev … and told 
Kernes that if Beletskiy and his friend are put in prison, Kernes will join them. If they are killed, Kernes 
will be killed too. As a result, Beletskiy was dressed into the police uniform and led out. But there is a 
video on which Kernes is shaking Beletskiy’s hand…” ((Yudaev, 2015, 35). The Right Sector activists 
were put into custody but later released.  
 
191 “Baluta: sobytiia na Rymarskoi – khorosho splanirovannaia provokatsiia prorossiiskikh shovinistov”, 057, 15 
March 2014.  
192 “Ukraine's Kharkiv mayor says numerous arms seized from suspects in clashes”, 15 March 2014, BBC Monitoring 
Newsfile; “Kernes rasskazal, chto dumaet o situatsii v Khar’kove”, 057, 15 March 2014; 
https://mikle1.livejournal.com/2014/03/14/; http://archive.is/s2tsI.  
193 “Violence erupts in Kharkiv as political turmoil grips city”, Deutsche Welle , 22 March 2014,  
194 “Trup, strel’ba i gotoviiashchiisia shturm: chto proishodit na Rymarskoi (video)”, 057, 14 March 2014.  
195 Ibid;  ; “Aktivist “pravogo sektora”: U “oplotovtsev” avtomaty i militseiskie shchity”, 057, 14 March 2014; 
“Violence erupts in Kharkiv as political turmoil grips city”, 22 March 2014, Deutsche Welle 
196 “Ukraine's Kharkiv mayor says numerous arms seized from suspects in clashes”, BBC Monitoring Newsfile, 15 
March 2014.  




The Rymarska murders were comparable to the violent clashes taking place in Donets’k at the time. Yet, 
they did not radicalise or intensify the Anti-Maidan and pro-federalisation protest in Kharkiv. The 
demand to investigate the murders was added to the set of demands made by the pro-federalisation 
activists, who continued to protest on a regular basis. The murders, therefore, did not lead to the 
radicalisation of the demands. In fact, following the murders, the local elites did everything to dampen the 
pro-federalisation protest.  
I have demonstrated here that Kharkiv was engulfed in a systematic and often violent protest in late 2013 
– early 2014, on a scale comparable to that in Donets’k, with greater violence during the Euromaidan 
phase of political protest. As in Donets’k, attendance at pro-federalisation protests began to slacken after 
28 March, while the strong appeal to Russia was largely absent from the set of demands after 16 March. 
We can therefore discount the link between protest activity and conflict, at least in the case of Kharkiv.  
5. Euromaidan and Anti-Maidan protest wave in Donets’k  
The Euromaidan protest in Donets’k region was much smaller than its counterpart in Kharkiv city. 
Euromaidan protestors rarely gathered more than 300 people compared to the protestors in Kharkiv, 
where 3000 people were often attending the Euromaidan meetings.  This was one of the reasons why 
Anti-Maidan violence was much less systematic and more contained in Donets’k region. The Euromaidan 
in Donets’k city and the region began on the night of 21 November 2013. On 22 November, there were 
as few as 4 people next to Shevchenko monument in Donets’k.198 User frankensstein, a much-quoted 
pro-Ukrainian blogger, attested to the small number of people participating in the Euromaidan in 
Donets’k region.199  Across the region, the Euromaidan was even less popular than in Donets’k: in 
Horlivka it gathered for the first time as late as 18 January.200 This was at the time when the whole of 
Western Ukraine was entering the “hot phase” of the Euromaidan. Similarly, the Avto-Maidan – the first 
Euromaidan meeting in Sloviansk on 18 December 2013 - gathered only a few people. The meeting 
consisted of a heated discussion between the local residents and the town mayor Nelia Shtepa, which 
 
198 “Donchane vyshli na spontannyi Evromaidan noch’yu – foto i video”, Novosti Donbassa, 22 November 2013. 
199 https://frankensstein.livejournal.com/2013/12/22/; http://archive.is/nmb4a.  
200 “Gorlovskii Evormaidan: “titushki” s “pionerskimi galstukami” na litsakh i sozdanie oppositsionnoi 
mezhpartiinoi gruppy v gorsovete”, Gorlovka.ua, 18 January 2014. 
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lasted for only 10 minutes, after which the protestors went home.201 Slov’’ians’k had frequent Anti-
Maidan meetings; the ratio of Euromaidan and Anti-Maidan meetings was decidedly in favour of the 
Anti-Maidan in Slov’’ians’k. 
As in Kharkiv, there were fewer Anti-Maidan than Euromaidan protests. I have catalogued 29 Anti-
Maidan against 36 Euromaidan protests. Elite Member 1 in his brief email to me stated that the “Anti-
Maidan in Donets’k gathered 200 people at most… The Party of Regions, including myself, periodically 
organised some protests to guard law and order.” (Email exchange with Elite Member 1, 22 07 2019).  
Table 17: The number of the Euromaidan and Anti-Maidan protest events in Donets’k region, November 







Overall, the greatest number of protest events took place in Donets’k and Mariupol. There were far fewer 
in Slov’’ians’k and Horlivka.  
  The demands of the Euromaidan protestors in Donets’k region were congruent with the 
demands in Kyiv and Kharkiv.202 For example, after the violent dispersal of the Maidan protestors by the 
police on 30 November in Kyiv, the Euromaidan protestors in Donets’k demanded the resignation of the 
Azarov government, the punishment of the perpetrators of the violence against the Euromaidan 
 
201 “Avtoprobeg v podderzhku Evromaidana Slaviansk vstretil bez osobogo entuziazma”, Slavgorod.com.ua, 18 
December 2013.  
202 “About 300 people at popular assembly in Donets’k demand Yanukovych, Azarov resignation, riot police 
disbandment” Interfax: Ukrainian General Newswire, 1 December 2013; “Donets’kii Evromaidan: kto prishel i 
pochemu”, Ostrov, 28 November 2013.  
131 
 
protestors, early elections, amnesty, and the disbandment of the riot police. They later demanded 
Yanukovych’s resignation. As in Kharkiv, Euromaidan protestors gathered every day in Donets’k,203 and 
much less frequently in the region overall, only to stop on 24 January, after violent provocations by the 
Anti-Maidan organisations and titushki.204 
The number of the Anti-Maidan protests led by organisations points to the organisation-led rather than 
elite-led nature of the Anti-Maidan in Donets’k. The Anti-Maidan and pro-Russian organisations were 
competing with the Party of Regions for protest attendees. As Elite Member 1 told me in his brief email, 
the Party of Regions organised a few Anti-Maidan protests to enforce law and order (email exchange 22 
07 2019). Prior to 5 February, when the Party of Regions’ activists began gathering daily next to Taras 
Shevchenko monument in Donets’k, 6 protests were held by organisations other than the Party of 
Regions, such as the Russian Bloc, Communist Party, Cossacks, Progressive Socialists and Donetsk 
Republic. Overall, where the organisations were clearly identified in the reports, 10 protests were held by 
organisations other than the Party of Regions against 8 of those held by the Party of Regions.  
Table 18: Euromaidan in Donets’k region: Repertoire of contention or street action 
march through the centre 3 
picketing police headquarters  1 
picketing Donets'k regional 
administration  
1 
picketing town council 1 
 
As one can see, the Euromaidan protestors were allowed to block the central streets of Donets’k and 
picket important administrative buildings in Donets’k and the region at least twice. In Kharkiv this did 
not happen. On 21 December 2013 they conducted an “enlightenment march” through the centre, from 
 
203 “Donchane, podderzhivaia evrointegratsiyu, reshili organizovat’ kruglosutochnuiu aktsiiu pod pamiatnikom 
Shevchenko”, 62.ua, 25 November 2013.  
204 “Na Donets’kom Evromaidane v blizhaishie dva dnia ne budet mitingov”, 062.ua, 24 January 2014; “Uchastnikov 
Donets’kogo Evormaidana prizyvaiut ne vykhodit na miting v voskresen’e”, Novosti Donbassa, 26 January 2014.  
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“Zolotoe Koltso” to the Shevchenko monument Square.205 The march was repeated three times, and one 
can see on the video that the protestors even managed to block some transport.206 
Large scale or systematic Anti-Maidan violence was absent in the Donets’k region, although there were 
plenty of calls for such violence. I have documented such calls for violence emanating from the key pro-
Russian groups in Donets’k and juxtaposed them against the real picture of Anti-Maidan violence in the 
region. Perhaps the most well-recorded case of the open call for violence is the speech by Oleksandr 
Khriakov, the then head of a pro-Yanukovych movement “Komitet Izbiratelei Donbassa” and later one 
of the ministers in the nascent DNR, during the meeting on 8 February. Khriakov openly appealed to the 
Soviet army officers to come to the rescue of the Anti-Maidan forces in Ukraine and to demonstrate that 
“they have not forgotten the lot numbers on their guns”.207  
The radical outlawed movement Donetsk Republic also appealed to violence against the Euromaidan 
protestors. It used its online platform on the Russian social media website Vkontakte not only to recruit 
people but also to issue or endorse a profusion of belligerent statements. On 7 February, the following 
message was posted on Donetsk Republic pages on Vkontakte: “Tomorrow the “Orange” Russophobe 
neo-banderites (or banderovtsy) will have a meeting next to the building of the Appeals Court… All those 
who want to come to beat them up, please write a message to me. We are going to be there at 11am. Let’s 
beat the fascists! Let’s clear the banderite scum from the Donbas!” 208 Comments were made on the 
Euromaidan meeting on 26 January: “peaceful Russian people, including our activists, have beaten up the 
visiting “maidauns” in Donets’k on 26 January”.209 Donetsk Republic frequently endorsed the posts by 
one “Varyag Crew” who posted on 29 December: “Today we have thrown eggs at you, tomorrow we will 
treat you to bullets!”210 and on 9 January “Today [we are coming out] with posters, but tomorrow [we will 
be] with guns!”. 211   
 
205 “V Donets’ke aktivisty Evromaidana provedut “prosvetitel’skii marsh”, 062.ua, 21 December 2013.  
206 “Tretii Evromarsh v Donetske”, YouTube, 5 January 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Y_0OIUUYJI  
207 https://frankensstein.livejournal.com/2014/02/08/; http://archive.is/Pdkix; “Donetsk: Oruzhie protiv 
Evromaidana”, YouTube, 8 February 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5E4wccw42Zw.  
208 https://vk.com/wall-3223620?day=07022014&w=wall-3223620_24730%2Fall; http://archive.is/kRbIk 
209https://vk.com/wall-3223620?day=26012014&w=wall-3223620_24080%2Fall; http://archive.is/qvHDM 
210 https://vk.com/wall-3223620?day=29122013&w=wall-3223620_23480%2Fall ; http://archive.is/m4Zxl 
211 https://vk.com/wall-3223620?day=09012014&w=wall-3223620_23598%2Fall; http://archive.is/JhBQg 
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Despite these calls to violence, there was no systematic violence against people or their property in 
Donets’k region. The quantitative evidence demonstrates this pattern.  
Table 19: Euromaidan and Anti-Maidan protests in Donets’k: Attacks on people (as reported) 
 
As one can see, the vast majority of Euromaidan protests were not followed by an attack. Verbal attacks 
were common, compared to the systematic and numerous serious violence against people in Kharkiv. 
Verbal attacks were perpetrated by Anti-Maidan organisations, such as the spontaneously organised Rada 
Narodu, Cossacks and others. Many verbal attacks were recorded on videos.212 Sometimes disruptions 
were accompanied by purely symbolic actions such as tearing the Ukrainian flag apart or shouting slogans 
such as “Fashistam get’” (Fascists out). Disruptions often included switching on loud music.213 A rather 
typical incident along these lines was reported in Horlivka, during the very first Euromaidan meeting on 
18 January. It was reported that along with the Euromaidan protesters, a group of men with red badges 
came to the meeting and engaged in verbal attacks on the “fascists”. They were driven out of the square 
by a deputy policeman.214 
 
212 https://peter-slyadek.livejournal.com/24771.html ; http://archive.is/Joy6m;  
https://frankensstein.livejournal.com/2013/12/29/; http://archive.is/bQ9tr.  
213 “Antimaidan v Donets’ke: trebovali CHP v strane i kidali prezervativy”, Novosti Donbassa, 20 January 2014.    
214 “Gorlovskii Evromaidan: “titushki” s “pionerskimi galstukami” na litsakh I sozdanie oppozitsionnoi 
mezhpartiinoi gruppy v gorsovete”, Gorlovka.ua, 18 January 2014.  
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I did not find any evidence of the Euromaidan protesters attacking their Anti-Maidan counterparts across 
blog posts, newspapers or social media.  
Table 20: Euromaidan and Anti-Maidan in Donets’k: type of attacks against people 
 
A simple count of the kind of attacks reveals that serious violence was far and between and very 
unsystematic.  
As I have already documented quantitatively, the majority of the attacks were verbal. For example, on 25 
November, a group of Cossacks from the “International Union of Cossacks of Ukraine and Abroad” 
came to the Euromaidan meeting and verbally attacked the protesters. This can be seen on the video.215 
Verbal attacks were levelled by Rada Narodu and others. Whereas in Kharkiv by late January there was 
full-fledged serious violence against the Euromaidan activists, in Donets’k the activists of the Anti-
Maidan would often be verbally aggressive but abstain from physical violence. For example, on 19 
January, the activists of the Anti-Maidan were verbally aggressive but not violent towards Auto-Maidan 
activists. 216 This can be seen on the video.217 Titushki, if they were present at all, were not as well 
equipped as their Kharkiv counterparts. For example, they would often throw eggs, paint and 
snowballs218 at Euromaidan activists but never Molotov cocktails or detonators. 
The only significant episode of violence, with four people injured, occurred on 26 January,219 
when a group of young people came to disrupt Euromaidan meeting, attacked journalists and seriously 
 
215 “Donetsk: provokator-regional protiv Evromaidana”, YouTube, 4 December 2013, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gYMU2KFxeiE  
216 “Po itogam Evromaidana v Donetske postupilo 9 zaiavlenii v militsiiu”, Novosti Donbassa, 19 January 2014.  
217 “19 ianvaria 2014 goda: blokirovanie Avtomaidana v Donetske”, YouTube, 19 January 2014, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nD45lj1saok  
218 “Khronika 22 ianvaria v Donets’ke. “Titushki” napali na zhurnalistov i sozhgli flag”, Novosti Donbassa, 22 January 
2014.  
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injured a journalist Serhiy Zhelnakov.220 Donetsk Republic activists rejoiced at this development. “The 
meeting next to Shevchenko monument was attended by around 300 to 400 people. These were 
Afghantsy, Cossacks and, of course, titushki. They were young lads with fire in their eyes and very 
aggressive. I think the grandfathers of these guys were driving the Germans in 1945 to Berlin. During one 
incident, we noticed a group of people with masks and sticks. They were quickly “beaten up”. It was done 
very quickly, with a speed of a lightening bolt…. I met one of my acquaintances who supports the 
Euromaidan. He tried to defend that group of people but was beaten up too. I did not defend him but I’d 
have dealt with him even better if given a chance”.221 
It is significant that despite the stereotype about the ineffective Donets’k police that developed during the 
Russian Spring phase, the police acted promptly and managed to restrain protesters on both sides. We 
often encounter such statements in the newspaper accounts of protests, as “interfered on time”222 or 
“acted professionally to stop violence from escalating”.223 This can also be seen on the videos. On 26 
January, the police can be seen in full gear trying to stop the violence.224 Judging from the evidence 
available, the police in Donets’k overall were much more proactive than their Kharkiv counterparts.  
Table 21. Euromaidan and Anti-Maidan in Donets’k: Police response to protest violence 
 




3223620_24080; http://archive.is/zRTgV  
222 “Kreshchenskii Evromaidan v Donets’ke – veche, draka, razorvannye flagi, razbityj megafon i postanovochnoe 
DTP”, 062.ua, 19 January 2014.  
223 “Donets’kaia militsia s trudom sderzhivaet izbienie 40 aktivistov “Batkivshchiny” 300 uchastnikami 
Antimaidana”, Ostrov, 08 February 2014.  





In contrast to their counterparts in Kharkiv city, local Anti-Maidan and pro-Russian activists in Donets’k 
region opted for a non-violent way of “resolving the “Euromaidan problem” in their region. They would 
often try to wrest the control of the streets away from their Euromaidan counterparts by filing requests to 
the city and towns administration to hold their meetings at the same time as the Euromaidan or by 
occupying the Shevchenko square themselves. In Slov’’ians’k, for example, on 26 December, the town 
mayor Nelia Shtepa prohibited the Euromaidan because “another meeting”, that is the Anti-Maidan, was 
being held on the central square at the same time.225 The same pattern could be observed in Horlivka. 
There Anti-Maidan and Euromaidan organisations would often file their requests to hold their meeting at 
the same time.226 On 24 January, Anti-Maidan protestors forced Euromaidan protestors out of the 
Shevchenko monument square. On 25 January, “titushki” cleared the square of the Euromaidan 
protestors and the meeting of Afghan veterans began instead.227 By 31 January, when Euromaidan 
protests ceased due to fears of impending attacks, the Party of Regions’ activists decided to hold a 
meeting in support of Yanukovych on the Shevchenko Square every day, at the usual meeting place for 
Euromaidan activists.  
 
225 “Ne vinovataia ia… Mer Slavianska ob’iasnila, pochemu uchastnikov avtoprobega ne pustili na tsentral’nuiu 
ploshchad’ goroda”, Slavgorod.com.ua, 26 December 2013.  
226 “Byvshuiu uchitel’nitsu, pytavshuisia rasskazat’ ob ideiakh Evromaidana, vytolkali s ploshchadi Shevchenko pod 
kriki “ed’ otsiuda, uezzhai iz Gorlovki”, Gorlovka.ua, 9 February 2014.  
227 “Storonniki Yanukovicha izbili uchastnikov Evromaidana v Donetske”, Novosti Donbassa, 25 January 2014.  







To summarise this section, Anti-Maidan protest violence during the Euromaidan phase of the political 
protest in the Donets’k region was very unsystematic and restricted to mostly verbal attacks on the 
Euromaidan activists. At the first glance, it seems to have failed to create a pool of unruly fighters that 
could be mobilised during the Russian Spring and beyond. Journalist 1 confirmed to me in an interview 
that the Anti-Maidan groups were sporadic. “There were small and infrequent clashes,” he said. He also 
stated that the Anti-Maidan was intimately connected to the criminal networks of Armen Sarkisyan from 
Horlivka, who did not know whom to support.  
6. Russian Spring protest wave in Donets’k region 
Following the flight of Yanukovych on the night of 21 February 2014, Donets’k region became engulfed 
in a protest of an extraordinary intensity, considering how weak the region’s protest potential had been 
historically. According to my interview with Journalist 1, “There was the regional council’s session behind 
closed doors during which the deputy chairman of the regional council Aleksandr Tret’yak presented his 
scenario of how things were going to develop from now on. For many, the scenario was too apocalyptic, 
so they refused to believe” (19 07 2019). Journalist 1 further elaborated and stated that Donets’k region 
was engulfed in a classic protest during the Russian Spring, “when people knew what they were against, 
but they did not know what they were for”. He further confirmed that Donetsk Republic, the radical 
movement, was present at all the protests “because it provided the most suitable ideology”. According to 
my brief exchange with Elite Member 1, after the flight of Yanukovych, “people began protesting en 
masse against the nationalists” (email exchange, 22 07 2019).  
There were at least 80 meetings in total in the region during the period between 22 February and 6 April 
2014. According to a report by the deputy head of Mariupol police Yuriy Horustovych, at least 30 
meetings had been held in Mariupol alone by 21 March.228 Most of pro-Russian and pro-federalisation 
meetings took place in Donets’k and Mariupol, as the table below attests.  
Table 22: Geographical diffusion of pro-Russian and pro-federalisation protest in Donets’k region, 22 
February – 6 April  
 
228 “V Mariupole militsia otkryla 6 ugolovnykh proizvodstv na uchastnikov prorossiiskikh mitingov”, 0629.com.ua, 21 




Compared to Kharkiv, where Euromaidan protestors and those supporting Ukrainian unity could hold 
their meetings throughout the period almost unhindered, in Donets’k region, these meetings were quickly 
sidelined. Out of 80 protests, I catalogued only 14 meetings on the Euromaidan and broad pro-Ukrainian 
themes, such as for the unity of Ukraine and against war. These pro-Ukrainian meetings gathered few 
people, with the greatest number of people (10,000) reported on 5 March. The number of attendees at 
other similar meetings fluctuated between 30 and 2000 participants. Often, these protestors were simply 
chased out of their gathering place by pro-Russian activists. On 2 March, for example, 50 people gathered 
next to Shevchenko monument to hold a pro-Ukrainian meeting and commemorate those perished 
during the Euromaidan, but pro-Russian activists quickly chased them away.229 This was confirmed in the 
account by a pro-Russian blogger.230 On 5 March, pro-Ukrainian protestors were forced to gather at night 
for the biggest pro-Ukrainian meeting in this period.231 After 16 March, the regional authorities began 
encouraging pro-Ukrainian protestors to abstain from holding their meetings or to stay within designated 
zones during their meetings due to the threat of protest violence.232  
 
229 “U zdaniia DONOGA 1500 chelovek mitinguiut za soiuz s RF, miting v Makeevke”, Novosti Donbassa, 2 March 
2014.  
230 https://donbassrus.livejournal.com/2014/03/05/; http://archive.is/BLrt3.  
231 https://pauluskp.livejournal.com/2014/03/05/; http://archive.is/hMCZ9.  
232 “Miting za edinuiu Ukrainu v Donets’ke perenesli – video”, Novosti Donbassa, 9 March 2014; “V tsentre Donets’ka 
na svoi mitingi sobiraiutsia storonniki edinstva Ukrainy i prorossiiskie aktivisty”, Ostro.org, 13 March 2014; “Chto 













In contrast to Kharkiv, pro-federal and pro-Russian organisations wrested the initiative away from the 
Party of Regions during this period: all of the meetings I have catalogued were led by these organisations. 
As in Kharkiv, the systematic pro-Russian and pro-federalisation protest in Donets’k region was launched 
by the Communist Party as “Lenin monument defence” on 22 February. In Slov’’ians’k, the Communist 
Party continued to be the main organiser of the pro-federal and pro-Russian meetings.  However, in 
contrast to Kharkiv, where such developments were not systematically observed, groups of spontaneously 
mobilised armed people began gathering in parallel to the meetings organised by the institutionalised 
parties. In Donets’k, one such group of people called themselves “Vostochnyi Front” or “Eastern 
Front”.233 Pavel Gubarev’s Narodnoe Opolchenie Donbassa (Donbass People’s Militia/ Self-Defense) 
also unleashed spontaneous mobilisation of armed people.234 After 16 March, this parallel development 
became harder and harder to control; armed groups proliferated, while ordinary citizens began creating 
checkpoints and blocking military hardware that was being moved around the region. This phenomenon 
of spontaneous armed mobilisation, not immediately observed, became one of the key factors propelling 
the region towards conflict. In chapter 5, I detail how this development occurred as a result of the 
opening of political opportunities for radical activism by the local elites and the skilful use of these 
opportunities by the activists.  
The demands of the pro-federal and pro-Russian protestors in the Donets’k region were similar to the 
demands of their counterparts in Kharkiv. After 1 March, the most frequent demands were to conduct a 
referendum on the federalisation of the Donets’k region, to ouster the “illegitimate” government in Kyiv 
and its “illegitimate” “henchman” governor Serhiy Taruta, and to seek protection by Russia. For example, 
on 5 March, the protestors in Slov’’ians’k demanded from the city council a referendum on the status of 
the south-east, expression of no-confidence in the governor Taruta, rejection of the agreement with the 
International Monetary Fund, and the prohibition of shale gas extraction in Slov’’ians’k. The demands 
also included the release of radical pro-Russian activists, such as Pavel Gubarev, after his detention by the 
SBU on 6 March 2014.  These demands remained stable throughout the period.  
 
233 “Uchastniki “Vostochnogo Fronta” v Donetske namereny sozdavat’ otriady samooborony dlia zashchity regiona 
ot “banderovtsev”, Ostrov, 22 February 2014.  
234 “”Narodnyi gubernator” Donetska priznal, chto ego boitsy vooruzheny”, Novosti Donbassa, 5 March 2014; “Moia 
populiarnost’ – eto ikh glupost’”, Lenta.ru, 5 March 2014.  
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At the same time, in contrast with Kharkiv, the demand to unite with Russia or to conduct a referendum 
which included a question on unity with Russia was voiced from early on and systematically during the 
first phase of the protest, that is, between 2 February and 6 March. On 22 February, in Slov’’ians’k, during 
the “meeting of the friendship of Slavic people”, led by the local branch of the Communist Party, the 
protestors read an appeal to Putin to protect the people against fascism. Apart from the demands for the 
referendum, 235  it was reported in some newspapers that the protestors demanded outright unity with 
Russia.236 On 1 and 3 March, several reports stated that the protestors demanded the annexation of the 
Donets’k region by Russia.237 Gubarev’s Narodnoe Opolchenie demanded a referendum with a question 
on the unity of the region with Russia.238 On 1, 16 and 22 March, Donetsk Republic proposed a set of 
demands that included the “return of the Donbas to Russia”.239 After Gubarev’s arrest on 6 March, the 
demand for unity with Russia did not disappear but was voiced more sporadically, such as on 9 March.240 
In the latter part of the protest, from 17 March till 5 April, the demand for a referendum was more 
frequent and the demand to join Russia somewhat subsided but was still present. The subsequent 
chapters detail how these radical demands could emerge in the region with the connivance of the local 
elites.  
The number of pro-Russian and pro-federal protest participants was most consistently reported in 
Donets’k and underreported in the surrounding towns. The mean of the number of protest participants 
in Donets’k was slightly over 2000, the mode 2000 and the median 1000. This indicates that the protests 
were less well attended in Donets’k than in Kharkiv. My main sources for protest cataloguing, Novosti 
Donbassa and Ostro.org, known for their pro-Ukrainian position but also for their consistently high quality 
journalism, reported that the protests were attended by mostly low thousands, rarely reaching over 8 
 
235 “V Slavianske proshel miting druzhby: liudi prosilis’ v Rossiiu i plakali, provozhaia poezd Kislovodsk – Moskva”, 
Slavgorod.com.ua, 22 February 2014; “V Slavianske na mitinge kommunistov trebovali referendum i obrashchalis’ k 
Putinu”, Gorod Slaviansk, 22 February 2014; “Ob’yavlenie. 22 fevralia obshchegorodskoi shod”, Gorod Slaviansk, 21 
February 2014.  
236 “V Slavianske proshel miting druzhby: liudi prosilis’ v Rossiiu i plakali, provozhaia poezd Kislovodsk – Moskva”, 
Slavgorod.com.ua, 22 February 2014.  
237 “Donets’k nakryla “Russkaia vesna”, Novaia Gazeta, 1 March 2014; “”Vostochnyi Front” v Donets’ke: Separatizm 
ne privedet k blagopoluchiiu”, Novosti Donbassa , 8 March 2014; “Pro-Russian rallies in southeast Ukraine call for 
secession”, BBC Monitoring Newsfile , 1 March 2014  
238 http://archive.is/Hychz 
239 http://archive.is/Ox6h4; http://archive.is/MsMgG  
240 “Uchastniki prorossiiskogo mitinga dvinulis’ k Donets’koi oblastnoi gosudarstvennoi administratsii”, Ostrov, 9 
March 2014; “In Ukraine, protests and hopes for diplomacy”, International New York Times, 10 March 2014,  
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thousand, except on 1 and 5 March. Foreign-language sources often relied on the figures reported in 
Novosti Donbassa or else reported the number of protestors as “several thousand”.241 The radical pro-
Russian groups systematically exaggerated the number of protest participants. For example, Gubarev’s 
Donbass People’s Militia reported over 50 thousand people attending 1 March meeting242 and over 15 
thousand people on 31 March in Donets’k.243  Similarly, Donetsk Republic reported over 15 thousand on 
23 March. 244 The two tables below attest to the fact that the pro-Russian and pro-federalisation protests 
did begin to “smoulder away” after 28 March.  
Table 23: Russian Spring in Donets’k region: mean number of protestors  
 
Table 24: Russian Spring in Donets’k region: median number of protestors 
 
241 “Thousands demand referendum on Donbas' status at pro-Russian rally”, Interfax: Russia & CIS Military Newswire, 
31 March 2014; “Pro-Russian rally being held in Donets’k”, Interfax: Russia & CIS Military Newswire, 24 March 2014, 
242 https://vk.com/wall-67059574?day=02032014&w=wall-67059574_3563%2Fall; http://archive.is/2QDnq 
243 https://vk.com/wall-67059574?day=31032014&w=wall-67059574_193036%2Fall; http://archive.is/99gsh  























As in Kharkiv, the majority of pro-federal and pro-Russian protests were not followed by attacks on 
people or property. At the same time, Donets’k region witnessed a higher number of attacks on and 
storming of government buildings, which indirectly testifies to the greater strength of the emotion of 
anger among the residents of Donets’k than among the residents of Kharkiv (Pearlman, 2013). In my 
interview with Journalist 1, he stated that the buildings were taken “too easily”. The SBU building was 
“taken by 40 people at most; nobody knew who opened the room with the weapons”. Process tracing in 
the subsequent chapters shows how this happened. There were at least 6 attacks on government 
buildings, such as the attack on the regional administration building (DONOGA) on 3 and 5 March, 
when the building was occupied by the protestors. There were attacks on the SBU building and the 
regional prosecutor building in Donets’k on 15 and 16 March, when the protestors managed to put the 
Russian and Donetsk Republic flags on the buildings.245 The governor Taruta’s ISD office was also 
attacked on 16 March.246 Overall, compared to Kharkiv, where no similar incidents occurred between 1 
March and 6 April, in Donets’k region, the pro-Russian protestors often managed to mount the Russian 
and Donetsk Republic flags on the buildings of the regional administration and the city councils in 
 
245 https://donbassrus.livejournal.com/2014/03/16/; http://archive.is/1FJuF.  





















Median number of protestors
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Donets’k and Mariupol. As in Kharkiv, central streets and important government buildings were 
systematically blocked in Donets’k and the region. This occurred on 9 of March and 16 March, and during 
all pro-Russian meetings from 30 March247 to 6 April.  
The proportion of reciprocal protest violence in Donets’k region was only slightly higher than in Kharkiv 
(12% against 11%). Out of 80 meetings, 10 were followed by attacks, including attacks on journalists and 
sporadic attacks on protestors. Two meetings, on 5 March and 13 March, were followed by attacks 
involving serious violence against people. According to the reports, on 5 March, 7 people were injured 
during the episode of reciprocal protest violence.248 On 13 March, 1 person was killed and at least 26 were 
injured.249  As in Kharkiv, pro-Russian protestors would often become incensed at the sight of a car with 
a Ukrainian flag.250  
Judging by the extent of protest violence, the meeting on 13 of March was similar to the meeting in 
Kharkiv on 1 March. It was unclear as to who initiated the violence first. Some reports stated that “The 
pro-Russian activists initiated some acts of provocation by throwing eggs, fire crackers and smoke bombs 
[at their opponents]”.251 These reports stated that the pro-Russian activists stormed the buses on which 
the Ukrainian protesters were trying to leave. Overall, the reports gave conflicting information as to who 
provoked the violence. Openly pro-Russian media sources such as Donetsk Republic’s Vkontakte pages 
stated that it was the Ukrainians who provoked the violence. The participants discussed on the social 
media how it was provoked by the Euromaidan forces who came to Donets’k to incite provocations.252 
Many people were emotionally affected by the events at the meeting and therefore left many belligerent 
comments on the Donetsk Republic’s Vkontakte pages.  
 
247 “V Donetske separatist traditsionno perekryli dvizhenie po ulitse Artema”, Ostrov, 30 March 2014.  
248 “Dozen injured as proRussians retake regional govt in east Ukraine”, 5 March 2014, Platts Commodity News; “7 
chelovek postradali v khode stolknovenii v Donets’ke”, Novosti Donbassa, 5 March 2014; “Sem’ chelovek postradali v 
rezul’tate stolknovenii v Donetske”, Ostrov, 5 March 2014.  
249 “Prokuratura oblasti nachala rassledovanie deistvii rabotnikov militsii vo vremia massovykh besporiadkov”, 
Novosti Donbassa, 14 March 2014; “Odin chelovek pogib pri stolknoveniiakh uchastnikov mitinga za edinuiu Ukrainu 
s prorossiiskimi aktivistami na ploshchadi Lenina v Donetske”, Ostrov, 13 March 2014. 
250 “Videofakt. V Donetske prorossiiskie aktivisty napali na zhenshchinu s ukrainskim flagom”, Ostrov, 10 March 
2014.  
251 “One killed, dozen injured as opponents clash in Ukraine's eastern city”, BBC Monitoring Newsfile 13 March 2014   
252 https://vk.com/wall-3223620?day=16032014; http://archive.is/lCMvt.  
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In summary, during the Russian Spring, the protest intensity and the incidence of protest violence were as 
high in Donets’k region as they were in Kharkiv. Simple statistical analysis of attendance at pro-Russian 
and pro-federal protests points that the protests were better attended in Kharkiv. In both regions, a 
pervasive anti-government emotional climate was created owing to the intensity of pro-federal and pro-
Russian protest. At the same time, radical pro-Russian demands were voiced early on, while attacks on 
government buildings were more numerous in Donets’k region. Yet, in both regions the protests did 
“smoulder away” after 28  March, as the statistics shows. 
7. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have demonstrated that the intensity of protest and protest violence should not be 
automatically linked to the incidence of internal war. I started with the discussion of the overall political 
protest potential in Kharkiv city and Donets’k region, in which I have demonstrated that Kharkiv city had 
greater overall political protest potential than the entire Donets’k region. This could have theoretically led 
to greater political destabilisation in Kharkiv. I then discussed the nature of the Euromaidan, Anti-
Maidan, and the Russian Spring protest waves in both Kharkiv city and Donets’k region. I have shown 
that structurally similar regions can demonstrate similar propensity to protest and protest violence, with 
one region demonstrating even greater propensity to protest violence at certain points during the protest 
wave. This points to a theoretically important conclusion that people in structurally similar regions can be 
animated by similar emotions, as they are effectively immersed in similar “emotional climates” or display 
propensity to similar “emotional worldviews” (Baele et al., 2016; Bar‐Tal et al., 2007). The protest 
potential of the regions can also be a poor guide for the decisions of foreign actors as to where to start 
the insurgency.  
At the same time, there were some important variations in the Russian Spring protest waves in the 
regions. I have shown that the attacks on government buildings were more frequent and the appeals to 
Russia were voiced early on in Donets’k region. These simple observations, however, are not enough to 
lead one to conclude that Donets’k region was somewhat more predisposed to an armed conflict than the 
city of Kharkiv.  In the subsequent two chapters, I detail how and why the political opportunities for 
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radical pro-Russian activism and foreign intervention were opened in both regions by the local elites and 


















Chapter 4: Elites and Regional Patronage 
1. Introduction  
In the theoretical introduction to the study, I have problematized the role of the local people and external 
ethnic patrons in causing the Donbas conflict. I argued that ascribing responsibility for the conflict to 
these actors becomes especially problematic if the conflict is examined comparatively. I have therefore 
considered Donets’k region in a comparative perspective with a structurally similar city of Kharkiv and 
built a theory of political opportunity opened by the local elites for specific types of protest. My main 
argument is that a clientelistic polity (Kitschelt, H., and Wilkinson, S. 2007, 19) would experience conflict 
if its elites function under the system of concentrated patronage. I define patronage in line with the 
definition provided by Henry Hale in Patronal Politics: “politics in societies where individuals organize their 
political and economic pursuits primarily around the personalized exchange of concrete rewards and 
punishments through chains of actual acquaintance, and not primarily around abstract, impersonal 
principles such as ideological belief or categorizations like economic class that include many people one 
has not actually met in person” (Hale, 2015, 9- 10).  
I argue that the local elites find themselves operating within a complex web of the specific regional 
patronage system. This system of regional patronage broadly describes the lines along which resources are 
delivered to the region and the “safeguards” that keep the elites in their seats and their assets protected. 
These lines (or personal networks) connecting the centre and the region are described by Easter as “a 
power resource [providing] an informal social structure by which information [is] exchanged, resources 
[are] obtained, and collaborative actions [are] planned” (Easter, 2000, 11). Holding constant other 
structural conditions, such as shared history and the presence of Russian speakers, as well as the aggregate 
pattern of the rising protest potential in both regions, we can argue that the main difference between the 
two regions of Donetsk and Kharkiv is the type of patronage that applies to their elites. I therefore 
develop the elements of the hypothesis 3 in this chapter: H3: the local elites would encourage or discourage specific 




We can distinguish between two types of patronage: diffused and concentrated. For one group of 
elites, their success in remaining in power and securing resources is premised upon their preferred 
network’s continuing presence in the centre (Zimmer, K.,2004, 290). These elites invest heavily in their 
preferred network, never switch to other networks and interact with the members of other networks only 
in cases of “political emergencies” (Kudelia, S.,2010; Kudelia and Kuzio, 2015). That is, these elites are 
placed within the concentrated patronage system. The other group of regional elites, by contrast, has been 
historically placed within the diffused patronage system, the resources of which it can successfully exploit. 
This group of elites is never strongly attached to one patron, even when this patron is ideologically allied 
with these elites or is known to have provided them with considerable resources.   
When the informal governing network changes in the centre, the elites in concentrated patronage regions 
open political opportunities for the types of protest that are in their interest in order to strike deals with 
the emerging patrons and retain their concentrated patronage system. By contrast, a polity characterised 
by diffused patronage would not experience conflict because diffused patronage polities are more adroit 
at adjusting to the changes of the informal governing networks. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss 
the aspects of the independent variable, that is the nature of patronage in the regions, and how this 
independent variable emerged. In doing so, I engage the key concepts developed in the theory chapter 
and “actual acquaintance” in particular.  
I first present Ukraine as a state of networks in order to highlight how volatile politics was in the 
centre. I define a “network” after Easter as “a nonkinship, informal association, within which exists group 
feeling and intimacy as well as group norms of behaviour” (Easter, 2000, 12). The centralised nature of 
Ukraine and its evolution into a state of networks acted as structural constraints on the regional elites. 
The second set of structural constraints is the nature of the political economy in the regions. These two 
structural constraints shaped the regions into diffused or concentrated patronage regions. The elites 
therefore functioned within a set of tight constraints shaped by the combination of the centralised nature 
of Ukraine and the nature of the regional political economy. Actual acquaintance of elites at different 
levels, which lies at the basis of Hale’s concept of patronal politics, eased these structural constraints. I 
then discuss how the elites managed to secure resources for their regions under different governing 
networks and, in the following section, I discuss the aspects of elite survival through learning, especially in 
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diffused patronage polities. Finally, I discuss the time lag between the change of the governing network 
and the deal struck between the regions and the centre. I present how the elites in the concentrated 
patronage polity of Donets’k region developed a set of certain stable bargaining ploys, which helped them 
preserve their concentrated patronage system.  
2. Ukraine as a state of networks  
Despite being a unitary state253 with a strong centralising impulse,254 Ukraine has long been characterised 
as a “state of regions”. Gwendolyn Sasse describes Ukraine in the late 1990s – early 2000s as “a regionalised 
unitary state” (Sasse, 2002, 96). “Domestically,” she writes (2002, 69), “the disparities between the 
different territorial components – their ethnic, linguistic, religious and socio-economic cleavages, 
historical memories and different political and foreign policy orientations – make Ukraine’s single most 
important characteristic its construction as a state of regions”. Much has been made of these regional 
cleavages within Ukraine, as noted by Robert Kravchuk (Kravchuk, 1999) and, more recently, Paul 
D’Anieri (D'Anieri, 2006) (D'Anieri, 2007). Since its independence, Ukraine’s regional divisions, especially 
those between the east and the west, have affected electoral priorities of voters and electoral outcomes 
(Colton, 2011) (Copsey, 2008) (Osipian and Osipian, 2006) (Clem and Craumer, 2008) (Romanova, 2013); 
stark divisions of opinion on a variety of key subjects, such as the direction of economic development 
and relations with Russia and the West, existed between the people of the east and the people of the west 
of Ukraine. In parliamentary elections, specific political parties continued to win votes in the same 
regions, thus solidifying the electoral landscape (D’Anieri, 2007, 108). This continued well into the 2000s, 
so that by 2011, D’Anieri wrote: “Ukraine’s regional division appears stubborn and nearly unchanging, 
 
253 Article 2 of the Ukrainian Constitution states that “Ukraine is a unitary state” (“Konstitutsiya” 
http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=254%EA%2F96%2D%E2%F0). According to Sasse, this 
was a result of a deliberate political choice made in the capital in order to harness the regional potential for 
disintegration in the turbulent times of the economic crisis (Sasse, 2002, 70). For an exposition, see (Wolczuk, 2001).  
254 In the early 1990s, Ukraine experimented with various types of regional self-government (Romanova, 2011). This 
changed under Kuchma, who, ironically, ran for presidency on the platform of federalisation and decentralisation. In 
a bid to establish greater control over regions and build a strong “vertical of power,” from 1996, Kuchma began 
appointing regional governors, in accordance with the Law on Power (1995). The Law also stipulated that he could 
dismiss governors for the violations of law or presidential decrees (Kravchuk, 1999, 167). The Law on Local Self-
Government 1997 stipulated that the regional assemblies were to be directly elected (Sasse, 2002, 76). The new 
Budget Code of 2001 established a direct relationship between the state budget and the local budgets (region, city 
and district level budgets) in some regions. Previously, the regional budget would act as an intermediary between the 
state and the city budget when allocating subventions (Martinez-Vazquez and Wayne, 2011, 21).  
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and the electoral map has changed only marginally” (D’Anieri, 2011, 28). According to the most recent 
research, regional divisions on the key subjects of economic development and relations with Russia and 
the West have smoothed out but still exist (Haran and Zolkina, 2017). 
However, I argue here that characterising Ukraine as a “state of regions” conveys a certain sense of 
rigidity. This characterisation also conflates the interests of the national elites, local elites, and local 
people, obscuring the variables that are important for the outcomes of peace or conflict. As Brian Holden 
Reid has demonstrated in the case of the American Civil War, it is not the voter behaviour, which (I add) 
can be nearly unchanging over time, that produces wars (Reid, 1996, 11-12). He writes: “whatever the 
strength of political opinions, and electoral shifts of opinion, it is the action – the decisions taken by 
politicians – which determine the chain of circumstances that result in war or peace” (ibid., 115). In the 
Ukrainian case, the experimentations with the Ukrainian Constitution and division of powers that started 
in 2004 demonstrate that it gradually moved towards being “a state of networks”. Characterising Ukraine 
as a “state of networks” also goes a long way to explain, for example, President Viktor Yanukovych’s 
attempts to co-opt people from a variety of networks (but not the “most important rival network” of 
Yulia Tymoshenko (Hale, 2015, 234)) into the Party of Regions later into his presidency. In the long haul, 
it also explains the survival of Rinat Akhmetov, who miscalculated the radical protest potential during the 
crucial period of spring 2014 (Interview with Journalist 1 19 07 2019), but finally managed to negotiate a 
deal with the new dominant network of Petro Poroshenko later into 2014 (Haran and Burkovsky, 2018).  
Therefore, I demonstrate that, instead of being a “state of regions,” over time, Ukraine evolved into a 
more flexible polity or a “state of networks”. According to Easter’s definition, a network is “a 
nonkinship, informal association, within which exists group feeling and intimacy as well as group norms 
of behaviour” (Easter, 2000, 12). Easter’s characterisation of how centre-periphery relations work in 
clientelistic polities is even more apt because it takes into account the perspectives of the regional elites 
(in Easter’s account the “provincial apparatchiki”): these personal networks connecting the centre and the 
region are “a power resource [providing] an informal social structure by which information [is] 
exchanged, resources [are] obtained, and collaborative actions [are] planned” (Easter, 2000, 11). Henry 
Hale, on whose theory of patronal politics I build the main argument of this dissertation, also converges 
on the view that, as other post-Soviet states, Ukraine has been governed by networks: “the collective 
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“actors” that actually wield the most influence in these countries… are precisely these extended informal 
networks, networks that constitute institutions in their own right…” (Hale, 2015, 95 – 96).  
Since Leonid Kuchma’s centralising bid, the formal aspects of centre-periphery relations in Ukraine 
remained unchanged, that is regional governors continued to be appointed by Presidents while regional 
and city councils continued to be directly elected. However, to harness the potential for disintegration and 
forestall conflict, Ukrainian national elites started experimenting with the Constitution and the division of 
powers (more specifically, the executive branch of power) from roughly 2002, when President Kuchma 
drafted the changes to the Constitution to give more power to the Prime Minister and Parliament 
(Kudelia, 2008). From January 2006, spurred by the Orange Revolution and the elite compromise 
between the two opposing camps of Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych (Kudelia, 2007), some 
important changes began occurring at the national level that moved Ukraine towards a “state of 
networks” and had a lasting impact on the regional elites. To use Henry Hale’s terminology, Ukraine 
experienced alternating periods of “dominant chief executive” and “divided-executive,” which created 
certain structural constraints for the regional elites and moulded their regions into “diffused” or 
“concentrated” patronage regions.  
The turmoil of the Orange Revolution resulted in an elite compromise, thereby the Prime Minister and 
Parliament were given more power at the expense of the President, ensuring that the eastern forces in the 
person of Yanukovych and the Party of Regions could “come back” (Kudelia, 2007) and be given a 
chance to exercise significant power in Ukrainian politics (Kudelia, 2010). More specifically, the Prime 
Minister was now appointed by Parliament rather than the President (Article 85. 12 of the Ukrainian 
Constitution from 01.01.2006; Hale, 2015, 77- 78) and the Cabinet could only be formed if there was a 
viable coalition in Parliament (Article 114 of the Ukrainian Constitution from 01.01.2006) (Copsey, 2008) 
(D’Anieri, 2006, 145). The Ministers in the Cabinet were now chosen by the Prime Minister rather than 
the President and appointed by Parliament (Article 85.12 of the Ukrainian Constitution from 
01.01.2006).255 The changes fragmented the national system of patronage so that the President, Prime 
Minister, Cabinet of Ministers and the opposition forces became their own separate patrons. Thus, the 
 
255 https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80/ed20060101  
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period between 2006 and late 2010 has been characterised as a period of “divided-executive,” during 
which the elites at both the national and regional level coordinated themselves around their preferred 
patrons.  
How Ukraine moved towards the state of networks and how these different networks availed of these 
changes can be seen from the Cabinet appointments of specific Prime Ministers under this period of the 
divided-executive. In August 2006, Yanukovych headed the new parliamentary coalition and became the 
Prime Minister. Kudelia and Kuzio write on his government: “overall, 15 Cabinet positions were filled 
either with members of the Party of Regions or with Yanukovych’s loyalists, supporting the goal of 
distributing patronage” (Kudelia and Kuzio, 2015, 262). Following the 2007 parliamentary election and 
the establishment of a coalition government by Yulia Tymoshenko’s Bloc BYUT and President 
Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine- People’s Self-Defence party (304, Copsey, 2008), Tymoshenko’s network 
(“the most powerful rival network’s chief patron” (Hale, 2015, 234)) similarly used the changes in the 
Constitution to its advantage. Thus, Tymoshenko’s second government was composed overwhelmingly 
of people from her own network. Oleksandr Turchynov, a member of BYUT, from Tymoshenko’s home 
town of Dniepropetrovsk, became the first deputy Prime Minister. Other key positions, that is the 
ministers most frequently lobbied by the regional governors and mayors, were occupied by people from 
either BYUT or Our Ukraine – People’s Self-Defence party. Iosif Vinskiy (Khmelnitska oblast), from 
BYUT, became the Minister of Transport and Communications; Bohdan Danilishin (BYUT) became the 
Minister of the Economy; Yuriy Lutsenko belonged to “Our Ukraine” party and came to occupy the 
position of the Minister of the Interior. Viktor Pynzenyk (BYUT) was promoted to the position of the 
Minister of Finance.256  
From the regional elites’ point of view, this period of the divided-executive meant that whoever occupied 
the positions of the Prime Minister and the positions in the Cabinet – and therefore was responsible for 
the disbursement of key resources to the region, such as contracts to regional enterprises or subventions 
and equalisation grants to the regional budgets– was the first port of call.257 This worked particularly well 
 
256 “Kto est’ kto v Kabmine novogo obraztsa”, Status Quo, 19 December 2007.  
257 To illustrate the relative power advantage of Prime Ministers over Presidents when it came to regional policies, an 
example can be used. In May 2009, President Yushchenko sent a letter to Prime Minister Tymoshenko asking to 
provide funds for road repairs in Kharkiv in preparation for the football tournament Euro-2012. He was lobbied by 
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for the elites within the diffused patronage system who benefitted from their access to multiple patrons. 
For the elites in the concentrated patronage system, continued access to power by Yanukovych meant 
that the state was in relative balance as, if not in government, Yanukovych and his network could control 
the positions in Parliament, use the weakness of the Presidency (Hale, 2015, 327) and play Tymoshenko 
off Yushchenko (Hale, 2015, 330). This continuing access to power by Yanukovych meant that the 
positions of both economic and political elites in Donets’k region could stay secure. This explains why no 
significant switching to other networks among the elites took place in Donets’k region.  
The changes made in the Constitution in 2006 and the multiple deadlocks in the centre (between the 
branches of the executive and legislature) worked in such a way as to ensure that Yanukovych and his 
network of the Party of Regions could return to power. Yanukovych demonstrated a capacity for 
concentration of patronage already under Kuchma’s old presidentialist Constitution. When he became 
Prime Minister for the first time in November 2002, his “new Cabinet of Ministers included several other 
members of the Donets’k elite. Mykola Azarov, formerly the head of the state tax administration, was 
appointed first deputy prime minister and finance minister; Vitaliy Hayduk, a former director of Industrial 
Union of [Donbas], became the deputy prime minister for the fuel and energy complex” (Kovaleva, 2007, 
64 – 65).  
Thus in 2010, following his victory in the presidential elections, Yanukovych began consolidating power 
heavily in one chief executive and, in particular, in one – albeit significantly extended – network of the 
Party of Regions. Operating under the old divided-executive Constitution, Yanukovych “manoeuvred” 
his old acquaintance Mykola Azarov into the position of the Prime Minister (Hale, 2015, 343). One 
journalist described Azarov’s Cabinet of Ministers as “a symbiosis of those who used to serve under 
Kuchma, key people from the Party of Regions, Lytvyn’s Bloc and Communists”.258 Thus, the deputy 
Prime Minister position was occupied by a Party of Regions’ member Andriy Kliuev. The Minister of 
 
Dobkin and Avakov. Presidents were generally lobbied by governors and mayors as a last resort. The Prime Minister 
and Cabinet of Ministers initiated government funding or contracts and then obliged various ministries, such as the 
Defence Ministry or the Ministry of Transport and Communications, to attend to the fulfilment of these and, 
importantly for state-owned enterprises, to cancel wage arrears. See “Riad ministerstv i vedomstv rasschitalis’ s 
Khar’kovskim zavodom im. Malysheva posle poseshcheniia zavoda Prem’er-Ministrom Ukrainy Yu. Tymoshenko – 
V. Babaev”, Status Quo, 1 August 2005. Yuschenko retained the veto power on privatisation.   
258 “Kabmin Azarova: “Kaznokrad”, konferans’e, prodavets i drugie”, Ukrayinska Pravda, 11 March 2010.  
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Finance formerly worked closely with Azarov, whereas the Minister of the Interior was a former head of 
the police in Crimea and supervised Yanukovych’s election campaign. The Minister of Industrial Policy, 
another key ministry frequently lobbied by regional governors, worked at Rinat Akhmetov’s factories and 
was a deputy of the Party of Regions.259 Overall, there were no less than 10 representatives of the Donbas 
in the new government of Yanukovych. It was claimed that 14 out of 24/27 regions (this includes Kyiv, 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol) were not represented at all in either Yanukovych’s 
Presidential Administration or the Cabinet of Ministers.260 Yanukovych effectively restored the “patronal 
presidentialism,” to use Hale’s term, and gave the President even more power than under Kuchma’s 
presidentialist Constitution of 1996. According to the new Constitution from 30.09.2010, the Parliament 
now approved rather than appointed the Prime Minister chosen by the President (Article 85.12) and the 
various committees, such as the Anti-Monopoly committee, were also approved by the Parliament but 
chosen by President (Article 85.24). The President now appointed the Prime Minister and the Cabinet 
(Article 106. 9 -10).  We can therefore argue that the reason why Yanukovych’s regime was “zlochinnyi” 
(to use Ihor Kolomoisky’s word, meaning “bad” in Ukrainian)261 was not so much because of corruption 
but because of the systemic disequilibrium that he introduced with the dominant chief executive. In the 
section below, I explain why Yanukovych consolidated so much power in his own network.  
3. Regional political economy  
Thus, the changes on the national level created certain structural constraints for the local elites. More 
specifically, these changes forced the elites to coordinate around different patrons in order to accomplish 
several goals: retain their hold on power, keep their assets, and secure resources for both the region and 
themselves. This was not the only constraint on these elites. Given the stable nature of the formal centre-
periphery relations, at the regional level whether a region developed into a concentrated or diffused 
patronage type of region depended largely on the nature of its political economy.  
In formally centralised systems governed by informal networks, there is an important information 
exchange process going on between the centre and the region with the purpose of protecting regional 
 
259 Ibid.  
260 “Back to USSR”, Novosti Donbassa, 13 March 2010.  
261 “Kolomois’skiy nazvav viinu na Donbasi “hromadians’kym konfliktom”, ZIK,  2 May 2019.  
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property. Actual acquaintance between the patrons and clients in the regions serves as a means of 
protecting and monitoring large-scale regional property. In regions where large property (factories) is 
state-owned, patrons (Presidents) would appoint clients (governors) from competing networks in order to 
monitor the behaviour of clients from other networks. They do so in order to improve information flows 
between the centre and the region. In regions where large property is mostly private, the patrons would 
appoint clients that are agreed with the network dominant in the region (Interview with Journalist 1 19 07 
2019). Regions therefore would evolve into concentrated or diffused patronage regions depending on the 
nature of their political economy.  
3.1. State-owned enterprises in diffused patronage regions  
Historically, Kharkiv city evolved into a diffused patronage region because the biggest enterprises in the 
city, such as the military-oriented Malyshev plant,262 the turbine-producer Turboatom, Elektrotyazhmash, 
Khimprom and the Kharkiv aviation plant, were state-owned. All of these plants depended on the 
decisions made by the ministries in Kyiv for their future development, including modernisation, 
government contracts supply, and, most importantly, cancellation of wage arrears to their employees.263 
Importantly, these state-owned enterprises were not entangled in any subtle and complex commodity 
chains that would have made the region a concentrated patronage one. The economic development of 
these enterprises also depended on the lobbying prowess of the regional governors.  
Due to the faltering economy at these enterprises, over time, Kharkiv city became very dependent on the 
centre (Activist in Kharkiv, interview 16 07 2019). These enterprises needed constant monitoring. The 
governors, mayors, and enterprise directors repeatedly acknowledged that these plants would not be able 
to survive without state support, particularly when it came to the cancellation of wage arrears.264 In fact, 
these plants were constantly in debt to their workers, the Pension Fund, and banks265 and needed the 
 
262 Valentin Badrak, “Krute pike bronetankobuduvannia”, Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, 17 August 2001.  
263 “Khar’kovskaia oblgosadministratsiia budet dobivat’sia vydeleniia v 2008 g. iz gosbiudzheta dlia khar’kovskogo 
aviazavoda 149 mln. grn. – pervyi vitse-gubernator”, Status Quo,  23 December 2008.  
264 “Odnim iz minusov svoei raboty za 2 goda A. Avakov schitaet to, chto ne udalos’ stabilizirovat’ deiatel’nost’ 
zavoda im. Malysheva”, Status Quo, 26 February 2007.  
265 In 2008, 19 plants, 13 of which were state-owned, were on the verge of bankruptcy. By 2009, Malyshev plant, 
Kharkiv aviation plant and Khimprom were in a severe debt to the Pension Fund. See “Zadolzhennost’ predpriiatii 
Khar’kovskoi oblasti v Pensionnyi Fond sostavliaet 234 mln. grn. – nachal’nik oblastnogo upravleniia”, Status Quo, 
13 April 2009.  By 2009, the Kharkiv aviation plant owned nearly 2 billion hryvnia to its creditors “Khar’kovskii 
aviazavod poluchil 112 mln. grn. iz stabilizatsionnogo fonda gosbiudzheta – A. Avakov”, Status Quo, 25 June 2009.  
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centre to bail them out. No matter how much the state would disburse to these plants to cancel their 
arrears in any given month, arrears would continue to accumulate. As a result, these plants were always on 
the verge of bankruptcy, had it not been for the disbursements from the state budget. If the state failed to 
provide essential funds to these plants, they were subject to privatisation, which the local elites resisted.266 
For example, in 2007, Khimprom required over 500 million hryvnia from the state budget to modernise; 
otherwise it was subject to privatisation.267 The problems at these plants were of such magnitude that the 
centre had to be heavily involved in helping manage them. For example, in November 2006, President 
Yushchenko took 10 major state-owned plants in Kharkiv under his protection.268 In January 2007, the 
committee of defense in the Verkhovna Rada took Elektrotyazhmash under its control.269 
These plants, particularly the military-oriented Malyshev plant, were also dependent on the steady supply 
of government contracts, to provide work to their employees.270 Therefore, workers would be dependent 
for their livelihoods on the supply and fulfilment of contracts at these plants.271 In some cases, workers 
raised complaints about the management to the regional administration’s deputies and even protested; 
their complaints were delivered to the ministries by the regional governors.272 
The regional governors and, to a lesser extent, city mayors therefore played a vital part in the functioning 
of these enterprises and acted as intermediaries between the enterprises and the centre (Activist in 
 
266 The regional council’s chairman Vasil’ Salygin resisted the privatisation of Turboatom. See “Perevod 
“Turboatoma” iz pervoocherednogo spiska privatizatsii v obshchii spisok ne imeet bol’shogo znacheniia – 
zamestitel’ predsedatelia FGI”, Status Quo, 27 February 2008.  Turboatom and Elektrotyazhmash repeatedly came 
under raider attacks or were on privatisation lists both under Tymoshenko and Yanukovych “Yu. Tymoshenko 
vystupila protiv privatizatsii Khar’kovskogo “Elektrotyazhmasha” – nardep-Khar’kovchanin V. Kamchatnyi”, Status 
Quo, 15 December 2008. Yushchenko vetoed the privatisation of Turboatom, and it was eventually removed from 
the privatisation list. Significantly, Turboatom was put on the privatisation list under Yanukovych but was later 
removed too. See “”Delo”: spisok aktsii predpriiatii, kotorye hochet prodat’ Kabmin v etom godu. Sredi nikh – 
“Turboatom””, Mediaport, 16 January 2008; “Fond gosimushchestva ne planiruet prodavat’ Khar’kovskii 
“Turboatom””, Status Quo, 18 March 2011.  
267 “Arsen Avakov: dlia modernizatsii “Khimproma” neobhodimo polmilliarda griven’””, Mediaport, 23 May 2007.  
268 “Prezident Ukrainy voz’met pod svoi patronat 10 krupnykh predpriiatii Khar’kovskoi oblasti”, Status Quo, 3 
November 2006  
269 “Komitet Verkhovnoi Rady po voprosam natsional’noi bezopasnosti voz’met pod kontrol’ problem razvitiia 
khar’kovskogo zavoda “Elektrotyazhmash” – A. Kinakh”, Status Quo, 29 January 2007.  
270 “O meste i roli tsirka v politike i obshchestvennoi zhizni”, Status Quo, 1 October 2006.  
271 “A. Avakov obratilsia k prem’er-ministru Ukrainy s pros’boi predusmotret’ v gosbiudzhete 2005 g. sredstva dlia 
prodolzheniia modernizatsii bronetankovoi tekhniki na zavode im. Malsheva”, Status Quo, 21 Ferbruary 2005.  
272 “Narodnye deputaty-khar’kovchane planiruiut obratit’sia k prem’er-ministru s pros’boi zashchitit’ interest 
rabochikh zavoda im. Malysheva”, Status Quo, 18 March 2009.  
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Kharkiv, interview 16 07 2019). For example, the governors often acted as intermediaries between banks, 
electricity suppliers, and the plants.273 The directors of the state-owned enterprises were subject to a close 
scrutiny by the governors. The governors initiated inspections of the enterprises, if the directors failed to 
cancel wage arrears or fulfil their contractual obligations.274  The governors often put pressure on 
directors to pay wages in a timely manner.275 Importantly, the governors could initiate a change of 
directors and they played an important role in how they were appointed (Activist in Kharkiv; Interview 16 
07 2019). The governors would be responsible for nominating directors who would finally be appointed 
by the Ministry of Industrial Policy or the Ministry of Transport and Communications.276 Certain 
governors such as Avakov initiated the change of directors several times during their governorship.277 As 
a result, the governors in Kharkiv were dependent on the centre for the budgetary disbursements to and 
appointments of directors at the state-owned enterprises. Ultimately, the governors were answerable to 
the local population because workers depended for their livelihood on the smooth running of these 
enterprises, which the governors were responsible for.   
The economic situation at these state-owned enterprises explains why Presidents, and especially Viktor 
Yushchenko, appointed clients from their preferred networks. The appointment of the trusted Avakov as 
governor, who was later made the head of Our Ukraine party’s committee in Kharkiv, in a region heavily 
dominated by the Party of Regions meant that the behaviour of enterprise directors who were members 
of or leaned towards the Party of Regions could be monitored. This was confirmed to me in an interview 
with the Activist in Kharkiv (16 07 2019). He stated that “Yushchenko appointed Avakov to keep “the 
balance of power” in the region against the Party of Regions”. The activist also stated that many 
enterprise directors were members of the Party of Regions. For example, in 2005 and 2007, Avakov 
initiated a change of director at Kharkiv metro which incurred the wrath of the Party of Regions’ 
 
273 “Khar’kovskaia oblgosadministratsiia budet dobivat’sia vydeleniia v 2008 g. iz gosbiudzheta dlia khar’kovskogo 
aviazavoda 149 mln. grn. – pervyi vitse-gubernator”, Status Quo, 23 December 2008.  
274 “Proverka deiatel’nosti gospredpriiatii Khar’kovskogo regiona mozhet zakonchit’sia znachitel’nymi kadrovymi 
perestanovkami – A. Avakov”, Status Quo, 11 April 2005.  
275 “Zadolzhennost’ po zarplate: ukaz est’, zarplaty net!”, Mediaport, 1 July 2002.  
276 The centre got involved in the highly controversial case of the director appointment at Kharkiv metro. See 
“MediaPost on-line. Avakov ne ustupit mesto Fel’dmanu (ekskliuzivnoe interview)”, Mediaport, 16 January 2008; The 
change of the director caused protests in February 2008 in Kyiv.  




members but led to certain improvements at the metro. Monitoring the situation at the regional 
enterprises through the governors also protest-proofed the politically explosive city of Kharkiv. 
Ultimately, it improved the transparency of information flows between the centre and the region.   
3.2. Securing resources for these enterprises  
One of the tasks of the regional elites was to secure resources for these enterprises. Due to the diffused 
nature of the regional patronage system, Kharkiv city was “plugged into” various patronage channels, 
especially during the period of the divided-executive (Interview with Activist in Kharkiv 16 07 2019). The 
elites therefore did not invest into any particular network as they relied on the past successes of exchange 
with multiple networks and benefitted from the rise of multiple patrons to the centre.278 There was 
therefore an expectation that when the governing network changes, the region would still continue 
accessing resources from the centre. 
The governors, mayors, and enterprise directors repeatedly acknowledged that these enterprises would 
not be able to survive without state support, particularly when it came to wage arrears cancellation. 
Consequently, on their frequent trips to Kyiv, Kharkiv governors and, to a lesser extent, mayors 
persistently hammered this point home to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet of Ministers.279 As it 
happened, the governor would often lobby the Prime Minister for him or her to issue a directive to the 
subordinate Ministries of Finance and Defence to finance these enterprises. These directives would then 
be discussed at the Verkhovna Rada to determine how much funding to allocate to the enterprises.280  
How did the frequent and dramatic changes of the governing networks in Kyiv affect Kharkiv elites? It 
seems that for Kharkiv elites, due to this serious dependence of the regional enterprises on the centre, 
these changes did not matter much. In other words, regardless of who was in control of the centre, the 
 
278 Traditionally, it can be noted that Kharkivites began to be occupying positions of power under the presidentship 
of Yushchenko and premiership of Tymoshenko. A good example of this is Oleksandr Fel’dman who became a 
member of one of the Rada committees on humanitarian affairs under Tymoshenko and proposed a great deal of 
bills in the Rada. Neither Dobkin nor Kernes opposed the elevation of Feldman. In 2014, several Kharkivites, 
notably the ex-governor of Kharkiv Arsen Avakov, and Ivan Shvaika of Svoboda, were promoted to positions of 
significant power, with Avakov now occupying the Minister of the Interior post, and Shvaika occupying the 
significant for Kharkiv post of the Minister of Agriculture. Therefore, the governing network of Tymoshenko 
brought substantial benefits to Kharkivites in that they gradually came to occupy positions of power in the centre. 
279 “Odnim iz minusov svoei raboty za 2 goda A. Avakov schitaet to, chto ne udalos’ stabilizirovat’ deiatel’nost’ 
zavoda im. Malysheva”, Status Quo, 26 February 2007.  
280 “A. Avakov obratil’sia k prem’er-ministru Ukrainy s pros’boi predusmotret’ v gosbiudzhete 2005 g. sredstva dlia 
prodolzheniia modernizatsii bronetankovoi tekhniki na zavode im. Malysheva”, Status Quo, 21 February 2005.  
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state-owned enterprises in Kharkiv had to receive government funding and their debts had to be 
cancelled using government funds. The governors and city mayors lobbied the centre for this funding 
intensely; they were more active in their lobbying efforts when their preferred network was controlling 
the centre.281  For example, when Tymoshenko became Prime Minister for the first time in 2005, Kharkiv 
city mayor Volodymyr Shumilkin and Kharkiv regional governor Arsen Avakov, both supporters of 
Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, were very active in lobbying the new Prime Minister for her to provide 
funding for the Malyshev plant282 and to continue providing funding for the building of the remaining 
stations of Kharkiv metro.283 
Both Prime Ministers Tymoshenko and Yanukovych delivered or not on their promises to cancel arrears 
of these state-owned enterprises, modernise, and supply them with government contracts, regardless of 
politics.284 Both were lax in their first (or second for Yanukovych) years of premiership,285 only to learn 
from their mistakes and become more active in their policies towards Kharkiv later. During her second 
premiership, Tymoshenko visited Kharkiv in January 2009 and promised to supply Malyshev plant with 
government contracts to produce defence equipment; she also promised not to privatise Turboatom and 
give enough funding to Kharkiv metro.286 Following this trip, in February 2009, on Tymoshenko’s 
initiative, the Cabinet of Ministers supplied around 40 million hryvnia to Kharkiv aviation plant to cancel 
wage arrears.287 In March 2009, the Cabinet of Ministers supplied Malyshev plant with enough 
government contracts to keep full employment.288 In April 2009, the plant received 136 million hryvnia 
from the Stabilisation Fund to cancel wage arrears and their debts to the Pension Fund.289 In July 2009, 
 
281 “Gosbiudzhet 2007 g. budet dlia Khar’kovskoi oblasti ne huzhe, chem predydushchii, v nekotorykh momentakh 
-dazhe luchshe – A. Avakov”, Status Quo, 28 December 2007.  
282 “A. Avakov obratilsia k prem’er-ministru Ukrainy s pros’boi predusmotret’ v gosbiudzhete 2005 g. sredstva dlia 
prodolzheniia modernizatsii bronetankovoi tekhniki na zavode im. Malysheva”, Status Quo,  21 February 2005.  
283 “Khar’kovskaia oblgosadministratsiia initsiiruet vydelenie iz gosbiudzheta 45 mln. grn. na stroitel’stvo 
metropolitena”, Status Quo, 17 March 2005.  
284 “Khar’kovskii aviazavod poluchil 112 mln. grn. iz stabilizatsionnogo fonda gosbiudzheta – A. Avakov”, Status 
Quo, 25 June 2009; “Khar’kovskii zavod im. Malysheva polnost’iu pogasil zadolzhennost’ po zarplate”, Status Quo, 19 
September 2007.  
285 “Zadolzhennost’ po zarplate na Khar’kovskom zavode im. Malysheva budet pogashena do kontsa sentiabria – V. 
Yanukovich”, Status Quo, 16 August 2007.  
286 “Aktsiia vstrechi, vosstavshie iz ada zastroishchiki i obeshchaniia prem’era”, Status Quo, 23 March 2009.  
287 “Khar’kovskomu aviazavodu vydeleno iz gosbiudzheta okolo 40 mln. grn. – oblgosadministratsiia”, Status Quo, 9 
February 2009.  
288 “Kabmin planiruet zagruzit’ khar’kovskii zavod im. Malysheva oboronnym zakazom – Iu. Tymoshenko”, Status 
Quo, 18 March 2009.  
289 “Parlamentskie komitety po biudzhetu i finansam soglasovali vydelenie bolee 130 mln. grn. Khar’kovskomu 
zavodu im. Malysheva – D. Shentsev”, Status Quo, 13 April 2009  
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the ministries in Kyiv supplied the Kharkiv state aviation plant with government contracts.290  Finally, in 
summer of 2009 Kharkiv metro received 75 million hryvnia, the first significant government tranche since 
2007, to build the remaining metro stations. According to my interview with the Activist in Kharkiv (16 
07 2019), Tymoshenko used the wage arrears at Kharkiv enterprises to “force the directors who belonged 
to the Party of Regions to her side”.  
The military-oriented Malyshev plant provides a good example of the effects of the frequent changes of 
the governing networks in the centre. The plant was among the most indebted enterprises in the region.291 
Wage arrears continued to accumulate at the plant, regardless of how many of the previous arrears were 
cancelled.292 Even after the disbursement from the state budget to liquidate wage arrears in April 2009, 
these arrears still accumulated at the plant by September of the same year.293 The situation was quite 
dismal. Directors could be prosecuted for not paying to the Pension Fund,294 criminal proceedings could 
be opened against the enterprise, and it could be closed as a result. Yet, regardless of who controlled the 
centre, it seems that the disbursement of state funds was guided by the economic expediency rather than 
politics. By August 2005, Tymoshenko supplied government contracts to Malyshev plant and liquidated 
its wage arrears.295 She became more active in her Kharkiv policies only during her second premiership, 
however. In March 2009, for example, the Cabinet of Ministers disbursed of 92 million hryvnia to cancel 
the plant’s wage arrears and the debts to Pension Fund.296 Under Tymoshenko’s second premiership, 
Malyshev plant began producing the Oplot and Bulat tanks.297 This continued when Yanukovych became 
President.298 During his second premiership, Yanukovych did not fulfil the promise to cancel significant 
 
290 “Kabmin prinial reshenie, obespechivaiushchie Khar’kovskii aviazavod sredstvami na dostroiku dvukh samoletov 
An-74 dlia Livii”, Status Quo , 6 July 2009.  
291 “Khar’kovskii aviazavod i zavod im. Malysheva v avguste narastili dolgi po zarplate”, Status Quo, 14 September 
2010; “Za dva mesiatsa v Khar’kovskoi oblasti khotiat pogasit’ vsiu zadolzhennost’ po zarplate”, Status Quo, 26 
January 2011.  
292 “Khar’kovskii zavod im. Malysheva pogasil svoiu zadolzhennost’ po zarplate”, Status Quo, 2 July 2009.  
293 “Zadolzhennost’ po zarplate na ekonomicheski aktivnykh predpriiatiiakh Khar’kovskoi oblasti sostavliaet 93, 5 
mln. grn.”, Status Quo, 30 September 2009.  
294 “Dolg Khar’kovskikh predpriiatii Pensionnomu Fondu sostavliaet bolee 230 mln. grn. – zamgubernatora I. 
Shurma”, Status Quo, 20 May 2010.  
295 “Kollektiv Khar’kovskogo zavoda im. Malysheva vyrazil blagodarnost’ Yu. Tymoshenko za okazannuiu 
pomoshch’ v likvidatsii zadolzhennosti po zarplate”, Status Quo, 25 August 2005.  
296 “Kabmin planiruet zagruzit’ khar’kovskii zavod im. Malysheva oboronnym zakazom – Yu. Tymoshenko”, Status 
Quo, 18 March 2009.  
297 “Khar’kovskii zavod im. Malysheva v 2009 g. nachnet seriinoe proizvodstvo tankov “Oplot” – ministr 
prompolitiki”, Status Quo, 24 April 2009.  
298 “Kabmin rasporiadilsia vydelit’ 22 mln. grn. na finansirovanie podgotovki proizvodstva tanka “Oplot””, Status 
Quo, 13 March 2010  
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wage arrears at the plant.299 When he became President in 2010, the plant began receiving somewhat 
greater disbursements from the state fund than under Tymoshenko. It was also better supplied with 
government contracts and funds for modernisation projects, especially of the Oplot tanks.300 Overall, the 
situation at the plant improved marginally when Yanukovych became President. This was confirmed to 
me in an interview with Activist in Kharkiv (16 07 2019), who stated that under Yanukovych, “things run 
more smoothly”. 
The governors rarely blamed politics for problems at these enterprises. In fact, I was able to detect only 
two cases when politics was explicitly blamed for under-financing of the plants. In July 2006, the Cabinet 
of Ministers suddenly stopped supplying funds to modernise Bulat tanks and cancel wage arrears at 
Malyshev plant.301 This continued when Yanukovych became Prime Minister in August 2006. In October 
2006, having tried all the usual lobbying channels, including the Cabinet of Ministers, without tangible 
results, the governor of Kharkiv Arsen Avakov vowed to sue the Ministry of Finance and the Cabinet of 
Ministers; he blamed politics for the lack of funds.302  Later, when funding was resumed in October 
2006,303 but arrears still accumulated at the plant, some of Avakov’s subordinates, such as Vasil’ 
Tretetskiy, a staunch opponent of the Party of Regions, promised to prosecute the Prime Minister 
Yanukovych under the Penal Code.304  
Finally, perhaps realising the potential negative impact of the volatile changes in the centre, the governors 
sought to reduce their dependence on the centre through various ingenious schemes. One instance would 
serve as an example (the other example comes from the sphere of inter-budgetary relations which I 
discuss below). Kharkiv metro was highly dependent on the state for the building of the remaining 
 
299 “Khar’kovskii aviazavod pogasil zadolzhennost’ po zarplate eshche na 2 mln. grn. – spetsializirovannaia 
nalogovaia inspektsiia v Khar’kove”, Status Quo, 10 September 2007.  
300 “Vitse-prem’er A. Kliuev poobeshchal, chto Kabmin v blizhaishie tri mesiatsa vydelit bolee 350 mln. grn. Zavodu 
im. Malysheva”, Status Quo, 10 June 2010 ; “Khar’kovskomu zavodu im. Malysheva vydeleno 236 mln. grn. na 
proizvodstvo bronetekhniki – vitse-prem’er A. Kliuev”, Status Quo, 23 June 2010; “Minoborony zakazhet u zavoda 
im. Malysheva tanki “Bulat” i “Oplot” na 100 mln. grn.”, Status Quo, 25 March 2011.  
301 “Vydelit’ bolee 200 mln. grn. Zavodu im. Malysheva i “Khimpromu” oznachaet ikh proest’ – V. Salygin”, Status 
Quo, 12 October 2006.  
302 “O meste i roli tsirka v politike i obshchestvennoi zhizni”, Status Quo, 1 October 2006.  
303 “A. Avakov v noiabre nameren snova dobivat’sia vozobnovleniia finansirovaniia goszakaza zavodu im. 
Malysheva”, Status Quo, 19 October 2006 ; “State Treasury Resumes Transfers To Malyshev Plant For Tank 
Modernization”, Ukrainian News, 19 October 2006,  
304 “V. Tretetskii predlozhil privlech’ prem’er-ministra i Minprompolitiki k ugolovnoi otvetsvennosti za 
nevypolnenie obiazannostei v reshenii problem gospredpriiatii”, Status Quo, 26 April 2007.  
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stations, and the demands of the regional governors in this regard continued to grow.305 The Cabinet of 
Ministers, regardless of who was in power, frequently failed to provide enough funding to the metro.306 
The building works were on hold for many years and only activated in 2007 when the subvention for the 
building works was received from the state budget.307 To reduce their dependence on the centre, the city 
mayor Dobkin initiated making the metro communal property in 2008, so that the greater bulk of the 
funding would come from the city and regional budget.308 Thus, the local elites in Kharkiv strived to 
reduce their dependence on the centre by generating other sources of funding for the state-owned 
enterprises, including Kharkiv metro (Activist in Kharkiv, interview 16 07 2019).  
3.3. Private enterprises in concentrated patronage systems309  
Donets’k region evolved into a concentrated patronage region partially due to its geographical location 
but also for deeper reasons. As Kerstin Zimmer demonstrates, this was the result of how the Soviet 
system of centralised planning operated in that by the time of Ukrainian independence the region had 
inherited a small number of heavy industries (Zimmer, 2004). The region, therefore, was politically, 
economically and cognitively “locked in” (Swain and Mykhnenko, 2007, 36): the elites clung onto these 
largely obsolete industries because there were no alternatives; seeking alternatives would have resulted in a 
social explosion (as the regional history demonstrated numerous times in the cases of miners’ strikes 
(Swain, 2007)).  
The painful economic transition in the 1990s meant that the elites had to protect the industries which 
were responsible for sustaining the region on even keel. These were primarily energy and metallurgy. 
Swain and Mykhnenko estimate that by the end of 2003, the Gross Value Added (GVA) per capita was 
above the national average in Donets’k (Swain and Mykhnenko, 2007, 20).  They document how this 
 
305 “V. Salygin predlozhil napisat’ pis’mo prem’eru i prezidentu Ukrainy s pros’boi vydelit’ sredstva na stroitel’stvo 
Khar’kovskogo metropolitena”, Status Quo, 7 February 2008 
306 Equally, Tymoshenko, Yanukovych and Azarov were anxious to supply Kharkiv metro with funding. In 2009, 
the Cabinet of Ministers disbursed of 75 million hryvnia. See “Kabmin vydelit 50 mln. grn. na stroitel’stvo st. 
“Alekseevskaia” Khar’kovskogo metro”, Status Quo, 10 June 2010. In 2011 it was 100 million. “V avguste-sentriabre 
na stroitel’stvo khar’kovskogo metro iz gosbiudzheta postupit 100 millionov griven’”, Status Quo, 29 July 2011 
307 “M. Dobkin obvinil Khar’kovskuiu oblgosadministratsiiu v sabotazhe stroitel’stva metro”, Status Quo, 23 January 
2008.  
308 “V. Salygin predlozhil napisat’ pis’mo prem’eru i prezidentu Ukrainy s pros’boi vydelit’ sredstva na stroitel’stvo 
Khar’kovskogo metropolitena”, Status Quo, 7 February 2008.  
309 I made a decision not to recite the statistics on the political economic make up of the region. For statistics, see 
(Kovaleva, 2007).  
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value and production picked up after 2002 (ibid.,25). This performance, they write, was largely 
determined by the primary sector (coal and energy) (ibid., 24). Moreover, it was geographically bound to 
Donets’k city and Mariupol (ibid., 33). Over time, therefore, the region became more dependent on 
energy, metallurgy, and other heavy industrial sectors (Swain, 2007, 2). The elites concentrated patronage 
in order to preserve this growth and insulate these industries from the volatile politics in the centre. They 
therefore developed a vested interest in keeping the concentrated patronage system. This was confirmed 
to me in the interview with Journalist 1, an expert on Donets’k region, who stated that the centre never 
appointed a governor who was at variance with the regional elites, thus preserving the concentrated 
patronage system (19 07 2019).  
Why the region evolved into a concentrated patronage region also depended on the nature of the 
enterprises themselves. Unlike in Kharkiv, in Donets’k tightly linked commodity chains largely based on 
coal, such as “coal-metals”, meant that the enterprises were susceptible to vertical and horizontal 
integration (Swain and Mykhnenko, 2007, 37)(for the purpose of price control, so that prices could be set 
arbitrarily and not conform to market or government-set prices, which led to the cross-subsidisation of 
enterprises) and monopolisation. This made the economy region-based and prevented businesses from 
other regions from establishing presence in the region (ibid.). These commodity chains “concentrated 
profits in the hands of the regional FIGs which then used to finance capital investment” (Lyakh, 2007, 
90). An attempt to introduce a certain degree of political diffusion later in the 2000s via Serhiy Taruta 
who was reportedly “Bat’kivshchina’s bankroller” (Hale, 2015, 333) backfired because he became 
involved in a commercial conflict with Akhmetov (Interview with Journalist 1, 16 07 2019). Taruta 
therefore diffused his assets towards other regions and countries rather than keeping them region-based 
but he was politically marginalised. By 2014, he was virtually bankrupt, according to Journalist 1 (19 07 
2019).  
“Clan behaviour” therefore can be explained by the desire to protect large-scale regional property and 
secure control over a potentially socially explosive region (due to the presence of workers in obsolete 
industries). Concentrating patronage through actual acquaintance worked to protect regional property. 
This also explains the closed configuration of power rotation in the region, thereby key positions in the 
region’s government were occupied by people who maintained close connections with each other 
163 
 
(Interview with Journalist 1 16 07 2019). According to Journalist 1, the regional governors appointed by 
the centre in Donets’k always had good knowledge of the regional economy and sported deep 
connections with the region. After 2002, actual acquaintance via Yanukovych and other members of the 
Party of Regions worked to preserve the balance in the centre (Activist from Donets’k, Interview, 27 07 
2019). However, every time the informal network changed in the centre, the elites had to negotiate a 
favourable deal with the centre to preserve their concentrated patronage system and keep access to 
power. Closed power configuration continued when Yanukovych became President. In effect, it 
lengthened the elites’ expectations that Yanukovych would continue accessing resources in the centre.  
The elites in Donets’k, therefore, relied on the past successes of exchange with Yanukovych and a group 
of people close to him, such as Volodymyr Rybak and Rinat Akhmetov. All of them developed close ties 
with each other at the end of the 1990s. Over time, Yanukovych became the region’s most important 
political patron, connecting the centre and the region. When Yanukovych, who by the time of his 
appointment as governor in 1997 had already been “deeply involved in local business circles” (Zimmer, 
2004, 275), was governor of the Donets’k region (1997 – 2002), he contributed to the socio-economic 
development of the region in many ways (Swain and Mykhnenko, 2007,  8). Swain and Mykhnenko write 
on Yanukovych: “the most significant governor appointment was of Viktor Yanukovych in 1997, who 
went on to create a political context in which the “clans” and specifically Industrial Union of the Donbas 
and System Capital Management could expand their operations without fearing punitive and arbitrary 
interference from the political authorities in Kyiv” (ibid., 39). Under Yanukovych, the elites secured a 
favourable economic deal with the centre through the establishment of a free economic zone in 1998 
which exempted the enterprises from tax for five years. Yanukovych was the head of the Council of 
Special Economic Zones, responsible for the enterprises (Zimmer, 2004, 276).  
As Zimmer highlights in her work, those who contributed to the development of the region were most 
trusted. Volodymyr Rybak, who in 2010 joined Yanukovych’s Presidential Administration, was in the 
Soviet times the head of the executive committee in one of Donets’k city districts and then mayor in 
1998. Rybak was “political patron both to businesses and to the general population and has “helped the 
city”” (Zimmer, 2004, 281). Rybak was the founder of the Party of Regions. Power then rotated in the 
closed configuration among people connected to Yanukovych, such as Yanukovych’s deputy Anatoly 
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Blizniuk, who later became governor of Donets’k region. As Journalist 1 stated in the interview with me, 
the appointment of Volodymyr Logvinenko, a compromise figure between the region and the centre, as 
governor by President Yushchenko in 2006 led to the “most peaceful times in Donets’k”. “Logvinenko 
had deep connections to the region,” Journalist 1 says, “he was a diplomat and was later offered a job at 
one of Akhmetov’s consultancies”. “Yushchenko consulted Yanukovych and the Respected One 
(Shanovnyi – i.e. Rinat Akhmetov) on the subject whether this person would be an effective governor. 
Logvinenko was suitable for the president because he was a suitable figure both for Donets’k, 
Yekhanurov, and other political actors”, writes a journalist on this.310 
This pattern of concentrated patronage, based on the protection of the key commodity chains, such as 
“coal-metal,” and closed rotation of power, thereby the people who rose to power had to have close 
acquaintance with each other explains how and why Rinat Akhmetov emerged as the most important 
financial patron of the Donets’k clan. Already in 1997, in a widely cited interview, Prime Minister Pavlo 
Lazarenko stated that Akhmetov “upheld the entire Donets’k region”.311  By the mid-2000s, System 
Capital Management, Akhmetov’s main holding, included more than 30 companies in a sprawling variety 
of spheres, such as metallurgy, energy (coal mining), banking, insurance,312 local press and Shakhtar 
football club.313 The holding controlled the entire economy of the Donbas through shares, and its 
“empire” continued to grow year on year.314  By 2009, his holdings controlled the most profitable 
enterprises across the entire region, such as Azovstal’, Horlivka machine building factory, and Makiivka 
metallurgy plant. By 2011, in a major privatisation bid, Akhmetov’s holding Metinvest bought 75% of 
shares in Mariupol’s Il’ich metallurgical plant.315 Compared to the state mines, Akhmetov’s mines 
continued to be financially sound:  Akhmetov’s coal mining and metallurgy assets were only slightly 
affected by the crisis of 2008 – 2009 and the first to recover.316 By contrast, state mines were continuously 
experiencing problems with wage arrears and modernisation.317 Akhmetov also employed a greater 
 
310 Serhiy Garmash, “Novyi gubernator Donbasu. Suto muzhits’kyii rozrakhunok”, Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, 19 May 2006.  
311 “Tumannist’ Yanukovycha”, Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, 25 June 2004 .  
312 Ihor Maskalevich, “SKM: vidtryttiia kompanii, shcho vvazhae sebe patriotom”, Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, 6 May 2005.  
313“Berliner Zeitung: krestnyi otets Donbassa”, Novosti Donbassa, 18 February 2005.  
314 Ibid. 
315 “Boiko rozpoviv, chomu zavod “Illicha” bulo prodano Akhmetovu”, Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, 14 January 2011.  
316 “Akhmetov kupil Makeevskii metallurgicheskii zavod”, Novosti Donbassa, 26 October 2010.  
317 “Mer Donets’ka obsudil s Yanukovichem sud’bu “Topaza” i smenu sobstvennika Donetskoi Shakhty”, Novosti 
Donbassa, 15 May 2002.  
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number of people than any other employer in the region.318 Aslund calls System Capital Management the 
biggest company in Ukraine already in 2004, with about 160,000 employees (Aslund, 2006, 17). By 2014, 
Akhmetov’s businesses employed about 300,000 people.319 Thus, journalists were not entirely off the 
mark when calling Akhmetov “the godfather of the Donets’k clan [or king of Donets’k]” (Aslund, 2006, 
17).320  
Despite not being a “professional politician,” Akhmetov threw his lot with the Party of Regions since its 
incipience and provided critical financial resources to the party, more so during the elections (Kudelia and 
Kuzio, 2015, 264). Akhmetov later became a deputy of the Party of Regions, albeit he was the most 
notorious absentee during the Rada sessions. In 2008, Akhmetov controlled more than half of the local 
party organisations.321  
Akhmetov therefore became the major employer, the most reliable tax payer, and the major benefactor in 
the region. Over time the regional governors, the regional council deputies, and the long-serving mayor of 
Donets’k Oleksandr Luk’yanchenko became dependent on him. This was confirmed to me in an 
interview with Journalist 1 (19 07 2019). As one journalist put it in November 2003, in Ukraine “the 
electoral preferences [of the population] were shaped by the preferences of the local elites, while the 
preferences of the local elites were shaped by the preferences of the local business”.322 Both governors 
Anatoliy Blyzniuk (2002 – 2005; 2010 - 2011) and Andriy Shyshatskiy (2011 – 2014), as well as Donets’k 
mayor Luk’yanchenko (2002 – 2014), repeatedly expressed their loyalty to Akhmetov in interviews.323 
There were several reasons for this. Firstly, both the city and the regional budgets were dependent on 
local income tax; the city and region authorities were also responsible for collecting profit tax. As the 
main employer and the owner of the most profitable enterprises in the region, Akhmetov therefore was 
 
318 “Ukraine oligarch campaigns to save his country”, Deutsche Welle, 21 May 2014,; “Foreign Direct Investment 
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the major tax payer.324 He was also continually recognised by both mayor and governor as the most 
compliant tax payer in the region.325 Not only that, since 2006, Akhmetov had been the most significant 
charity donor in the region.326 In July 2006, the city council bestowed the title of the “honorary citizen of 
Donets’k” upon him for his charity work and employment policies.    
When Yanukovych became President, the pattern of rotating power in closed configuration around a 
small group of people continued, lengthening the elites’ expectations about the viability of the regime. 
Akhmetov continued to be the most significant financial patron of the Party of Regions, and by 2011, his 
influence was firmly entrenched in the regional council, with the former employees of his major holding 
Metinvest staffing the council327 and with the newly appointed governor Andriy Shyshatskiy being his 
representative. Journalist 1 confirmed the following curious statistics to me in an interview: “In the 
regional council, Akhmetov’s group represented the percentage of seats in accordance with how many 
work places he controlled. I counted them: this was 30%. The rest were divided between different groups, 
therefore, making Akhetmov’s group the most influential. Because the headquarters of Akhmetov’s 
enterprises were in Donets’k city, he held most influence in the city council and, in particular, on the 
mayor Luk’yanchenko”. Journalist 1 also confirmed the connection between Akhmetov and the new 
governor, Andriy Shyshatskiy, who was formerly the director of Khartsyzk Pipe Plant belonging to 
Metinvest Holding. He then became the director of Pharmacy Donbass, which sold all of its shares to 
Akhmetov’s holding System Capital Management.328 Matsuzato (2017, 182) writes on this clientilistic 
connection between Akhmetov and Shyshatskiy: “The Oblast Rada [regional council] filled the vacancy of 
its chairman after Blyznyuk’s promotion by electing [Andriy Shyshatskiy], president of the Pharmacy of 
Donbass, which benefited from monopolistic contracts for supplying medicines to state pharmacies and 
 
324 “Na kogo postavit Akhmetov”, Novosti Donbassa, 13 March 2009.  
325 “Svoi sredi svoikh. Interv’iu s gubernatorom Donets’koi oblasti”, Novosti Donbassa, 3 July 2010; “Mer Donets’ka 
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various city projects was dependent on the oligarchs such as Boiko and Akhmetov. The head of the Donets’k 
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city budget. Yevhen Shibalov, “Manual po biudzhetu, abo malen’kii krok nazustrich”, Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, 25 July 2010.  
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“potribni liudi””, Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, 19 November 2010.  
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hospitals. [Shyshatskiy] may have been elected as the regional Rada chair as a reward for selling a 
significant portion of the stock of his pharmacy company to Akhmetov’s System Capital Management in 
the same year”.329 For his entire governorship, Shyshatskiy did not interfere with the economy of the 
region, in fact supporting the privatisation of mines. 
Any change of the governing network in the centre affected Donets’k elites. In contrast with Kharkiv, for 
Akhmetov and the “clan” the frequent changes in Kyiv had tangible consequences. This was particularly 
true when the rival network of Yulia Tymoshenko was involved. When Tymoshenko was deputy Prime 
Minister in 2000, she sought to reform the coal industry which would have made mines independent 
actors on the market, effectively endangering the key commodity chains on which the Donets’k clan was 
reliant (Bogatov, 2007, 133). The Donets’k clan succeeded in having her replaced, as Zimmer writes 
(Zimmer, 2004, 326).  After the Orange Revolution, the incumbent President Yushchenko made a list of 
oligarchs and party functionaries subject to inspection and lustration. These included Akhmetov. 
Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko sought to revise the privatisation deals, do away with corruption, 
force the key oligarchs to pay taxes and retain the money they earned in Ukraine rather than transfer it to 
offshore zones (Kudelia, 2012, 423) (Markus, 2015, 50).330 In 2005 the Presidential Administration 
subjected the Ministry of the Interior to a considerable pressure to find breaches of law in the business 
activities of Akhmetov.331 In September of the same year, the State Property Fund announced the 
inspection of privatization of Akhmetov’s factories, such as Horlivka and Druzhkovka machine-building 
factories. In March 2005, Akhmetov’s close friend Borys Kolesnikov was arrested on extortion charges. 
Akhmetov was therefore forced to spend several months abroad to avoid possible arrest. He only 
returned following the memorandum between Yushchenko and Yanukovych in September 2005. 
It is quite possible that Yushchenko took these measures against Akhmetov involuntarily but was 
rather forced by Tymoshenko, whose relationship with Akhmetov was that of enduring enmity. In fact, 
there is some evidence that Yushchenko began negotiating with Akhmetov to compete electorally with 
the Social Democratic Party long before the Orange Revolution, since 2002.332 There was even a 
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possibility of the Party of Regions joining Yushchenko’s “Our Ukraine” at one point in the early 2000s.333  
Following the initial backlash against Akhmetov, by 2008, an informal coalition existed between 
Akhmetov and Yushchenko, thereby Yushchenko protected Akhmetov’s assets against Tymoshenko’s 
reprivatisation drive. At the same time, the enduring enmity between Tymoshenko and Akhmetov and 
not between the latter and Yushchenko meant that under Tymoshenko, Akhmetov’s assets were 
constantly in danger, he could not progress with further privatisation, and his business projects were 
stalled. Under Tymoshenko, Akhmetov’s important oil and gas project Vanco Prikerchenska (initiated 
during Yanukovych’s government) was put to a halt, following the ruling of the Ministry of Ecology.334  
By contrast, having a trusted friend (albeit with whom one’s relationship was complex) controlling the 
centre, benefitted Akhmetov greatly. When Yanukovych became Prime Minister, Akhmetov’s assets grew 
and expanded beyond Donets’k, and in August 2007 he acquired the company “Dnieproenergo,” which 
Tymoshenko vowed to nationalise. When Yanukovych became President, Akhmetov’s companies 
“received exclusive treatment in tender distribution, subsidy provision and major privatisation deals, and 
won nearly half of all state-procurement contracts in 2012 and 2013” (Kudelia, 2014e, 26).335 In August 
2011, as a result of the renewed privatisation drive, Akhmetov received four Donets’k mines336 and in the 
same year, the state began buying coal from Akhmetov as a matter of priority.337 In 2011, Akhmetov 
became the owner of the Horlivka machine building plant338and in February of the same year, the Cabinet 
of Ministers339 allowed the project Vanco Prikerchenskaya stalled by the former Prime Minister 
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Tymoshenko to go forward.340 In January 2012, DTEK became a shareholder in Donets’koblenergo.341 
By 2012, 47,5% of coal mining volume in the country was controlled by Akhmetov’s System Capital 
Management.342  
In summary, both regions developed along the paths of either diffused or concentrated patronage 
depending on the nature of their political economies. Actual acquaintance between patrons and clients 
ensured that large-scale regional property was protected. In a classic diffused patronage region of 
Kharkiv, enterprises were state-owned and needed constant monitoring from the centre. As a result, 
governors from competing networks were appointed by the centre in order to monitor the enterprises. 
The region was “plugged into” various patronage channels in that it benefitted from access to multiple 
patrons. In Donets’k, by contrast, large-scale private property was protected through concentrated 
patronage. Power rotated in a closed configuration among a small group of people and the region 
benefitted from the rise of one patron to the centre.   
4. Actual acquaintance and securing resources for the region  
Accessing budgetary resources to distribute to the region was one of the most important priorities of the 
local elites. Local elites were responsible for channelling subsidies to the local population, providing 
resources for social and cultural programmes, supporting various vulnerable groups of people, such as 
veterans and the disabled, and maintaining the infrastructure in the regions. All of this could be 
accomplished using the region’s own as well as government resources, such as equalisation grants and 
subventions. Significantly, cutting subsidies to the local population had a direct relation with the protest 
potential in the regions, as the large-scale protest of Chernobyl veterans demonstrated in Donets’k in 
2011. In Kharkiv, too, ordinary people continually scrutinised how the elites managed the regional 
budget.  
Kharkiv and Donets’k regions differed in their inter-budgetary relations with the centre. I demonstrate in 
this section that Kharkiv region’s and city’s relations with the centre in the budgetary sphere were more 
 
340 “Zavtra Kabmin poidet na “mirovuiu” s Akhmetovym”, Novosti Donbassa, 8 February 2011.  
341 “Akhmetov kupil “Donets’koblenergo””, Novosti Donbassa, 11 January 2012.  
342 “Dolia DTEK v ugledobyche Ukrainy prevysila 47%”, Novosti Donbassa, 3 April 2012.  
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stable. By contrast, Donets’k’s relations with the centre in the budgetary sphere were more volatile when 
the rival informal governing network of Yulia Tymoshenko was controlling the centre. This created 
greater incentives for the elites to press for federalisation and clandestinely finance separatism in 2014.  
In this section I focus on the budgetary issues that concerned the local elites as reported in the press. For 
Kharkiv’s regional elites state subventions were the most important aspect of the inter-budgetary relations 
between the region and the centre. According to the new Budget Code 2001, the centre now had direct 
relationship with the regional, city and district budgets (Martinez-Vazquez and Wayne, 2011, 22). 
Therefore, the intergovernmental transfers were made to and from the regional, city and district budgets 
separately. According to Article 2.37 of the Budget Code, state subventions were intergovernmental 
transfers with a purpose.343 Due to the sheer amount of subventions, here I consider three types of 
subventions: subsidies for poor families with children (poor families) and subsidies that covered utility 
payments (subsidy 1 and subsidy 2).  These were the subventions that were covered in the local press. I also 
consider the so-called equalisation grants (дотація   вирівнювання). This was an unconditional or non-
targeted transfer to finance the so-called “delegated expenditure tasks” which “involved the provision of 
so-called soft, or people-related, public services such as education, health and social protection” 
(Martinez-Vazquez and Wayne, 2011 23). As Martinez-Vazquez and Thirsk write, “these tasks, in which 
there is a national interest at stake, are delegated by the State to local budgets” (ibid.). These equalisation 
grants were important for the elites in Donets’k.  
4.1. Diffused patronage region  
As Donets’k, Kharkiv region and city were budgetary donors, that is they contributed to the state 
budget more than they retained. In 2002, for example, the region transferred around 60% of the taxes it 
collected to the recipient (or subvention-dependent) regions in Ukraine.344 At the time, throughout the 
entire period prior to the Maidan of 2013, neither the mayors nor regional governors (nor in fact the two 
directors of the Kharkiv region and city finance departments who commented on the budgets most often 
 
343 “Biudzhetnyi kodeks Ukrayiny”, Zakon.Rada, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2456-17.  
344 “Marina Vishnevskaia: “Khar’kovskaia oblast’ sredi oblastei Ukrainy zanimaet vtoroe mesto po dokhodam i 25-e 
– po raskhodam”, Status Quo, 22 November 2002.  
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in interviews),345 apart from the governor Yevhen Kushnaryov,346 made much of a political point of this 
situation, as opposed to the mayors and governors of the Donets’k region.  
As in Donets’k, lobbying for a better budget took place on a variety of levels, with both the 
mayors Shumilkin and Dobkin and governors Avakov and later Dobkin involved. Since it was the 
Cabinet of Ministers who proposed the budget to the Verkhovna Rada, the governors and mayors 
lobbied the Cabinet of Ministers and the Prime Minister as a priority,347 followed by budgetary 
committees and the Ministry of Finance (Article 37 of the Budget Code). Often the state budget discussed 
in the Rada did not allocate funds to Kharkiv projects, such as the building of the Kharkiv metro.348 
However, after lobbying by the governors, the Rada often reconsidered the budget and supplied what 
they wanted. For example, in 2004, the Rada failed to allocate enough funds to finance over 100 social 
programmes, including subsidies to the local population in Kharkiv. The governor Kushnaryov asked 
Kharkiv deputies to propose the issue in the Rada.349 Following this, the Ministry of Finance increased 
the amount of state budget transfers to Kharkiv by 80 million hryvnia.350 Similarly, in 2009, no funds were 
allocated to the building of Kharkiv metro by the Rada, but the region received 75 million hryvnia after 
Avakov’s intercession.351 Lobbying for a better budget was similar to lobbying for funding for the 
regional enterprises in that when a favoured informal governing network was controlling the centre, the 
governors and mayors lobbied it with a greater zeal. For example, when Yanukovych became President 
and the Party of Regions supporters Dobkin and Kernes were in control of the region and the city, in 
many budgetary reports from the years 2010 to 2013, it was noted that “the city authorities expected to 
 
345 Ibid.  
346 “Khar’kovskaia oblast’ obdelena sredstvami v proekte gosbiudzheta na 2003 g. – E. Kushnarev”, Status Quo, 2 
September 2002.  
347 “Postoiannaia komissiia oblsoveta rassmotrela na svoem zasedanii itogi ispolneniia biudzheta za pervyi kvartal 
2002 g.”, Status Quo, 7 May 2002.  
348 “Khar’kovskii metropoliten peredan v kommunal’nuiu sobstvennost’ Khar’kova – Yu. Tymoshenko”, Status Quo, 
27 August 2009.  
349 “Ob’em biudzheta Khar’kovskoi oblasti, zalozhennyi v proekt gosbiudzheta-2005, men’she neobkhodimogo 
pochti na 1 mlrd. grn. – E. Kuz’kin”, Status Quo, 6 September 2004.  
350 “Ministerstvo finansov Ukrainy uvelichilo predpolagaemye otchisleniia v biudzhet Khar’kovskoi oblasti 2005 g. 
na 80 mln. grn.”, Status Quo, 21 September 2004.  
351 “Kabmin vydelil 75 mln. grn. na stroitel’stvo metro v Khar’kove”, Status Quo, 31 August 2009.  
172 
 
receive more from the state”. In April 2012, for example, the Party of Regions deputy Valery Pisarenko 
lobbied the Prime Minister Azarov to allocate an unprecedented 825 million hryvnia to Kharkiv.352 
Kharkiv city and region became dependent on government’s subventions rather than equalisation 
grants. Subventions were the most important aspects of the budget discussed in the local press.353 
Subventions were primarily allocated to financing the building of the remaining Kharkiv metro stations 
and various subsidies to the city population.354 Overall, the level of subventions allocated to Kharkiv 
increased incrementally over the years.355 The changing governing networks in the centre did not seem to 
affect the allocation of subventions from the year 2003 to 2009. Under Tymoshenko, subventions were 
received on time; in nearly all cases, subvention plans were complete at 88 to 90%. The table below 










352 “Nardep V. Pisarenko obratilsia k prem’er-ministru s predlozheniem vydelit’ Khar’kovu pochti milliard griven’”, 
Status Quo,  12 April 2012.  
353 
https://www.city.kharkov.ua/uk/search.html?p=405&qstring=%D0%B1%D1%8E%D0%B4%D0%B6%D0%B5
%D1%82&date_from=2006-10-01&date_to=2013-09-01&searchNews=1  ; 
https://kharkivoda.gov.ua/dokumenti/113/750/752/2544  
354 “Biudzhet Khar’kova -2012: kuda ushli den’gi”, Mediaport, 26 February 2013.  
355 It has to be said that during the first premiership of Yanukovych, the subventions from the state budget 
increased by an unprecedented amount – the total subvention increased two-fold, including a nearly three-fold 
increase in the subventions to poor families. The subventions were also more diverse and the city received the first 
sum for the building of the remaining metro stations (nearly 50 million). See “Svodnyi biudzhet Khar’kova za 11 
mesiatsev sostavil 2 mlrg. 103 mln. 900 tys. grn.”, Mediaport, 5 December 2007.  
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Table 25: Subventions to Kharkiv, in million hryvnia, 2003 – 2009 
Dates Total subventions 
January - June 2003 70,9356 
January - July 2004 123,8357 
January – May 2005 59,1358  
January - July 2006 105,8359 
January -September 2006 167,6360 
January - April 2007 129, 6361 
January – June 2007 241, 3362 
January – July 2007 286,1363 
Total in 2007 673,9364 
January – April 2008 169,2365 
January - July 2008 326, 1366 
January – April 2009 179, 6367 
January - July 2009 332,5368 
 
356 “Dokhody biudzheta Khar’kova v sravnenii s proshlym godom vyrosli na 20%”, Status Quo, June 2003.  
357 “Dokhodnaia chast’ biudzheta Khar’kova za pervoe polugodie sostavila 482 mln. grn”, Status Quo, 5 July 2004.  
358 “Biudzhet Khar’kova po itogam pervogo polugodiia 2005 g., skoree vsego, nedopoluchit 20 mln. grn. – 
gorupravlenie biudzheta i finansov”, Status Quo, 22 June 2005.  
359 “Khar’kov – edinstvennyi krupnyi gorod Ukrainy, kommunal’nye predpriiatiia kotorogo ne otchisliaiut chast’ 
pribyli v gorbiudzhet – T. Takuesheva”, Status Quo, 18 July 2006.  
360 “Plan postuplenii v biudzhet Khar’kova za 8 mesiatsev perevypolnen na 3,8%”, Status Quo, 4 September 2006.  
361 “Biudzhet Khar’kova v I kvartale perevypolnen na 4,5%”, Status Quo, 20 April 2007.  
362 “Biudzhet Khar’kova za 5 mes. 2007 g. perevypolnen na 7,6%”, Status Quo, 4 June 2007.  
363 “Biudzhet Khar’kova v I polugodii 2007 g. perevypolnen na 9,5%”, Status Quo, 3 July 2007.  
364 “Biudzhet Khar’kova na 2007 g. perevypolnen na 1,3% - gorsovet”, Status Quo, 9 January 2008.  
365 “734,6 mln. grn. Postupilo v biudzhet Khar’kova v I kvartale 2008 g.”, Status Quo, 2 April 2008.  
366 “Odin milliard 439,5 mln. grn. postupilo v biudzhet Khar’kova za pervoe polugodie”, Status Quo, 17 July 2008.  
367 “Bolee 650 mln. grn. postupilo v gorodskoi biudzhet Khar’kova za 1 kvartal 2009 g.”, Status Quo, 2 April 2009.  
368 “1 mlrd. 359 mln. grn. postupilo v biudzhet Khar’kova za pervoe polugodie 2009 g. – gorsovet”, Status Quo, 2 
July 2009.  
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January - December 2009 600,2369 
 
However, subventions increased when Yanukovych became President.370 The table below illustrates the 
changes.  
Table 26. Subventions to Kharkiv, in million hryvnia, 2010 – 2013 
Dates Total subventions 
January – April 2010 267,5371 
January - June 2010 429,5372 
January – July 2010 513373 
January - November 2010 745,1374 
January – July 2013 596, 4375 
January - November 2013 1 billion 837376 
 
I could not find any information about state subventions for 2011 – 2012 across Status Quo, Mediaport and 
Kharkiv city portal. However, it was consistently reported that “state subventions increased by 1,2%”.377  
 
369 “Pochti 2,5 mln. grn. postupilo v biudzhet Khar’kova za 11 mes. 2009 g.”, Status Quo, 2 December 2009.  
370 http://www.city.kharkov.ua/ru/news/za-2012-rik-dohodi-byudzhetu-harkova-sklali-ponad-4-5-milyarda-griven-
17556.html 
371 “Bolee 960 mln. grn. postupilo v svodnyi biudzhet Khar’kova s nachala goda”, Status Quo, 6 May 2010.  
372 “1,5 mlrd. grn. postupilo v biudzhet Khar’kova za pervoe polugodie 2010 g.”, Status Quo, 2 July 2010.  
373 “Biudzhet Khar’kova za sem’ mesiatsev 2010 g. perevypolnen na 1,5%”, Status Quo, 3 August 2010.  
374 “Za 10 mesiatsev etogo goda v biudzhet Khar’kova postupilo 2,6 mlrd. grn.”, Mediaport, 2 November 2010.  
375 “V biudzhet Khar’kova postupilo bol’she dvukh milliardov dokhodov”, Status Quo, 2 July 2013.  
376 “Biudzhet Khar’kova uvelichilsia na 11 millionov”, Status Quo, 20 November 2013.  
377 “Biudzhet Khar’kova za 9 mesiatsev uvelichilsia na 15%”, Status Quo, 4 October 2011; “Dokhody biudzheta 





Under Yanukovych, the subventions continued to rise every year by at least 1%.378 In August 2010, 123 
million hryvnia of a “special subvention” was proposed to be disbursed to subsidise the population of 
Kharkiv region.379 In February 2011, the region received around 200 million hryvnia to compensate for 
the use of natural resources.380 Under Yanukovych, for the first time, Kharkiv began receiving special 
subventions for building and maintenance of roads and to complete the preparation for the Euro-2012, 
which was unprecedented.381 In 2012, an unprecedented 850 million was disbursed to finance medical 
care in Kharkiv. According to Kharkiv city Department of Health Care, this was a very substantial 
amount. 382 In 2012 it was reported that the following year Kharkiv was to receive a greater amount of 
subventions than any other regions.383 
From the mid-2000, unlike their Donets’k counterparts who were reliant on informal networks 
controlling the centre, the city authorities sought to increase the independence of the city budget by 
selling communal property and land to increase revenues.384 Over the years, land auctions and 
privatisation of communal enterprises contributed greatly to the city budget.385 The mayor Dobkin 
followed this through by reforming the public utilities sector, so that the city budget would increasingly 
rely on its own resources.386 In February 2008, the city authorities proposed to privatise Kharkiv metro in 
order to make it less dependent on the centre for subventions.387 
 
378 “V merii podveli itogi biudzheta-2011”, Mediaport, 4 January 2012.  
379 “Bolee 120 mln. grn. Budet vydeleno v etom godu na subsidirovanie zhitelei Khar’kovskoi oblasti”, Status Quo, 16 
August 2010.  
380 “Khar’kovskaia oblast’ poluchit bolee 200 mln. grn. Kompensatsii za pol’zovanie prirodnymi resursami”, Status 






383 “Khar’kovskaia oblgosadministratsia poluchit iz gosbiudzheta bol’she ostal’nykh administratsii”, Status Quo, 7 
December 2012  
384 “Biudzhet Khar’kova-2012: kuda ushli den’gi”, Mediaport,  26 February 2013.  
385 “Ob’em postuplenii v biudzhet Khar’kova ot prodazhi zemli v 2008 g. uvelichilsia v 32 raza – gorsovet”, Status 
Quo, 20 May 2008.  
386 “M. Dobkin: ia ne schitaiu sebia velikim merom vsekh vremen i narodov, kotoryi ne oshibaetsia”, Status Quo,  8 
November 2006.  
387 “Trudovoi kollektiv Khar’kovskogo metropolitena podderzhal vozmozhnost’ peredachi predpriiatiia v 
kommunal’nuiu sobstvennost’ goroda”, Status Quo, 18 February 2008.  
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As in the sphere of politics, Kharkiv’s inter-budgetary relations were not free from conflict. 
Conflicts between the two opposing camps – the Party of Regions and “Our Ukraine”– spilled into the 
budgetary sphere, and the region relied on the centre and the judiciary system to resolve these conflicts. 
In April 2008, the Cabinet of Ministers ruled that the city of Kharkiv was to receive a subvention to 
finance its socio-economic development through the regional budget. According to Avakov, the regional 
council controlled by the Party of Regions gave the city too much,388  therefore in late April 2008, 
Avakov’s deputy challenged the decision of the regional council to allocate funds to the city and declared 
that the lawfulness of the regional council’s decision had to be determined by the regional prosecutor.389 
The prosecutor got involved supporting the regional administration against the regional council.390 The 
regional council dismissed the prosecutor’s claim, while the city council allocated the funds to the socio-
economic development of the city. The prosecutor filed a complaint with the Kharkiv district 
administrative court against the decision of the regional council to dismiss the prosecutor’s challenge.391In 
June 2008, the regional administration representatives, including Avakov, visited the Ministry of Finance 
to determine the list of subvention recipients. Following the consultation with the Ministry of Finance, 
Dobkin claimed that the regional administration presented a fraudulent list of subvention recipients to the 
Cabinet of Ministers. According to Dobkin, Avakov did not consult the regional council but included the 
subvention recipients arbitrarily. Dobkin asked the deputies of the regional council to appeal to the centre 
to further assist with resolving this issue.392 The issue was finally settled when the subvention was 
allocated to the city.  
 
388 “Reshenie poslednei sessii Khar’kovskogo oblsoveta grubo narushilo zakon o gosbiudzhete- pervyi 
zampredsedatelia obladministratsii”, Status Quo,  18 April 2008.  
389 “Zakonnost’ resheniia sessii oblsoveta o pereraspredelenii sredstv gossubventsii dolzhna opredelit’ prokuratura – 
V. Babaev”, Status Quo, 25 April 2008.  
390 “Prokuror Khar’kovskoi oblasti oprotestoval reshenie sessii Khar’kovskogo oblsoveta v chasti, kasaiushcheisia 
raspredelenia gosudarstvennoi subventsii – oblgosadministratsia”, Status Quo, 29 April 2008.  
391 “Predstaviteli Khar’kovskoi oblgosadministratsii soglasovyvaiut v Minfine pereche’ ob’ektov pod poluchenie 
subventsii iz gosbiudzheta – vitse-gubernator”, Status Quo, 10 June 2008.  
392  
“M. Dobkin obvinil A. Avakova v fal’sifikatsii dokumentov, podannykh v Kabinet ministrov dlia poluchenia 
subventsii iz gosbiudzheta”, Status Quo, 11 June 2008.  
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4.2. Concentrated patronage region  
In Donets’k, the inter-budgetary relations with the centre were more volatile. Due to its peculiar 
economic make up,393 Donets’k region remained one of the richest regions in Ukraine and, therefore, was 
a donor region, even at the height of the economic malaise in the 1990s. Kravchuk shows that per capita 
regulating revenues generated in the eastern oblasts amounted to 41.8% of the all-Ukraine total in 1995 
(and 13% for Donets’k Oblast alone). Overall, between 1992 and 1995, the east, including Donets’k, 
produced between 40 and 45% of total regulating revenues (Kravchuk, 1999, 156).394 According to 
Martinez-Vazquez and Wayne’s calculations, between 1992 and 1999 Donets’k region consistently over-
executed its budget and achieved higher spending levels than planned (Martinez-Vazquez and Wayne, 
2011). In fact, both Donets’k region and Donets’k city consistently over-executed their budgets for most 
of the period up to 2014.395 
As a result, the region acted as a donor to some regions in the west of Ukraine.396 In the 1990s, 
the ratio of central government subventions to total revenue in Volynska oblast was 60% and 0% in 
Donets’k (Martinez-Vazquez and Wayne 2011, 44 – 45). As Kravchuk writes of the 1990s, “several poor 
regions in western and central Ukraine are highly dependent upon the budgetary subsidies that originate 
largely in taxes paid in the east” (Kravchuk, 1999, 156). This continued throughout the entire period 
before 2014. In July 2008, the governor of the Donets’k region Volodymyr Logvinenko stated that the 
budgetary requisition (or sequesterisation) practices by the centre were unfair and that the equalisation 
grants had to be distributed in line with the regional population and not according to the formula (“the 
 
393 As of 2006, 20% of Ukraine’s manufacturing was concentrated in the Donets’k region (Kovaleva, 2007, 64).  
394 As of 2006, the Donets’k region “[produced] nearly a quarter of gross industrial production and along with two 
other [regions] – Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv – [was] a net contributor to the state budget” (Kovaleva, 2007). By 
contrast, as Kuzio (2015, 175) writes, “The seven oblasts of western Ukraine only account for 12 percent of the 
country’s GDP or less than the city of Kyiv (18 percent)”. Donets’k region produced over 20% of GDP in Ukraine 
by 2013. See “Donets’kie korni nyneshnei vlasti obespechivaiut finansirovanie oblasti – ekspert”, Novosti Donbassa, 
11 December 2012.  
395 “Luk’ianchenko schitaet, chto god raboty s Tymoshenko “po poniatiam” oboshelsia Donets’ku v 75 millionov 
griven”, Novosti Donbassa, 5 January 2010 ; “Dokhodnaia chast’ gorodskogo biudzheta vypolnena na 111,5% - 
Luk’yanchenko”, Novosti Donbassa , 6 August 2013.  
396 Serhiy Blavats’kyi,“Partykuliaryzm chi prykhovani symptomy ukraiins’kogo federalizmu”, Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, 26 
July 2002.  
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more the region earns, the more the centre takes”).397 “We contributed 20% of GDP,” Logvinenko 
stated, “the region has 10% of Ukraine’s population, but we only received 6-7% from the consolidated 
budget”. He noted that most subventions and grants went to agricultural regions in the west.398 
Logvinenko was a compromise figure appointed by President Yushchenko with the agreement of the 
Party of Regions dominant in the region. Unlike all other governors (except Vadim Chuprun who served 
for less than a year as the Donets’k region governor) who belonged to the Party of Regions, Logvinenko 
was not openly affiliated to any political party in Donets’k. Given that “Donets’k as the donor region” 
was these governors and mayor’s favourite argument periodically invoked when negotiating with the 
centre,399 it is quite telling that a compromise figure such as Logvinenko used exactly the same argument. 
By 2013, 15 regions in Ukraine, including the western regions, received over 50% in government 
equalisation grants.400  
The budgetary asymmetry included not only how subventions and equalisation grants were distributed 
between the centre and the regions but also the kinds of taxes that the regions were allowed to retain. For 
example, for the year 2000 the personal income tax was assigned entirely to local budgets and the 
enterprise profits tax became exclusively a State revenue source (Martinez-Vazquez and Wayne, 2011, 16). 
“Because of their strategic importance and political power, Crimea and the city of Kyiv were subject to 
separate legislation from the rest of the regional government,” write Martinez-Vazquez and Wayne (2011, 
16), “in 2000, these two subnational governments enjoyed all of the profits tax collected on their 
territory”. By contrast, all the other regions received only profits from communal enterprises and land tax. 
Such budgetary asymmetry therefore encouraged intense bargaining and lobbying for a better budget or, 
as the governors and mayors called it, “a fair budget”. In fact, for much of the period in question, the 
state budget and the levels of equalisation grants and subventions could be adjusted only after intense 
 
397 In 2002 this coefficient was allowed to vary in a range of .8 to one for donor governments and the lower end of 
this range was associated with rapid revenue growth in the period 1999 – 2002. For transfer recipients the value of 
“alpha” has been maintained at unity (Martinez-Vazquez and Wayne, 2011, 124). 
398 “Donetskii gubernator schitaet utopiei formulnyi podkhod pri formirovanii biudzheta”, Novosti Donbassa.  
399 “SBU ne vozbuzhdala ugolovnoe delo protiv Donetskogo gorsoveta prokuror oblasti”, Novosti Donbassa, 13 
March 2007.  




lobbying by the governor and mayor.401 As Martinez-Vazquez and Wayne write of the 1990s (2011, 12), 
there was “a pervasive climate of budget bargaining… among different levels of government to ration 
scarce budgetary resources”. The rate of the shared taxes and subventions (transfers) depended on the 
success of such bargaining (Martinez-Vazquez and Wayne, 2011,12) and the negotiating and political skills 
and personal networks of the regional government officials (ibid., 34). 
 With the economic malaise subsiding in the 2000s, these practices, however, continued. Regardless of 
their political affiliation, all governors and mayors had to lobby for a “fair budget”.402 Donets’k mayor 
Oleksandr Luk’aynchenko, one of the most experienced and tenacious negotiators for the “fair budget,” 
for example, lobbied the Ministry of Finance almost every year since 2006 for a certain percentage of 
profit tax to remain in the region.403 More specifically, the mayors and governors advocated a new 
approach to the budget, thereby the region which earned most would not have to contribute most.404 This 
was confirmed in my brief exchange with Elite Member 1, who published extensively on budgetary 
federalism (email exchange, 22 07 2019). In April 2013, at the behest of the Donets’k region, two Party of 
Regions representatives registered a new bill in the Rada asking for profit tax to remain in the regional 
budget.405  
Governors usually lobbied the Ministry of Finance directly on their trips to Kyiv. However, sometimes 
they used other, more unorthodox methods, of bargaining. A unique case of budgetary bargaining with 
the use of radical groups, was the creation of “Donbas Rus” in 2008 by Natalia Vitrenko’s Progressive 
Socialists.406 The group became one of the most important groups during the pro-Russian protests in 
spring 2014. Thus, the local elites sometimes fostered radical parties and movements to force changes in 
the centre and make it reconsider its policies. It was argued that openly secessionist groups such as 
 
401 For example, in November 2005, after intense lobbying, the budgetary sequesterisation was adjusted to the 
previous level. See “Donets’ku udalos’ otstoiat u minfina tot variant biudzheta, v kotorom iz’iatia iz gorbiudzheta 
ostanut’sia na urovne 2005 goda”, Novosti Donbassa . There was a similar situation in the early 2010.  
402 “Gubernator Donetskoi oblasti pretenduet na 10 % gosudarstvennogo biudzheta”, Novosti Donbassa, 26 April 
2010.  
403 “Mer Donets’ka hochet, chtoby gorodu ostavliali khotia by 40% ot zarabotannogo”, Novosti Donbassa, 21 
September 2010.  
404 “Gubernator Donets’koi oblasti khochet po spravedlivosti podelit’ biudzhet”, Novosti Donbassa, 29 November 
2010.  
405 “Popravki v nalogovyi i biudzhetnyi kodeksy mogut prinesti Donets’ku sotni millionov griven’”, Novosti Donbassa, 
26 April 2013.  
406 “Partiia Regionov raskololas’ v Donetske”, Novosti Donbassa, 4 February 2008.  
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“Donetsk Republic” movement, legalised by the local government in 2006 was used as a bargaining tool 
with the centre. In 2007, the group was banned, but in the years that followed, they conducted at least 10 
public protests with anti-government slogans, reportedly sanctioned by the local elites.407  
The governors and mayors were more successful in their lobbying efforts when the centre was controlled 
by their own network (or the “Donets’k clan”) and not the rival network of Yulia Tymoshenko.  
Budgetary requisitioning was less intense under Yanukovych than under Tymoshenko. Luk’yanchenko 
commented on the city budget in 2012: “So far, budget requisitioning is at the level of 2011. This is less 
than under the “Orange government”. Under that government, we paid 337 million hryvnia408 but in 2012 
we paid 208 million hryvnia.”409 Despite the requisition into the state budget being the highest in 
Donets’k, according to the mayor,410 in 2013, the level of budgetary requisitions into the state budget 
decreased dramatically compared to 2012.411 Not only that, the governors secured the desired 9% of 
subventions by 2013.412 According to journalists, this was due to the Donets’k origins of the current 
government and successful lobbying efforts.413 In the same year, the government decided to disburse over 
half a billion of state funds to Donets’k and Luhans’k.  
The tables below illustrate how equalisation grants – that is what the State transferred to the city budget – 
increased under Yanukovych and how budgetary sequesterisation or contribution to the state increased 
under Tymoshenko for Donets’k city. In effect, Tymoshenko’s government introduced greater volatility 
into the inter-budgetary relations between Donets’k city and the centre. This was consistently emphasised 
in the press.  
 
 
407 “V Donbasse reanimirovali separatistov”, Novosti Donbassa, 15 November 2008;  The post appears quarter of the 
page down on Donetsk Republic Vkontakte archived page on 28 August 2012 https://archive.is/jOJD2. 
408 Corroborated here “Mer Donetska nadeetsia chto Tymoshenko ne budet zaritsia na bol’shie dokhody goroda”, 
Novosti Donbassa.  
409 “Iz’iatie iz biudzheta Donets’ka sokratilos’ po sravneniiu s “Oranzhevoi” piatiletkoi – mer”, Novosti Donbassa, 22 
November 2011.  
410  “Luk’yanchenko rasskazal, chto lozungi Partii Regionov vypolniaiutsia vezde, krome Donetska”, Novosti 
Donbassa, 11 December 2012.  
411 “V 2013 godu bol’she vsego deneg zaberut u Donetska – govorit mer”, Novosti Donbassa, 5 December 2012 .  
412 “Donetskii gubernator rasskazal na chto on portratit biudzhetnye den’gi”, Novosti Donbassa, 16 October 2012.  
413 “Donetskie korni nyneshnei vlasti obespechivaiut finansirovanie oblasti – ekspert”, Novosti Donbassa, 11 
December 2012.  
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Table 27: Equalisation grants and negative transfers to the state in Donets’k city and Donets’k region 





















0 0 149845,3 31,14 
Kharkiv city 
 
0 0 79928,4 9,31 
Donets’k region 
 
3347,1 0,03 0 0 
Kharkiv region 
 





0 0 337 739,6 54,43 
Kharkiv city 
 
0 0 98 087,3 8,25 
Donets’k region 
 
134 794,7 0,86 0 0 
Kharkiv region 
 





0 0 301 153,1 23,56 
Kharkiv city 
 
0 0 13 571,4 1,08 
Donets’k region 
 
306 195,9 1,75 0 0 
Kharkiv region 
 
488 601,4 4,32 0 0 






0 0 207 718,1 13,47 
Kharkiv city 
 
  2 626,6 0,15 
Donets’k region 
 
658 385,3 3,19 0 0 
Kharkiv region 
 
 397 778,1 2,18 0 0 






0 0 281,648.2 20,37 
Kharkiv city 
 
43,670.2 0.22 0 0 
Donets’k region 
 
803,430.1 3.05 0 0 
Kharkiv region 
 
495,769.5 2.46 0 0 
 
414“Pro derzhavnyii biudzhet Ukrayiny na 2007 rik”, Zakon. Rada; https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/489-16 
415 “Pro derzhavnyi biudzhet Ukrayiny na 2008 rik ta pro vnesennia zmin do deiakikh zakonodavchykh aktiv 
Ukrayiny” https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/107-17 
416 “Pro derzhavnyii biudzhet Ukrayiny na 2009 rik”, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/835-17 
417 “Pro derzhavnyii biudzhet Ukrayiny na 2011 rik”, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2857-17 









0 0 280,563.2 17.15 
Kharkiv city 
 
0 0 71,660.5 3.16 
Donets’k region 
 
810,820.2 2.99 0 0 
Kharkiv region 
 
925,456.2 4.44 0 0 
     
 
The tables below illustrate that the levels of subventions were greater for Donets’k region under 
Yanukovych than for other regions. See also Appendix II. 





Subsidy 1 Subsidy 2 
2009 (Tymoshenko 
government)420 
Donets’k region  
 
1 038 820,7 543 023,6 34 085,9 
Kharkiv region 
 
632 694,6 437 189,5 21 478,7| 
Donets’k city 
 
0 0 0 
Kharkiv city 
 
0 0 0 






2,436,787.2 877,291.8 105,555.5 
Kharkiv region 
 
1,553,747.5 587,623.5 24,248.1 
Donets’k city 
 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
Kharkiv city 
 







3,121,888.9 828,716.0 131,647.9 
Kharkiv region 
 
1,936,889.6 591,913.0 22,681.8 
Donets’k city 
 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
Kharkiv city 
 
19,707.1 0.0 0.0 
    
 
 
419 “Pro derzhavnyii biudzhet Ukrayiny na 2013 rik”, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/5515-17 
420 “Pro derzhavnyii biudzhet Ukrayiny na 2009 rik” https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/835-17 
421 “Pro derzhavnyii biudzhet Ukrayiny na 2012 rik” https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/4282-17 




A panoply of articles appeared in 2012 – 2014 illustrating that Donets’k in fact became a budgetary 
recipient under Yanukovych.423 The data above and in the articles provides support to the argument that 
Donets’k benefitted from the subventions when the favoured informal network was controlling the 
centre.  
The potential success of the federalisation bid in 2014 would have reduced the amount of resources and 
effort put into budgetary lobbying. It could have also potentially led to a consistently fairer budget for 
Donets’k, reducing the impact of the volatile politics in the centre. Regardless of whether indeed 
Donets’k was a donor region or not, the fact remained that the budgetary policies of the centre were 
highly asymmetric, favouring two select regions of Kyiv and Crimea much more consistently than 
Donets’k. In addition, the promotion of the rival network forces in the centre in 2014, such as 
Tymoshenko’s “right-hand man” Oleksandr Turchynov, and a potential political come back of 
Tymoshenko might have instilled fear and confusion into the Donets’k political elites as they were not as 
adroit at negotiating with Tymoshenko for a fair budget than they were when Yanukovych was in power.   
An example of the “crisis budgets” of 2008 – 2010 when Tymoshenko was Prime Minister would 
illustrate the point. The region was hit very hard by the crisis of 2008; production was cut in the key 
industries, such as mining and metallurgy, undermining the incomes. The budgets therefore severely 
underperformed, albeit according to Donets’k mayor, the city continued to contribute into the state 
budget in a timely manner.424 Yet, the requisitioning from both the city and regional budgets continued to 
be draconian, regardless of the mayor’s and governor’s lobbying efforts, so that by February 2010, the 
governor Logvinenko claimed that the State Treasury took over 1 billion hryvnia from the regional 
budget, without the prospect of returning this money.425 This was confirmed to me in an interview with 
Journalist 1 (19 07 2019). 
 
423 “Dotatsiinyi Donbas. Chi spravdi rehion godue Ukrayynu?”, Tyzhden’.ua, 12 March 2013; “Iaki rehiony goduiut’ 
Ukrayynu: U Rivnens’kij oblasti dokhody i vytraty biudzhetu praktichno rivni”, Ogo, 28 February 2014 ; “Khto kogo 
“godue” sered ukrayynskikh regioniv”, Ekonomika, 29 August 2012; “Khto godue Ukrayynu: mifi i real’nist’”, 
Ukrayinska Pravda Forum. 
424 “Aleksandr Luk’yanchenko: biznesa u menia net”, Novosti Donbassa, 25 December 2009.  
425 “Donets’kii gubernator nadeetsia, chto region ostaviat milliard griven”, Novosti Donbassa, 25 February 2010.  
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The 2009 year was particularly turbulent.426 Due to the worldwide economic crisis and also hosting the 
Euro-2009 and Euro-2012 sporting events, the city of Donets’k especially was in need of increased 
subventions. The mayor Luk’yanchenko continually complained about the centre reneging on its 
promises to finance the major infrastructural projects, such as Donets’k metro which was in the making 
for 8 years,427 and social programmes in the city of Donets’k.428 According to Luk’yanchenko, the city 
received less than 40% of what was planned.429 The mayor stated in one of the interviews that most of 
the state subventions went into the building of water pipes in L’viv and infrastructural projects in other 
regions.430 The region faced exactly the same budgetary problems as the city according to the governor 
Anatoliy Bliznuk, with no money transferred from the government. State programmes were financed only 
23% according to Bliznuk.431 
Luk’yanchenko blamed Tymoshenko for the lack of sound budgetary policies towards Donets’k. 
Commenting on it in an interview, he stated that she was “micro-managing the budget”. Under 
Yanukovych, by contrast, the city administration could supply better communal services and build more 
houses. The city was therefore forced to borrow municipal loans and rely on private companies to build 
more social housing.432 Many of those private building companies the mayor and governor had to rely on 
during the crisis years of 2008 – 2010 were owned by Akhmetov and Yanukovych’s son Oleksandr.  
With the ascent of Yanukovych in 2010, however, despite his origins in Donets’k, some other budgetary 
problems continued to occur thus contributing to the further need for bargaining with the centre and 
creating the grounds for pushing forward the federalist argument in 2014. More specifically, beginning in 
2004, the wages of state employees were began to be paid through the State Treasury.433 According to the 
mayor Luk’yanchenko, this practice was initiated because in 2004, at the height of the “separatist crisis” 
 
426 Yevhen Shybalov, “Biudzhetnyi roman: donets’kyi rozdil”, Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, 15 February 2008.  
427 “Aleksandr Luk’yanchenko: biznesa u menia net”, Novosti Donbassa, 25 December 2009.  
428 Ibid.; “Luk’yanchenko ne pugaet president Tymoshenko, u nego est’ opyt smeny politicheskikh orientirov”, 
Novosti Donbassa, 24 December 2009.  
429 “Luk’yanchenko ne khvataet partnerskikh otnoshenii s tsentrom”, Novosti Donbassa, 3 June 2009.    
430 “Luk’yanchenko vypolnil ob’yazatel’stva pered gosbiudzhetom”, Novosti Donabssa, 2 December 2009.  
431 “Blizniuk govorit, chto kaznacheistvo “zamorozilo” 900 millionov griven mestnykh sovetov”, Novosti Donbassa, 
13 January 2010.  
432 “Aleksandr Luk’yanchenko: posle prezidentskikh vyborov ya reshu idti li mne na tretii srok”, Novosti Donbassa, 24 
December 2009.  
433 “Luk’yanchenko ne smozhet prekratit’ platezhi v tsentral’nyi biudzhet”, Novosti Donbassa, 24 March 2009.  
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(that time it was initiated by the elites – on which below), the regions withheld budgetary payments to the 
centre. This necessitated the transfer of budgetary oversight to the State Treasury as a single 
“transmission belt” so that the centre could retaliate against the regions.434 Paradoxically, during the 
presidency of Yanukovych, perhaps due to the pervasive corruption, the State Treasury began 
accumulating debt to the regions and the city. As Journalist 1 stated in the interview with me, 
Yanukovych’s government “showed people gigantic numbers but this money failed to arrive to the 
region” (16 07 2019). From 2011, the State Treasury began holding up money on its accounts leading to a 
situation when the entire region and the city were in months-long arrears to their state employees.435 In 
2012, the State Treasury owed 60 million to Donets’k city budget and 1.3 billion to the region.436 In 2013, 
Mykola Levchenko began lobbying for a law that would allow governors and mayors to prosecute the 
Treasury for not paying the wages on time and holding up money on its accounts.437  
All of this meant that the regions could not withhold budgetary transfers to the State Treasury in 2014, as 
they did in 2004, for the fear of the centre’s retaliation. 438 This meant that one of the channels of putting 
pressure on the centre –such as through withholding the budgetary transfers – was blocked. The only 
channel that remained for the governors and mayors was to engage in more subtle political bargaining 
with the centre. A referendum on federalisation might have potentially eliminate the State Treasury’s 
control over the budgets.  
Finally, the paralysis of the city and regional administration and their incoherent decisions in 2014 might 
be explained by the fact that they were afraid of the spontaneous popular upheaval in spring 2014. This 
was confirmed to me in an interview with Journalist 1 (19 07 2019). Why is the budgetary politics relevant 
to this? For many years prior to the crisis, subventions and regional resources were directed primarily 
towards financing social programmes to support particularly vulnerable sections of the population 
(especially under the governor Shyshatskiy, whose short governorship was aimed exclusively at this), pay 
 
434 Ibid.  
435 “V Donets’koi oblasti kaznacheistvo ne oplatilo scheta na 750 mln. griven”, Novosti Donbassa, 28 December 2011.  
436 “Kaznacheistvo zadolzhalo Donets’ku 60 mln. griven. Mer schitaet, chto sudit’sia bessmyslenno”, Novosti 
Donbassa, 26 December 2012.  
437 “V Rade predlagaiut shtrafofat’ kaznacheistvo iz-za dolgov pered Donets’kom”, Novosti Donbassa, 4 March 2013.  
438 “Luk’yanchenko ne smozhet prekratit’ platezhi v tsentral’nyi biudzhet”, Novosti Donbassa, 24 March 2009.  
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wages to state employees,439 and finance some form of “hand-to-mouth” existence, such as paying 
mounting wage arrears at state mines. In 2008 – 2009, for example, half of the regional budgets and 
subventions went to finance wage arrears in state mines. Wage arrears in state mines and state plants 
however continued to accumulate throughout the entire period in question. For example, in 2006 75% of 
all wage arrears accumulated in the state mining industry.440 Governors, such as Logvinenko, continued to 
complain that none of the funds went to modernise state mines and improve working conditions. It is, 
therefore, quite logical to conclude that the region overall had a strong latent protest potential. The 
inconsistent decisions and clandestine bargaining by the local political elites that followed in 2014 is, to a 
certain extent, evidence to their fear of uncontrolled public upheaval. At the same time, the local political 
elites could perceive the upheaval as an opportunity to put pressure on the centre.  
 In summary, in Kharkiv inter-budgetary relations with the centre were more stable, regardless of 
the network controlling the centre, with the level of subventions increasing incrementally under the 
premiership of Yanukovych and Tymoshenko. It must also be said that the level of subventions to 
Kharkiv improved under Yanukovych. In Donets’k, by contrast, the inter-budgetary relations were more 
volatile: Donets’k depended on the largely informal negotiations with the centre and on its kin informal 
governing network controlling the centre. This was particularly evident when Yulia Tymoshenko’s 
network was controlling the centre. The governors and mayors were pressed hard to lobby for the fair 
budget therefore.  
5. Actual acquaintance, elite survival, and elite learning 
5.1. Diffused patronage  
Owing to the national and region-specific structural constraints described above, in diffused patronage 
regions, local elites from competing networks are involved in dense interactions with each other and with 
their patrons in the centre. Through the iterative processes of conflict, the elites learn how to make their 
actual acquaintance with the members of competing networks and those from their preferred network 
work to their advantage. More specifically, they learn how to negotiate with the members of rival 
 
439 Called “the budget of survival”. See Yevhen Shybalov, “Antykryzovi tantsi”, Dzerkalo Tyzhnia¸6 February 2009.  
440 “Obshchestvennaia kollegiia pri Donetskoi OGA raskritikovala proekt biudzheta Ukrainy na 2006 god”, Novosti 
Donbassa.   
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networks and how to use the resources of their preferred networks distributed across the political system, 
especially in the judiciary. Actual acquaintance and dense interactions with the members of rival networks 
and their own network act as “safeguards” protecting these elites’ hold on power. Thus, ongoing conflicts 
among the members of competing networks become a type of investment, which helps the elites acquire 
knowledge of what rival networks prefer and build resilience to ensure their own survival under any 
network. In Kitschelt and Wilkinson’s terms, ongoing conflicts create certain cognitive expectations about 
the behaviour of the members of their rival networks, which are useful for the elites in the long-term in 
that, if a challenge comes from the rival network again, the elites know what to expect. This explains why 
certain elites in diffused patronage regions became well versed in law, compared to their counterparts in 
the concentrated patronage regions, and why they opted for united and integral Ukraine in spring 2014. In 
addition, some local elites can be targeted by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and the Ministry of 
the Interior. These elites would manipulate the local courts and the loopholes in the judiciary system to 
settle their scores with the SBU and the Ministry. The centre in Kyiv is heavily involved in resolving all of 
these conflicts, which makes information flows between the centre and the region more transparent.  
In the classic diffused patronage city of Kharkiv, ideological and commercial conflicts permeated local 
politics throughout the period of the divided-executive, only subsiding under one chief executive of 
Yanukovych. In many cases, the line between a commercial and a political conflict was extremely blurry 
because the key actors, such as the governor Arsen Avakov, city council secretary and later Kharkiv city 
mayor Hennadiy Kernes, and Kharkiv city mayor and later governor Mykhailo Dobkin, had strong 
commercial interests in the region, being simultaneously owners of banks, firms, and land at various 
points in their careers. Some individual members of the local elites were continuously embroiled in 
conflict. For people like Hennadiy Kernes (the Party of Regions’ member since 2006), who became the 
key political actor during the events of 2013 - 2014, not a month passed without a challenge in the years 
prior to Yanukovych becoming President. He was continuously exposed to the allegations of either 
spreading libel, being connected to the city’s criminal networks, or destroying buildings unlawfully.441 In 
 
441 Kernes was involved in at least 3 in 2006 alone: the building of kiosks (June – September 2006); See 
“Obshchestvennye slushania o tselesoobraznosti malykh arkhitekrutnykh form v Khar’kove byli zakryty, tak i ne 
otkryvshis’”, Status Quo, 29 September 2006; over increasing public utility tariffs; See “O meste i roli tsirka v politike 




2006 – 2007, Kernes faced assassination attempts on his home turf.442 The fact that Kernes was able to 
survive all of this illustrates that he was building resilience to survive under any network.  
Two broad types of conflict took place in Kharkiv prior to 2013: the conflicts among the members of the 
competing networks of Our Ukraine, Bat’kivshchina, and the Party of Regions on political-commercial 
grounds, and the conflict between Hennadiy Kernes and Mykhailo Dobkin and the SBU and the Ministry 
of the Interior. The first type of conflict illustrates how the politics in diffused patronage regions worked. 
The second type of conflict demonstrates how transparent the information flows were between the 
region and the centre. Both types illustrate how skilful the elites were at harnessing the potential of 
clientelistic acquaintance with the variety of networks to accomplish one of their key objectives - to 
remain in power.  
Conflicts among the members of the competing networks ensued with the appointment of Arsen 
Avakov, from President Yushchenko’s party Our Ukraine, as governor in Kharkiv region heavily 
dominated by the Party of Regions. These conflicts permeated all aspects of regional politics and 
governance, from land issues to utility payments to ideology. At the basis of these conflicts lied the rivalry 
between Avakov, on the one hand, and Dobkin and Kernes, on the other, involving the management of 
the city’s land plots and the city and regional enterprises.443 Dobkin and Kernes alleged that, upon 
becoming governor, Avakov began alienating land from Kharkiv community (hromada) using his real and 
fictitious firms, thus depriving the city and regional authorities of essential financial flows. This was 
important because land tax constituted one of the major sources of taxes for the regional and city 
budgets. Avakov, in his turn, argued that Kernes’ and Dobkin’s real and fictitious firms were 
monopolising the land market. A statement on the city council’s website read: “In 1990, A.B. Avakov 
established a company “Investor” and in 1992 he founded the bank “Bazis”. In line with the resolutions 
of Kharkiv city council (5th convention), many land plots and communal property belonging to Avakov’s 
companies were confiscated by the city’s hromada (community), i.e. they became public property of the 
city. After Mykhailo Dobkin became the mayor of Kharkiv, the governor Avakov has been publicly 
 
442 “G. Kernes ne postradal v rezul’tate vzryva v Khar’kovskoi gostinitse “Natsional’”, Status Quo¸ 13 January 2007.  
443 Some fascinating detail on this can be found in (Markus, 2015).  
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discrediting the work of the city council and the mayor. He uses all media resources available to him to do 
so.”444  
To manage their conflicts, these elites used the resources of their actual acquaintance with the various 
patrons in the centre and in the judiciary system. The conflicts therefore contributed to the processes of 
elite learning thereby these elites acquired skills in manipulating the law and using their clientelistic capital 
in order to survive. Following the land plot management incident on the Klochkovska street in December 
2006, when the construction site of the Target supermarket and workers and ordinary people, who came 
to support the building of the supermarket, were attacked by “hired thugs,” allegedly at the sanction of 
Kernes and Dobkin themselves present at the site, governor Avakov’s faction “Our Ukraine”, the 
smallest in the city council, initiated the dismissal of Kernes from the position of the city council’s 
secretary. Dobkin and Kernes, in their turn, used their actual acquaintance with and patronal links to 
Yanukovych and his Cabinet of Ministers to try and rein Avakov in.445 In January 2007, Dobkin appealed 
to the Cabinet of Ministers and the President’s Administration to “analyse Avakov’s activities more 
seriously”.446 The following month, he vowed to write to the General Prosecutor and the Cabinet of 
Ministers complaining about Avakov’s statements on utility payments that encouraged Kharkivites not to 
pay their utility bills.447 After the informal governing network changed in the centre and Tymoshenko 
became Prime Minister, Avakov, in his turn, followed his challenge through more boldly, and in late 
December 2007, he sent a communique to the chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Arseniy Yatseniuk 
proposing local re-elections.448 He even proposed changes in the local self-government law and the 
Constitution in order to conduct these pre-term elections.449  To him, the Klochkovska street incident 
 
444 “Iurdepartament gorispolkoma schiaet deistviia Avakova prezhdevremennymi”, Mediaport, 10 December 2007; 
“Kernes vs Avakov. Pervyi khod sdelan, otvet sleduet…”,  057, 14 March 2014.  
445 In fact every single move of the city council was scrutinised by Avakov. Throughout 2006 to 2009, the issues of 
utility payments, the Klochkovska street incident, the advent of the new statute of the city council all were 
scrutinised by Avakov and sometimes he organised picketing of the city council to oppose its decisions. See 
“Khar’kovskaia oblorganizatsiia partii “Narodnyi Soiuz “Nasha Ukraina” 22 sentiabria primet uchastie v pikete 
protiv povysheniia tarifov – A. Avakov”, Status Quo, 20 September 2006.  
446 “Mikhail Dobkin poprosit Kabmin I SP proanalizirovat’ deiatel’nost’ Avakova”, Mediaport, 23 January 2007.  
447 “Mer Khar’kova budet zhalovat’sia v Kabmin i Genprokuraturu na gubernatora”, Status Quo, 13 February 2007.  
448 “A. Avakov podpisal i napravil na imia predsedatelia Verkhovnoi Rady predstavlenie o naznachenii dosrochnykh 
vyborov gorsoveta i mera Khar’kova”, Status Quo, 25 December 2007.  
449 This was a daring act as, by law, it required a court decision on the unlawful actions of the city mayor and an 
investigation by a special Rada committee. By that time, such a decision was still absent. See “Khar’kov-2008: 
perevybody mera i griadushchie konflikty”, Status Quo, 9 January 2008. Yushchenko’s motion to change the local 
self-government law was defeated as this motion was dependent on the decision of the administrative court of 
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demonstrated that the city mayor Dobkin and the city council’s deputies were involved in banditry and 
therefore had to be dismissed.  
The dispute did not settle there but carried on until 2010 and involved other small factions in the regional 
and city councils, such as Yulia Tymoshenko’s BYUT, who followed Avakov in condemning the city 
council’s secretary and the mayor. In January 2007, BYUT began collecting signatures for a referendum 
on the re-election of the city council, and Kernes and Dobkin.450 In September 2008, with Tymoshenko’s 
network now dominant in the centre, BYUT organised daily and nightly pickets in front of the buildings 
of law enforcers and state organisations in the city, protesting the actions of the city council; protesters 
were planning to go to Kyiv to appeal to the President, Prime Minister and the Rada.451 Most importantly, 
“Our Ukraine”, BYUT and, notably, some Party of Regions deputies began pressing the Verkhovna Rada 
to create a special commission to investigate the incident on Klochkovska Street and the activities of 
Kernes and Dobkin more generally.452 The Rada resisted this at first453 but eventually yielded to the 
pressure, and a special commission to investigate the actions of the city council was created in March 
2007.  
The working of the Rada special commissions on Kernes and Dobkin’s case demonstrate how these elites 
could use the resources of their actual acquaintance with their preferred networks distributed across the 
political system and especially the judiciary in order to ensure their own survival. In the years 2007 – 2008, 
two special commissions were created in the Verkhovna Rada to investigate first the Klochkovska street 
incident and then, in March 2008, to investigate the alleged breaches of the Constitution of Ukraine, the 
laws of Ukraine on public utility tariffs, communal property, land and regional and city budgets by Kernes 
and Dobkin.454 Both commissions were created at the behest of their political rivals from BYUT and 
 
Ukraine. In the end, local re-elections were impossible because of the provisions in the Constitution but also 
because of the lack of a suitable candidate among the opposition parties.  
450 “V sluchae initsiirovaniia otstavki G. Kernesa s posta sekretaria Khar’kovskogo gorsoveta BYUT, vozmozhno, 
budet rekomendovat’ svoei fraktsii v gorsovete podderzhat’ takoe reshenie – V. Kamchatnyi”, Status Quo¸15 January 
2007  
451 “Khar’kovskie aktivisty BYUT platniruiut piketirovat’ Verkhovnuiu Radu, poka parlamentarii ne obratiat 
vnimaniia na ikh trebovaniia”, Status Quo¸17 September 2008.  
452 “Proekt postanovleniia po sobytiam na ul. Klochkovsoi v Khar’kove budet podan v profil’nyi komitet 
Verkhovnoi Rady na sleduiushchei nedele – D. Sviatash”, Status Quo¸27 March 2007.  
453 “Vopros o sozdanii sledstvennoi komissii po sobytiam na ul. Klochkovskoi v Khar’kove budet povtorno 
rassmotren Verkhovnoi Radoi 13 marta – V. Leshchenko”, Status Quo, 24 February 2007.  
454 “Verkhovnaia Rada priniala reshenie o sozdanii sledstvennoi komissii po rassledovaniiu deiatel’nosti gorodskikh 
vlastei Khar’kova (dopolneno)¸Status Quo, 7 March 2008.  
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“Our Ukraine”, with the governor Avakov being particularly active. Eventually, the first commission 
found the work of the city council satisfactory and the charges were dropped.455 It is quite possible that 
this was because the Rada’s “committee chairs … [were], by law, allocated proportionately according to 
the seats controlled by the various parties” (D’Anieri, 2006, 141) and therefore these were heavily 
dominated by the Party of Regions. As for the second commission, the Rada refused to continue its work 
because the meeting gathered for the purpose of deciding on Kernes’ and Dobkin’s cases was inquorate. 
Oleh Lyashko, the head of the commission, argued that the Rada and certain judges were protecting both 
Kernes and Dobkin and helping them avoid punishment. “We have evidence that there are certain people 
in the Presidential Secretariat, Highest Council of Justice, Constitutional Court, Ministry of Justice, and 
many deputies, who were involved in acquitting Dobkin and Kernes”, said Lyashko.456  In the end, either 
the local court or the Rada resisted instigating further proceedings into the Kernes’ and Dobkin’s affairs, 
and the Supreme Court of Ukraine was never involved in prosecuting both. As a result, no re-elections 
took place.457 These loopholes in the system ensured the enduring political survival of Kernes and 
Dobkin in the uncertain and highly precarious political climate of Kharkiv. According to my interview 
with Activist in Kharkiv, the mayor and the city council secretary survived also because it was not easy for 
the Rada to dismiss directly elected members of the regional elite (16 07 2019).  
The conflict between the governor Avakov and the Party of Regions that dominated the regional council 
illustrated how the various courts were used by the elites to ensure that they stayed in power.458 Avakov 
 
455 “Khar’kovskii gorsovet nameren priniat’ obrashcheniia k tsentral’nym organam vlasti otnositel’no dosrochnykh 
vyborov v mestnye sovety, smeny rukovodstva metropolitena I privatizatsii “Turboatoma”, Status Quo, 26 February 
2008. In March 2009 Rada dismissed all consideration of charges against Dobkin and Kernes; not even Yushchenko 
could influence the situation although he desired the re-elections; the Parliament repeatedly turned down to consider 
this question.  
 
456 “Deputat Liashko: my nazovem vsekh, kto “krysheval” Dobkina i Kernesa”, Unian, 4 September 2008; There is 
some evidence that the local courts were under control of the city council. It comes from the director of OOO 
Pressa Kharkov Vasil Tretetskiy who was involved in a long land dispute with the city authorities over the building 
of press kiosks. “V. Tretetskii nameren obratit’sia v General’nuiu prokuraturu s pros’boi otsenit’ deiatel’nost’ 
oblastnoi prokuratury v dele OOO “Pressa-Khar’kov””, Status Quo , 21 August 2008.  
 
457 “Strannaia komissiia”, Status Quo, 11 March 2008.  
 
458 The local political elites used the centre and the entire judiciary system of Ukraine skilfully. This explains why 
they were so knowledgeable about the law. The state and local court systems were used by the local elites in several 
ways: if the appeal was not successful in one court, they sought help from another court. For example, following the 
mayoral elections in October 2010 and the victory of his political adversary from the Party of Regions Hennadiy 
Kernes, Avakov challenged the outcomes of the elections in Kharkiv district administrative court on the grounds of 
electoral fraud. His appeal was turned down. He followed it with an appeal at Kharkiv appeals court where it was 
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was thrown into the vortex of the political struggle between the competing networks early in his career as 
Kharkiv governor. On 3 June 2006 – before Yanukovych became Prime Minister but after the Party of 
Regions won the plurality in the Rada during the March 2006 parliamentary elections – the Party of 
Regions-dominated regional council passed a motion of non-confidence in the governor Avakov, finding 
his work in the region unsatisfactory and harmful for the region’s economic and social development. The 
deputies also cited the low popularity of Yushchenko-Avakov’s party “Our Ukraine” in city, district, and 
village councils (no more than 5% of votes). The number of deputies supporting the vote of no-
confidence was 105, which, according to the Constitution, warranted the dismissal of the governor. The 
row between the regional council and Avakov threatened to draw the region to a standstill when the 
chairman Vasil’ Salygin refused to debate the administration’s proposals at the regional council sessions. 
At first, Avakov retaliated by filing a complaint against the non-confidence voting procedure within the 
Kyiv district court in Kharkiv, which dismissed the complaint citing the breaches of the procedure as 
immaterial. In its turn, the regional council filed an appeal against Avakov with the Appeals Court. 
Avakov travelled to Kyiv with Dobkin and Salygin in November 2006 to try to resolve the dispute at the 
Presidential Secretariat and with the help of his friend in the Secretariat, Viktor Baloga.459 Yushchenko 
agreed to act as an intermediary; multiple talks were conducted between the regional elites and the central 
government, and upon his visit in Kharkiv in November 2006, Yushchenko said that Avakov was to 
remain.460 The litigation around the vote of non-confidence dragged on at different courts until early 
2007, when in January the Highest Administrative Court ruled in disfavour of Avakov.461 Following this 
decision, Avakov’s lawyers challenged the decision in the Supreme Court of Ukraine.462 In April 2007, 
Avakov won his case in the Supreme Court of Ukraine: the Court ruled in Avakov’s favour and judged 
 
turned down too. See “Apelliatsionnyi sud vo vtoroi raz otkazal A. Avakovu v pereschete golosov na vyborakh mera 
Khar’kova”, Status Quo,  15 November 2010. Avakov therefore appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court of 
Ukraine. See “Vysshii administrativnyi sud Ukrainy otkazal A. Avakovu v tom, chtoby priznat’ bezdeiatel’nost’ TSIK 
protivopravnoi. “Bat’kivshchina” zaiavila o prekrashchenii sudebnykh tiazhb”, Status Quo¸16 November 2010.  
459 “A. Avakov, M. Dobkin i V. Salygin obsudili problemy sotrudnichestva vetvei vlasti i razvitia Khar’kovskoi 
oblasti s glavoi Sekretariata prezidenta Ukrainy V. Balogoi”, Status Quo, 3 November 2006.  
460 Olena L’vova, “Iak Yushchenko vyrishyv kharkivs’ke “zemel’ne pytannia”, Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, 3 November 2006 .  
461 “Oblsovet vyrazil nedoverie Avakovu zakonno – reshenie Vysshego Administrativnogo suda (obnovleno)”, 
Mediaport, 24 January 2007.  
462 “Vysshii Administrativnyi sud – ne posledniaia instantsiia” – predstavitel’ Arsena Avakova v sude”, Mediaport, 24 
January 2007.  
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the motion of no-confidence unlawful, in breach of the due procedures.463 This conflict demonstrated the 
almost immediate involvement of the centre in the local conflict and the skilful use of the judiciary system 
by the local elites.  
Finally, both Kernes and Dobkin were involved in conflict with the security and law enforcement agents. 
In fact, both had extremely conflictual relations with the entire security and law enforcement apparatus, 
namely the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and the Ministry of the Interior, including their central464 
and local branches. The incident on the Klochkovska street prompted the SBU to open criminal 
proceedings against the city council in January 2007. For Kernes, this meant that the head of the Kharkiv 
region SBU branch Andriy Mukhataev was “serving the interest of certain financial groups [i.e. Target 
supermarket]”. Kernes followed this allegation up with an appeal to the President of Ukraine, General 
Prosecutor and the SBU’s central branch; he also detained an SBU officer in Kharkiv, which Mukhataev 
interpreted as Kernes’ attempt to keep tight control over the city.465 In September 2007, Mukhataev 
demanded the state to divest Kernes of his position and to deny both the city council secretary and the 
mayor access to the state’s classified documents.  
In March 2008, the local branch of the SBU began criminal proceedings against the city council on the 
account of corruption and misuse of the city budget.466 A concerted physical attack was launched against 
the deputies of the city council on 18 March, and many personal documents were extracted from 
Dobkin’s and Kernes’ cabinets, leading to the SBU being accused of a “raider attack” on the government 
seat”.467 According to Kernes, Mukhataev was planning provocations against Dobkin and himself, 
involving their property and families.468  Kernes appealed to the Kyiv district court in Kharkiv to stop the 
 
463 “Khar’kovskii gubernator Arsen Avakov pobedil oblastnoi sovet v Verkhovnom sude Ukrainy (obnovleno)”, 
Mediaport,  4 April 2007.  
464 Dobkin was seeking to involve the central SBU apparatus to analyse the actions of the local SBU when he was 
refused access to the state classified documents in September 2007. “Tol’ko proverka SBU v Khar’kovskoi oblasti 
sotrudnikami tsentral’nogo apparata i genprokuraturoi postavit tochku v protivopravnykh deistviiakh rukovoditelei 
oblastnogo upravleniia SBU – M. Dobkin”, Status Quo, 4 October 2007.  
465 “Nachal’nik oblupravleniia SBU A. Mukhataev deitsvuet v interesakh opredelennoi torgovoi gruppy – press-
sluzhba Khar’kovskogo gorsoveta”, Status Quo, 25 January 2007.  
466 “Miting v podderzhku gorodskikh vlastei Khar’kova i protiv deistvii SBU prokhodit okolo zdaniia upravleniia 
SBU v Khar’kovskoi obl.”, Status Quo, 20 March 2008.  
467 “V. Yushchenko boitsia perevyborov v Khar’kove – A. Fel’dman”, Status Quo¸20 March 2008.  
468 “Predstaviteli SBU zanimaiutsia vyemkoi dokumentov v priemnykh M. Dobkina I G. Kernesa. SBU vozbudila 
ugolovnoe delo”, Status Quo, 18 March 2008.  
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criminal proceedings against the city council employees, which was immediately satisfied.469 The General 
Prosecutor ordered to inspect the actions of the SBU in the city council, and by April the judge ruled in 
favour of the city council.470  
Both the city council secretary and the city mayor had disputes with the local police and the Ministry of 
the Interior. In February 2008, the local police and the regional prosecutor disrupted one of the very first 
land auctions conducted in Kharkiv by Dobkin and Kernes, claiming that the sale of land was unlawful. 
Dobkin appealed to Yuriy Lutsenko, the Minister of the Interior, and the general prosecutor Oleksandr 
Medved’ko and even the President Yushchenko.471 Kernes claimed that the law enforcement agents were 
acting in the interests of Avakov and his other rival Oleksandr Fel’dman, a supporter of BYUT.472  
In a scenario that was fated to repeat itself in March 2014, in July 2008, Kernes was summoned to Kyiv 
for questioning on the account of a bodily injuries case in 2006 and attempted murder.473 He was also 
suspected of organising drug trafficking (cocaine storage and trade). The Minister of the Interior Yuriy 
Lutsenko promised to take Kernes for questioning by force.474 An attempt to prosecute Kernes and 
remove him from Kharkiv’s political landscape was cut short because, as Lutsenko stated in November 
2008, all criminal cases against Kernes were closed by the local court and the local prosecutor, therefore, 
no further prosecution was possible.475  
5.2. Concentrated patronage  
Under concentrated patronage system, one dominant network permeates regional politics. There is almost 
no interaction among the members of competing networks at the regional level, little chance for the elites 
to engage in learning about how to survive under different networks, and almost no scrutiny of the region 
 
469   
“Piket v podderzhku deistvii SBU i protiv deistvii gorodskikh vlastei prokhodit vozle Kievskogo raisuda 
Khar’kova”, Status Quo, 31 March 2008  
470 “Khar’kovskii gorsovet na sessii nameren priniat’ obrashcheniia k prezidentu Ukrainy, genprokuroru i 
rukovoditeliu SBU po povodu sobytii 18 marta v zdanii merii”, Status Quo, 15 April 2008.  
471 “Khar’kovskii gorodskoi golova M. Dobkin nameren lichno dostavit’ obrashcheniia gorsoveta po intsidentu v 
khode zemel’nogo auktsiona v tsentral’nye organy vlasti”, Status Quo, 3 March 2008. 
472 “Pravookhranitel’nye organy diskreditiruiut gorodskie vlasti v interesakh A. Avakova, A. Protasa I A. Fel’dmana – 
G. Kernes”, Status Quo, 16 April 2008.  
473 “Police To Question Kernes On Four Cases”, Ukrainian News, 23 July 2008.  
474 “Party of Regions outraged with arrest of acting Kharkov mayor”, ITAR-TASS World Service, 22 July 2008.  
475 “Deistviia sudov i prokuratury, zakryvshikh ugolovnye dela, k kotorym imeet otnoshenie G. Kernes, mne 
kazhutsia zaangazhirovannymi – Iu. Lutsenko”, Status Quo, 25 November 2008  
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from the centre. Regional political elites’ survival is heavily dependent on the dominant network’s 
continuing access to power in the centre. Even if the popularity of the dominant network continues to 
decline in the region, as it happened with the Party of Regions after 2011, no alternative strong power 
centres emerge.  Again, the nature of the political economy explains the relative insulation of the regional 
elites. 
In the classic concentrated patronage region of Donets’k, the representation of political parties 
other than the Party of Regions was exceptionally low (Kuzio, 2010, Kuzio, 2011).476 As noted by 
Zimmer, already in the early 2000s, the region became completely “captured” by its political and 
economic elites (Zimmer, 2005, 370) and by 2014, the Party of Regions became “the only centrist party of 
power in Ukraine to capture a region and mobilize a stable voter base” (Kuzio, 2015, 175). In the 2006 
regional elections, the Party of Regions won 120 out of 150 seats in the regional council,477 while the 
representatives of the rival networks of Bat’kivshchina478 and President Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine-
People’s Self-Defence479 failed to secure any seats in either the regional or Donets’k city councils.  In 
2008, 90% of the regional council deputies were the Party of Regions’ members.480 This domination of 
the Party of Regions became even more pronounced under the dominant chief executive of Yanukovych. 
In 2011, Donets’k regional council consisted of 166 deputies from the Party. The rest were various 
smaller parties, such as Strong Ukraine allied with the Party of Regions, and the KPU, which presented 
very few challenges to the Party of Regions. There were no representatives of Bat’kivshchina and Front 
Zmin. Donets’k city council was similarly dominated by the Party of Regions.481  As a result, the local 
elites had no experience of interacting with the members of rival networks.   
Overall, in the Donets’k region, conflicts were either of strictly commercial nature, as between 
Serhiy Taruta and Rinat Akhmetov (Aslund, 2006, 18 – 20)(Journalist 1, interview 19 07 2019) and, later, 
Akhmetov and Yanukovych’s son Oleksandr, or socio-political as between the Party of Regions and a 
marginally popular Natalya Vitrenko’s Progressive Socialist Party which however lost representation at all 
 
476 See (Copsey, 2012), (Romanova, 2011) for regional voting results breakdown. 
477 “Sovet vam regionalovskii da problemy”, Novosti Donbassa, 25 April 2006.  
478 “My sdelali vazhnyi shahg v demokratizatsii Donets’ka – Rotov”, Novosti Donbassa, 10 April 2006.  
479 “”Oranzhevye” Donets’koi oblasti uvereny v svoei budushchei pobede”, Novosti Donbassa, 25 April 2006.  
480 “Partiia Regionov raskololas’ v Donets’ke”, Novosti Donbassa, 4 February 2008.  
481 “Donetskaia oblast – getto”, Novosti Donbassa, 1 November 2011.   
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levels of local politics by 2010.482 These conflicts were parochial, and the centre was never involved in 
them.  
The marginally popular Vitrenko’s Progressive Socialists regularly organised anti-NATO483 and 
“anti-fascist” meetings.484 They regularly challenged the Party of Regions for not making good on its 
promise to conduct a referendum on the status of the Russian language and for failing to proclaim 
Donets’k region a “territory free of NATO”;485 they also challenged the regional council’s budgetary, 
education, and public utilities policies throughout the years. Natalya Vitrenko commented on 
Yanukovych and the Party of Regions in an interview in April 2010, succinctly summarising the quite 
narrow views of the PSPU: “I think Yanukovych is deliberately avoiding all contact with me, because 
compared to the [strong] views of PSPU and my own views regarding Ukraine’s ascension into the trade 
partnership with the European Union, the building of a common state with Russia and Belarus, the 
defence of the Russian language as the second state language, [and] Ukrainian fascism, the views of the 
Party of Regions and Yanukovych’s followers are very uncertain and contradictory”.486  
It has to be said that most of the motions proposed by Vitrenko’s party regarding the budgetary 
policies, public utilities and the status of the Russian language487 were defeated in the regional council. 
PSPU’s mayoral candidate Volodymyr Marchenko commented on this in an interview in October 2011: 
“Our motions were [regularly] taken off the agenda [at the regional council meetings]… they did not let 
 
482 “Chto poterial Donetsk v 2010 godu”, Novosti Donbassa, 15 December 2010. In fact Vitrenko’s Progressive 
Socialsits, BYUT and Oleksandr Moroz’s Socialist Party lost representation in the city council after the November 
2010 elections. According to the election results in November 2010, Donets’k city council was now composed of 
Party of Regions (84 deputies), 3 deputies from Communist Party and Strong Ukraine (2 deputies). See “V 
Donetskom gorsovete poiavilis’ glavy fraktsii”, Novosti Donbassa, 3 December 2010. Donets’k regional council had 4 
parties: the Party of Regions with 65% voices, Communists with 7% votes and Strong Ukraine with 3%. According 
to Novosti Donbassa journalists, Donets’k regional council therefore had 166 Party of Regions deputies, 9 deputies 
from the Communist Party, 4 from Strong Ukraine and 1 deputy from the Agrarian Party – 1. See “Itogi vyborov: 
Partiia Regionov poluchila 92% mest v Donetskom oblsovete”, Novosti Donbassa, 7 November 2010.  
483 “Donetskie “Vitrenkovtsy” zaiavliaiut, chto po rasporiazheniiu Yanukovicha Donetsk gotoviat k vstupleniiu v 
NATO”, Novosti Donbassa, 18 May 2010; “Vozle Donnu Yushchenko zhdut storonniki Vitrenko s antinatovskimi 
nastroeniiami”, Novosti Donbassa, 17 January 2007; “U Vitrenko sobralis’ mitingovat’ protiv pamiatnika Mazape”, 
Novosti Donbassa,  
484 “V Donetske “Vitrenkovtsy” prignali bronevik na tsentral’nuiu ploshchad’ goroda Foto”, Novosti Donbassa, 9 May 
2010; “Donetskie vitrenkovtsi protestuiut protiv UPA i rugaiutsia s militsiei”, Novosti Donbassa,  
485 “V PSPU uvideli otryv Ukrainy ot Rossii”, Novosti Donbassa, 18 November 2010  
486 “Vitrenko: pozitsiia Partii Regionov i okruzheniia Yanukovicha otkrovenno mutnaia i protivorechivaia”, Novosti 
Donbassa, 7 April 2010.  





us explain our position regarding the increase in public utilities tariffs… and the budgetary policies. Our 
deputies went on a hunger strike when the regional councillors failed to proclaim Donets’k region a 
territory “free from NATO”. Our motion to establish direct links with Russian and Belarusian factories 
was defeated…. Or consider our language motions...”488  
As a testimony to a very low level of scrutiny of the region by the centre, the regional council 
protected and promoted people with openly Ukrainophobic views and anti-integrationist ideas such as the 
Donets’k city council secretary Mykola Levchenko, who was a self-styled mediator between the pro-
Russian protestors and the regional council in April 2014. During the crisis of 2004, Levchenko gave a 
speech about federalisation of Ukraine in the Russian Duma and in 2014 he boasted of close personal 
relationship with Vladimir Zhirinovsky to the pro-Russian protestors (Journalist 1, interview 19 07 
2019).489 In June 2007, Levchenko stated that Ukraine was “a failed state”, with the two Russian-speaking 
and Ukrainian-speaking halves constantly confronting each other. He openly asked the Kremlin to put 
pressure on the Ukrainian government and demand a special status for the Russian language in exchange 
for cheaper gas. In the same speech, he predicted a “civil war” for Ukraine. He also called Ukrainian a 
“folkloric language,” which caused great consternation in other regions in Ukraine. It is notable that he 
was never convicted for his Ukrainophobic views beyond a disciplinary action by his colleagues.490 
According to my interview with Journalist 1, this was because Levchenko never put his radical views into 
action. Not only that, Levchenko was popular among the people in Donets’k. During the October 2012 
parliamentary elections, Levchenko won 77% of votes in Petrovsk district of Donets’k city thus becoming 
a representative of the Party of Regions in the Verkhovna Rada.491    
What did this political independence mean from the point of view of the separatist crisis in  
2014? Firstly, despite all the surveys conducted in the Donbas showing the low support for separatism 
and the willingness to remain in Ukraine, the regional authorities made the region an incubator of 
Ukrainophobic and anti-integrationist ideas. The one-time chairman of the Donets’k regional council 
 
488 “Vladimir Marchenko – Partiia Regionov – partiia bezdarnostei”, Novosti Donbassa, 11 October 2010.  
489 See the famous 8th of April 2014 video where Levchenko and Akhmetov talk to the separatists 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01eWab_Wvvc  
490 “SBU ne vozbuzhdala ugolovnoe delo protiv Donetskogo gorsoveta – prokuror oblasti”, Novosti Donbassa, 13 
March 2007.  
491 “Levchenko stal narodnym deputatom”, Novosti Donbassa, 29 October 2012.  
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Borys Kolesnikov promoted the ideas of federalisation since 2002. These ideas were entertained by one 
of the key spokesmen for the local political elites during the crisis of 2014, the Donets’k council secretary 
and later the deputy of the Party of Regions in the Verkhovna Rada, Mykola Levchenko. Some separatist 
groups, such as Donetsk Republic, were allegedly financed by Kolesnikov.492 This was however 
disconfirmed in my interview with Journalist 1 who said that “Donetsk Republic activists were very poor 
but very fanatical”. Kolesnikov reportedly financed Aleksandr Khriakov’s Committee of the Donbas 
voters (“Komitet Izbiratelei Donbassa”); Khriakov organised protest during the Euromaidan crisis of 
2013 and then pro-Russian protests in spring 2014. He became one of the ministers in the Donetsk 
People’s Republic (DNR) embryo government.493 In 2008, the deputies created “Donbas Rus’” group 
that was one of the key groups in protesting in 2014.  
In summary, in the diffused patronage region of Kharkiv the opportunities for elite learning were 
abound due to the ongoing conflicts among the members of the key competing networks. This explains 
why the members of the Party of Regions were so well versed in law and why they opted for the integral 
Ukraine in 2014. In the concentrated patronage region of Donets’k, on the other hand, the opportunities 
for elite learning were closed because of the exceptionally low penetration of the region by parties other 
than the Party of Regions. In the section below, I demonstrate how historically the elites in the regions 
used the time lag between the ouster of one network and the viable deal between the regions and the 
centre.  
6. Time lag  
Historically, each change of the governing informal network in the centre was accompanied by a time lag, 
during which both national and local elites were recoordinating themselves around the emerging patrons. 
If an electoral contest preceded the change, then the elites had enough time to recoordinate. In 
concentrated patronage regions, due to their relative isolation and dependence on the preferred network’s 
access to power in the centre, the elites developed a stable repertoire of bargaining ploys to preserve their 
concentrated patronage system and ensure that their preferred patrons continued to exert enough 
 
492 In November 2007, Donets’k Republic was officially banned.  
493 “Partiia Regionov raskololas’ v Donetske”, Novosti Donbassa, 4 February 2008.  
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influence in the centre.  Encouraging or defusing certain types of political protest was a strategy used by 
the elites to help them attain this goal. In diffused patronage regions, by contrast, bargaining with the 
centre was used only once and with little success. Over time, the elites in diffused patronage regions learnt 
that they would be marginalised if they resist the changes in the centre and therefore switched to the new 
patrons very quickly. In essence, due to the nature of diffused patronage regions, whereby the region was 
“plugged into” various patronage channels, these elites did not need their preferred patrons to continue 
occupying powerful positions in the centre.  
6.1. Diffused patronage  
Kharkiv’s single attempt at bargaining with the centre was undertaken by the late governor of Kharkiv 
Yevhen Kushnaryov during the Orange Revolution (November – December 2004). This attempt was 
highly circumscribed, compared to those in Donets’k and Luhans’k, and eventually unsuccessful. Notably, 
Kernes, at the time the secretary of the city council, joined with his adversary Avakov to disassociate 
himself from Kushnaryov and defame him publically during a protest meeting in Kharkiv city.494 
According to my interview with the Activist in Kharkiv, Kushnaryov was unsuccessful in his bargaining 
with the centre “because there were a lot of Kharkivites supporting the Orange camp” (16 07 2019).  
Kushnaryov first condemned the Maidan and, as a staunch supporter of the Party of Regions, opposed 
the “premature” recognition of Yushchenko as president in western Ukraine. He claimed that a leaked 
document from Yushchenko’s Kharkiv headquarters contained a proposal to blockade Kharkiv regional 
administration and dismiss Kushnaryov.495  Accordingly, at the heyday of the Orange Revolution, 
Kushnaryov and the Party of Regions-dominated regional council began demanding federalisation for 
Ukraine. On 26 November 2004, the deputies of Kharkiv regional council proposed the creation of the 
South-Eastern Autonomous Republic,496 and Kushnaryov ruled that no budgetary transfers were to be 
made to the centre. The regional council deputies proposed to concentrate all power in the regional 
council497 and on 27 November, the council refused to recognise the central government.498 However, in 
 
494 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NGOXCYb5oaY  
495 Olena L’vova, “Kamo griadeshi?”, Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, 3 December 2004.  
496 “Kushnaryov ne hoche takogo mynulogo iak u Yanukovicha i vidmovliaet’sia vid separatizmu”, Ukrayinska 
Pravda, 30 November 2004.  
497 “Khar’kovskii oblastnoi sovet vzial vlast’ v svoi ruki”, Mediaport, 26 November 2004.  
498 “Vneocherednaia sessiia Khar’kovskogo oblsoveta: kak eto bylo”, Mediaport, 27 November 2004.   
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three days, the deputies of the regional council retracted their steps at the regional council’s session, when 
they revoked several decisions made on 26 November, including the decisions to confer all power on a 
new executive committee in Kharkiv region, stop budgetary transfers to the state budget, and create 
voluntary self-defence units. The council also excluded the wording “and to immediately discuss the 
creation of the South-Eastern Autonomous republic” from one of the resolutions.499  
Failing to force his way in the regional council, Kushnaryov became increasingly isolated and marginalised 
in his quixotic attempts to change the politics in the centre. Amid the continuing negotiations between 
the two opposing camps of Yushchenko and Yanukovych in Kyiv and the decision to rerun the elections, 
Kushnaryov handed in his resignation notice on 10 December.500 He continued criticising the 
Yushchenko government501 and was dismissed by mid-February 2005.502 By June 2005, Kushnaryov was 
no longer a deputy in the regional council.503 He blamed the new government for his loss of all influential 
positions in Kharkiv, claiming that its representatives were putting pressure on his subordinates and 
judges504 for him to be voted out of power.505 He created a new political party called “New Democracy,” 
which promoted the ideas of federalisation of Ukraine506 and later merged with the Party of Regions.507 
Kushnaryov’s travails did not stop with his dismissal and loss of power in Kharkiv. In fact, his fate was a 
tall tale for the local elites, demonstrating that they could become victimised if they resisted the changes 
in the centre. As it happened, Kushnaryov was convicted of several crimes, including an attempt to 
violate Ukraine’s territorial integrity and promote separatism. Criminal proceedings on these grounds 
began immediately in December 2004,508 when he was summoned to the General Prosecutor in Kyiv.509 
 
499 “Khar’kovskii oblsovet otmenil i priostanovil deistvie chasti reshenii, priniatykh im 26 noiabria”, Status Quo, 30 
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500 “Evgenii Kushnaryov obratilsia v Kabmin s pros’boi osvobodit’ ot dolzhnosti predsedatelia oblgosadmnistratsii”, 
Mediaport, 10 December 2004.  
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503 “Novyi glava oblasti. Kommentarii Khar’kovskikh politikov”, Status Quo¸4 February 2005.   
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oblsoveta – E. Kushnaryov”, Status Quo¸8 February 2005.  
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506 “Tsel’ partii “Novaia Demokratiia” – federalizatsiia Ukrainy – E. Kushnaryov”, Status Quo, 17 January 2005.  
507 “29 Khar’kovchan zaregistrirovany kandidatami v narodnye deputaty Ukrainy po spiskam Partii Regionov”, Status 
Quo¸19 December 2005.      
508 “Kusharyova dopytaly iak separatysta”, Ukrayinska Pravda, 23 December 2004.  
509 “E. Kushnaryov dal pokazaniia v Genprokurature Ukrainy”¸Status Quo¸23 December 2004.  
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He was also questioned by the General Prosecutor repeatedly in June 2005 on the account of other 
crimes, such as the unlawful use of bank loans to finance the building of Kharkiv metro (the budget code 
prohibits the regional council to take loans)510 and held in custody in August 2005.511 In January 2007, 
Kushnaryov was killed in a hunting accident. It never became clear whether the killing was political,512 but 
the fact that Kushnaryov was gradually dispossessed of all political influence in Kharkiv and had to exit 
the political stage following his bargaining attempt is notable. In his place, Arsen Avakov, a rich 
Kharkivite with strong ties to President Yushchenko, was appointed.513  
6.2. Concentrated patronage  
For the elites in concentrated patronage regions, it was important to sustain the concentrated patronage 
system each time after the governing network in the centre changed. It was significant because the elites 
had to protect large-scale private regional property and keep their hold on power. As a result, the regional 
elites in Donets’k developed a rich experience of bargaining with the centre. In fact, to my knowledge, 
Donets’k was the only region in Ukraine whose bargaining with the centre was systematic and successful, 
especially in the 1990s. Donets’k’s long-serving functionaries must have had memories of these past 
examples of successful bargaining and lobbying and a rich inventory of bargaining ploys. Compared to 
the bargaining in Kharkiv region, where the governor Kushnaryov was eventually divested of all political 
power, Donets’k region’s bargaining was less costly for the local political elites.  
The governors and mayors engaged in bargaining with the purpose of keeping access to power in the 
centre through concentrated patronage. In the 1990s, bargaining was undertaken to extract economic 
concessions and keep the regional property intact. In 2004, an attempt was made at forcing a political 
change in Kyiv and make Yushchenko negotiate with Yanukovych thus securing access to power for the 
most important regional patron. In 2008, smaller-scale bargaining occurred, which served primarily to 
showcase the strength of the Party of Regions to their electorate and underscore the cultural 
 
510 “E. Kushnaryov znal, chto kredit mozhet brat’ tol’ko gorodskoi sovet, oblastnoi sovet ne imel prava etogo delat’ 
– A. Avakov”, Status Quo, 25 August 2005.   
511 “E. Kushnaryov pereveden iz gospitalia v SIZO”, Status Quo¸19 August 2005.  
512 The investigations were closed in 2009.  
513 “A. Avakov rekomendovan V. Yushchenko v kachestve pretendenta na dolzhnost’ gubernatora Khar’kovskoi 
oblasti”, Status Quo, 17 January 2005.  
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confrontation between the east and the west of Ukraine.514 In 2008 – 2009, there was a severe economic 
crisis in the region, and the regional council blamed the current “Orange” government for this. There 
were protests and appeals to the centre in the region, with the regional council advocating early elections 
and a complete change of government.  
Bargaining with the centre was first attempted in the mid-1990s, when the regional elites took advantage 
of the regional protest potential to press their demands for a certain degree of autonomy for the region 
and to keep access to power in the centre.  Beginning in 1992, the head of the regional administration 
Vadym Chuprun repeatedly stated that the “primary task is independence in the decision of economic 
questions” and that “regions of Ukraine should have domestic and external independence” (Kovaleva 
2007, 67).  As a result, in late 1993, following the Donbas’ coal miners’ strikes in June, and that summer’s 
agitation for a national referendum of no confidence in president and parliament, Leonid Kravchuk 
issued a decree granting greater autonomy to the administrations of certain eastern oblasts - Donets’k 
including  - for a two-year period ending in December 1995 (Kravchuk, 1999) 164). Then in March the 
same year, he ordered the wholesale transfer of the ownership of all state assets in housing and communal 
services to the regional governments (ibid.: 165). The miners’ strikes, the protest movements, and the 
Donbas “consultative” referendum of 1994 on federalisation were successful in forcing the pre-term 
presidential election in 1994, as a result of which Leonid Kuchma became President. A “Donbas” 
government comprising some members of Donets’k regional elite was formed in Kyiv. Yukhym 
Zviahylskyi, the director of the Zasyadko coal mine, was appointed as the acting prime minister 
(Kovaleva, 2007, 68).   
 The most significant attempt at bargaining with the centre to preserve the concentrated 
patronage system was undertaken during the Orange Revolution when the protest potential in the region 
was very high and the elites took advantage of this protest potential in order to strike deals with the new 
patrons (Interview with Journalist 1 19 07 2019). In contrast to Kharkiv, in Donets’k region federal 
 
514 In 2008 another “congress of deputies of all levels in South and East” in Severodonets’k was initiated by the local 
elites in Donets’k and Luhansk. This time it was meant to voice their opposition to Yushchenko’s humanitarian 
policies and protect the Russian speakers. To many in the centre, this was the repeat version of Severodonets’k of 
2004. The SBU was summoned to investigate the congress and invite the participants for “an explanatory 




arrangements were proposed on a variety of levels by a group of regional elites closely connected to 
Yanukovych. Keeping the concentrated patronage system would have given the elites an opportunity to 
control the governor appointments, protect their hold on power and keep their assets. Thus, on 28 
November 2004, following the Maidan in Kyiv, Donets’k regional council decided to hold a regional 
referendum on granting Donets’k region a status of an autonomous region within the “Ukrainian 
federation”. A union of all south-eastern regions was proposed and the chairman of the Donets’k regional 
council Borys Kolesnikov, closely connected to Yanukovych, was chosen as its head. Kolesnikov 
proposed to create a “new federal state in the form of a South-Eastern Republic with the capital in 
Kharkiv,” if Yushchenko won the presidential election.515 
Both Donets’k mayor Luk’yanchenko and governor Anatoliy Blizniuk actively promoted autonomy 
arrangements for Donets’k.  They also actively encouraged people to attend pro-Yanukovych protest 
events. What was the effect this bargaining? It must be said that throughout the whole of 2004, there 
were continuous negotiations between the Yushchenko’s and Yanukovych’s camps. As Kudelia 
demonstrates, elite pacts were negotiated, and the changes in the electoral law enacted in 2005 following 
the victory of Yushchenko guaranteed a political comeback to Yanukovych (Kudelia, 2007, 96). 
Compromises had to be reached over the governor such as Logvinenko. “Yushchenko consulted 
Yanukovych and the Respected One (Shanovnyi – i.e. Rinat Akhmetov) on the subject whether this 
person would be an effective governor. Logvinenko was suitable for the president because he was a 
suitable figure both for Donets’k, Yekhanurov, and other political actors”, writes a journalist on this.516 
The last attempt at bargaining before 2014 to change the politics in the centre, again sanctioned by the 
local elites, was undertaken at the end of 2009. The economic crisis of 2008 – 2009 hit the region 
particularly hard; production was cut by at least one third,517 especially at state mines and plants,518 and 
there were wage arrears,519 particularly at state mines. Some compared the situation to the year 2000.520 
 
515 “Budet li Yanukovich i dal’she stradat’ separatizmom?”, Novosti Donbassa, 23 November 2005.   
516 “Novyi gubernator Donbasu. Suto muzhyts’kyi rozrazhunok”, Dzerkalo Tyzhnia¸19 May 2006.  
517 “Glavnye sobytiia Donetskoi oblasti 9 dekabria. Krizis unichtozhaet region”, Novosti Donbassa, 9 December 2008.   
518 “Glavnye sobytiia Donetskoi oblasti 17 dekabria. Ekonomika Donetskoi oblasti degradiruet, nachinaiutsia aktsii 
protesta”, Novosti Donbassa, 17 December 2008.  
519 “Donetskii oblastnoi balagan”, Novosti Donbassa, 26 March 2009. 
520 “Glavnye sobytia Donetskoi obasti 17 dekabria”,  
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The government raised taxes for private companies and increased utility tariffs.521 There was a widespread 
fear that, as a result of the crisis, Donets’k might become a subvention-receiving rather than a donor 
region.522 The governor Logvinenko was unable to overcome the crisis.523 In December 2009, there was a 
series of protests against the central government organised by the Donets’k trade unions. The protest 
numbered over four thousand people.524 The deputies of the regional council, in the notable absence of 
Logvinenko, summoned the regional council. The deputies sent the statement to the Rada demanding 
early presidential and parliamentary elections and a change in budgetary policies.525 In 2010, as a result of 
regular presidential elections, politics in the centre changed to the Donets’k local elites’ advantage and 
Yanukovych was elected President.  
 In summary, owning to their unequal standing vis-à-vis the centre, both regions developed 
different strategies of dealing with the changing politics in the centre. In Donets’k, the default strategy 
was bargaining, while in Kharkiv bargaining was attempted once and foundered spectacularly. Given the 
success of the previous bargaining attempts by Donets’k elites, we therefore can expect them to 
undertake bargaining with the centre again in 2014 (Interview with Journalist 1 19 07 2019).  
7. Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have demonstrated that, over time, Ukraine evolved into a more flexible polity or a 
“state of networks”. This introduced a certain degree of volatility in the politics in the centre and acted as 
a structural constraint on the regional elites. With the formal aspects of centre-periphery relations 
remaining the same throughout the period in question (the governors were appointed by the President), 
regions developed their own systems of patronage depending on the type of their political economy. In 
diffused patronage regions, large-scale enterprises were state-owned. Due to the nature of ownership and 
the state of the economy at those enterprises, patrons appointed clients from their own networks in order 
 
521 “Kak unichtozhit’ Donbass za 7 dnei. Prakticheskii kurs ot Donetskikh vlastei”, Novosti Donbassa, 19 December 
2008.  
522 “Gubernskii pessimizm”, Novosti Donbassa, 19 March 2009; Yevhen Shybalov, “Antykryzovi tantsi”, Dzerkalo 
Tyzhnia¸6 February 2009.  
523 “Ob’edinit’ Yushchenko, Yanukovycha i Tymoshenko ili tri v odnom Logvinenko”, Novosti Donbassa, 26 
December 2008.  
524 “Kak unichtozhit’ Donbass za 7 dnei”.  
525 “Donetskii oblastnoi balagan”.  
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to monitor the behaviour of the clients from competing networks. This improved transparency of 
information flows between the centre and the region. The diffused patronage region of Kharkiv “plugged 
into” various patronage channels, especially during the period of the divided-executive and secured 
resources for the enterprises thanks to the governors’ lobbying efforts. By contrast, in the concentrated 
patronage region of Donets’k, owning to the nature of the enterprises themselves and other factors, the 
economy was largely privatised. Concentrating patronage and using the resources of actual acquaintance 
ensured that this property was protected (Hale, 2015). The concentrated patronage region of Donets’k 
benefitted from one network’s continuing access to power (Easter, 2000; Hale, 2015, 47; Sabic, C., and 
Zimmer, K. 2004, 116). The most important financial patron of Donets’k region, Rinat Akhmetov, was 
able to secure resources for his enterprises when Yanukovych rose to power in the centre. Overall, 
Yanukovych’s career rise to the centre benefitted Donets’k region, which is consistent with the 
expectations in the literature on networks and Easter’s argument, in particular (Easter, 2000, 34). The 
elites in this region had vested interest in preserving the concentrated patronage system. I followed by the 
discussion of how the regional elites used the resources of their actual acquaintance with the various 
patrons in the centre to secure budgetary resources for their regions. I then discussed the aspects of elite 
learning (Grzymala-Busse, 2010) in diffused and concentrated patronage systems. I demonstrated how the 
practice of appointing clients from rival networks led to conflicts in the diffused patronage region of 
Kharkiv and how this contributed to the processes of elite learning. This confirmed the theoretical 
expectation in the literature on informal politics in Eastern Europe. Gzymala-Busse writes on elite 
learning, the iterative process in which different networks are engaged, and how these worked for the 
elites in Poland and Hungary: “The more elites are advanced on the basis of pragmatic competence rather 
than ideological orthodoxy … and the more these parties engage in informal negotiation with opponents 
and policy experimentation, the more diverse and useful the skill sets and reputations of elite 
actors”(Grzymala-Busse, 2010, 327) .  
By contrast, the elites in the concentrated patronage region of Donets’k were isolated and no elite 
learning took place in their region. This also reduced the transparency of information flows in that the 
regional elites were very rarely scrutinised by the centre. Finally, I discussed the time lag between the 
change of the informal governing network in the centre and a viable deal between the centre and the 
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regional elites. I have demonstrated that the elites in diffused patronage systems attempted bargaining 
with the centre only once and this was unsuccessful. By contrast, the elites in concentrated patronage 
systems had a rich experience of bargaining with the centre in order to preserve access to power and keep 
their concentrated patronage system. When there was an electoral contest preceding the change of the 
governing network, the elites encouraged popular protest in order to coordinate themselves around the 
emerging patrons and make sure that their preferred patrons continued accessing power in the centre 
(Hale, 2015). This follows from the key insight by Hale on electoral contest: “a victory in a head-to-head 
high-stakes contest between rival networks can be among the most powerful shapers of expectations as to 
















Chapter 5: Elites and Protest in Kharkiv and Donets’k, 2013 - 2014 
1. Introduction  
In the preceding chapter, I have discussed the aspects of my independent variable, that is the nature of 
patronage in the regions. I have demonstrated that the local elites function under different systems of 
patronage which are conditioned by the centralised nature of Ukraine and the political economy of their 
regions. Protest cataloguing revealed high levels of protest and protest violence in both regions in 2013 - 
2014. Protest cataloguing, however, points only to the aggregate patterns of protest. It cannot account for 
the nature of protest in the regions. For example, it cannot account for the persistent radical demands 
made by the pro-Russian activists in Donets’k and moderate demands made by the pro-federal activists in 
Kharkiv.  It also cannot account for the clandestine armed mobilisation in Donets’k and the lack thereof 
in Kharkiv.  
In this chapter, I use process tracing and protest cataloguing to discuss the aspects of my intervening 
variable, which is radical or moderate protest. I start with process tracing the Anti-Maidan contention in 
both regions. I demonstrate that the Russian Spring did not emerge in a vacuum and not with the 
assistance of the ethnic patron Russia (Interview with Activist from Donets’k 27 07 2019), as the 
literature on conflicts and ethnic patrons (Jenne, 2007; Laitin, 2001) and the role of external state actors in 
conflict (Gleditsch and Beardsley, 2004; Salehyan, 2006) would predict. Instead, political opportunities for 
the Anti-Maidan protest were opened by the local elites. I define political opportunity after Sidney Tarrow 
as “dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for collective action by affecting 
people’s expectations for success or failure” (Brockett, 2005; Tarrow, 1998, 76 - 77). Thus, local elites in 
eastern Ukraine opened political opportunities for specific types of activism for a variety of reasons. In 
Kharkiv, they were opened as part of the local Party of Regions’ elites’ response to the Euromaidan. This 
was because the Party of Regions’ elites were challenged by the local opposition parties and ordinary 
people in the past, which made these elites insecure and more aggressive towards protests that were not in 
their interest. In this way, they opened political opportunities for the Anti-Maidan in order to retain their 
hold on power, that is they acted in an “instrumental” or “rationalist” way towards the Anti-Maidan, as 
the general literature on elites in civil conflicts would predict (de Figueiredo, M., and Weingast, B. 1999; 
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Gagnon, 1994; Jones, B.,1999; Kaufman, 2001; Wilkinson, 2004; Woodward, S.,1999). In Donets’k, 
political opportunities were opened for the Anti-Maidan activists because the elites wanted to remain 
loyal to Yanukovych government’s course, which is consistent with the expectations discussed in the 
literature on patronal politics (Hale, 2015). Therefore, before the Russian Spring commenced, both 
regions started with similar initial conditions, with the political opportunities being open for the Anti-
Maidan.  
I treat the change of the governing network in the centre in February 2014 as the critical juncture. With 
the change of the governing network, the intervening variable also changes: it becomes radical or 
moderate pro-Russian and pro-federal protest. Depending on the nature of the regional patronage – 
concentrated or diffused – the local elites would encourage radical or moderate protest.   Therefore, I 
focus on the interaction between the local elites and specific types of activists in this chapter. I refute the 
hypothesis that the political opportunities for specific types of activism are opened externally by ethnic patrons (H2). 
Through process tracing, I demonstrate that political opportunities were opened locally by the local elites. 
I also describe the pro-federal and pro-Russian challengers and demonstrate that they were relatively weak 
and disorganised prior to the Russian Spring, which is consistent with the observations made in the 
theoretical literature on political opportunity that describes its external nature (Almeida, 2008; Tarrow, 
2011, 163; Tilly, 1978, 133). In addition, congruent with the theoretical literature on process tracing, I 
discuss alternative explanations of why there is an armed conflict in Donets’k region and no armed 
conflict in Kharkiv.   
To reiterate my theoretical argument, in both regions, the local elites play a key role in channelling protest 
in their desired direction. In concrete ways, they create or close political opportunities for protest by 
allowing protestors to gather or banning protest through the local courts; by influencing protest action 
directly and personally; by endorsing or denouncing activists; and by refusing or agreeing to act on the key 
demands put forward by the activists. In diffused patronage regions, the local elites use their knowledge 
of the law to defuse radical protest, so that it does not disrupt their relations with the emerging patrons in 
the centre and the competing networks in the region. In concentrated patronage regions, the elites use the 
time lag between the ouster of the network and the viable deal with the centre to encourage radical 
protest. Protest therefore mirrors the elites’ actions. In diffused patronage regions, moderate actors come 
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to the forefront of the protest wave and make moderate demands on the local elites. In concentrated 
patronage regions, radicals are encouraged by the local elites and given confidence to press with their 
demands.526 Therefore, this chapter seeks to test the hypothesis developed in the last sections of the 
theoretical introduction: H3: the local elites would encourage or discourage specific types of protest depending on the 
regional patronage system.  
The chapter is organised as follows. I first discuss how political opportunities were opened for the Anti-
Maidan in Kharkiv city and Donets’k region. I then describe the critical juncture – the change of the 
governing network in Kyiv – in detail. I then discus the aspects of the moderate protest in the diffused 
patronage region of Kharkiv and close with the discussion of the radical protest in the concentrated 
patronage region of Donets’k.  
2. Anti-Maidan in Kharkiv  
2.1. General protest potential in the region  
The chapter on the regional protest potential revealed that Kharkiv’s top elites, and particularly Hennadiy 
Kernes and Mykhailo Dobkin, were constantly challenged both by the local opposition (and even their 
own) parties and ordinary people. The period of the “divided-executive,” that is when the centre 
experienced constant rotation of and confrontation among patrons from rival networks, was 
characterised by almost unending political and socio-economic protests in Kharkiv. These protests made 
the local elites more insecure but also more aggressive, in that they became quite possessive of their 
power. Relative quiescence was achieved during the period of one chief executive when Yanukovych was 
dominating the centre. This explains why the local elites reacted more aggressively towards the 
Euromaidan in 2013 and why they opened political opportunities for the Anti-Maidan protest.  
The protests for the dismissal of Kernes and Dobkin picked up during the period of the divided-
executive. In the year 2006 alone there were 12 major protests, with wide-ranging demands, numbering 
up to 1000 people. There were protests by agricultural and local market workers, and trade unions 
demanding Dobkin to fulfil his mayoral election campaign promises, that is to lower the utility tariffs and 
 
526 It can be argued that the Russians captured the concentrated patronage region of Donets’k after summer 2014.  
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stop interfering with construction works. There were also protests against the directors of Kharkiv’s state-
owned enterprises.527 Over 25 protests specifically targeted the local elites, demanding the dismissal of 
Avakov, and Kernes and Dobkin. Out of these, 17 were mounted specifically against Kernes and Dobkin 
and numbered 5,000 people at most. Throughout 2007 – 2008, the protests demanding the dismissal of 
Dobkin and Kernes intensified. They were often held by the rival parties at the same time and in the same 
location. For example, following the new city council statute, which reportedly gave greater power to 
Kernes and required organisers of any protests to file their requests to conduct their protest with the city 
council at least 10 days in advance,528 BYUT organised a series of protests against the statute,529530 and 
after the SBU stormed the city council in March 2008, protests were organised to support the actions of 
the SBU. Significantly, on 12 September 2007, a meeting demanding the dismissal of Dobkin and Kernes 
was organised by some Party of Regions’ members and supporters, who claimed that the mayor and the 
city council secretary were discrediting the party.531  
Relative quiescence came only under the presidency of Yanukovych,532 when most protests were of socio-
economic nature, so that by March 2011, Dobkin claimed that there was “no opposition in the region”. 
“There are political forces in the region who are trying to oppose the government, but for some, this does 
not work because they are very weak; others don’t do it properly,” he said.533 
How did the elites respond to these protests? Some elites, particularly Arsen Avakov, openly participated 
in the protests organised by Our Ukraine534 and Bat’kivshchina.535 Political protest events attracted some 
attention from Dobkin and Kernes, who frequently labelled opposition protestors as “insane,” or claimed 
 
527“Okolo trekh tysiach chelovek s simvolikoi BYUT piketiruiut zdanie Khar’kovskogo gorsoveta (dopolneno)”, 
Status Quo¸27 February 2008; “Khar’kovskii front. Khroniki srazhenii”, Status Quo¸20 November 2006.  
528 “Gorodskaia vlast’ pytaetsia obespechit’ bezopasnost’ grazhdan, ogranichivaia vozmozhnost’ provedeniia 
mitingov na pl. Konstitutsii i pl. Svobody – M. Dobkin”, Status Quo, 6 July 2007.  
529 “Predstaviteli BYUT provodiat piket vozle zdaniia Khar’kovskoi oblgosadministratsii”, Status Quo, 23 November 
2007.  
530 “Storonniki BYUT provodiat piket vozle zdaniia Khar’kovskoi obsgosadministratsii (obnovleno)”, Status Quo, 9 
July 2007.  
531 “Miting s trebovaniem otstavki M. Dobkina i G. Kernesa prokhodit v Kieve vozle ofisa Partii regionov”, Status 
Quo, 12 September 2007.  
532 There was a short-lived protest, with the participation of politicians from opposition parties, Arseniy Yateniuk 
and Oleh Tyagnibok, in summer 2013. See “Oppozitsiia perekryla dvizhenie transporta na ploshchadi Konstitutsii”, 
Gorodskoi Dozor, 12 April 2013.  
533 “Kernes vyigral sud u politicheskikh opponentov”, Gorodskoi Dozor, 26 October 2012.   
534 “Arsen Avakov: ia boius’ provokatsii”, Mediaport, 16 March 2007.  
535 “Na ploshchadi Svobody prokhodit miting “za chestnye vybory”, Mediaport, 17 November 2010.  
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that protestors were being paid for participating in the meetings.536 Overall, the local elites’ reaction to 
political protest in the city of Kharkiv became more vehement over the years. This was due to the fact 
that the Party of Regions’ elites were engrossed in conflict with the competing networks and their 
popularity was not very stable.537  
To counter political protest in Kharkiv, the Party of Regions’ elites used courts. This contributed to the 
process of elite learning, which the elites took advantage of in spring 2014. This was confirmed to me in 
an interview with the Activist in Kharkiv who described his travails at the local court ruled by “the 
telephone justice”: “They summoned me to the court and claimed that I filed a request which I did not 
file. They eventually prohibited all of us from holding our meeting” (16 07 2019). The activist claimed 
that this was done on Kernes’ instruction. Kernes skilfully used one of the local courts to ban Our 
Ukraine’s and Bat’kivshchina’s rallies on two occasions. In March 2007, upon the request from the city 
council and Kernes specifically, Dzerzhynskiy district court banned Our Ukraine-People’s Self-Defense 
opposition movements’ leaders Mykola Katerynchuk and Yuriy Lutsenko from installing their stage on 
the Freedom Square and conducting a rally on 16 March. Kernes stated that he did not want “a second 
Maidan on the Freedom Square”. He argued that the documents provided by Lutsenko and Katerynchuk 
to support their right to conduct this meeting were not originals.538 It was reported that Kernes came to 
the Square to express his personal indignation at the installation of the stage for the meeting.539 The 
protest organisers lodged an appeal against this decision with another local court.540 In the end, they 
 
536 Dobkin, for example, blamed the regional administration and Avakov for organising protest and hunger strike to 
force the change of the directors at Kharkiv metro in February 2008. See “V. Yushchenko poobeshchal razobrat’sia 
v situatsii s Khar’kovskim metropolitenom – M. Dobkin”, Status Quo¸15 February 2008.  
537 Dobkin and Kernes did not enjoy stable popularity among their voters. According to a survey conducted 
between 14 and 19 December 2007 in Kharkiv, 63% of people thought that Dobkin was not suitable for his post, 
51% supported the idea of local pre-term elections. 61% expressed negative attitudes towards Dobkin. Two-thirds 
noted that Dobkin did not fulfil his mayoral election campaign promises. As for Kernes, 76% of Kharkivites held 
negative attitudes towards Kernes. See “63% Khar’kovchan schitaiut, chto M. Dobkin ne sootvetstvuet zanimaemoi 
dolzhnosti – sotsopros”, Status Quo, 25 December 2007. According to a survey from 5 to 10 June 2008, over 30% 
regarded the work of Dobkin as unsatisfactory. Over 50% considered the creation of a Verkhovna Rada 
commission to investigate Dobkin and Kernes’ actions as reasonable. Things changed dramatically in 2010. 
According to a survey of March 2010 conducted by Kharkiv branch of Gorshenin Institute of Governance (Kyiv), 
over 50% trusted the new governor Dobkin; 70 % did not trust Kernes. During the local elections, Kernes narrowly 
beat Avakov, winning 33.4% of votes, while Avakov won 31.9%.  
538 “My ne dadim organizovat’ na pl. Svobody novyi “Maidan” – G. Kernes”, Status Quo, 15 March 2007.  
539 “Opposition MP banned from staging rally in east Ukraine”, BBC Monitoring Ukraine & Baltics 15 March 2007.   
540 “Dzerzhinskii raiionnyi sud Khar’kova zapretil Yu. Lutsenko provodit’ miting na pl. Svobody”, Status Quo, 16 
March 2007.  
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conducted their rally on Rosa Luxemburg square, which is further away from central Kharkiv.541 In a 
similar vein, in August 2011, the local elites attempted to ban a meeting in support of Tymoshenko 
through the local court.542  
Political protest involving ordinary people was more complex in Kharkiv. In such protests, politics often 
quickly became enmeshed with the opposing parties’ commercial interests. As such, the local elites were 
particularly energetic in banning protests that were concerned with land use because land tax constituted 
one of the major sources of tax revenues for the city and many local elites had extensive business interests 
in land. One such confrontation began in May 2006, when the city council suspended several decisions 
adopted by the previous convocation of the city council allowing construction to take place on certain 
land plots. On 13 July 2006, Target Trading Group, who was involved in these construction works, was 
calling on the Rada to dismiss Dobkin and dissolve the city council.543 On 16 December, the Target 
Group organised a meeting on 197 Klochkovska Street in order to announce the construction of a 
shopping mall on the plot of land that was repossessed by the city council. Local people, Kharkiv regional 
youth organisations, representatives of the Green party, and the city council members, together with 
Dobkin and Kernes, were present.544 The meeting turned into the “bloodiest confrontation in Ukraine 
since 2001,” according to some journalists:545 the fence around the construction site was destroyed, and 
several people, including a city council deputy, were beaten. According to the member of Target Group 
supervisory board and the head of the “Miska Varta” (Gorodskoi Dozor or City Watch) political 
association Vladislav Protas, Dobkin and Kernes provoked the disorders, as a result of which “800 
“young upstarts” beat 21 Target Group workers and 10 passer-bys”.546 Protas immediately appealed to 
the Verkhovna Rada.547 He claimed that this purely commercial conflict turned into a political one by 
 
541 “Kak Kernes Lutsenko pomogal”, Status Quo, 19 March 2007.  
542 “Razoshlis’. No obeshchaiut vernut’sia”, Status Quo, 9 August 2011.  
543 “Miska Varta Accuses Kharkiv City Mayor Dobkin Of Provocation Of City Disorders”, Ukrainian News, 21 
December 2006.  
544 Ibid.  
545 “Vladimir Radchenko: v Khar’kove proishodiat massovye besporiadki, kotorykh strana ne znala s 2001 goda”, 
Mediaport, 15 January 2007.  
546 “Park Gor’kogo: test ukrayins’koii hromads’kosti na voshyvist’”, Ukrayinska Pravda, 1 June 2010.  
547 “Mer Khar’kova i sekretar’ gorsoveta sprovotsirovali massovye besporiadki i izbienie gorozhan – V. Protas”, 
Status Quo, 18 December 2006.  
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Dobkin and Kernes because he and Target Trading Group supported the “Orange Camp” during the 
Orange Revolution.548  
Following the Klochkovska Street confrontation, Vladyslav Protas initiated the collection of signatures 
for a referendum on the dismissal of Dobkin on the grounds that he was not fulfilling his election 
campaign promises and was putting pressure on the local small businesses. Kernes refused to register the 
people tasked with the collection of signatures: he claimed that the signatures were collected with 
breaches of due procedure.549 Protas followed this with a protest in front of the city council, with around 
200 people participating; they vowed to involve courts and claimed that Kernes breached the “The Law 
on all-Ukrainian and local referendums”.550 Eventually, no litigation followed these protests.551  
Protas’ claims that Kernes and Dobkin provoked the disorders on Klochkovska Street were most 
probably true. Stanislav Markus’ research on property rights in Kharkiv confirms that Kernes especially 
was extremely jealous of how the local land was used. Markus writes in his book Piranha Capitalism (54): 
In Kharkiv, a city in Ukraine’s Northeast, a limited-liability firm “Khar’kov-Moskva” signed a land lease agreement with the 
municipal authorities in 2009 that authorized the firm to build an ambitious business center, which would include a hotel and a 
helipad. The agreement transferred a swath of down-town land to the firm for twenty-five years, subject to subsequent renewal. 
Having secured all relevant permissions and attracted the necessary investors, the firm launched the construction. In 2010, a new 
mayor [Kernes] assumed power in Kharkiv. Immediately, the firm came under attack from the authorities. Based on damning 
reports from a multitude of inspecting agencies, the municipal court annulled the lease, after which the Procuracy opened nine 
administrative cases and one criminal case against the firm and its director and imposed an 840,000 hryvnia … fine on the firm 
for the “unlawful use of land.” According to the firm’s director, the new mayor did not mince words when he met with him in March 2011: “He 
[the mayor] said, “Let go of the site, or I will take it away!”  
In summary, Kharkiv region was a politically combustible region. Protests increased in intensity during 
the period of the divided-executive. Political protests enmeshed with socio-economic protests that 
 
548 “Khar’kiv: Krov i reidery u vilykh rukavchykakh”, Ukrayinska Pravda, 21 December 2006.  
549 “Initsiativnye gruppy po sboru podpisei dlia provedeniia referenduma o prekrashchenii polnomochii M. Dobkina 
i Khar’kovskogo gorsoveta sozdaiutsia s narusheniiami zakonodatel’stva – G. Kernes”, Status Quo, 6 November 
2006.  
550 “”Gorodskoi dozor” piketiroval Khar’kovskii gorsovet s trebovaniem zaregistrirovat’ initsiativnye gruppy 
referenduma po otzyvu gorodskogo golovy i gorsoveta”¸Status Quo, 17 November 2006.  
551 “Khar’kovskaia obshchestvennaia organizatsiia “Gorodskoi Dozor” sozdala initsiativnuiu gruppu po sboru 
podpisei khar’kovchan v podderzhku provedeniia referenduma po otstavke M. Dobkina”, Status Quo, 4 April 2007.  
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threatened to dislodge the local elites, while the latter just about managed to survive the intra-elite conflict 
and the protest challenge by skilfully using the local courts.  
2.2. Anti-Maidan in Kharkiv 
Thus, for Kharkiv’s top political elites, and the city mayor Hennadiy Kernes and the regional governor 
Mykhailo Dobkin, in particular, the Euromaidan that began in Kharkiv on 24 November 2013 stood in 
the long line of political protests that threatened to unseat them. Early Euromaidan rallies were organised 
spontaneously, without the participation of political parties,552 but by people who were very critical of 
these top elites, such as Dmytro Pylypets.553 After 28 November 2013, Kharkiv’s Euromaidan protestors 
demanded Yanukovych’s resignation and the overhaul of the entire political system. Early on, they began 
compiling lustration lists, that is the lists of politicians and civil servants to be dismissed for corruption.554 
They also began demanding Kernes’ resignation from as early as 16 December.555 Over time, the 
Euromaidan protestors grew even bolder. On 23 February 2014, the Euromaidan protestors stormed 
Kharkiv regional administration building (HOGA) and demanded the immediate resignations of Dobkin 
and Kernes. They claimed that corruption was involved in the building of city roads, Kharkiv metro 
stations,556 and the Three Marys’ church in central Kharkiv.557 They also pointed to the city authorities’ 
negligence in handling the fire on the Khartron plant in January 2014 and the fact that no one was 
prosecuted for it.558 
Hence the local elites’ reaction to the Euromaidan protest was consistent with how they reacted to 
political protests in the past. When the Euromaidan began in Kharkiv, the city authorities took immediate 
 
552 “Bez flagov i politsimvoliki: “Khar’kovskii evromaidan” sobral okolo tysiachi chelovek”, 057, 25 November 
2013.  
553 “Est’ tol’ko mig mezhdu aziatskimi sumerkami i evropeiskim rassvetom i nuzhna li nam budet rabochaia viza v 
Finliandiiu”, 057, 24 November 2013.  
554 “Ministr MVD b’et trevogu: aktivisty “evromaidana” sostavliaiut “liustratsionnye spiski” chinovnikov, 
sotrudnikov “Berkuta” i dr.”, 057¸5 December 2013.  
555 “Gepu v Dopu, Khar’kov – v Evropu”. Podderzhat’ “evromaidan” priekhali znamenitye pisateli brat’ia 
Kapranovy (foto, video)”, 057, 16 December 2013.  
556 “Metro “Pobeda” gotova na 53 protsenta. Kernes lichno proveril khod stroitel’stva ob’ekta”, 057, 21 December 
2013.  
557“Massovoi potasovkoi zakonchilsia miting protiv tserkvi za “Stekliannoi struei”, a na Pavlovom Pole dvoe arabov 
ugrozhali prokhozhim nozhami”, 057, 27 November 2013; “Kernes o protestakh khar’kovchan: “Ia im slomaiu ruki-
nogi, esli oni k chemu-to podoidut”, Censor.net, 28 November 2013.  
558“ Subbota na Evromaidane ob’iavlena dnem traura v pamiat’ pogibshikh vo vremia pozhara v Khar’kove”, 
Censor.net, 10 January 2014.  
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action against the protestors. On 25 November 2013, Kernes prohibited all public gatherings, citing an 
imminent flu epidemic.559 This was probably an insincere move: according to a local epidemiological 
research organisation, no epidemic was expected in November. Other specialists presented statistics 
showing no major incidents of flu.560 On 2 December, the city council hastily ordered a fence to be built 
around the Freedom Square. The mayoral press service stated that this was done in order to prepare for 
the New Year celebrations.561 Some Euromaidan meetings were simply prohibited. The organisers of the 
all-Ukrainian Euromaidan forum scheduled for 10 January claimed that their request to use public 
buildings was turned down. The activists were forced to rent private flats and offices of other political 
associations and parties.562 
The local elites feared the Euromaidan movement because it threatened not only to unseat them but also 
disrupt the smooth work of the regional enterprises, for which they were responsible. The content 
analysis563 of the anti-Euromaidan statements made by the governor Dobkin, mayor Kernes, and the 
regional council’s chairman and member of the Party of Regions Serhiy Chernov illustrates the point. As 
one can see, the issues relevant to the enterprises, such as wage freezes, job losses, and stability featured 







559 “Kak Khar’kovchane k evromitingam priobshchalis’”, Vechernii Khar’kov, 25 November 2013.  
560 “Mer Khar’kova Gepa zapretil gorozhanam provodit’ massovye aktsii”, Censor.net, 25 November 2013.  
561“Ploshchad’ Svobody obnesli po samye bordiury 2-metrovym zaborom (foto, dopolneno)”, 057, 2 December 
2013.  
562 “Organizatory foruma Evromaidanov zaiavliaiut o prepiatstvovanii so storony vlasti”, Novosti Donbassa, 10 
January 2014.  
563 I used the regional internet newspapers such as 057, Khar’kovskie Izvestiia and Slobids’kii Krai to find articles that 
contained interviews or comments by these elites. I then selected the major themes or issues raised in those articles 
and counted how many times each theme or issue was mentioned.   
216 
 
Table 29: Content analysis of the local political elites’ Anti-Maidan statements in Kharkiv  
 
 
The qualitative data further supports the argument. According to the statement by the city council 
deputies, the events on the Maidan were threatening to disrupt the work of the local enterprises.564 Such 
claims circulated at Anti-Maidan meetings, with people expressing similar concerns.565 During a Party of 
Regions’ conference on 28 November 2013, the governor Dobkin openly voiced his support for the 
course taken by Yanukovych.566 He stressed his support for Yanukovych in the presence of the major 
enterprise directors at the biggest Anti-Maidan rally organised by the Party of Regions on 30 
November.567 In particular, Dobkin expressed his fear that because of the Euromaidan, Ukraine risked 
losing jobs in the east.568 On 2 December, during the emergency session of the regional council, the 
deputies issued a statement which read: “We support our people’s desire to become part of the European 
community, with its high living standards, democracy, and rule of law. However, we must not cut our ties 
with the Russian Federation and the Customs Union countries, because the welfare of our citizens is 
dependent on our cooperation with them.” Kernes and Dobkin later echoed this statement.569 They seem 
 
564 “Prypynyty maidany ta ity pratsiuvaty zaklykaiut’ u tsentri Kharkova”, Slobids’kii Kraii, 11 January 2014.  
565 “Pochemu khar’kovchane molchat, kogda za oknom revoliutsiia?” Mneniia ekspertov”, 057, 5 February 2014.  
566 “Dobkin pidtrymav Yanukovicha”, Slobids’kii Kraii, 28 November 2013.  
567 “Khar’kovskie regionaly podderzhali Yanukovicha (tekst rezoliutsii)”, Gorodskoi Dozor, 28 November 2013.  
568 “Mikhail Dobkin: “My poluchim volnu bezrabotrnykh”, Vechernii Khar’kov, 29 November 2013.  
569 “Gennadii Kernes “mnozhit na nol’” tekh, kto hochet voiny. Interv’iu v efire radio “Russkaia sluzhba novostei”. 
Polnaia versiia”, Khar’kovskie Izvestiia, 4 February 2014.  

















to have fully appropriated the arguments made by the chairman of the regional council Serhiy Chernov: 
“We will not allow the situation to escalate, so that people cannot reach their work places. We will not 
allow state institutions and public utility providers to be paralised [by the crisis]”. He then further 
admonished the opposition parties for not taking into account the effects of the Euromaidan on the 
enterprises: “The opposition demands the enterprises to stop working, but nobody is willing to claim 
responsibility [for what will happen] if they do stop working and paying taxes”.570 
 To showcase their strength, the local elites organised Anti-Maidan protests of their own. In fact, 
Kharkiv’s Anti-Maidan can be described as elite-led, compared to the Anti-Maidan in Donets’k.  Out of 
10 Anti-Maidan protests I have catalogued, 6 were organised by the local elites.571 These protests were 
well attended, with as many as 100,000 people reported on 30 November,572 and thousands on 12 
January.573 These rallies were attended primarily by workers of state-owned enterprises and had the local 
Party of Regions’ functionaries, such as Dobkin, speak in support of Yanukovych. The other Anti-Maidan 
rallies were organised by the Communist Party of Ukraine and, unfortunately, were poorly reported. As to 
the protests organised by pro-federal and pro-Russian activists that were reported across various media, I 
was able to find only two. A protest on 15 December 2013 gathered a number of organisations, such as 
the Communist Party, Borot’ba, “Trudovaia Khar’kivshchina” (Labour Kharkiv), and the openly pro-
Russian Sut’ Vremeni.574 It was attended by 80 people. 575  The only other Anti-Maidan protest organised 
 
570 “Kharkivs’ka vlada proty povalennia konstytutsiinogo ladu. Zaiava oblrady”, Slobids’kii Kraii, 2 December 2013.  
571 It seems that not many people took the Anti-Maidan peaceful protests seriously. Several well-attended rallies 
organised by the local Party of Regions (one on 30 November reportedly gathered 100,000 people) drew criticism 
for the use of the administrative resource. Some people, especially those working in education and at state-owned 
enterprises, claimed that they participated at these rallies against their will. See “Po slukham, uchitelei khar’kovskikh 
shkol zavtra povezut v Kiev mitingovat’ za Tamozhennyi soiuz. Vlasti eto nazyvaiut dezinformatsiei”, 057, 27 
November 2013. One reader of the Censor.net reported: “Today an acquaintance of mine who works in a 
kindergarten called me and said that she was compelled, under the threat of dismissal, to participate in a Party of 
Regions’ meeting on the Freedom Square on 11 January”. See “Gepa sgoniaet biudzhetnikov na miting 11 ianvaria 
“za Yanukovicha””, Censor.net, 9 January 2014.  
A video from the rally on 30 November shows a group of young men, 16 to 17 years of age, being asked by a 
journalist why they came to the rally. They respond: “because our Serhiy Sergeivych asked us to come; he wrote to 
our school, so we can take a day off”. Upon questioning, whether they understand why they are here, they don’t 
respond. See “Govoriat Azarov priedet. Nas sniali s zaniatii”. Kak po kholodu na slet PR vystavili “koridor” iz 
molodezhi s flagami”, 057, 23 November 2013.  
572 “Tysiachi liudei u Kharkovi vysunuly svoii vymogy do ES”, Slobids’kii Kraii¸30 November 2013.  




575 https://vk.com/wall-38967458?day=16122013&w=wall-38967458_971%2Fall; http://archive.is/RhVxf  
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independently of the local elites took place on 9 February 2014. It was organised by “Russkoe Veche” and 
numbered around 50 people. It is unclear whether Yuriy Apukhtin’s “Grazhdanski Forum” participated 
in the meeting because there were radical demands made at the meeting, such as the demand for Ukraine 
to join Russia.576 
There is also some indirect evidence that titushki, who perpetrated violence against the Euromaidan 
protestors in Kharkiv (see the chapter on the protest potential), were connected to the local elites. This 
was confirmed to me in an interview with the Activist in Kharkiv (16 07 2019). The appearance of more 
sophisticated equipment used to disperse the Euromaidan protestors indicates that titushki might have 
been receiving some external funding. The increasing viciousness of the attacks against the Euromaidan 
protesters after they refused to leave Taras Shevchenko Square also indicates that titushki might have 
been paid by the local elites, who were extremely jealous of their power.  One of the main organisers of 
Kharkiv’s Euromaidan, Dmytro Pylypets, openly and persistently claimed that titushki were hired by 
Kernes and Dobkin577 or, at least, acted at their sanction. When a group of “unknown people” burnt a car 
rented by the Euromaidan protestors in late December, Pylypets was adamant that Kernes was behind the 
arson. He claimed that Kernes offered money to the car owner in return for cooperation with the police 
against the activists.578  A detailed report produced by MediaPort using pictures and archival documents 
claimed that titushki were not connected with Kernes directly but indirectly via various other people, 
especially those whom Kernes assisted in their career rise. It found that the same group of people 
participated in the dispersal of the meeting organised by the Target Group in December 2006, the 
meeting to protect Gorky Park in 2011, and the Euromaidan rallies of 2013. The report claimed that 
titushki were hired by Maksim Museev, who first chaired the Lenin district council and then became a 
deputy of the city council under Kernes. Some of the organisers of the dispersals, such as Kirill 
Pronchenko, became members of the local Party of Regions after 2006. The local judges amnestied 6 out 
 
576 “Neskol’ko desiatkov chelovek v tsentre Khar’kova trebovali ob’edineniia Ukrainy i Rossii”, 057, 9 February 
2014.  
577 “Na votchine “Gepy” napali na shtab Evromaidana”, Censor.net, 20 December 2013.  
578 “Organizator khar’kovskogo “evromaidana” zaiavliaet, chto ego pytalis’ uvolit’ s raboty, a militsiia “sh’et” 
ugolovnoe delo”, 057, 18 December 2013.  
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of 14 perpetrators of violence and released others on parole, which indicated that the judges might have 
been influenced by the local elites.579  
The claim that titushki received funding from the local elites is not too far-fetched, given that Kernes and 
Dobkin strongly supported violent action against the Euromaidan protestors in Kyiv. This was confirmed 
to me in an interview with the Activist in Kharkiv (16 07 2019). On 21 January, Dobkin stated that the 
laws passed by the Rada on 16 January tightening punishment for “extremist activities,” such as blocking 
and seizure of buildings, were not tough enough to counter the threat emanating from the radicals in 
Kyiv.580 On 30 January, during a session of Kharkiv’s regional council, the deputies of the Party of 
Regions, including Dobkin, called the Euromaidan activists “vandals and barbarians,”581 and earmarked 
150 thousand hryvnia for the treatment of the Berkut police officers wounded during the violence in 
Kyiv.582 When by 25 January, local city councils were stormed and occupied by the Euromaidan 
protestors in 8 regions across Ukraine,583 including the Poltava region adjacent to Kharkiv,584 the elites 
became even more belligerent. During the creation of the Ukrainian Front on 1 February (below), 
Dobkin claimed that if the situation could not be resolved by peaceful means, the deputies would use 
other - unspecified - means.585  
Thus, faced with the threat of the Euromaidan, the local elites fell back on their earlier tactics of 
countering political protests. By doing so, they inadvertently opened political opportunities for the Anti-
Maidan and pro-federalisation activists. Not only that, Kharkiv’s top elites, and Dobkin especially, actively 
promoted federalisation and decentralisation during the Euromaidan phase of political protest. The 
request to conduct a national “referendum” on a limited set of political issues was raised repeatedly by the 
elites. Notably, this request did not contradict the provisions on national referendums in the Ukrainian 
 
579 “Udarnyi batal’on”, Mediaport, 20 January 2014.  
580 “Kharkiv regional governor says laws passed by Rada on January 16 not tough enough”, Interfax: Ukrainian 
General Newswire, 21 January 2014.  
581 “Novyi performans ot khar’kovskikh vlastei: deputaty massovo “vstupili” v raidy “Berkuta” i otdali 
spetsnazovtsam 150 tysiach griven”, 057, 30 January 2014.  
582 Ibid.   
583 “Territoriia protesta rasshirilas’ do vos’mi regionov”, Vechernii Khar’kov, 25 January 2014; For Ivano-Frankivsk see 
“V Ivano-Frankovske tolpa zakhvatila zdanie administratsii”, Vechernii Khar’kov, 24 January 2014; For Lutsk see “V 
Lutske proishodit shturm zdaniia oblgosadministratsii”, Vechernii Khar’kov, 24 January 2014.  
584 “Skol’ko zakhvachennykh oblgosadministratsii v Ukraine (karta)”, 057, 26 January 2014.   
585 “U Kharkovi stvoryly vseukraiins’ke ob’ednannia – alternatyvu Maidanu (foto)”, Slobids’kii Kraii, 1 February 2014.  
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Constitution. However, it highlights how frightened the local political elites were of the Euromaidan. 
Additionally, Dobkin and Kernes openly endorsed local Anti-Maidan groups and began forming their 
own self-defence units. This sent signals to the activists, which I discuss below.  
As early as 12 December 2013, Dobkin claimed that federalisation would be the only way to save Ukraine 
from an impending civil war.586 On 12 January, during a press conference, Dobkin advocated a “radical 
federalisation” and stated that Ukraine failed as a unitary state.587 According to him, federalisation would 
allow regions to make their own decisions on the controversial questions of the language policy and 
historical monuments. On 15 January, Kernes officially demanded an all-Ukrainian referendum to remove 
deputy immunity, reduce the number of deputies in the Rada, and give the voters the chance to revoke 
deputies on any levels, including city mayors. This did not contradict the Constitution. On 1 February, 
when the Ukrainian Front was created, Dobkin reiterated this demand.588 Both Kernes and Dobkin 
referred to the Article 72 of the Ukrainian Constitution on the people’s right to hold a national 
referendum.589 On 20 February, at another conference, Dobkin proposed a local referendum, in case of a 
“coup”.590 The demand to hold a referendum on federalisation became part of the pro-federal activists’ 
mobilisation repertoire later on.  
In response to the threat of the Euromaidan, the local elites began endorsing some Anti-Maidan groups 
and forming their own “self-defence units”. On 28 January Kharkiv’s Party of Regions deputies called for 
a “general mobilisation”. By this they meant the mobilisation of their supporters and spontaneous self-
defence units, which would defend the city’s administrative buildings against the “extremists from the 
Maidan”. The self-defence units included the local Cossacks, the Union of Afghan fighters, Oplot, and 
those formed at the local factories and enterprises. These self-defence units were meant to patrol the city 
alongside the police.591  
 
586 “Mikhail Dobkin: “Samoe strashnoe chto mozhet byt’ – eto grazhdanskaia voina”, 057, 12 December 2013.  
587 Daryna Shevchenko, “Yanukovych’s Kharkiv due in legal trouble: Dobkin arrested, Kernes named as suspect”, 
Kyiv Post, 11 March 2014.  
588 “Stvorenyii “Ukraiins’kyi front”: Dobkin rozpoviv pro zavdannia ta tsili (foto)”, Slobids’kii Kraii, 1 February 2014.  
589 “Kernes vymagae referendum”, Slobids’kii Kraii, 15 January 2014.  
590 “Dobkin rasskazal o svoikh deistviiakh v khudshem dlia strany stsenarii”, Gorodskoi Dozor, 20 February 2014.  
591 “Stvorennyii “Ukraiins’kyi front”” 
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The creation of the “Ukrainian Front” by the Party of Regions on 1 February 592 seems to have 
demonstrated to the organisers of pro-federal protests in Kharkiv that the elites were on their side. A 
LiveJournal user wrote on his blog:  
A Party of Regions’ congress is taking place at this very moment… in Kharkiv. Out of approximately six thousand 
people present, there are around one and half thousand leaders of organisations who can’t stand Yanukovych and 
the Party of Regions. But in the face of the Nazi invasion, they decide to set their disagreements aside and act 
together. This is because if Yanukovych is toppled by the banderites today, it will mean the end of Ukraine… the 
South-East does not want a civil war.593  
The user quoted Dobkin and Kernes extensively on the blog. The Ukrainian Front was meant to include 
all Anti-Maidan organisations, such as Cossacks, the Union of Afghan fighters, openly pro-Russian Sut’ 
Vermeni, and others.594 According to Dobkin, the “activities of [the Ukrainian Front] will be directed 
towards freeing Ukraine from the occupational forces represented by the Euromaidan”.595 Within a week, 
Dobkin claimed that more than 2,000 people joined the Ukrainian Front.596 Yet, the only major meeting 
held by the Front was the Congress of the Deputies of the South-East on 22 February. It was organised 
before Yanukovych fled Kyiv, on 21 February.597 It was reported that the Front contravened the principle 
of the united and integral Ukraine. According to the same report, the SBU opened criminal proceedings 
against Dobkin and Kernes on the grounds of financing titushki, organising provocations, and stealing 
money via auctions.598 
There is some evidence that the local fight club Oplot, an openly Anti-Maidan organisation with 
proclivities to radicalism, was also endorsed by the local elites. The official statements on Oplot’s 
 
592 “Gepa” zaiavil, chto “oni – ne “titushki”, a vot protestuiushchie – eto “otbrosy, kotorye zarazheny batsilloi 
Maidana”, Censor.net, 1 February 2014.  
593 https://mikle1.livejournal.com/2014/02/01/ ; http://archive.is/CZLGI.  
594 “Pro-government mayor lambasts Ukrainian opposition in Russian paper interview” BBC Monitoring Former Soviet 
Union, 15 February 2014.  
595 “S’ezd “regionalov” v Khar’kove reshil sozdat’ “Ukrainskii front” dlia “bor’by s okupantami”, 057¸1 February 
2014.  
596 “Kharkiv governor notes strong ties to Russia, hopes for support”, BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, 8 February 
2014.  
597 “Dobkin u Kharkovi zbyrae vsikh deputativ pivdennogo skhodu i Krymu”¸Ukrayinska Pravda, 21 February 2014.  
598 “”Ukrainskii front” samolikvidirovalsia: “Dobkina i Kernesa zhdet SBU, esli nado my smozhem mnogoe 
rasskazat’ novomu glave SBU”, 057, 22 February 2014.  
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webpages supported Yanukovych, echoed Dobkin in calling the Euromaidan activists vandals and 
barbarians,599 and expressed solidarity with other Anti-Maidan organisations, such as the Union of Soviet 
Officers,600 Communists, and the political club Yugo-Vostok (South-East).601 Oplot fighters participated 
in the Anti-Maidan rallies in Kyiv602 and Kharkiv. Quite possibly, they joined titushki in attacking the 
Euromaidan Forum on 11 and 12 January.603 
Oplot invoked the use of violence against the Euromaidan early on. The club’s founder, Evhen Zhilin, 
was adamantly against the Euromaidan. He opposed the destruction of Lenin monuments across Ukraine 
and expressed his anger at the marches held in honour of Stepan Bandera. In an interview with a 
prominent Ukrainian journalist, Mustafa Nayyom, Zhilin claimed that the Euromaidan protestors 
gathered unlawfully, and that the state must use its monopoly on violence to evict them from the 
Maidan.604 On 25 January, on their official website Oplot distributed information that the Euromaidan 
activists were going to arrive on “50 buses” to Kharkiv to take over the administration, “topple the local 
government”605 and attack the office of Oplot. They attempted to recruit people and arm them.606 On 31 
January, Zhilin stated in an interview that a direct action must be taken to defend the city.607 On 7 





D&w=wall-17147496_2709; http://archive.is/JSE7Y.   
600 http://www.oplot.info/tegi/antimaydan  
601 http://www.oplot.info/content/evromaydan-glazami-harkovskih-kommunistov-i-zhiteley-goroda  
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604 “Yevhen Zhilin – lider hromads’koii organizatsii “Oplot”. Interview Mustafi Nayyomu”, YouTube, 5 February 
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According to some opposition newspapers, Dobkin and Kernes protected Oplot and its leader Zhilin. On 
1 February, an opposition newspaper reported that Oplot became part of the Ukrainian Front,609 and that 
Zhilin was asked by the government to help defend Kharkiv.610 In his controversial interview on 4 
February 2014, Zhilin claimed that he could “break someone’s leg and gorge out someone’s eye” with 
impunity: “I explain the provisions of the law to all my fighters. I am a candidate of juridical science. I tell 
them that you won't have any problems if you knock out an attacker's eye, rip their arms or legs off. If 
they have a club, you can kill them”.611  
Thus, the culmination point in terms of political opportunity for pro-federal protest in Kharkiv was 
reached on 22 February, during the Congress of All Deputies of the South-East, Crimea, and Simferopol. 
At the Congress, the deputies condemned “fascism,” refused to cooperate with the centre, and passed all 
the reins of power to the local councils and administrations.612 Zhilin was present at the Congress and 
invited people across the south-east to mobilise into self-defence units.613 According to Protest Organiser 
1 and Protest Organiser 2, the pro-federalisation activists hoped that, following the Congress, 
Yanukovych would form “a government in exile” in Kharkiv. However, the Congress was disbanded at 
noon, and Yanukovych failed to appear, let alone form a government. By evening, all the elites had left 
the Congress.  Protest Organiser 2 was disappointed in the local elites, calling them “degraded” and 
“people without ideas and principles”: “all of these elites went to politics because politics was giving them 
special privileges” (Interview 28 09 2018). Rumours emerged that both Kharkiv governor Mykhailo 
Dobkin and Kharkiv mayor Hennadiy Kernes, the organisers of the Congress, fled to Russia.614 
According to Yuriy Apukhtin, Kernes left Kharkiv for Dniepropetrovsk to speak to Ihor Kolomoiskiy.615 
 
609 “Lider “Oplota” zaiavil, chto mozhet ubivat’, i emu za eto nichego ne budet”, 057, 4 February 2014.  
610 Ibid.   
611 “Ukrainian TV warns "semi-legal armies" being set up in east, west of country”, BBC Monitoring Ukraine & Baltics 
10 February 2014; “Zhilin: ia govoriu svoim boitsam: vy mozhete vybit’ glaz, otlomat’ ruku ili nogu. Esli na vas 
zamakhnutsia palkoi – mozhete ubit (video)”, 057, 7 February 2014.  
612 “Ukraine’s Southeast seeks to restore constitutional order, thousands gather in Kharkov”, Russia Today, 22 
February 2014.  
613“Zhilin prizval mestnye vlasti vooruzhit’ otriady samooborony”, 057, 22 February 2014; “Evgenii Zhilin OPLOT 
na s’ezde v Khar’kove”, YouTube, 22 February 2014 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-uEvKotjBd0.   
614 “Lidu oznakomilis’ s kabinetami sbezhavshego iz strany Dobkina”, Novosti Donbassa, 23 February 2014.  
615 Kernes, whose “Ukrainian Front” Kolomoiskiy considered to be a major faux pas, seems to have heeded to the 
latter’s invective “not to tempt the fate” and not to play with the unpredictable pro-Russian forces. See 
“Kolomoiskiy predupredil Kernesa ob otvetstvennosti za separatizm”, Nahnews, 22 February 2014.  In an interview, 
Boris Filatov, the deputy of the odious Dniepropetrovsk governor, claimed that Kernes would often call their office 
and ask for advice. See “Boris Filatov rasskazal, kak emu so tovarishchi udalos’ to, chto ne smogli Taruta i 
Akhmetov”, 057, 23 April 2014. As it is known, Kolomoiskiy was at the forefront of countering pro-Russian threats 
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The ex-interior minister Yuriy Lutsenko stated that the SBU launched criminal proceedings against both 
Dobkin and Kernes on the grounds of separatism.616  
Protest Organiser 2’s disappointment with the local elites was retrospective. In this period, the Anti-
Maidan and pro-federalisation activists still believed that the elites were on their side. A LiveJournal user 
quoted Kernes on his blog on 23 February to demonstrate that Kharkiv was resisting “the Nazi 
plague”.617 According to his blog, it was only from 26 February when the local elites began “betraying” 
Anti-Maidan and pro-federalisation activists, with Dobkin deciding to run for presidency and Kernes 
failing to clear the HOGA building of the Euromaidan activists.618  
Thus, the local elites created political opportunities for the Anti-Maidan and pro-federal activists in 
Kharkiv. By demonstrating their strong Anti-Maidan attitudes throughout the Euromaidan phase of 
political protest, the elites provided certification and legitimation to these activists. By engaging in 
federalisation and decentralisation rhetoric, they provided rhetorical devices that the activists used during 
the Russian Spring.  
3. Anti-Maidan in Donets’k  
As the chapter on the protest potential has illustrated, the Euromaidan in Donets’k region was less 
popular than the Euromaidan in Kharkiv. Activist from Donets’k stated in an interview that the 
Euromaidan protest in Donets’k was far less popular than its counterpart in Kharkiv: “it numbered no 
more than 100 people,” he said (27 07 2019). Donets’k region’s Euromaidan activists began making 
radical demands, such as to dismiss the regional governor Andriy Shyshatskiy, only later, in February 
2014.619 The city’s mayor Oleksandr Luk’yanchenko attributed this low turnout for the Euromaidan to 
popular attitudes in the region. He cited an opinion poll, according to which some 57.5% of Donets’k 
 
in his region where they eventually failed to take hold. See “Desiat’ tysiach za moskalia”: SMI Ukrainy o rastsenkakh 
za strel’bu po liudiam”, Vesti.ru, 17 April 2014.  
616 “SBU nachala ugolovnye proizvodstva iz-za separatistskikh zaiavlenii Dobkina i Kernesa – Lutsenko”, Novosti 
Donbassa, 22 February 2014.  
617 https://mikle1.livejournal.com/2014/02/23/; http://archive.is/e7gLi.  
618 https://mikle1.livejournal.com/2014/02/26/ ; http://archive.is/daqxx.  
619 “Nikto ne zabyt, nichto ne zabyto: gorodskoi golova Slavianska Nelia Shtepa popala v liustratsionnyi spisok 
Donetskogo evromaidana”, Slavgorod, 26 February 2014.  
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residents chose the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia over the integration with the 
European Union (27.2%).620  
The ways in which the local elites reacted to the Euromaidan can be explained by their expectations about 
Yanukovych’s regime. Due to the extreme concentration of patronage both regionally and nationally over 
the previous decade, the local elites expected Yanukovych to stay in power (Interview with Activist from 
Donets’k, 27 07 2019). The local elites’ behaviour can also be explained by the low popularity of the 
Euromaidan protest. Accordingly, the elites made far fewer anti-Euromaidan statements and these 
statements were much less vitriolic than those made by Kernes and Dobkin in Kharkiv. Overall, like their 
Kharkiv counterparts these statements were strongly pro-Yanukovych and pro-status quo.621 Below I 
present the content analysis of some of the local political elites’ statements.  
Table 37: Content analysis of the local political elite’s statements during the Euromaidan/Anti-Maidan 
phase in Donets’k region 
 
Source: Novosti Donbassa 
 
620“58% zhitelei Donetska hotiat integrirovat’sia v TS – mer”, Novosti Donbassa, 26 November 2013. 
621 “Donets’k region's governor: Our families need wellbeing, calm, not slogans, disturbances”, Ukrainian National 
News Agency, 2 December 2013.  
 











Again, as in Kharkiv, the most important issues highlighted were stability, the fact that the signing of the 
Association Agreement would lead to job losses across the region, and the closure of factories.  
Significantly, there were far fewer statements made against the opposition forces (Udar, Bat’kivshchina). 
This can be attributed to the fact that the elites rarely interacted with those opposition forces in the 
region.   
The qualitative evidence bears out the same conclusion. On 27 November, during the extraordinary 
session of the regional council, the deputies of the Party of Regions unequivocally supported the 
President.622 Similarly, during a press-conference on 2 December the regional governor Shyshatskiy stated 
that the region would rally in support of Yanukovych.623 Similar statements were made in city and town 
councils across the region. In a typical statement, Shyshatskiy emphasised the threats the Euromaidan 
spelt to the local industries: “We do not want to lose the industrial region of the Donbas. If the President 
signs the agreement with the EU, there will be economic risks, especially in the Donbas. For example, the 
machine-building enterprises will incur the most significant losses. Everywhere in the machine-building 
industry, the volume of exports to Russia and Kazakhstan is decreasing. This industry is not suited for 
exports to Europe. If we sign the agreement, 150 thousand work places would be lost, and 100 thousand 
of these in Donets’k region only. 80% of our industries is connected with Russia and this is how it has 
been for decades”.624  
The elites attempted to rein the Euromaidan in but their attempts at doing so were quite mild compared 
to those in Kharkiv. For example, on 8 December, Shyshatskiy set up the “crisis management 
headquarters” in Donets’k “to promote dialogue with political parties, work collectives, public 
organisations and trade unions”.625 The organisation died down later. Compared to the vitriolic Ukrainian 
Front, which aimed to encompass all pro-Russian organisations, had reportedly enormous resources 
(Kernes and Dobkin were blamed for theft from its fund), this was a very mild undertaking. Moreover, in 
an interview, Shyshatskiy referred to the Ukrainian Front as an organisation that failed to take hold in 
 
622 “Donetskie regionaly sobiraiutsia idti v narod zashchishchat’ Yanukovicha”, Novosti Donbassa, 27 November 2013.  
623 “Donbass to protect President – governor”, Unian , 2 December 2013.  
624 “Soglashenie s ES unichtozhit 100 tys. Rabochikh mest v Donetskoi oblasti – gubernator”, Novosti Donbassa, 27 
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Donets’k and dismissed it altogether as an “informal gathering”.626 Compared to the radical actions taken 
by Kernes in Kharkiv, when he prohibited meetings to be held for a week since the incipience of the 
Euromaidan in Kyiv, the elites in Donets’k region did not prohibit public meetings. In a mild attempt to 
control the protest, they prohibited mounting tents and booths on public squares.627 
To counter the Euromaidan, the elites in Donets’k region organised their own Anti-Maidan meetings. 
This was confirmed to me in a brief email exchange with Elite Member 1 who said that “the Party of 
Regions, myself including, organised meetings periodically to protect law and order” (22 07 2019). These 
meetings were not very well-attended. The chairman of the Independent Trade Union of miners of 
Donbas Mykola Volynko claimed that miners were forced to attend the meetings under the threat of 
dismissal. Opposition parties reported calls from relatives and friends working in education who claimed 
to have been forced to attend the meetings.628 It is hard to ascertain whether the people gathered on their 
own will or were gathered under the threat of dismissal.629 On the video of the Party of Regions’ Anti-
Maidan meeting on 4 December, one can see that those who were allegedly “dragged” to the meeting 
against their will are acting quite emotionally and explain their reasons for being there in quite emotional 
ways, which are hard to choreograph.630 By 7 December, the elites in Donets’k claimed to have managed 
to stage just one modest pro-regime demonstration. One planned demonstration even had to be cancelled 
due to an expected low turnout.631  
Some members of the local political elites attempted to get involved with the Anti-Maidan. These 
members of the local elites later became the key actors during the Russian Spring protests and vied to be 
the mediators between the pro-Russian protestors and the centre. Among them was Serhiy Bogachov 
who was present at some Anti-Maidan meetings, according to some reports.   Bogachov was reportedly 
 
626 “V Donetskoi oblasti “Ukrainskii Front” poka ne sozdaiut – gubernator”, Ostrov, 3 February 2014.  
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062, 25 November 2013.  
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no show “Protivno chuvstvovat’ sebia bydlom, kotoroe stroem goniat na miting”. V Gorlovke uchitelia riskuiut 
ostat’sia bez raboty, esli ne pridut podderzhat’ prezidenta”, Gorlovka.ua, 25 January 2014.  
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key in circulating various rumours which spurred local pro-Russian activists to mobilise.632 Activist from 
Donets’k told me in the interview that Bogachov was trying to “earn some political capital because 
everyone at the time was vying to be the new mayor, as the current mayor Luk’yanchenko was heading 
towards the end of his term” (27 07 2019). Bogachov, however, tried hard to disconfirm these allegations. 
One of the most important rumours was based on the alleged imminent arrival of the Right Sector 
radicals from the Maidan to Donets’k. On 27 January, Bogachov reportedly stated that “700 armed 
radicals from the Maidan, on several buses and cars, are arriving to Donets’k region in order to cause 
mass disturbances and storm and occupy administrative buildings”.633 Bogachov claimed to have gained 
this information from “insider sources”.634 This was later repudiated by the chief of Donets’k police 
Mykola Kryuchenko.635  
Rather than attempting to ride the Anti-Maidan wave, like their counterparts in Kharkiv, by late January, 
the local elites came to rely on the local activists for the defence of the city against “the radicals”. These 
were networks of existing local activists, such as the members of the Afghan fighters’ Union, Cossacks 
and others. This was confirmed to me by Elite Member 1. Journalist 1 in an interview with me also stated 
that the elites engaged with the activists on some level but not as intensely as in Kharkiv. On 27 January, 
the mayor posted the message saying that the region was expecting the arrival of activists of the Right 
Sector on 8 buses.636 Several bus-loads of miners came to defend the regional administration building. 
Grifon and Berkut were deployed too. The activists of the radical movement Donetsk Republic were said 
to have participated in the “defence of the OGA”.637 Cossacks and Afghan fighters came to the defence 
of the OGA as corroborated in the evidence provided by a pro-Russian activist LiveJournal user 
donbassrus.638 He claimed that he met his friends from the National Freedom-Fighting Movement 
 
632 “”Titushki” izbili aktivistov Donetskogo Evromaidana”, Novosti Donbassa, 23 January 2014.  
633 “V Donetskom gorsovete uznali, chto v oblast’ edut “boeviki Maidana” i vveli voiska v zdanie”, Novosti Donbassa, 
27 January 2014.  
634 “V Donetske ekstremistov net. Sekretariu gorsoveta pokazalos’?”, Novosti Donbassa, 25 February 2014.  
635 “Donetskie chinovniki ne mogut razobrat’sia skol’ko k nim edet “boevikov Maidana”, Novosti Donbassa, 27 
January 2014.  
636 “Vlasti priznali, chto “boeviki Maidana” ne sobiralis’ brat’ shturmom Donetskuiu OGA”, Novosti Donbassa, 31 
January 2014.  
637 https://vk.com/wall-3223620?day=29012014&w=wall-3223620_24279%2Fall; http://archive.is/J2tQJ.  
638 https://donbassrus.livejournal.com/2014/01/28/ ; http://archive.is/FsLDT;  https://vk.com/wall-
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(NOD) next to the OGA.639 The scare was real. One of the workers of the city administration in 
Donets’k claimed that the administration received hundreds of calls from pensioners, teachers and others 
demanding to explain what was going on. 640 On 28 January, the rumour was repudiated and the miners 
and activists returned home.641 By the beginning of February, local Cossacks patrolled the centre of 
Donets’k together with the police. They did so on their own accord, according to press reports and 
donbassrus user.642 On 5 February, the Cossacks announced their decision to guard the OGA.643 They 
said they guarded the Constitution.644 The Cossacks were endorsed by the Party of Regions only post 
factum, after they started patrolling the streets.645  
 Finally, the elites refused to participate in the federalisation talks. This was because Yanukovych 
and the Party of Regions stopped using federalisation as their campaign promise when Yanukovych 
became President. This was a regular political ploy used by the Party of Regions. They would often use 
federalisation as their campaign promise, only to renege on it once in power. Ukrayinska Pravda reported 
extensively how Yanukovych used federalisation as his campaign promise in 2005, only to denounce it 
once in power in August 2006.646 In fact, in 2010, the then-governor of Donets’k region Anatoly Blyzniuk 
advocated some form of decentralisation thereby the regional administration would stipulate the salaries 
of the state employees. He also wanted the region to participate in the law-making process, promoted 
budgetary independence of the region, and envisaged it as “part of a Ukrainian federation”. According to 
a source in the presidential administration, these ideas “enraged Yanukovych”.647 It was speculated that 
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642 https://donbassrus.livejournal.com/2014/01/28/; http://archive.is/FsLDT .  
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647 “Donetskii bumerang separatizma dlia Yanukovicha”, Novosti Donbassa, 9 April 2010.   
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Blyzniuk’s dismissal shortly after this was caused by his federalisation ideas. In line with their loyalty to 
Yanukovych’s government course, on 10 February, Shyshatskiy stated that talks of federalisation were 
irresponsible and could lead to the loss of sovereignty for Ukraine.648 In early February, the Communist 
Party filed a motion with one of the town councils to redraw the map of Ukraine along federal lines, 
which would have stopped the regional taxes from being transferred to other regions, where, according to 
the representatives of the Party, the power was usurped by “illegal” people’s councils.649 The Party sent 
the request to the Rada through the Novoazovsk district council.650 The request was rejected. Moreover, 
not only did the Donets’k prosecutor reject the request; he also threatened the Party with criminal 
proceedings on the grounds that they endangered the territorial integrity of Ukraine by their proposal.651 
Overall, it seems that only Mykola Levchenko, one of the members of the Party of Regions and, later, a 
self-styled mediator between the pro-Russian radicals and the centre in spring 2014, was consistently 
advocating federalisation.652  
If by 28 January, the Western and Central Ukraine were engulfed in a full-fledged rebellion, with violence 
against both people and property, the Anti-Maidan and pro-Russian resistance that was independent of 
the Party of Regions in Donets’k region was much milder. According to my brief exchange with Elite 
Member 1, “there was no Anti-Maidan in Donets’k” (22 07 2019). Journalist 1 also confirmed the small-
scale nature of the Anti-Maidan in Donets’k as did Activist from Donets’k (27 07 2019); the latter told me 
in the interview that “they brought some titushki to these meetings, but this was mostly for the media”. 
Immediately following the Euromaidan, on 26 November, the Russian Bloc organised a meeting against 
the Euromaidan with slogans such as “Donbass for the Customs Union”, “An association with the EU is 
a crisis and destitution”, “European values = libertinage and degradation” and others.653 On the following 
day, the Communist Party – always the first to counter the Euromaidan challenge across the entire 
 
648 “Donetskii gubernator: my ne mozhem seichas sebe pozvolit’ igrat’ v federalism. Eto vse mozhet plokho 
zakonchitsia”, 062, 10 February 2014.  
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Ukraine – held a meeting against the signing of the Association Agreement.654 Donetsk Republic 
organised its very first Anti-Maidan meeting jointly with the Russian Bloc on 7 December. Like its 
counterpart on 26 November, judging by the video, it was attended by 10 people at most and they were 
mostly onlookers. User donbassrus claimed that there were “hundred people”, even if the video clearly 
shows that there were very few. The claims made revolved around the threats posed by Ukrainian 
nationalism and the European Union, the necessity to preserve the Russian language and culture and the 
desire to unite with the historical Russia.655 One is struck by the great number of people who could be 
amassed to come to the Party of Regions’ meeting and these small meetings organised by pro-Russian 
forces in Donets’k.  
Yet by mid-January, pro-Russian resistance groups began proliferating, without the participation of the 
local elites. Journalist 1 told me in an interview that these groups were aided by the criminal networks of 
Armen Sarkissian from Horlivka (19 07 2019). This resistance was mostly clandestine. Both Journalist 1 
and Activist from Donets’k told me that it is highly unlikely that these groups had arms. Apart from the 
more or less established Anti-Maidan groups, such as the institutionalised party Russian Bloc and the 
marginal Donetsk Republic, there sprung up “Rada Narodu”, a complete unknown “Donetsk 
Resistance”, and by 12 February, “Oborona Donetska”.656  The Rada Narodu participated in the meeting 
on 9 January.657 The city council informed the journalists that the organisation did not exist before and 
this was the first time they filed a request to hold a meeting.658 Rada Narodu then frequently participated 
in the subsequent Anti-Maidan meetings. Activist from Donets’k told me in an interview that he was not 
aware of these groups because “they were too small; I was busy with my business at the time” (27 07 
2019).  
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The aim of the “Oborona Donetska” group was to guard the city against the “imminent arrival of the 
radicals”.659 In one of their rare interviews, Denis Yurtsov stated that he joined the group “when I found 
out that radicals from the West (Western Ukraine) and Maidan are coming here to occupy the regional 
administration. I did not want pro-fascist organisations to come to my city and dictate their own rules.”660  
By 11 February, “Oborona Donetska” gave their official press conference, where they announced the 
aims of the movement more officially: “the defence of the rule of law and order in the region, the support 
of Berkut and constitutional order, the containment of nationalist and extremist organisations and 
movements”. 661 They participated in the meeting on 12 February where they demanded economic 
federalisation of Ukraine and supposedly attacked Euromaidan protesters. 662 
By late January, the “radicals are coming” scare reached its most intense proportions in Donets’k. On 23 
January 2014, the Russian Bloc began online recruitment on its social media platform for “volunteers” to 
form “self defence units”.663 On 28 January, when the scare entered its most intense phase, Anti-Maidan 
Mariupol,664 Donetsk Republic, Russian Bloc and other groups began recruiting people en masse on their 
social media platforms. On 27 January, a typical post included the following: “Dear citizens! It has been 
reported that the police are waiting for the “dear guests”. We have plenty of those who want to meet 
them (with sarcasm). Just in case, those who are in the centre, be ready to defend your rights to peaceful 
assembly. If we need help, we will post the request here”; “According to some unconfirmed reports, there 
are 2 buses [with the radicals] that have been held at the border [of the region] and 2 buses that have 
arrived. There are enough police to defend administrative buildings, and there are guys who can help. At 
the moment all is quiet”.665 On 27 January, it was posted on Donetsk Republic’s wall: “Now we have the 
information that the Banderovtsy want to send their provocateurs to occupy administrative buildings in 
southern and eastern cities of the country. We have some information about them travelling on 8 buses. 
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Our guys need help because there are too little police and too few of our guys. Please repost”.666  On 31 
January, Donetsk Republic began recruiting people into “people’s self-defence units to for the purpose of 
defending administrative buildings in Donets’k”.667 
By 27 January, it was clear that the initiative was finally wrested from the local political elites to local 
activists. Serhiy Bogachov claimed that everyday he was receiving calls from activists willing to join 
people’s self-defence units that formed spontaneously.668 It is important to note that in Kharkiv the elites 
announced the formation of the self-defence units first669 whereas in Donets’k the pattern was reversed. 
The process of such spontaneous formation via personal networks is described on one of the blogs. At 
the end of January, there was a conference to celebrate the anniversary of the Pereyaslavl Rada. 
Representatives of Russia and “Russian movement of Ukraine”, including Khriakov and Donetsk 
Republic activist Aleksandr Matyushin participated. When they found out that there were allegedly 
“busloads” of banderovtsy moving towards the city, they spontaneously organised a Coordinating 
council. Donetsk Republic activist Matyushin was the chairman. They then began calling to everyone they 
knew: Cossacks, Afghan veterans, and retired army officers – to mobilise them into a self-defence unit. 670 
Around 15 February, a “national freedom-fighting unit” was formed in Mariupol. The members of this 
unit came to the square next to the town theatre to hold an anti-fascist meeting.671 
It was unclear whether there were indeed busloads of banderovtsy. The fact that the OGA was not 
stormed and occupied or there was no significant violence in Donets’k until mid-March testifies that they 
were mythical. Yet one source stated that they were stopped at the border. It said that some of them came 
on foot or by car to the city and tried to storm the city library,672 but this was never confirmed in any 
newspaper reports or on any social media accounts I have read. 
 
666 https://vk.com/wall-3223620?day=29012014 ; https://archive.is/NfENs;  https://vk.com/wall-
3223620?day=27012014&w=wall-3223620_24234%2Fall; http://archive.is/BWnTl.  
667 https://vk.com/wall-3223620?day=22022014 ; https://archive.is/2y5qp; https://vk.com/wall-
3223620?day=31012014&w=wall-3223620_24525%2Fall; http://archive.is/c2Zqk .  
668 https://yadocent.livejournal.com/521863.html http://archive.is/J4CyE.  
669 Ibid.  
670 https://yadocent.livejournal.com/525094.html http://archive.is/6ncmw 
671 “Stop – fashizm! V Mariupole pod stenami khrama Mel’pomeny obrazovalsia antimaidan”, 0629, 15 February 
2014.  
672 http://haile-rastafari.livejournal.com/87171.html; http://archive.is/DUBZr;  
https://yadocent.livejournal.com/525094.html http://archive.is/6ncmw.  
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In summary, political opportunities were opened in Donets’k region for Anti-Maidan activists, partially by 
the local elites because they wanted to remain loyal to Yanukovych and expected him to stay, partially 
independently of the local elites. This was particularly true of various less known groups, such as 
Oborona Donetska and Rada Narodu. Others, such as Donetsk Republic, Russian Bloc and “Donbas 
Rus” actively participated in the Russian Spring that commenced after the critical juncture which I discuss 
below.  
4. Critical juncture  
I treat the events of late February 2014, when the governing network changed in Kyiv, as the critical 
juncture. This is because both regions followed the same path in November 2013 to February 2014: 
political opportunities were open for the Anti-Maidan protest, which later morphed into the Russian 
Spring protests (Interview with the Activist in Kharkiv 16 07 2019), and the activists began making claims 
on the local elites. In February 2014, however, the sudden change of the governing network brought the 
change in the local elites’ behaviours and in my intervening variable (radical or moderate protest).  
According to Journalist 1, an expert on Donets’k region, “nobody was expecting Yanukovych to leave; 
this was an extraordinary situation for the local elites” (19 07 2019). Similarly, Activist from Donets’k told 
me in in the interview: “When Yanukovych left, the entire institution of the “watchers” (smotriyashchie) that 
included the people in the city and regional council, - the vertical of power that has been forming over the 
years, - collapsed”.  Activist from Donets’k described a situation of great confusion in the city: “I 
contacted the press office of the mayor who did not know what to do”. I describe this extraordinary 
situation below in more detail.  
After a several months-long standoff between the Euromaidan protestors and government forces in Kyiv, 
the escalation of violence against the protestors in February, and a series of talks involving the opposition 
parties and diplomatic representatives of the EU, on the night of 21 February, Yanukovych left Kyiv in an 
unknown direction. The intricate patronage system revolving around his figure and the political-economic 
conglomerate of the Party of Regions finally collapsed with his sudden disappearance. This was preceded 
by a steady stream of defections from the Party at both the regional and national level, turning into a 
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cascade after 18 February violence against the protestors in Kyiv.673  The result was that by March 2014, 
Yanukovych’s “majority in parliament evaporated” (Hale, 2015, 236).   
At first, the defections did not affect the domination of the Party of Regions and, specifically, the 
Donets’k clan in the government. Neither did they affect the expectations about whether the regime was 
going to stay (Hale, 2015, 237 – 238). Deputies began leaving the Party of Regions on 30 November, 
following the police brutality against the Euromaidan protestors. Most of these were regional deputies, 
such as Inna Bohoslovska from Kharkiv. The exception was Serhiy Liovochkin, an important member of 
the “gas lobby” (Kudelia and Kuzio, 2015), who resigned from his position as the Head of the 
Presidential Administration on 30 November.674 We can therefore argue that in the Rada and Presidential 
Administration, there was a sudden concentration of power around the Donets’k clan, whose members, 
such as Mykola Azarov, began resigning or “leaving in an unknown direction” only after 18 February 
escalation in Kyiv.  
After the escalation of protest violence in Kyiv in late February 2014, however, the Donets’k clan’s 
domination of government was severely undermined. Not only did Yanukovych’s disappearance 
contribute to this but also the sheer numbers of deputies who were leaving the Party of Regions. How 
they left also affected the morale of the remaining party members. Thus, by 23 February, 72 deputies left 
the Party.675 These included its key members from the Donets’k clan, such as the party’s founder and 
Rada speaker, Volodymyr Rybak; Vitaly Khomutynnik, the head of the Tax and Customs Committee in 
the Rada;676 and Iryna Akimova, the first deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, who had ties to 
Rinat Akhmetov.677 Some deputies were leaving demonstrably during the Rada sessions.678 Some were 
simply not attending the sessions. It was reported that during the Rada session on 20 February, there were 
only 10 Party of Regions deputies present.679 The effect was such that on 22 February, the Party of 
 
673 “Regionaly vykhodiat’ iz partii”, Ukrayinska Pravda, 19 February 2014.  
674 “Bunt u “Rehionakh”: Zhvaniia vyiishov iz fraktsii”, Ukrayinska Pravda, 30 November 2013.  
675 “Fraktsiiu PR zalyshyly vzhe 72 deputaty”, Ukrayinska Pravda, 23 February 2014.  
676 “Regionaly” pokydaiut’ fraktsiiu: Khomutynnik, Dzhyga, Buriak, Poliachenko”, Ukrayinska Pravda, 21 February 
2014.  
677 “Vid Yanukovicha tikaiut’ iogo radnyky?”, Ukrayinska Pravda, 21 February 2014.  
678 “Nardepy ii dali tikaiut’ z riadiv Partii rehioniv”, Ukrayinska Pravda, 22 February 2014.  
679 “Poshuk vyhodu z kryzy pereneseno do Verkhovnoii Rady”, Holos Ukrayiny, 21 February 2014.  
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Regions was in a minority in the Rada.680 By the time the new Cabinet was formed on 27 February 2014, 
the opposition parties Bat’kivshchina, Udar and Svoboda dominated the parliament.681  
It can be argued that there was a certain element of fear accounting for these defections. As has been 
argued by Kudelia and Umland, in 2014 Ukraine witnessed an unprecedented level of street violence. This 
also included anti-elite violence. This street and anti-elite violence created conditions that were radically 
different from those in 2004, during the Orange Revolution, when the deputies from the east also 
engaged in bargaining with the centre. Since December 2013, there were attacks on the Party of Regions’ 
offices that resulted in deaths of some deputies.682 There were rumours that the radical group “Right 
Sector” was putting pressure on the Party of Regions’ members in various regions.683 According to the 
head of the Rivne city organisation of the party, Alla Yvoylova, the “Right Sector” put severe pressure on 
the members of the party and their families.684 After Yanukovych left, the “Right Sector” appealed to the 
new government to disband the Party of Regions.685 Numerous deputies, especially those from Donets’k 
and those who rose to prominence under Yanukovych, such as Oleh Tsarev, claimed that they were 
threatened with violence by the radicals. At a Party of Regions’ conference, a deputy from Donets’k, 
Tetiana Bakhteeva, described in detail how she was prevented from travelling to Donets’k on family 
business by an armed group of people in Kyiv.686 In a retrospective interview granted to a Ukrainian talk 
show, Mykola Levchenko from Donets’k (he left Ukraine for Russia in September 2014) described the 
dispossessions of the Party of Regions’ deputies by the Right Sector.687 Oleh Tsarev described his 
experiences in the Rada in graphic detail: “I called my friend Vitaly Hrushevskiy. He did not respond. 
Then I called his aide who told me that Hrushevskiy has been beaten up next to the Parliament. They 
have taken voting cards from some deputies and started voting on their behalf. It is possible that some 
 
680 “Tihipko: PR vidmovylas’ vid kandydatury spikera”, Ukrayinska Pravda, 22 February 2014; “Poshuk vykhodu z 
kryzy pereneseno do Verkhovnoii Rady”.  
681 “Rada zibralasia na subotne zasidannia. Rehionaly ii dali vykhodiat’ z fraktsii”, Ukrayinska Pravda, 22 February 
2014.  
682 “Opozytsiia “pyliae” portfeli. “Rehiony” gotuiut’sia otrymaty svoe”, Ekonomichna Pravda, 23 February 2014.  
683 “Ukrainian Radicals Deny Putting Pressure on Law Enforcers’ Families”, BBC Monitoring Newsfile, 25 February 
2014.  
684 “Local Head of Ukraine’s Former Ruling Party Seeks Protection From “Radicals”, BBC Monitoring Newsfile, 25 
February 2014.  
685 “Pravyi sector prizval prekratit’ deiatel’nost’ partii regionov i KPU”, Novosti Donbassa, 22 February 2014.  
686 “Konferentsiia partii regionov vse video”, Novosti Donbassa, 22 March 2014.  




deputies from whom the cards have been taken are locked up somewhere in the Rada. There is no 
Symonenko (the leader of the Communist Party of Ukraine), nor many other deputies, who were beaten 
up earlier, in the Rada. But now somebody is calling me and pretending to be Mikhail Chechetov, with a 
voice which does not sound like his at all, telling me that I should leave Ukraine urgently. Otherwise, I 
will be arrested. I told him… that I am not going to leave Ukraine.”688  
All this presented unique problems for the Party of Regions and specifically, the Donets’k clan. The 
remaining Party of Regions’ deputies were forced to ally themselves with other deputies and opposition 
parties to help form the new government. Various new factions emerged on this basis, including such 
vague entities as “Economic Development” (Ekonomichnyi Rozvytok) and an anti-crisis coalition headed 
by Serhiy Tyhipko, who joined the Party of Regions relatively recently and was not from the Donets’k 
clan; despite being allied with the Party, his “Strong Ukraine” was responsible for political protests in 
Donets’k in 2010. He later became one of the most vocal critics of the Party of Regions.689 Most 
importantly, the Donets’k clan no longer dominated the government, and there was no prospect of it 
coming back. The fugitive Yanukovych perhaps was responsible for creating certain expectations that he 
might still influence politics in Ukraine (Activist from Donets’k interview 27 07 2019). He conducted 
numerous press conferences in the Russian city of Rostov during this period,690 stating that he did not 
recognise the new government and that he was still the legitimate president.691 In mid-March, a wave of 
protests in eastern Ukraine was conducted under the slogan “Yanukovych, come back to work!”.692 Serhiy 
Taruta, the new governor of the Donets’k region, believed that Yanukovych’s Family was funding the 
pro-Russian protest wave in the region.693 Activist from Donets’k stated in the interview that Yanukovych 
“had many connections in the region and he was trying to control the processes” (27 07 2019).  
 
688 http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/2014/02/22/; http://archive.is/WRwie; corroborated 
https://vk.com/oleg.tsarov?w=wall170184267_77467; http://archive.is/Vdo8P.   
689 “Partiiu regionov pokinuli eshche dva deputata”, Novosti Donbassa, 11 April 2014; “Tihipko zaiavill, chto ego 
vygnali iz “prognivshei” partii regionov”, Novosti Donbassa, 7 April 2014. 
690 “V Rostove-na-Donu proshla press-konferentsiia Viktora Yanukovicha”, Novosti Donbassa, 28 February 2014.  
691 “Opozytsiia “pyliae” portfeli”.  
692 “V Donetske proshel 2-kh tysiachnyi miting za Yanukovicha, potom ushli k Tarute – foto/video”, Novosti 
Donbassa, 23 March 2014.  
693 “Taruta: Aktsii separatistov – stsenarii “Sem’i”, Novosti Donbassa, 9 April 2014.  
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Despite the fact that, as it was reported in the press, Rinat Akhmetov was the first to desert Yanukovych 
behind closed doors in the Rada,694 it is still unclear whether he accepted openly the domination of 
Bat’kivshchina and other parties formerly in opposition to the Party of Regions, given how turbulent his 
previous relationship with the Bat’kivshchina network was. Activist from Donets’k told me that 
“Akhmetov was trying to dissuade Yanukovych from taking the course of action he took” (27 07 2019). 
The new Cabinet was formed on the basis of a coalition between the remaining Party of Regions’ 
deputies, various offshoots of the party, and the now-dominant opposition parties. It is not clear what 
proportion of those remaining Party of Regions’ deputies belonged to the so-called Akhmetov group. In 
any case, Akhmetov was not a single actor presenting the Donets’k clan. There were plenty of members 
of the political elite in Donets’k who had grounds to fear the domination of the rival networks. Activist 
from Donets’k told me in an interview that “they were very fearful that the new authorities would take 
revenge on them” (Activist from Donets’k 27 07 2019).  
After Yanukovych fled, a member of Bat’kivshchina and a man described as being very loyal to 
Yanukovych’s main rival Yuliya Tymoshenko, Oleksandr Turchynov,695 was appointed speaker of the 
Rada by the majority of votes. It was reported in the official parliamentary newspaper Holos Ukrayiny 
that Turchynov was appointed without consultations with the Party of Regions.696 In the end, only 28 
deputies from the party supported his candidature.697 At the same time, the remaining Party of Regions 
deputies voted almost unanimously for the reinstitution of the 2004 Constitution that granted the Rada 
supreme power in the country.698 The previous constitution gave much more power to the President, 
such as the power to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.  
The opposition-dominated Rada followed promptly with overturning the constitutional changes made 
under Yanukovych. Journalists argued that the opposition parties were “back with a vengeance” against 
the “dictatorship” of Yanukovych.699 This is consistent with Hale’s observation that in Ukraine one 
 
694 “Opozytsiia “pyliae” portfeli”.  
695 Significantly, Turchynov was described as very loyal to Tymoshenko (see, for example, report “Ukraine’s Interim 
Leader: Number “two” man loyal to Tymoshenko” in Agence France Presse 23 February 2014). 
696 “Verkhovna Rada stala tsentrom kerivnytstva kraiiny, edinoiu legitymnoiu vladoiu, zakhyshchae i ob’ednue Skhid 
i Zakhid, Pivnich i Pivden’”, Holos Ukrayiny, 23 February 2014.  
697 Ibid.  
698 Ibid.   
699 “Opozytsiia “pyliae” portfeli”.   
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network would always seek revenge on the members of rival networks once it secures power (Hale, 2015, 
346). Thus, according to the first decisions by the new Rada, the 80 Presidential acts that granted 
Yanukovych excessive power were to be annulled.700 Using its constitutionally-enshrined powers, the 
Rada appointed the new Prosecutor General and the Head of the Security Service of Ukraine, both 
opponents of the Party of Regions.701  
Most importantly, the Rada issued laws that aimed to offend the eastern elites and, in the long-term, 
created perfect grounds for bargaining with the centre for those who operated under the concentrated 
patronage system in the previous years. It was therefore argued in the press that the people who were 
empowered by Yanukovych in the regions had no choice but to sabotage these laws.702 More specifically, 
these laws concerned the budget and the use of Russian and regional languages. Firstly, the Rada moved 
to revise most government programmes concerning the distribution of government funds.703 On 23 
February, the Parliament abolished the law “On the Principles of the State Language Policy” adopted on 
3 July 2012 (the so-called Kivalov-Kolesnichenko law).704 The law granted Russian and other languages 
spoken by at least 10% of the population in the regions an official status as “regional languages”.705 The 
language law repeal was vetoed by Turchynov on 28 February, with the government promising to adopt a 
new law on languages, which did not, however, abate the damage it had done.706 On the same day, the 
government issued a statement on seeking $35 billion from western governments to pay government 
debts.707 From 24 February, the Rada repeatedly stressed that the cooperation with the IMF was its first 
priority.708 Once appointed Prime Minister, Arseniy Yatseniuk stated that Ukraine must comply with the 
IMF conditions without delay.709 The full programme of Yatseniuk’s government included “strict 
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economy of the budget funds” (read “reduction of social benefits”) and a “cardinal decrease of all 
subsidies”.710 
How the main executive body of the country, the Cabinet, was formed also spelled threat to the Party of 
Regions and specifically, the Donets’k clan. Many of the new ministers were “unknown quantities” for 
the clan, with whom potentially difficult negotiations had to be conducted. This created higher 
transaction costs and endangered Donets’k regional elites’ access to resources and capacity to retain 
power. Therefore, due to their limited learning experience under the domination of one network and as 
prisoners of a concentrated patronage system, they were in danger. As Journalist 1 told me in an 
interview, the elites “feared for their money, seats and they wanted to avoid responsibility [for what 
happened under Yanukovych]” (19 07 2019). As a result, the time-lag between the ouster of the dominant 
network and the “new deal” between the centre and the elites (that never came to pass however) was 
crucial. Radical contention in Donets’k region developed precisely during this time lag.  
The candidates promoted to the position of Prime Minister came either from the rival network of 
Bat’kivshchina or were “opportunistic businessmen”, such as Petro Poroshenko, who had a history of 
switching to Yushchenko camp fairly quickly, after having been co-opted by the Party of Regions briefly 
in the early 2000s (Kudelia and Kuzio, 2015, 257). Bat’kivshchina deputies introduced a novelty – seeking 
approval of the Cabinet ministers from the Euromaidan People’s Council (Narodnoe Veche) – which was 
unprecedented.711 Eventually, some Euromaidan activists came to occupy several humanitarian posts and 
the anti-corruption ministry in the Cabinet.  
Thus the Cabinet that came into being on 27 February was heavily dominated by Bat’kivshchina, included 
some members of the nationalist Svoboda party, and had no representatives of the Party of Regions.712 
Bat’kivshchina vied to take the most important positions, such as Prime Minister and First Deputy Prime 
Minister.713 Deputy Minister of regional politics Volodymyr Hroisman, from Vinnitsa, did not belong to 
 
710 “Programma deiatel’nosti Kabmina Yatseniuka: polnyi tekst”, Novosti Donbassa¸27 February 2014; “Yatseniuk 
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any party but supported Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine since 2005. In 2014, he promoted decentralisation, 
which however failed to register with the Donets’k elites who were advancing either federalisation or 
decentralisation on their own terms. The new Minister of Finance, Oleksandr Shlapak, originated from 
L’viv, and, despite having criticised Yuliya Tymoshenko’s policies while she was Prime Minister, he had 
more experience working with Yushchenko, Yatseniuk and Kolomoiskiy than with Yanukovych.714 He 
was said to have been connected to Tihypko more than anyone else from the Party of Regions. The 
Cabinet was thus dominated by the people from western and central regions of Ukraine.  
Significant ministerial posts came to be occupied by people from Kharkiv, such as Ihor Shvaika 
(agriculture minister) and Arsen Avakov, the new Minister of the Interior. Kharkiv therefore maintained 
its position as a “diffused patronage” region. More importantly, in broad terms, owning to their long-
standing conflict with Avakov, Kharkiv’s top elites Hennadiy Kernes and Mykhailo Dobkin, could expect 
appropriate punishments, had they endorsed radical pro-Russian contention in Kharkiv. Donets’k 
regional elites, by contrast, became even more isolated and insulated from other networks. 
Thus, in 2014, Donets’k regional elites confronted something that they never confronted before, even 
though they were expecting the events to take a course similar to that in 2004- 2005 (Journalist 1 
interview 19 07 2019). As both Activist from Donets’k and Journalist 1 revealed to me in the interviews, 
in 2014, “the situation was extraordinary” for the local elites. It is, therefore, useful to contrast it briefly 
with the events of the Orange Revolution. In 2004, two factors were present that shaped the perceptions 
of the local elites: a head-to-head electoral contest and the continuous negotiations between the opposing 
camps of Yushchenko and Yanukovych. Both allowed the regional elites to coordinate themselves. 
Significant levels of street and anti-elite violence were absent. More specifically, all the key actors in the 
2004 Orange Revolution agreed on a peaceful outcome to the deadlock. As Serhiy Kudelia has 
demonstrated in several accounts, the main rival of Viktor Yanukovych, Viktor Yushchenko was 
adamantly against violence: “We decided that this [compromise] was the payment which had to be made 
so that the confrontation on the streets would not turn into a civil war…” (Kudelia, 2010, 183).  
Tymoshenko and Turchynov, on the other hand, supported radical action such as the storming of 
 
714 “Katya Gorchinskaya: the not-so-revolutionary new Ukraine government”, Kyiv Post, 27 February 2014.  
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administration buildings (Kudelia, 2010, 181). Thus, when they came to dominate the government in 
2014, the local elites in Donets’k had ample grounds to fear retaliation. The “time lag” they needed 
became even more crucial.  
Secondly, in the 2004 confrontation, all parties agreed that a compromise was needed. Yushchenko 
“agreed to leave the door open for the old guard to reclaim much of its power” (Kudelia, 2010, 161). The 
deadlock therefore resulted in a “political pact”715 between the Orange forces and Yanukovych. Kuchma’s 
constitutional compromise that granted the Prime Minister more power appeared to save the day.716 This 
constitutional change meant that the forces represented by Yanukovych could come back. D’Anieri 
commented on the elite pact in 2004: “[it ensured] the ability of those who are defeated at one point in 
time to continue to compete, and to have hope of winning in the future” (D’Anieri, 2006, 99). This is 
exactly what happened in the 2006 and 2007 parliamentary elections when the Party of Regions won the 
plurality of votes in the east and was coming back as a major single party in parliament. Therefore, 
Donets’k elites could rest assured that their interests were still represented in the centre after the Orange 
Revolution. Below I chart how the elites and pro-federal and pro-Russian activists reacted to the change 
of the governing network in the centre.  
5. Elites in the diffused patronage region adapt to the change of the governing network  
After the sudden change of the informal governing network in Kyiv, Kharkiv’s top elites’ behaviour was 
consistent with the expectations about the behaviour of the local elites in a diffused patronage region. 
These elites demonstrated great adaptability and flexibility when responding to the change, as they did in 
the past. They used the time lag between the change of the network and a viable settlement between the 
region and the centre to defuse the radical pro-federal and pro-Russian protest in the region and to 
recoordinate themselves around the new patrons. Thus, in line with the empirical expectation that local 
elites in diffused patronage regions would not invest in one particular patron even if this patron provided 
them with significant resources in the past, the city mayor and the Party of Regions’ member Hennadiy 
Kernes proceeded to denounce Yanukovych in a major interview he gave straight after the ill-fated 
 
715 Kudelia defines political pact as “a political pact is a set of institutional arrangements guaranteeing that the vital 
interests of all the parties involved will be honoured” (Kudelia, 2010, 162).   
716 See (Kudelia, 2008).  
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Congress of the South-Eastern deputies on 22 February. Kernes stated that he recognised the new Rada’s 
authority717 and the interim presidency of Turchynov.718 It was in this early interview where he stated that 
he “did not think of separatism or federalism at all”.719  He would later latch on to this idea staunchly in 
his negotiations with pro-federalisation activists. In an interview with me, Activist in Kharkiv described 
Kernes as “very flexible” (16 07 2019).  
Despite their aggressive and forbidding stance towards the Euromaidan protest, the Party of Regions’ 
elites signalled their recognition and support of the new government when they allowed the Euromaidan 
activists to storm and occupy the regional administration building on 23 February. Kharkiv was among 
very few eastern and southern regions where this took place. According to Dobkin and a Euromaidan 
activist, the activists were allowed in by Vasil’ Homa,720 the deputy chairman of the regional council.721 
The activists demanded the immediate resignation of both Kernes and Dobkin, but the latter were 
conciliatory and somewhat soft towards the Euromaidan activists. The protest catalogue I compiled 
indicates that Kernes came to speak to the Euromaidan protestors no less than seven times. Dobkin later 
stated that Kernes tried negotiating with the activists but to no avail.722 Unlike in Donets’k, where 
regional elites began resigning under pressure from radical pro-Russian activists, in Kharkiv, Dobkin and 
others resigned under pressure from the Euromaidan activists.723 Dobkin, in particular, decided to run for 
presidency and, therefore, became largely irrelevant to the “Russian Spring” protest in Kharkiv. This was 
confirmed to me in an interview with Protest Organiser 2 (Interview 28 09 2018). Dobkin continued to 
make incendiary statements about federalisation and the need of help from Russia but this was in line 
with his practice of making bold comments on the politics in Kyiv in the past. Activist in Kharkiv 
described Dobkin as being much less flexible than Kernes (16 07 2019).  
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Congruent with the expectation that a diffused patronage region would benefit from multiple patrons’ 
rise to the centre, Kharkiv’s top elites from the Party of Regions did not oppose the elevation of several 
Kharkivites to important government positions.  The Party of Regions-dominated city council, together 
with Kernes, recognised the new Minister of the Interior, and Kernes’ long-time adversary, Arsen 
Avakov, and Ihor Shvaika, the head of the local Svoboda party, who became the new minister of agrarian 
policy.724 Kernes did not oppose the appointment of both.725  In fact, throughout the “Russian Spring” 
protest wave, none of the Party of Regions’ members in Kharkiv seem to have resisted the key changes 
made in the local cadres, even if these changes meant having to co-exist with their political adversaries. 
On 26 February, general-mayor of the local police Oleh Demchenko was dismissed, and in his place 
Anatoliy Dmitriev, a member of Bat’kivshchina, was appointed. The regional prosecutor was dismissed 
on the same day.726 In the major reshuffle that took place across the entire east, Ihor Baluta, a member of 
Bat’kivshchina and a Euromaidan coordinator, was appointed the regional governor on 2 March.727 On 4 
April, Baluta appointed Ivan Varchenko, a local Batkivschina deputy, as his deputy governor.728 In effect, 
the power balance between the Party of Regions and Bat’kivshchina in the regional politics shifted back 
to what it was when Avakov was governor.  
6. Elites in the diffused patronage region remove the radical streak from the pro-federal 
protest  
Whilst adapting to the change of the informal governing network in the centre, the elites in the diffused 
patronage city of Kharkiv systematically opposed the radical streak of the Anti-Maidan protest as it 
threatened their positions in the local government and their relationship with the now-dominant 
governing network. According to two of my interviewees who participated in the pro-federalisation 
protest, Kernes and other members of the local elites sought to remain “in control of the city” and “to 
keep their seats” in the local government (Interview, participant 23 09 2018). According to Protest 
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Organiser 1 (Interview 29 09 2018), Kernes’ first task was to maintain order in the city and “to make sure 
there were no killings and fires”. Another interviewee was convinced that Kernes wanted peace in 
Kharkiv – “he did the right thing” (Interview 2 participant, 23 09 2018). One of my interviewees stated 
that Kernes could have been “easily removed” or even “killed,” had he been more resistant to the 
changes in government (Interview, Participant 23 09 2018). This was confirmed in an interview with 
Protest Organiser 2 (28 09 2018).  
Both Protest Organiser 1 and Protest Organiser 2 maintained that Kernes attempted to reconcile 
Euromaidan and pro-federalisation protestors. Activist in Kharkiv described Kernes’ attempts “to be a 
peacemaker between the opposing camps” (16 07 2019). However, Kernes did not approve radical pro-
Russian protest. “Kernes tried to head the protest”, Protest Organiser 2 said, “his people appeared on the 
Freedom Square on 23 February; they began giving us material help but they were taking down the 
Russian flags and [our] Velikaya Rus’ flags” (Interview 28 09 2018).729 During the Anti-Maidan meeting 
on 23 February, Kernes and Dobkin addressed the Anti-Maidan protestors from the stage and asked 
them to dismantle the barricades they built around the Lenin monument.730 Another notable event was 
the attempt to hoist the Russian flag on the building of the city council on 26 February. On that day, 
during a pro-Russian rally where people presented with St George ribbons and chanted “Russia”, a pro-
Russian activist hoisted the flag of Russia on the building of the city council.731 Kernes tried to remove 
the flag, urging the protestors not to follow the “Crimean scenario”.732 It can be seen on the video that 
Kernes nearly fought with the crowd in rage.733 Similarly, the Lenin Monument defence movement was 
abandoned by Kernes on 4 March, for unknown reasons. According to a report, Kernes told Lenin 
monument defence activists to leave the Square and threatened them with 7 to 15 years of imprisonment 
for enticement of separatism.734 This is corroborated in Serhiy Yudaev’s chronicle: “Then I saw our 
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“leaders”, who were shouting the day before “Kernes is a traitor, Kernes has stopped resisting and 
become the junta’s (the new government in Kyiv) servant,” listening to this same Kernes and dismantling 
the tents, following his orders” (Yudaev, 2015, 16). The appeals to Russia for help then gradually 
disappeared during the Anti-Maidan and pro-federalisation meetings in the period between 23 February 
to 6 April. The Activist in Kharkiv attributed this to the “good work” of the Minister of the Interior 
Arsen Avakov and his “conversations” with Kernes (Interview 16 07 2019). This again highlights the 
diffused nature of the regional patronage, as Avakov was a Kharkivite who rose to the position of power 
in the centre in 2014.  
The events of 1 March similarly showed that the local elites tried controlling the radical Anti-Maidan and 
pro-federal forces. By 1 March, Kharkiv regional administration building (HOGA) remained occupied by 
the Euromaidan activists for nearly a week and no attempts at evicting them had been made. According 
to Vasil’ Homa, the activists did not clear the building despite having negotiated to do so with the local 
Bat’kivshchina, Udar and Svoboda parties. There is also some evidence that the local elites could not 
coerce the police to clear the regional administration building of the Euromaidan activists. On 3 March, 
Kernes stated in an interview that the city police force “extricated themselves” from the events and 
played the game of wait and see.735 During 1 March meeting, Kernes addressed the people from the stage 
saying that the police was demoralised and therefore incapable of performing its duties.736  
As such, the pro-federalisation forces were used by the local elites to clear the building of the Euromaidan 
protestors. On 1 March Kernes organised a meeting to defend the Lenin monument and to show that 
Kharkiv stood undivided.737 The meeting quickly gathered around 20 thousand people and seemingly 
began slipping out of control. People were chanting slogans such as “Russia Help us!” which contradicted 
the spirit of the meeting. One of the leaders of Kharkiv’s branch of the Communist Party, Alla 
Aleksandrovskaya, stated from the stage that only federalisation would help preserve Ukraine. Kernes 
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contradicted her and asked her not to repeat such statements again.738 In his speeches at the meeting, he 
maintained that Kharkiv remained an inseparable part of Ukraine and that no separatism would be 
allowed in the region.739  
The episode that followed, when Kernes allowed one of the most radical leaders of the Anti-Maidan and 
pro-federalisation protest, Yehor Lohinov, to speak on the stage, can be interpreted as an attempt to 
determine the “weak links” in the movement and demonstrate to Kharkivites that Kernes was in control 
of the city. Yudaev later claimed that Lohinov was “Kernes’ creation” (Yudaev, 2015, 4, 20; Yudaev 
misspells Lohinov’s name as “Logvinov”). Both Protest Organiser 1 and Protest Organiser 2 described 
Lohinov as “a man from the grassroots” to me, but they were silent as to whether Lohinov was an 
informer or a double agent. Lohinov was later imprisoned during the eviction of the pro-federalisation 
protestors from the HOGA building on 8 April.740 As such, during 1 March meeting, Lohinov read out 
the address written by the members of Kharkiv self-defence forces. “Keep Kernes in his office until the 
next elections”, the address run, “create the Kharkiv veche (council) consisting of five people and make it 
the main ruling body in the region; the veche must sustain the relationship between the regions in Ukraine 
and the neighbouring regions of Russia; continue forming self-defence units; force the law enforcement 
agents, i.e. the police, to join the self-defence units or else they must resign; further steps as to the status 
of the region must be decided only by the population of the region; Berkut must defend the city; stop 
financing the Kyiv treasury; forbid the signing of any agreements with the EU until the referendum is 
held.”741 
 The statement contradicted the spirit of the meeting which is evident from Kernes’ reaction to it. 
Again, as an elite member functioning in a diffused patronage region, Kernes demonstrated his 
knowledge of the law. Despite having allowed Lohinov onto the stage, Kernes went on to counter-argue 
him and reminded those who wanted to destabilise the situation – he probably meant Lohinov and other 
pro-federalisation activists – that the elections would be held strictly in accordance with the law. He drew 
 
738 “Rossiia – SOS” ili vsego dva ukrainskikh flaga na mnogotysiachnuiu tolpu: chto proishodit na ploshchadi 
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the attention to the fact that all local administrative bodies were working in accordance with the law, thus 
questioning Lohinov’s statement of people’s power. Kernes also reminded the activists that he would not 
resign. He pledged that they defend the city together within some legal parameters and reminded the hot -
headed activists in the crowd that whoever wanted to aggravate the situation would be rebuffed “within 
20 minutes”. He somewhat reluctantly endorsed the self-defence units but then retorted to another 
speaker who offered to create other self-defence units and ask the fight club Oplot for help: “There is no 
need to create anarchy… Why are you asking us to fight?”.742After this meeting, Kernes stated in an 
interview: “if we are law-abiding citizens and do not let our emotions overwhelm us, we will not allow our 
meetings to become a coup for the benefit of Russia”.743  
The sudden closure of the fight club Oplot and disappearance of its leader Yevhen Zhilin in early March 
are also good examples of how the political opportunities for radical Anti-Maidan activism were closed in 
Kharkiv. According to one of my interviewees who participated in the pro-federal protest, Oplot and 
Zhilin, in particular, were “a formidable force,” willing to and capable of confronting the new 
government violently (Interview, Participant 28 09 2018). My interviewee claimed that Zhilin urged him 
and others to form militarised units to resist the Kyiv government. This, however, never came to pass. In 
a widely-quoted interview in February 2014, Zhilin claimed to have gone to St Petersburg to “seek 
help”.744 Protest Organiser 1 and Protest Organiser 2 stated that the members of Oplot had ties with the 
criminal world and presented danger. Protest Organiser 1 said that many went to fight in the Donbas later 
(Interview, 29 09 2018). According to one of my interviewees, Oplot fighters “wanted to be with Russia” 
(Interview, participant, 28 09 2018). On 1 March, Oplot published a statement requiring a referendum on 
either “autonomy” or “unity with Russia”. “Due to the irreconcilable differences between the west and 
east of Ukraine (their heroes, their history, and their values, in particular)”, the statement read, “we need a 
referendum to help people express their views”. “Among the questions considered by such a 
referendum,” it continued, “should be the status of the Russian language, the status of the region (for it to 
remain within a unitary Ukraine, to become a federalised unit with its own budget and constitution, to be 
 
742 Ibid.  
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744 “Ukrainian TV warns "semi-legal armies" being set up in east, west of country”, BBC Monitoring Ukraine & Baltics, 
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an autonomous state, or unite with Russia), the status of the Red Army veterans, and the status of the 
OUN-UPA fighters”. The request was to be filed with the regional administration.745 These radical views 
did not agree with the local elites, and therefore Oplot and Zhilin had to be reined in.  
Following Zhilin’s fiery speech urging the local elites to provide weapons for self-defence against the 
Right Sector at the Congress of All Deputies on 22 February, the acting Minister of the Interior Arsen 
Avakov claimed to have opened criminal proceedings against Zhilin and Oplot.746 Zhilin was forced to 
leave for Russia.747 On 25 February, Oplot office in Kharkiv had to evacuate itself. According to eye 
witnesses and journalists, furniture and computers were being taken out from the building for several 
hours, while Zhilin did not answer his mobile phone and his co-workers left the office.748 On 1 March, 
Ukrainian nationalists stormed and occupied the building. This is corroborated by the posts on Oplot’s 
Vkontakte pages, which announced the closure of the club.749 This was confirmed by one of my 
interviewees. He also claimed that when the Right Sector arrived to Kharkiv around 1 March, their aim 
was to “get rid of Zhilin” rather than simply vandalise the Oplot office (Interview, participant, 28 09 
2018). Activist in Kharkiv stated in an interview with me that his men arrived to the aerodrome where 
one of the meetings of Oplot was supposed to be held but “there was no one there” (16 07 2019). 
In line with the expectation that the elites in a diffused patronage region would use their knowledge of the 
law in an attempt to rein in the radical forces in the pro-federalisation movement, the local elites refused 
to budge on the activists’ key demand – the federalisation referendum (Protest Organiser 1, interview 24 
09 2018). This was important because in Donets’k, the elites signalled their readiness to conduct such a 
referendum throughout the period, beginning on 1 March. By contrast, Kernes adopted a tough stance 
towards the referendum demand and refused to budge on this issue. In an interview on 4 March, he 
stated: “I am not going to comply with any ultimatums and blackmailing, I am not going to gather any 
sessions, announce the referendum and the rest. Please do not drag me into this. I know what the current 
law says and will only work within its remit”. He also said “Kharkiv is for united Ukraine and Kharkiv 
 
745 https://mikle1.livejournal.com/3784485.html ; http://archive.is/unar3.  
746 “Yanukovicha i Ko ob’iavili v rozysk, a za liderom “Oplota” v Khar’kov uzhe edut operativniki”, 057, 24 
February 2014.  
747 “Ul’trapravye radikaly zakhvatili zdanie kluba “Oplot””, Gorodskoi Dozor¸1 March 2014.  
748 “V Khar’kove razbegaetsia zhilinskii “Oplot””, Khar’kovskie Izvestiia, 25 February 2014.  
749 https://vk.com/wall-17147496?day=25022014&w=wall-17147496_4339%2Fall ; http://archive.is/DPN8c  
250 
 
will always be in Ukraine”.750 Kernes maintained this stance during a pro-federalisation meeting on 15 
March.751  
Unlike in Donets’k where the elites embraced the referendum and even began preparing for it, in 
Kharkiv, on 12 March, Kharkiv city council lodged an appeal with the local judiciary to limit the rights of 
citizens to hold mass meetings in the coming weekend.752 This was done on Kernes’ instruction.753 "I 
have instructed the Kharkiv City Council to ask the administrative court to ban the referendum. It is 
illegal," Kernes told reporters before a court session at the Pecherskiy District Court in Kyiv. Kharkiv's 
district administrative court eventually banned the holding of the referendum. Regional Council Chairman 
Serhiy Chernov confirmed this: “A number of NGOs appealed to the Regional Council with a 
memorandum which requires the convening of an extraordinary session to set a local referendum on the 
federal structure and the state language. However, these issues could be addressed only by a nationwide 
referendum, which, in accordance with Article 72 of the Constitution of Ukraine, can be set exclusively by 
the Verkhovna Rada or the President of Ukraine”.754 “The deputy corps of the Kharkiv Regional Council 
cannot put the issues onto the agenda of the session and take decisions which are contrary to the law. The 
issue of the country's federal structure requires a serious preparatory work of legal experts and the widest 
public discussion,” Chernov added. Additionally, in accordance with Article 72 of the Ukrainian 
Constitution, the all-Ukrainian referendum must be held on request of no fewer than 3 million citizens of 
Ukraine eligible to vote, on the condition that signatures for such a referendum are collected in no fewer 
than two-thirds of regions, with at least one hundred thousand signatures from each region”.755  
Not only that, the judge sent letters to the activists to appear before the court.756 The SBU launched 
criminal proceedings against the organizers of the referendum over the encroachment on the territorial 
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integrity and inviolability of Ukraine's borders.757The court, the mayor, the prosecutor and the regional 
council thus acted in concert. They were swift in targeting the activists and acted quickly. This became 
their mainstay tactic applied to the later protests. It is notable that no protests were banned in a similar 
way in Donets’k during this period.  
Despite the prohibition, the activists still went ahead with the referendum meeting, and it was held on 16 
March, on the square full of people.758 People were given bulletins with the heading “On economic 
federalisation and self-rule of Kharkiv and Kharkiv region”. Three questions were asked: for or against 
economic federalisation, people’s power and language sovereignty (meaning the status of the Russian 
language as the second state language). The activists planned to ask Russia to “announce the results of the 
referendum to the whole world”, “in the absence of a legitimate government that would do so”.759 
Following this, the activists picketed the Russian consulate asking for Russian peacekeeping forces to 
“defend the rights of Russian citizens in Kharkiv”.760 Lohinov in an interview prior to the meeting stated: 
“[I think] we will have to take the reams of power into our own hands. We will say that all law 
enforcement agencies, all military structures and all administrative structures of the city and the region 
must immediately swear allegiance to the executive committee (the executive committee of the pro-
federalisation movement “Veche Kharkov”). We will use all available means to achieve this. We will ask 
the Veche to support us in our appeal to Russia for help”. Lohinov also stated that it was planned to elect 
a people’s mayor at the meeting. Another member of the executive committee “Veche Kharkov” 
Hennadiy Makarov stated that the pro-federalisation activists would ask the Russian President Putin to 
bring the Russian army into all regions of the left-bank Ukraine.761 
It is plausible to argue that the prohibited referendum-veche took place because Kernes was arrested on 
13 March, summoned to Kyiv, and therefore unable to control the protest. His arrest was in relation to 
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the attacks and death threats directed at the two Euromaidan protestors on 25 and 26 January.762 In an 
interview he gave straight after his arrest, Kernes maintained that his arrest was a political revenge by 
Avakov and that the charges were entirely fabricated.763 It is unclear whether the charges levelled against 
Kernes were true, despite the testimonies made by the Euromaidan activists.764 On 13 March, Pechersk 
district judge put Kernes under home arrest. He was not divested of his rank and could fulfil his mayoral 
duties while under the arrest.765  
Finally, the work of the local security service agents was important in neutralising the radical streak in the 
pro-federalisation protest. In Kharkiv, despite being in confrontation with the Security Service of Ukraine 
over the previous decade, the local elites did not oppose the methodical work of the SBU. Being higher 
up in the hierarchy of the law enforcement agencies, the SBU was not supposed to target the activists at 
all, according to one of my interviewees (Interview, participant 28 09 2018). It is worth noting that it was 
the SBU rather than the police that targeted the activists. In Donets’k, by contrast, according to Activist 
in Kharkiv, both the SBU and the police were “completely hopeless”. “These were Potemkin’s Villages 
that they constructed [when they detained the radicals],” he said (Interview, 16 07 2019).  
In both regions, there was a general paralysis of and confusion among the police force after the 
Euromaidan. One of my interviewees stated that there were “internal rifts” within the police force as to 
whom to support (Interview, participant 28 09 2018). According to Activist in Kharkiv, the police were 
completely hopeless in Kharkiv (Interview, 16 07 2019). A Kharkiv Euromaidan activist Oleksandr 
Shevchenko claimed that many policemen did not know what to do after the flight of Yanukovych. 
“Many policemen help us”, he stated, “But a lot of them are unable to work; they simply wait and see”.766 
On 22 February, Svoboda deputy Ihor Shvaika informed the journalists that 247 policemen patrolling the 
city wanted to join the Euromaidan767. Around 1 March, in one of his interviews, Kernes claimed that 
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more than a thousand policemen across the region began resigning.768 This inability to work effectively 
was explained by the fact that the police did not know how to react to protestors, especially after the 
violent behaviour of their Berkut colleagues during the Euromaidan. Were they too lenient towards the 
protestors, they would have been punished by their superiors. Were they too violent, they would have 
become victims of reciprocal violence.  On the other hand, according to my interview with Protest 
Organiser 1, almost the entire police force in Kharkiv was “on the side of [the pro-federalisation] 
protestors” (Interview 24 09 2018). He stated in the interview that the police did everything to make sure 
there was as little bloodshed as possible (Interview 29 09 2018). They even spoke to protestors and 
organisers themselves asking what could be done to prevent bloodshed. 
As a result of the general paralysis of the local police, the local branches of the SBU began targeting pro-
federalisation protestors. According to Protest Organiser 1 and one of my other interviewees, the more 
methodical work of the SBU in the region in the period before 6 April prevented the local protest from 
degenerating into an internal war. Apukhtin in one of his interviews said that the SBU often invited him 
for interrogations and they said they were not going to give up the city.769  
The SBU began targeting the activists systematically from the first pro-federalisation meeting on 1 March. 
Following the meeting, it opened the criminal proceedings in accordance with the Part 1 Article 294 
(mass disturbances) of the Penal Code, which carried the punishment of 10 years of imprisonment.770 
One of the members of Apukhtin’s Grazhdanskiy Forum commented on these events, with a deeply felt 
grievance at injustice: “On 1 March, during the clearing of HOGA… the attackers (that is the Anti-
Maidan activists) handed over the Euromaidan activists to the MVD (the Ministry of the Interior) 
together with their equipment (automatic guns, Molotov cocktails etc.). The next day all the detained 
[Euromaidan activists] were freed and could walk freely in Kharkiv. On 8 March… our men and Cossacks 
who stormed the HOGA received notices to come to the police who held them responsible for mass 
disturbances”.771 This is confirmed in one of the newspaper reports where it says that the activists of pro-
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federal movements in Kharkiv informed the press that they had begun receiving similar notices to come 
to the SBU for investigation. These were connected to the events on 1 March.772 On 14 March, the SBU 
opened criminal proceedings against the pro-federalisation activists on the grounds of their separatist 
announcements, such as public calls to change the territorial order of Ukraine.773 The SBU informed that 
22 people had already been investigated and 7 had been detained.774 
After 16 March “referendum meeting”, the SBU became heavily involved in seeking out and opening 
criminal proceedings against pro-federalisation activists on the grounds of encroachment on the territory 
of Ukraine. On 20 March, Ihor Massalov, one of the protest organisers, was summoned to the SBU.775 
He was allegedly a witness in a case encouraging separatism.776  On 24 March, the activist of one of the 
key pro-federal movements, Borot’ba, Denys Zaitsev was convicted of an administrative offence after 
filing a notification for a meeting with the local council. Zaitsev was convicted of holding a meeting 
prohibited by the district judge. One of Borot’ba leaders Serhiy Kirichuk was also convicted of the 
administrative offence. Zaitsev stated that he was unaware of the court’s decision.777 Kirichuk 778 and Sut’ 
Vremeni activists claimed to have been receiving threats on their phones.779 By 29 March, one of the more 
radical activists Ihnat Kramskoi (nickname “Topaz”) was arrested on the charges of organisation and 
participation in mass disturbances using dangerous objects (Part 1 Article 241 of the Penal Code, with the 
maximum punishment of 8 years imprisonment). This was in relation to the events of 1 March when the 
HOGA was stormed by pro-federalisation activists.780  
 
772 “Prorossiiskie aktivisty v Khar’kove zaiavliaiut o presledovaniiakh”, Nahnews¸7 March 2014.  
773 “SBU nachala rassledovanie prizyvov khar’kovskikh separtistov”, Censor.net, 14 March 2014.  
774 https://vk.com/wall-67607008?offset=840&own=1  
775 “V Khar’kove vyzvan na dopros “narodnyi gubernator” Ihor Massalov”, Nahnews, 20 March 2014.  
776 “Odnogo iz organizatorov prorossiiskikh mitingov v Khar’kove priglasili priiti v SBU dlia dachi pokazanii”, 057, 
22 March 2014.  
777 https://borot’ba-ua.livejournal.com/2014/03/25/ ; http://archive.is/oEy1j.  




780 “Leninskii sud izbral meru presecheniia dlia “Topaza””, 057, 29 March 2014.  
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7. Moderate protest emerges in response to the elites’ actions  
7.1. Relatively weak challengers  
As outlined in the theory chapter, political opportunities for protest can be used even by challengers who 
are relatively weak and have little experience in organising protests. Kharkiv’s pro-federal and pro-Russian 
challengers fall into this category. There were numerous pro-federal and pro-Russian groups prior to the 
onset of the “Russian Spring” in Kharkiv. Very few of these groups participated in any collective action, 
such as protest or picketing (as listed by Tarrow (Tarrow, 1998, 110)). None of my interviewees 
confirmed that the pro-Russian groups specifically organised any direct collective action on a major scale 
prior to 2014. According to Protest Organiser 1, “There were no serious protests in Kharkiv [against the 
language policies]”, but there were many conferences and forums” (Interview 29 09 2018).  
Many people who later became pro-federal and pro-Russian protest organisers in 2014 were information 
warriors, publishing on the Internet and distributing printed copies of pamphlets. User Mikle1 was a 
somewhat typical information warrior who published extensively on his blog on a variety of topics, such 
as Ukrainian history and current affairs.781 At the same time, he did not seem to have organised or 
participated in an offline direct collective action, such as protest or picketing. Protest Organiser 2 
confirmed in the interview that both he and Protest Organiser 1 organised televised debates, conferences, 
and annual marches on various dates, such as the Victory Day and May Day (28 09 2018). They did not 
engage in a collective action on the scale of that in 2014. He said in the interview that the only major 
collective action he participated in was an anti-LGBT march in Kyiv in summer 2013, where he 
confronted the police for the first time: this “was the only mass protest I can remember”; “it 
demonstrated to me how the current government cooperated with the nationalists, who were allowed to 
throw smoke bombs into the crowd while being cordoned off by the police.”  
Other notable Kharkiv-based pro-Russian groups, such as Sut’ Vremeni (the Essence of Time), had more 
extensive coverage on social media, but did not engage in any collective action, such as protest or 
picketing, in the years prior to 2014. Paradoxically, most of the meetings they covered on social media 
 
781 https://mikle1.livejournal.com/2009/04/; http://archive.is/pilcd.  
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were in Russia,782 apart from the regular Victory Day and Labour Day (1st of May) meetings held in 
Kharkiv.783 Sut’ Vremeni participated in the Anti-Maidan meetings from their start, such as a joint one on 
16 December 2013, when they made one of the very first appeals to the ethnic patron Russia, pledging it 
to “see in the protestors adherents of the Russian World”.784 
The leaders of the Russian Spring, such as Protest Organiser 1, had more experience in organising 
political action and were “known to the people”, according to Protest Organiser 2 (interview 28 09 2018). 
This is why, according to Protest Organiser 2, Protest Organiser 1 emerged at the helm of pro-
federalisation resistance in Kharkiv in 2014. In the interview, Protest Organiser 1 stated that he was in 
Kharkiv politics since the mid-1990s, when he was a deputy in the regional council. He confirmed to me 
that he did not organise protests and pickets on the scale of 2014 (Interview 24 09 2018).  
The only anti-Maidan that seems to have had sufficient resources785 and experience in political activism in 
Kharkiv was a Marxist, anti-oligarchic, anti-nationalist786 “Borot’ba” (“Fight”). In fact, according to one 
of my interviewees, Borot’ba had significant resources and “well-educated people” who could lead the 
crowds; for example, Borot’ba had sound amplifiers, according to the same interviewee (Interview, 
participant, 28 08 2018). Both Protest Organiser 1 and Protest Organiser 2 confirmed to me that the 
organisation was well financed from Europe.  
Borot’ba engaged in collective action such as picketing from its incipience in 2011.787 The years 2012 and 
2013 were punctuated by a series of collective actions conducted by Borotba, such as an all-Ukrainian 
anti-capitalist protest in Kharkiv in defence of trade unions and against the new labour code on 21 May 
2012,788 and anti-UPA meetings and demonstrations in October 2012.789 In summer 2012, Borot’ba 
organised a joint meeting with the Green Party to defend the Gorky Park.790 They had experience in 
 
782 https://vk.com/wall-25354839?offset=28500&own=1&w=wall-25354839_89; http://archive.is/iw4KM.  
783 https://vk.com/wall-25354839?day=01052012; http://archive.is/0P9Bb.  
784 https://vk.com/wall-25354839?day=16122013&w=wall-25354839_3059%2Fall; https://archive.is/MFoOX . 
785 “Politzaklyuchennyi Yuriy Apukhtin”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RkVkE57sLp0  
786 https://borotba-ua.livejournal.com/2014/04/15/; https://archive.is/2pUw4 
787 https://vk.com/wall-38967458?offset=1240&w=wall-38967458_8%2Fall; http://archive.is/5LTd0  
788 https://vk.com/wall-38967458?offset=1240&w=wall-38967458_18%2Fall; http://archive.is/msto6  






uniting various leftist currents in their protests, such as in January 2013, when they used the resources of 
other organisations to support trade unions of a mine “Red partisan”. They picketed the office of DTEK 
who managed the mine.791 In January of the same year, they successfully united with other organisations 
to “fight fascism and capitalism”.792 They had experience in picketing the city council, such as on 3 June 
2013, when they, together with the old stalwart “Labour Kharkiv” (Trudovaya Kharkivshchina) and other 
organisations, picketed the city council to demand to lower the prices on the city transport.793  However, 
judging by photographs and video footage, these meetings were poorly attended.794 Borot’ba was also 
institutionalised: their candidates participated in the local elections in 2012.795  
With the beginning of the Euromaidan, Borot’ba began participating in the Anti-Maidan meetings where, 
like their pro-federal counterparts, they adopted an anti-EU position. To Borot’ba activists, the 
integration with Europe might have led to catastrophic social consequences, including unemployment. 
Additionally, they were against the integration with Europe on ideological grounds, as to them, the 
integration was promoted by a group of rich Ukrainian families with assets in metallurgy.796 Borot’ba was 
anti-Russian, which provoked consternation among their fellow protestors. During an Anti-Maidan 
meeting on 26  November 2013, one of Borot’ba leaders Serhiy Kirichuk criticised Ukraine’s bid to 
integrate into the EU and the Customs Union, calling the latter “a neoliberal institution like the EU”.797  
7.2. Moderate pro-federal protest in Kharkiv 
As one of the protest organisers revealed to me, there was always a possibility of an armed conflict in 
Kharkiv (Protest Organiser 1, interview 24 09 2018). However, the type of protest that emerged in 
Kharkiv was moderate. Here I demonstrate that this type of protest emerged in response to the actions of 
the local elites. I also offer alternative explanations of why this type of protest emerged in the city, which 
I discussed with the protest organisers and participants. I discuss these alternative explanations first.  
 
791 https://vk.com/wall-38967458?offset=980&w=wall-38967458_346%2Fall; http://archive.is/Ashp6  
792 https://vk.com/wall-38967458?offset=960&w=wall-38967458_358%2Fall; http://archive.is/1ScMu  
793 https://vk.com/wall-38967458?offset=860&w=wall-38967458_482%2Fall; http://archive.is/CYOjt  
794 https://vk.com/wall-38967458?offset=840&w=wall-38967458_523%2Fall; http://archive.is/pRp2r  
795 https://vk.com/wall-38967458?offset=1160&w=wall-38967458_115%2Fall; http://archive.is/gUFOb 
796 https://vk.com/wall-38967458?offset=800&w=wall-38967458_577%2Fall; http://archive.is/OTii5 
797 https://serg-slavorum.livejournal.com/2370020.html; https://archive.is/QoDni ; https://vk.com/wall-
38967458?offset=880&w=wall-38967458_464%2Fall;  http://archive.is/b8zCH  
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Political opportunities for moderate pro-federal protest were opened by the local elites when they 
endorsed the Anti-Maidan and self-defence units in 2013 and allowed the Euromaidan activists to storm 
and occupy the regional administration building on 23 February 2014. According to Yuriy Apukhtin’s798 
and Serhiy Yudaev’s (Yudaev, 2015, 12)799 accounts, the pro-federalisation movement began 
spontaneously, as the “defence of the Lenin monument” movement, on the morning of 23 February. The 
movement demanded first to preserve the Lenin monument on the Freedom Square and then to clear the 
Euromaidan activists out of the HOGA building. One of my interview participants stated that there was a 
genuine desire to protect the monument: “we were outraged at the fact that the nationalists wanted to 
demolish it” (Interview with participant, 28 09 2018). According to the protest catalogue, these 
spontaneous Anti-Maidan forces protested alongside the Communist Party on the Freedom Square, who 
organised an all-day and all-night vigilante next to the monument.800  
In a later interview, Apukhtin stated that the movement attempted to unite people who had many 
different views but agreed on one thing: they opposed the events in Kyiv. He claims that in this period, 
there was a great confusion as to which side the elites were on. Apukhtin stressed that the local elites did 
not help organise the movement in Kharkiv, while in Donets’k, by contrast, the radical pro-Russian 
movement was “taken over by the oligarchs” and began demanding autonomy from Ukraine from early 
March. The Anti-Maidan and pro-federal activists could not reconcile their moderate demands with these 
radical demands made in Donets’k.801  
According to Protest Organiser 2, Kharkiv’s “Russian Spring” was “political all the way through” 
(Interview, 28 09 2018). Kharkiv activists were weary of making radical demands, such as a complete 
autonomy from Ukraine or unity with Russia. According to Protest Organiser 2, this was because Protest 
Organiser 1 and other prominent activists did not want to risk people’s lives if they had to confront the 
state. For Yudaev and Protest Organiser 2, the main purpose of the pro-federalisation protest in Kharkiv 
 
798 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bynkj_Nic0Q  
799 https://bambuser.com/v/4515201?fb_action_ids=10152132571813311&fb_action_types=og.likes ; Streaming 
not available  
800 “Chto proiskhodilo na ploshchadi Svobody”, 057, 23 February 2014.  
801 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bynkj_Nic0Q  
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was “to keep distracting the junta from Donets’k and Luhans’k” and help Donets’k and Luhans’k 
organise the insurgency (Yudaev, 2015, 63). This was confirmed in my interview with Protest Organiser 1, 
who said that the demands of the pro-federlisation protestors in Kharkiv remained stable, political and 
moderate. They included the demands to federalise Ukraine and make the Russian language the official 
language of the state. The demand to unite with Russia was “a provocation that came from Donets’k”, 
according to him (24 09 2018). As the protest catalogue demonstrates (see the chapter on protest 
potential), the appeal to Russia was strong at the beginning of the protest in Kharkiv; however, later it 
became superseded by the demand for the referendum. Consistent direct appeals to Russia were made 
sporadically by small pan-Slavic groups such as Sut’ Vremeni,802 who were not leading the pro-federal 
protest. By contrast, the organisations united under Apukhtin’s Civic Forum, such as Velikaya Rus, Rus’ 
Triedinaya and others did not make direct appeals to the ethnic patron.803 The only direct appeal to the 
ethnic patron that I am aware of was made by Apukhtin’s Civic Forum on 21 February 2014. It was 
published on the Forum’s social media page. It was addressed to the President of Russia Vladimir Putin. 
It described Kharkiv as a thoroughly Russian city that stood against “aggressive Galician spiritual and 
cultural expansion”. The appeal asked for help from Russia to defend the protestors against the Right 
Sector and the possible civil war.804 
The protest organisers and participants I have interviewed attributed this inability to make radical 
demands and militarise the movement also to a certain degree of resource mobilisation failure. By 
“militarisation” I understand the ability of activists and protestors to find weapons and mobilise people 
who would be ready to fight. As Protest Organiser 2 revealed to me, he struggled to find people “who 
would want to fight”. “Kharkiv is a city of intelligentsia; look at Protest Organiser 1 [meaning he is a 
representative of the Kharkiv intelligentsia]” (Protest Organiser 2, interview 28 09 2018). This is 






25354839_8152_r8201 ; http://archive.is/cWokg.  
803 https://mikle1.livejournal.com/4632551.html; http://archive.is/F1ycy.  
804 https://vk.com/wall-67607008?offset=820&own=1 ; https://mikle1.livejournal.com/3914542.html 
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great difficulties finding weapons and arming our people,” he said, “But I would not want to go into 
detail about this”. According to Protest Organiser 2, in Donets’k “people were ready to take up arms” 
(Interview 28 09 2018). By contrast, in Kharkiv, “the protest was purely political; I struggled to find 
people who would want to fight”. Protest Organiser 2 claimed that he began searching for such people 
from the very first day of the Russian Spring.  
Protest Organiser 2 also said that Yudaev and Lohinov, “the men from the grassroots,” refused to fight. 
He described the outcomes of the massive pro-federal protest on 1 March in the following terms: “I was 
left alone in the regional administration. I called all the different organisations on their phones, [including 
Yudaev’s group], but there was no one who could come and help me defend the regional administration”. 
Overall, Yudaev and his group did not have concrete ideas and were not ready to fight, Protest Organiser 
said. “I couldn’t find the people like Mozgovoi, Motorola and Givi,” he said. “Motorola came to Kharkiv 
and said “yes, these people are not ready to kill”. “I knew the people who occupied the Luhans’k SBU – 
these people were ready to kill”. Overall, “the key was the storming of the SBU and local police stations 
to get weapons – but neither Yudaev nor Apukhtin were prepared to do this”.  
Both protest organisers attributed this to the culture and psychological makeup of the people in the 
respective regions, with Donets’k being a “young” region where “miners, who risked their lives daily, 
were always ready to fight” (Protest Organiser 2 interview 28 09 2018), while Kharkiv was the “city of 
intelligentsia”, with nearly 250,000 students before the end of the Soviet Union. Protest Organiser 1 
maintained that, due to its high levels of crime, Donets’k was always prone to rapid militarisation 
(Interview 24 09 2018). Protest Organiser 2 stated that people in Kharkiv “were used to resolving 
problems in a different way” (Interview 28 09 2018).  
Another aspect of resource mobilisation failure that I discussed with the protest organisers was the lack 
of material resources. According to Protest Organiser 1, the activists had few resources at the beginning 
of the protest (Interview 24 09 2018). As Protest Organiser 2 told me, they had difficulties “finding a 
black and white printer to print out leaflets”, in contrast to a more well-endowed Borot’ba (interview 28 
09 2018). Protest Organiser 2 also maintained that both the Communists and Sut’ Vremeni were asking 
their leadership for help but no one helped them. He claimed that Alla Aleksandrovskaya, the leader of 
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Kharkiv branch of the Communist Party in Kharkiv and “a woman with an iron will”, organised the 
protests using her own resources, without any coordination or input from Symonenko, the leader of the 
CPU. Similarly, Protest Organiser 2 claimed that Sut’ Vremeni asked its leader Sergey Kurginyan for 
resources but these failed to come by. One of my interviewees who participated in the protests confirmed 
that the “provocative” Kharkiv People’s Republic declared on 7 April 2014 “was not sustainable” because 
the people instituting it “lacked resources” (Interview, participant, 28 09 2018). The chairman of the 
Russkoe Veche Hennadiy Makarov stated on 24 March that some pro-Russian organisations lacked financial 
resources to acquire sound amplifiers and cars to be used at the meetings and to carry the equipment.805 
There were also some leadership problems. For example, several independent leaders with their own 
ideas, such as Lohinov and Yudaev, began emerging early on (Protest Organiser 1, interview 24 09 2018). 
Yudaev devotes much attention to leadership problems in his chronicle. According to Protest Organiser 
2, however, this was because Yudaev “did not satisfy his ambition” to become the overall leader of the 
movement (28 09 2018). His chronicle nonetheless highlights some of the problems facing the 
movement, and these problems were confirmed by one of my interviewees directly and indirectly by the 
protest organisers. Yudaev claimed that many people were disappointed with the early pro-federalisation 
movement as the leaders constantly bickered over money. This was confirmed in one of the interviews 
with a participant whom I asked why the movement failed to effect change: “this was the organisers’ 
mistake and financial mismanagement; a lot of money was stolen” (Interview, participant, 28 09 2018).   
Leaders suspected each other of provocation and selfishness. As Protest Organiser 1 told me, Massalov 
and Makarov were “professional Russians,” that is they participated in the protest in order to advance 
their own cause. He did not trust them and they did not seem to him to be good leaders. Yudaev believed 
that Lohinov was Kernes’ creation (Yudaev, 2015, 19). Some in Apukhtin’s camp also contended that 




aya_borotba.html; http://archive.is/5bUgP.  
806 https://vk.com/wall-67607008?offset=420&own=1&w=wall-67607008_1198; http://archive.is/RwxwZ  
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Yudaev suspected everyone to have worked for the SBU and Kernes. He wrote: “Trofimov, Gur’yanov 
and Lohinov… These are the people who paved the way for Massalov and his clique. They did not care 
about the Anti-Maidan. They did not put themselves to the service of the people but the SBU from the 
beginning” (Yudaev, 2015, 22). Yudaev wrote on one of the people who joined the movement later, 
Anton Gur’yanov: “Gur’yanov left the [Lenin defence movement] on 26 February. I was sure that he left 
just like everybody else. But then we found out that he had been to the SBU [office]. It seemed that he 
was about to be jailed for promoting separatism. When I spoke to him to find out, it emerged that he 
decided to cooperate with the SBU” (Yudaev, 2015, 14). Massalov, according to him, was a “political 
prostitute” who served the SBU, Avakov, Kernes and the Party of Regions (Yudaev, 2015, 29). On this 
video, the nascent Ukrainian Eastern Bloc headed by Yudaev calls Apukhtin and Borot’ba 
provocateurs.807 These leadership problems in the end may have resulted in the lack of organisation of the 
movement (Protest Organiser 2 interview 28 09 2018) and the lack of a guiding idea (Protest Organiser 1 
interview 24 09 2018). When asked how these internal problems could have contributed to the final 
outcome of peace, Protest Organiser 2 stated: “We confronted very well prepared people in the form of 
state-supported and oligarch-supported squads; these people had been preparing for the [government 
overthrow] for 10 years, by Nalyvaichenko, the former head of the SBU”. “What could have the 
disorganised movement of Kharkivites accomplished when confronted by these people?” he asked.    
However, process tracing revealed that this resource mobilisation failure was the result of the local elites’ 
actions. Protest in Kharkiv mirrored the diffused patronage nature of the region in many ways. Activists 
disassociated themselves from the radicals of Oplot and strove to use the resources of moderate 
organisations in order to make more effective claims on the local elites. The byproduct of this decision 
was that the more specific claims of the pro-federal protestors became diluted by the more abstract claims 
of the organisations they sought to unite with. Additionally, due to the more transparent nature of 
information flows between the region and the centre, clandestine military mobilisation did not take place. 
Radicals such as Yudaev and Lohinov were sidelined or “hoodwinked” by Kernes, as I demonstrated 
above. The leaders also suspected Borotba and other organisations, especially those led by the deputy of 
 
807 “Ukrainskii vostochnyi blok”, YouTube, 30 March 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7-HYWTLZQJo.   
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the city council Ihor Massalov, to have worked for Kernes.  In the end, the protestors did not receive any 
help from Russia. On 6 and 7 April, the actions of the activists reliant on the local elites and the actions of 
the elites converged, as I demonstrate below.  
Thus, to make more effective claims on the local elites, pro-federal activists had to rely on resources of 
other organisations, such as the Communist Party, with whom they worked particularly closely (Protest 
Organiser 1 interview 28 09 2018), and, later, Borot’ba (ibid.). At the end of 2013, Apukhtin brought 
Velikaya Rus together with more than 30 other organisations. Just before the referendum veche on 16 
March, Yehor Lohinov, claimed that the consultative body of pro-federalisation activists included over 50 
organisations, among them Borot’ba, Cossacks, Afghan fighters, and others. Ihor Massalov claimed that 
by 16  March, the pro-federal movement united more than 100 organisations.808On 30 March 2014, the 
organisation was merged with yet more organisations and became “the Movement Yugo-Vostok”  or 
“South-East Movement”.809 Apukhtin later described the experience of such spontaneous amalgamation 
of resources and its effects in an interview: “At the beginning, our movement was called “Grazhdanski 
Forum Kharkova” (“Kharkiv’s Civic Forum”); recently it has been renamed into the social movement 
“Yugo-Vostok”. The Communists were doing something together with us or on their own. Besides, there 
appeared the movement “Borot’ba”. Then the movement “Rassvet” appeared and it soon became 
“Ukrainian Eastern Bloc”. We had our own disagreements, and last Sunday (6April), we were divided, we 
had two meetings on the same topic” (on this further below).810  
The relationship between Borot’ba and the pro-federal activists was very complex. Protest Organiser 2 
told me that Borot’ba might have worked for the SBU. According to Yudaev’s memoir, shortly after the 
events of 1 March, the activists began renting Borot’ba office (Yudaev, 2015, 20). The office was located 
on the central Sumska street, next to the Freedom Square, which came in handy for the activists. “When 
our tents next to the [Lenin] monument were dismantled (Yudaev refers to the end of the Lenin defence 
movement),” Yudaev writes, “the guys from Borot’ba took us in. At the time, they were our whole-
hearted associates. Their office was located along the Sumska street, next to the Freedom Square. Each 
 
808 “V Khar’kove provedut narodnyi veche-referendum”, Nahnews, 12 March 2014.  
809 https://mikle1.livejournal.com/6188252.html ; http://archive.is/SEB7D. 
810 “Lider Khar’kovskogo dvizheniia “Yugo-Vostok”: Rossiia siuda voiska ne vvedet”, Ria Novosti, 12 April 2014.  
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morning, day, and evening we gathered in that office” (20). Both protest organisers confirmed to me that 
their cooperation with Borot’ba began on 8 March 2014. These activists sometimes relied on Borot’ba for 
filing their meeting requests with the city council, such as on 23 March.811 
Despite relying on their resources, the pro-federal activists clashed with Borot’ba around their key 
demands. Borot’ba activists often took an anti-Russian stance during the pro-federalisation meetings in 
Kharkiv. On 8 March, one of its leaders Serhiy Kirichuk voiced the demands of the Borot’ba, such as the 
self-rule for the south-east and the nationalisation of the oligarchs’ property. He claimed that several pro-
Putin activists tried attacking Borot’ba for their anti-war position and their criticisms of the Customs 
Union. During that meeting, Borot’ba was actively against the “occupation of Ukraine” and war claiming 
that the working people of the western Ukraine were not their enemies. The protest was dubbed the 
“Ukrainian Spring” as a snub to the Russian Spring perhaps.812 During the meeting on 9 March, Kirichuk 
addressed the crowds with an anti-Putin rhetoric: “… Putin has played into the hands of the new regime. 
But the disappointment [with the new regime] is growing and soon it will lead to major social 
upheavals… By that time, we need to wrest the power from the hands of fascists and oligarchs… .”  
According to other activists, Borot’ba was adamantly against Ukraine joining the Customs Union with 
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. They wanted Ukraine to be independent and “not exploited by the 
Russian oligarchs”. Equally, they did not support Ukraine joining the Russian Orthodox civilisation.813 
Indeed, judging by the activity on their VK page, they did not make appeals to the ethnic patron and did 
not agitate for joining the Customs Union.814 The only demand that Borot’ba had in common with pro-
Russian activists was the demand for a greater self-rule for the south-east: “We are a Ukrainian 
movement, we support the territorial integrity of Ukraine, but we also say that the territorial integrity of 
Ukraine is only possible when the rights of the people of the South-East are taken into consideration”.815 
 
811 https://borotba-ua.livejournal.com/2014/03/25/; http://archive.is/oEy1j. 
  
812 https://borotba-ua.livejournal.com/2014/03/08/;  http://archive.is/9sphZ.  
813 
http://www.ravnopravie.org/news/novosti/dva_mitinga_v_harkove_vliyanie_na_plocshadi_zahvatyvaet_trockistsk
aya_Borot’ba.html ; http://archive.is/5bUgP.  
814 https://vk.com/wall-67607008?offset=400&own=1; http://archive.is/UgXNW 
815 https://borotba-ua.livejournal.com/2014/04/02/; https://archive.is/QUZJa ; “Borot’ba za Yugo-Vostok. Kto, 
Skol’ko, Zachem”, MediaPort, 22 March 2014.  
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This was clearly a moderate demand. Kirichuk in his March interview stated flatly that they were a 
“Ukrainian” rather than “pro-Russian” movement.816 
These clashes were often quite severe and led to some practical consequences, such as the diversion of 
the meetings, bickering over the microphone on the stage, and loss of the ordinary people’s trust. Overall, 
both ordinary people participating in the protest and pro-federalisation activists had low trust in Borot’ba. 
One of my interviewees who participated in the protests and was friends with Ihnat Kramskoi (nickname 
“Topaz”) and the late Yevhen Zhilin (the leader of “Oplot”) stated that Borot’ba did not inspire his trust 
(interview participant, 28 09 2018). He called it a “shadowy” organisation, possibly introduced into the 
pro-federal movement by the local elites to break it up. Similarly, Yudaev claimed that Borot’ba tried to 
“break up the pro-federalisation movement from the beginning” (Yudaev, 2015, 53). LiveJournal user 
called Borot’ba’s claims too abstract,817 while Apukhtin stated that the pro-federal movement had “a few 
common points [with Borot’ba], but there were a lot of provocateurs among them”.818 In the same 
interview, Apukhtin claimed that Borot’ba worked for Kernes.819  In the 2016 interview, the ex-governor 
of Kharkiv Ihor Baluta confessed that he used “agents” to infiltrate the ranks of the pro-federalisation 
activists to monitor their actions.820 Perhaps, Borot’ba and its offshoot “Narodnoe Edinstvo” were these 
agents. Protest Organiser 2 told me that Borot’ba might have worked for the SBU.  
Hennadiy Makarov, the chairman of the coordination council of Russian Veche, recalled the meetings on 
22 and 23 March: “[Borot’ba] gave the microphone only to their own activists but not to the 
representatives of other organisations”. For example, Ihor Massalov, who was elected a people’s governor 
by several organisations, was also not given a chance to speak. Makarov claimed to have tried to influence 
the meeting and showed to Borot’ba’s leader Serhiy Kirichuk one of his publications, where he praised 
Yanukovych. “Serhiy rejected it immediately and argued that Borot’ba does not recognise Yanukovych as 
President,” Makarov wrote, “and do not even want his name to be mentioned.” Makarov was equally 
 
816 “Borot’ba za Yugo-Vostok. Kto, Skol’ko, Zachem”, MediaPort, 22 March 2014;  
817 https://mikle1.livejournal.com/8800265.html; http://archive.is/a5Ckr.  
818 “Politzaklyuchennyi Yuriy Apukhtin”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RkVkE57sLp0  
819 See also https://vk.com/wall-
67607008?q=%D0%91%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%82%D1%8C%D0%B1%D0%B0&w=wall-
67607008_1198 http://archive.is/hilJY  
820 “Eks-gubernator Khar’kovshchiny Igor’ Baluta: “Dlia menia reshaiushchim stalo 22 aprelia – likvidatsiia 
separatistskogo gorodka vozle pamiatnika Leninu”, Censor.net, 7 April 2014.  
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unhappy with Borot’ba slogans being too abstract: “Apart from such abstract notions as “all oligarchs are 
bad”, “Kharkiv is our city”, “We are against Nazism”, Borot’ba did not offer anything concrete”.821 
Makarov said that both him and Massalov were approached by people angry at the abstract claims made 
by Borot’ba. The people were concerned about what they should do after the meeting.822 
Another practical consequence of these clashes confirmed by Protest Organiser 2 was the diversion of 
some meetings. On 30 March for example, when pro-federalisation activists were opening the memory 
plaque to the Anti-Maidan activists killed on Rymarska Street on 14  March, Apukhtin tried taking people 
to Rymarska; instead the meeting was diverted by Borot’ba who took the people first to the SBU, then to 
the Russian and Polish Embassies (Protest Organiser 2 interview 28 09 2018).823 To Protest Organiser 2 
this was a “rare example of nastiness”. Overall, he said, Borot’ba was “trying to spearhead the protest 
because it was in their interest”; “they told us that they were not a pro-Russian organisation but they 
protested with Russian flags and shouted “Russia” with everybody else”. He stated that, after spring 2014, 
once Borotba activists realised that they might be arrested, they stopped their activities in Kharkiv. 
Protest Organiser 1 confirmed to me that Borotba disappeared from the Kharkiv political scene in June 
2014 (interview 28 09 2018). 
Finally, my own research into an armed mobilisation demonstrates that, compared to Donets’k, there was 
little of such mobilisation. Spontaneous armed formations were unheard of, although there were 
registered movements, such as various Cossack hundreds.824 This is in stark contrast with Donets’k. 
Unlike in Donets’k where spontaneous mobilisation of young, potentially armed, people into the Anti-
Maidan units began in late January, in Kharkiv such mobilisation took place on a more limited scale from 




aya_Borot’ba.html ; http://archive.is/5bUgP 
822 
http://www.ravnopravie.org/news/novosti/dva_mitinga_v_harkove_vliyanie_na_plocshadi_zahvatyvaet_trockistsk
aya_Borot’ba.html ; http://archive.is/5bUgP.  
823https://emelamud.livejournal.com/120725.html; http://archive.is/CvxGP.  
824 “Lyubotinskaya kazach’ya sotnya”, OO “Terskoe kazachestvo Kharkova”, OO “Krasnogradskaya kazach’ya 
sotnya”, OO “Lozovskaya kazach’ya sotnya”, OO “Saltovskaia kazach’ya sotnya”. See for this list 
https://andreistp.livejournal.com/2506766.html . http://archive.is/8fu0z . Using Google and Yandex advanced 
searches, I could not find any information whatsoever on these.  
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severely circumscribed,825 with bigger and more experienced organisations such as Borot’ba and 
Apukhtin’s Grazhdanski Forum directing most pro-federalisation meetings. The claims that these smaller 
spontaneous organisations made were broadly similar to each other. Organisations such as “Za Kharkov” 
professed to defend the city against “armed radicals” using exclusively peaceful methods. The members 
of a similar organisation, a spontaneously organised “Kharkovskoe opolchenie,” stated in an interview: 
“Kharkiv people and the people of the south-east are against the armed coup; we are against the 
illegitimate Verkhovna Rada and the destruction of the country and the war that is being forced upon us”. 
When the HOGA building was occupied by Euromaidan protestors on 23 February, “Kharkovskoe 
opolchenie” made a set of demands that resonated with the demands of other pro-federalisation activists: 
they demanded the building to be cleared of the activists, illegal armed units to be disbanded and Russian 
made the second state language. They also demanded a referendum on the status of the region.  Both “Za 
Kharkov” and “Kharkovskoe Opolchenie” used social media platforms to organise themselves. 826 None 
of these smaller organisations claimed to have had weapons.827 Another organisation that operated during 
this time was the Association of Afghan warriors. This organisation demanded weapons in order to 
defend the city and restore order.828 Protest Organiser 2 revealed to me that Afghan fighters and 
paratroopers “did not support us and followed their superiors who switched their allegiance to the new 
government” (interview 28 09 2018). 
Eventually, due to the insufficient signals from both the local elites and the activists, the latter failed to 
secure resources from Russia. In his interview with me, Protest Organiser 2 detailed his travails trying to 
obtain resources from Russia in early March: “I was in Crimea from 12 March until 17 March … looking 
for help”. He then said he approached the head of the resistance movement in Sevastopol and was told 
that “no directions have been given to us in relation to Kharkiv”. “They told me directly and simply that 
no one was going to bother about Kharkiv”, he said. This was despite the fact that he claimed to have 
been known to these people (“I could have at least said my name and [they would have recognised me])”. 
 
825 Despite my best attempts at trying to find more information about organisations such as “Za Kharkov” and 
“Kharkovskoe Opolchenie” mentioned here, I could not find anything.  
826 “V Khar’kove odna za drugoi voznikaiut obshchestvennye organizatsii, trebuiushchie presech’ ekstremizm i 
radikalizm”, Nahnews, 28 February 2014.  
827 “Bilia Budynku Rad tryvae prorosiis’kyii piket”, Slobids’kii Kraii, 5 March 2014.  
828 “Khar’kovskie afgantsy gotovy s oruzhiem navodit’ poriadok v gorode”, Gorodskoi Dozor, 1 March 2014.  
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He then told me that he went to Moscow at the beginning of June and saw some people from Kharkiv 
who were asking for weapons to go back and fight in Kharkiv. “[The people from Moscow] said : “Go to 
the Donbas”. “[Overall], the maximum resources we could get from Moscow was the money to buy flags 
and to bail out our friends captured by the SBU”. “We bailed out several people this way,” he told me.   
 Yudaev in his chronicle also went at length to describe how he tried – unsuccessfully – to secure 
some funding from Crimea and Russia for the movement.  He detailed his travails in Crimea where he 
was introduced to Sergey Aksenov’s people. Yudaev met with Aksenov’s aide to discuss Kharkiv’s 
Euromaidan (Yudaev, 2015, 41). Yudaev was offered help by some people from Crimea such as Marat 
Chistov, only to be hoodwinked and abandoned by them during the crucial episode of the pro-
federalisation contention on 6 – 8 April. Yudaev stated that he pressed not for financial support but for 
people: “our priority was not to get financial backing but some people – we needed weapons and one or 
two groups of well-prepared “little green men” (Yudaev, 2015, 52). Yudaev stated that Konstantin 
Dolhov, one of the people directly sent by the Crimeans to help Kharkiv pro-federal activists, failed to 
secure funding from Russia: “I asked him what he had. He said “Luhans’k and Donets’k have received 
instructions regarding tomorrow’s resistance. Then I asked him about Kharkiv and he said that Kharkiv 
did not receive any instructions” (Yudaev, 2015, 63). He blamed Dolhov for having failed to secure 
financial backing from Russia and Crimea. According to Protest Organiser 2, Yudaev was a hopeless case 
because he was not known to anyone in either Crimea or Russia.  
8. Local elites and local activists converge 
  How the moderate nature of the local protest turned on the diffused nature of the regional 
patronage was finally and clearly demonstrated by the events from 6 to the morning of 8 April, when 
Kharkiv regional administration building was stormed and occupied by the pro-federalisation activists. 
During this brief period, the protestors continued to make demands on the local elites while the elites 
continued to demonstrate their strong pro-Ukrainian stance.  All of my interviewees, including Protest 
Organiser 1, confirmed the crucial importance of these two days for the pro-federalisation protest. 
According to Protest Organiser 1, the eviction of the pro-federalisation activists from the building on the 
morning of 8 April and the imprisonment of some of them were the key events, after which the city 
became “engulfed in terror” and the possibility of an armed conflict in Kharkiv disappeared. The most 
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radical activists disappeared from Kharkiv, although protests continued on a regular basis. By 3 May 2014, 
Yuriy Apukhtin was arrested, together with a few associates.829 
The pro-federalisation meetings on the Freedom Square on 6 April were divided. Reports differed as to 
how many meetings there were on the Square. Some claimed that there were four meetings; others stated 
that there were three.830 The first was organised by Yehor Lohinov, who formed his own “Ukrainian 
Eastern Bloc”. The second one was organised by Apukhtin’s Yugo-Vostok and CPU (Alla 
Aleksandrovskaya). The third meeting gathered very few people; they were Russian nationalists standing 
under the flags of “Russian Unity”. The fourth meeting was organised by Borot’ba and advocated 
federalisation.831 The protestors demanded Ukraine to be transformed into a federal republic, with a 
South-Eastern autonomy. They demanded the regional council to conduct a local referendum on 
federalisation.832  
The protestors openly quarrelled with each other on 6 April. There was a major rift between Lohinov’s 
Ukrainian Eastern Bloc and Apukhtin’s Yugo-Vostok. Lohinov threatened to burn the car of the Yugo-
Vostok if it parked next to the Lenin monument.833 Protest Organiser 2 claimed that Lohinov aimed at 
marshalling the potential of the radical youth at that meeting. Yudaev was similarly appalled at the 
disunity of the meetings. “When I came to the Square, I was shocked: there were two tribunes, in 
different places.” According to Yudaev, the “provocateur and SBU agent” Anton Gur’yanov was present 
at the meeting, standing next to Konstantin Dolhov, who was sent to Kharkiv by the Crimeans to help 
organise the resistance movement (Yudaev, 2015, 63).  
The meetings then united and advanced towards the HOGA. At 9pm on 6 April, the pro-federalisation 
activists began storming the HOGA. All the reports state that the police and the internal troops, who 
were protecting the building entrance, did not show much resistance.834 According to Yudaev, there were 
 
829 https://vk.com/wall-67607008?offset=400&own=1&w=wall-67607008_1526; http://archive.is/ZclCG.  
830 “Raskol v stane prorossiiskikh aktivistov. Na ploshchadi Svobody 4 raznykh mitinga”, Gorodskoi Dozor, 6 April 
2014.  
831 https://borotba-ua.livejournal.com/2014/04/07/; http://archive.is/uJWgT.  
832 https://mikle1.livejournal.com/3892712.html?page=7; http://archive.is/ZPLRS 
833 https://mikle1.livejournal.com/3892712.html?page=7; http://archive.is/ZPLRS 
834 “Activists still inside Kharkiv regional administration building – eyewitnesses”,  Interfax: Russia & CIS General 
Newswire, 7 April 2014; “Kharkivs’ku ODA zakhopleno. Nad budivleiu vysyt’ trikolor”, Slobids’kii Kraii, 7 April 2014; 
“Stril’ba na ploshchi Svobody u Kharkovi. Mitynguval’nyky hochut vyboriv”, Slobids’kii Kraii¸7 April 2014.  
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certain informers amongst the police who persuaded the police to yield to the protesters and drop all 
resistance. Yudaev writes: “Our commanders of the “secret” divisions studied the situation inside the 
HOGA building and talked to the officers of the Ministry of the Interior. We told the officers that we 
would not beat them – we would just push them aside and calmly enter the building” (Yudaev, 2015, 66). 
Hence the occupiers took over the building. According to Yudaev, it took them less than 5 minutes to do 
so (Yudaev, 2015, 67). 
Accounts differ as to whether the protesters occupied the entire building. According to different reports, 
they blocked the entrance to  the HOGA but did not occupy the whole building.835 Homa stated that they 
did not enter the rooms.836 However, according to an eye witness they occupied the whole building.837 
Yudaev and the journalists covering the events stated that the activists aimed at staying in the building for 
“at least one day”. Around 21:30 they removed the Ukrainian flag from the building and replaced it with a 
Russian tricolor.838 Yudaev writes: “Several of our divisions managed to climb to the very top and hang 
the Russian flag” (Yudaev, 2015, 70).   
It was reported that on the morning of 7 April, the activists rowed with each other over whether they 
advocated the unity with Russia or federalisation of Ukraine.839  They then began negotiations with the 
local authorities. According to Yudaev, there were at least 40 representatives of the protestors, among 
them the deputies Dmytro Sviatash, Alla Aleksandrovska, and Apukhtin (Yudaev, 2015, 68). Kernes was 
among the negotiators. According to my interview with Protest Organiser 1, the activists demanded 
federalisation. Yudaev also claimed that the activists converged around the demand for the “economic 
independence from Kyiv and the status of the Russian language” (Yudaev, 2015, 68). Some newspapers 
reported a confusing array of issues put forward by the activists: “The pro-Russian activists demand a 
discussion for the possibility of calling an emergency session on the issue of the referendum, as well as 
political, socio-economic issues, issues relating to mobilization, and "the issue of liability for using 
weapons against civilians." The negotiation participants are now having a heated debate on whether 
 
835 Ibid.  
836 “Shcho vidbuvaet’sia vseredyni Kharkivs’koii ODA”, Slobids’kii Kraii, 7 April 2014.  
837 Ibid.  
838 “Stril’ba na ploshchi Svobody u Kharkovi”.  
839 “Militsiia pokidaet zdanie HOGA. Kernes vstupil v perepalku s mitinguiushchimi”, 057, 7 April 2014.  
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Viktor Yanukovych is the legitimate president of Ukraine, an Interfax correspondent has reported. Alla 
Aleksandrovskaya, first secretary of the Kharkiv region's committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, 
has suggested calling an extraordinary session of the region's council to schedule a consultative poll on 
three issues (federative structure of Ukraine, giving the Russian language state status, and Ukraine's 
membership in NATO), if a local referendum cannot be conducted”.840 Some activists voiced their 
dissatisfaction at the fact that the attack by the Right Sector on the remembrance meeting of the 
Rymarska murders was not reported or investigated.841  The activists claimed that the new government 
was not going to amnesty them and that they had already opened proceedings against them, while the 
Right Sector was amnestied within hours. They complained of unjust persecution for the non-violent 
takeover of the HOGA on 1 March.842  
According to most accounts, Kernes opposed the referendum. He told the activists upfront that no 
referendum would be held because it was unlawful.843 Yudaev, however, wrote: “On 7 April, I called 
Dolhov, who said that we managed to pressure the authorities into conducting an extraordinary session 
on the economic independence from Kyiv and the status of the Russian language; he was now gathering 
some documents to that effect” (Yudaev, 2015, 68). According to the pro-federalisation activists 
conducting the negotiations, Kernes was trying to redirect the negotiations towards the investigation of 
the Rymarska murders.844  Protest Organiser 1 told me that he was allowed to speak during the 
negotiation process and demanded the referendum. “However, they found some judicial loophole in the 
current law on the referendum and said that it could not be conducted if there was one village in the 
region that did not want a referendum” (Interview, 24 09 2018). According to some reports, Kernes was 
adamantly against the referendum: “There will not be any referendums on separatist topics here. Kharkiv 
is part of Ukraine.” Kernes said that holding a referendum would be illegal and he proposed replacing it 
with a broad-based opinion poll to help determine the mood of the people of the city and the region.  
 
840 “Negotiators in Kharkiv region's administration discuss status of Yanukovych, possibility of referendum” Interfax: 
Russia & CIS General Newswire, 7 April 2014; “Kernes predlozhil provesti v Khar’kove vmesto referenduma 
sotsopros”, Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, 7 April 2014.   
841 “Itogi peregovorov antimaidana s Kernesom”, 057, 8 April 2014.  
842  Ibid.   
843 Ibid.;  “Kernes predlozhil provesti v Khar’kove vmesto referenduma sotsopros”.  
844 “V HOGA – tolpa prorossiiskikh aktivistov, zato na kryshu vernulsia ukrainskii flag”, 057¸7 April 2014.  
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Kernes also said that the pro-federalisation protesters were very heterogeneous and that they were not yet 
able to formulate a common set of demands.845  
Then, according to Yudaev, an extraordinary thing happened that should not have happened – the 
proclamation of Kharkiv People’s Republic on the evening of 7 April. The activists drew up a list of 
alternative councillors and intended to convene a session to schedule a secession referendum. It was 
announced that "The 'Council of councillors of the Kharkiv territorial community', acting as the Kharkiv 
regional council, has taken a decision to create a sovereign state entitled 'Kharkiv People's Republic' 
which will 'build relations with other states in compliance with international law”. Also, a decision was 
taken to "appeal to [the deposed] Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych" asking him to legitimize this 
assembly and its documents, and to the government of the Russian Federation to ensure the peaceful 
holding of a referendum in Kharkiv Region as mediators.846 
According to both Protest Organiser 1 and Yudaev’s chronicle, the proclamation of Kharkiv People’s 
Republic was “a provocation imported from Donets’k,” because it was not supported by the people. As 
Protest Organiser 1 told me, he communicated with Denis Pushilin in Donets’k who offered to conduct 
the referendum in early April. The Organiser resisted the idea because “it was not supported by the 
people”. Moreover, in the interview, he maintained that the proclamation of the referendum in Donets’k 
on 11 May 2014 was also “a provocation”.  Yudaev also believed that this was a provocation: “Because all 
the real leaders were negotiating at that time, suddenly [Anton] Gur’yanov appeared in the foyer of the 
HOGA. This Gur’yanov began proclaiming Kharkiv People’s Republic, autonomy from Ukraine and a 
new government. This was a good idea. But at that moment we could not have put it into practice – we 
did not have weapons or resources… Gur’yanov deliberately annulled everything that was achieved 
through the negotiations. He portrayed us as inconsistent … people.” (Yudaev, 2015, 69) According to 
one of the participants in the protest, the activists lacked resources to build and defend the “republic” 
(Interview, participant, 28 09 2018).  
 
845 “Kharkiv Mayor Kernes: It Is Impossible To Hold Referendum On Federalization In Kharkiv Region”, 
Ukrainian News, 7 April 2014.  
846 “Separatists in east Ukraine announce creation of "Kharkiv people's republic", BBC Monitoring Newsfile, 7 April 
2014; https://borotba-ua.livejournal.com/2014/04/08/; http://archive.is/WUHGz  
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In the meantime, the Kyiv government began preparing a “counter-terrorist” operation. Due to the 
earlier sabotage by the Berkut,847 the Minister of the Interior Avakov had to summon the police force 
from Poltava and Vinnitsa.848 Around 11pm on 7 April, a police force was brought from Poltava to clear 
the building from the protestors.849 There were around 270 policemen participating in the clearing of the 
building.850 The operation began at around 620am on 8  April and finished by 7:30. As a result, 70 
protestors were detained.851 The press service of the Ukrainian Interior Ministry stated that the detainees 
"were suspected of illegal actions associated with separatism, staging mass disturbances, inflicting damage 
on people's health and violating a whole series of articles [of the Penal Code].852 Radical protestors, such 
as Ehor Lohinov, were detained.853 Three were put under home arrest and 59 were put in custody.854 By 
10 April, 46 were put under custody for 2 months.855 On 10 April, the Kharkiv district administrative 
court banned all mass rallies to ensure public order.856 
In summary, I have illustrated in this section how the moderate protest emerged in the diffused patronage 
region of Kharkiv not as a result of a resource mobilisation failure but as a result of the actions of the 
local elites.  
 
847 “Khar’kovskie aktivisty piketiruiut upravlenie MVD”, Nahnews, 11 April 2014.  “ Ukrainian interior minister 
threatens to fire 30 percent of Kharkov police Itar-Tass”, ITAR-TASS World Service,  8 April 2014.  




850 “Na Vostok Ukrainy pribyli spetspodrazdeleniia MVD iz drugikh regionov- Avakov”, Censor.net, 7 April 2014.  
851 “About 70 separatists detained in antiterrorist operation in Ukraine's Kharkiv”, BBC Monitoring Newsfile, 8 April 
2014.  
852 “About 70 separatists detained in antiterrorist operation in Ukraine's Kharkiv” BBC Monitoring Newsfile, 8 April 
2014.  
853 “Kharkiv separatists used grenades against police officers - Ukraine acting president”, Interfax: Ukrainian General 
Newswire, 8 April 2014.  
854 “Prorosiis’kii mitynguval’nyky otrymaly sudovyii vyrok”, Slobids’kii Kraii, 11 April 2014.  
855 “Court in Ukraine's Kharkiv remands 46 pro-Russian activists in custody”, BBC Monitoring Ukraine & Baltics, 10 
April 2014 
856 Ibid.  
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9. Radical protest in a concentrated patronage region  
9.1. Challengers  
Many scholars writing on the conflict in the Donbas have pointed to the low popularity of pro-Russian 
political parties in Donets’k region.857 Indeed, in this region with a supposedly strong pro-Russian 
orientation, the small pro-Russian parties, such as the Russian Bloc not only did not win any seats in the 
regional government in 2010, despite having nominated their candidates in the local elections,858 but they 
were not even allowed to participate in the elections due to “the lack of experience and ineptitude of 
[their] candidates”.859 These parties conducted very low-scale meetings on various celebration dates, such 
as the anniversary of the Pereyaslavl Rada. For the Russian Bloc, I was able to catalogue and corroborate 
evidence for three such regular meetings: the “Russian March” on 4 November 2011, and the regular 
meetings on 1 and 9 May.860   
If organisations such as the Russian Bloc strove to enter Ukrainian politics, the radical Donetsk Republic 
movement, at first, existed at the margins of Ukrainian political life and in 2007 was banned altogether, 
following an investigation by the SBU and a court ruling.861 This was on the basis of their views that 
threatened the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Journalist 1 confirmed to me in an interview that the 
activists of the Donetsk Republic were “very poor but very fanatical” (19 07 2019). Journalist 1 said that 
 
857 The most cited evidence can be found in Andrew Wilson’s book “Ukraine Crisis” on page 142.  
858 “Golosa zhitelei Donetska: 72% za Luk’yanchenko – eto fashizm”, Novosti Donbassa, 8 November 2010.  
859 “Oni kovali pobedu dlia partii regionov v Donetske”, Novosti Donbassa, 8 November 2010.  
860 https://vk.com/wall-
50935961?offset=1200&q=%D0%94%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%86%D0%BA&w=wall-50935961_28; 




BE%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%B6%D0%B8&w=wall-3223620_17557; http://archive.is/0NCVB; “V Donetske na 
russkom marshe s natsistskoi simvolikoi trebovali zakryt’ posol’stvo SSHA video”, Novosti Donbassa, 4 November 
2013.  
861 Andrey Purgin commented on the organisation in February 2010: “We have great difficulties in disseminating our 
ideas because we are being persecuted by the SBU and the current government. [The SBU opened] criminal 
proceedings against 3 people; these are Articles 109, 110 and 161 of the Ukrainian Criminal Code…. We have a 
group on social media [Vkontakte?], with around 9 thousand people. We have a great number of supporters, they all 
exist autonomously. We are active primarily on the Internet…. We are a social movement, we are not a political 
party and not represented in the regional or city councils and we do not participate in elections…. The Party of 
Regions supports federalisation sometimes and sometimes it forgets about it. PSPU [Progressive Socialists] 
supported federalisation but now they do not. But we have a very good relationship with the PSPU and 
Communists. But we do not have any dealings with the Party of Regions, we just don’t.” 
https://donbassrus.livejournal.com/214371.html ; http://archive.is/0MCEZ.  
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they promoted the independence of Donets’k from the rest of Ukraine because of the economic potential 
of the region. According to the Novosti Donbassa and Donetsk Republic Vkontakte pages, Donetsk 
Republic held strong anti-Ukrainian views.  For example, according to the resolutions of a conference 
organised by the group on 9 February 2008, the “forced ukrainisation of the south-east” was considered 
as “occupation” aimed at destroying the Russian people”. The resolutions denied the Ukrainian nation its 
existence. The conference adopted a resolution to create the Donets’k Federative Republic and to appeal 
to the Verkhovna Rada to federalise Ukraine. If the Rada refused, the group vowed to press for secession 
from Ukraine.862  
These strong and radical pro-Russian views were expressed freely on Donetsk Republic’s social media 
pages and blogs. Andrey Purgin, one of the leaders of Donetsk Republic believed that Yushchenko’s 
ukrainisation policies led to the “genocide” of Russians.863 He also refused to recognise Ukraine as a 
viable state and wanted the Donbas to become part of Russia.864 Their regular conferences had a strong 
pro-Russian tinge.865 A claim that “the Donbas is Russia” began circulating on Donetsk Republic’s 
Vkontakte page on 7 September 2013866 and became the mainstay of its discourse throughout 2014. In 
2013, they published an article discussing the changes that would potentially occur in the Donbas were it 
to become part of the Russian Federation.867  
Significantly, even after its ban in 2007, the Donetsk Republic movement was able to hold regular 
celebratory meetings in central Donets’k, which means that the movement was condoned by the Donets’k 







3223620_22386%2Fall ; http://archive.is/ovSAi.  
864 “V Donetske na russkom marshe”.  
865 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=69BqyQjz1go  
866 https://vk.com/wall-
3223620?day=07092013&q=%D0%A0%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D1%8F&w=wall-
3223620_21080; http://archive.is/alPiz.  
867 https://vk.com/wall-
3223620?day=20112013&q=%D0%B1%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%B3%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B4&w
=wall-3223620_22074; http://archive.is/6lelL  
868 https://vk.com/wall-3223620?day=20112013&q=%D0%B0%D0%BA%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%8F&w=wall-
3223620_21713; http://archive.is/Pq38v  
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some of their meetings (19 07 2019). Donetsk Republic held an anti-government meeting on the 
Constitution Day in June 2007. They were allowed to march from the Artem monument next to the city 
council to Lenin Square unhindered.869 On 8 November 2008, they held a “Russian World in action” 
meeting together with the “International Russian Front” on Lenin Square. The meeting aimed at 
delivering the message of the Russian World to the public.870 The regular 9 February meetings to celebrate 
the anniversary of the Donets’k-Kryvyi Ryh Republic and to “proclaim the state sovereignty of the 
Donets’k Federative Republic” were all corroborated with the data on Donetsk Republic Vkontakte 
pages.871 Journalist 1 confirmed to me that Donetsk Republic held these regular meetings almost every 
year since its incipience. Novosti Donbassa reported that the protestors, usually numbering no more than 20 
people, were always allowed to march through the streets, from the Artem monument next to the city 
council building to the Lenin Square.872  
 Donetsk Republic and other pro-Russian movements, such as Donbass Rus’, were better 
endowed with mobilisation experience, crucial connections with Russia and stable mobilisation repertoire 
than their Kharkiv counterparts. The evidence presented here primarily comes from Donetsk Republic 
Vkontakte pages, donbassrus user’s blog and Novosti Donbassa.  
Donetsk Republic had connections with various Russian social movements, such as the Eurasian Union 
of Youth.873 They regularly participated in the Lake Seliger meetings organised by the Union and the 
 
869  http://novosti.dn.ua/news/42156-v-donecke-nachalsya-novyy-vytok-separatystskogo-dvyzhenyya. I have 
attempted to triangulate the evidence on the Donetsk Republic found on Novosti Donbassa, which, being a staunchly 
pro-Ukrainian source, presented the organisation in a rather biased light, with the evidence found on Donetsk 
Republic archived Vkontakte (Russian social media platform) pages. I have discovered that most meetings and 
protests reported on Novosti Donbassa were not reported on Vkontakte, with the exception of the regular celebration 
of the Donets’k-Kryvyi Ryh Republic founding anniversary. 
870 http://novosti.dn.ua/news/60994-doneckye-separatysty-v-centre-goroda-pryzyvayut-k-raskolu-ukrayny 
871 “Segodnia Donbass ob’iavit o suverenitete”, Novosti Donbassa, 9 February 2009; https://vk.com/wall-
3223620?day=10022009&w=wall-3223620_3720%2Fall; http://archive.is/77PiN  
872 “V Donetske prizvali narushit’ territorial’nuiu tselostnost’ Ukrainy i RF”, Novosti Donbassa, 10 February 2010; 
https://vk.com/wall-3223620?day=11022010&w=wall-3223620_9565%2Fall; http://archive.is/Kg5Qt; 
https://donbassrus.livejournal.com/2009/06/04/; http://archive.is/4lOy3.  











radical Russian movement Nashi.874 Throughout 2012, they held conferences on the concept of the 
“Russian World” and the role of the Orthodox Church in uniting Russian people. Leaders of the Eurasian 
Union of Youth and members of the Izborsk club actively participated in these conferences.875 They 
often invited Russians from the Russian regions neighbouring with Ukraine, such as Belgorod, to these 
conferences.876 
The movement reached out to other pro-Russian movements, such as “Donbass Rus’,”877 particularly 
during the regular “Russian March” demonstrations held regularly in November. These pro-Russian 
movements and individuals organised regular meetings on broadly anti-government themes. These 
meetings were usually held together with other parties, such as the Communist Party of Ukraine and 
Progressive Socialists. The brainchild of Natalya Vitrenko’s Bloc “Donbass Rus” (“Donbasskaya Rus’”) 
participated in these meetings.878 According to the blog run by donbassrus user, a member of “Donbas 
Rus’,” regular conferences and meetings were organised in Donets’k, on the historical theme such as 
Pereyaslavl Rada879 and the founding of Donets’k-Kryvyi Ryh Republic.880  
While being relatively quiescent in the years that followed its ban, Donetsk Republic began organising 
regular pickets, meetings and campaigns once Yanukovych was in power. From 2011, they held a regular 
campaign to honour the Russian Flag in Donets’k.881 On 4 May 2012, they organised a campaign for unity 
 















BE%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%B6%D0%B8&w=wall-3223620_17610; http://archive.is/sO0qH.  
877 “V Donetske na russhkom marshe s natsistskoi simvolikoi trebovali zakryt’ posol’stvo SSHA video”, Novosti 
Donbassa, 4 March 2013.  
878 https://donbassrus.livejournal.com/2008/12/20/; http://archive.is/kqWBr.  
879 https://donbassrus.livejournal.com/2009/01/12/http://archive.is/Vxx8q 





with Russia.882 Throughout 2012 -2013, a number of pickets was held,883 at one of which a member of 
Edinaya Rossiya (United Russia) was present. 884In 2013, they picketed the SBU building in Donets’k885 
and the USA consulate in Kyiv.886 They had activists in Horlivka and Makiivka and campaigned there.887 
Both the Donetsk Republic movement and “Donbas Rus’” had experience in violently confronting 
Ukrainian nationalist organisations,888 such as during meetings in April 2012 and during the “Russian 
March” meeting on 4 November 2011.889  
9.2. Radical protest in a concentrated patronage region  
Once Yanukovych’s network collapsed in the centre, the elites in the concentrated patronage region of 
Donets’k began behaving very differently from their counterparts in Kharkiv. They used the time lag 
between the sudden change of the governing network and a viable settlement between the region and the 
centre (which never came to pass) to make demands on the centre to keep their concentrated patronage 
system. These demands concerned their ability to stay in power, continue accessing resources from the 
centre, and keep their assets. During this time lag, radical pro-Russian contention developed with the 




882 m-kalashnikov.livejournal.com/1250205.html#cutid1; http://archive.is/VniRH.  
883 https://vk.com/wall-3223620?day=20112013&q=%D0%BF%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%B5%D1%82&w=wall-
3223620_14680; http://archive.is/uzPUD.  
884 https://vk.com/wall-
3223620?day=20112013&q=%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%8F%20%D1%80%D0%BE
%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D1%8F&w=wall-3223620_14678; http://archive.is/pchAr.  
885 https://vk.com/wall-3223620?day=20112013&q=%D0%BF%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%B5%D1%82&w=wall-
3223620_19913; http://archive.is/sNeXB.  










=wall-3223620_18218; http://archive.is/Zgd6J ; http://archive.is/TKbYU.  
888 https://donbassrus.livejournal.com/2009/01/29/; http://archive.is/5vbUh.  




The rapid militarisation in the region was caused by three developments. Firstly, in stark contrast to what 
took place in Kharkiv city, where the radicals from Oplot were quickly neutralised, no attempt was made 
to control the radical groups, such as the Donetsk Republic and Pavel Gubarev’s Narodnoe Opolchenie 
Donbassa (Donbas People’s Self-Defence/Militia), in Donets’k region. In fact, Oplot fighters began 
arriving to Donets’k. Secondly, the office of the Security Service of Ukraine was stormed twice and 
weapons were acquired from its stockpiles (Protest Organiser 1 in Kharkiv, interview 24 09 2018). In my 
interview with Journalist 1, he stated that the buildings were taken “too easily”. The SBU building was 
“taken by 40 people at most; nobody knew who opened the room where the weapons were stored” (19 
07 2019). This was because the disturbances caused by the protestors were handled by the local police 
subservient to the local oligarchs, rather than the SBU, as in Kharkiv. Thirdly, Kyiv government’s 
decision to send military hardware to Donets’k (people began spotting tanks from 16 March at the latest) 
can be interpreted as an attempt to break the non-transparency of information flows between Donets’k 
region’s elites and the centre. To use the terminology of the civil war research, this meant that the Kyiv 
government wanted to force the elites to reveal their true intentions and begin negotiating with the centre. 
If we extrapolate rebel characteristics to these elites, it meant that by sending military hardware to the 
region, the centre wanted to find out who the rebels were (J. D. Fearon and Laitin, 2003). When Strelkov 
arrived to the region, it was too late to bargain.   
At first, the elites in Donets’k recognised the new government. On 23 February, the governor Shyshatskiy 
issued a statement in which he described his meeting with Rinat Akhmetov and “other respected people” 
of Donets’k. The governor posted a message on the regional administration’s website stating that “all of 
them see our common future in indivisible and independent Ukraine."890 On the following day, 
Shyshatsky stated that he recognised the Rada as the only legitimate authority in the country.891 On 25 
February, Donets’k mayor Oleksandr Luk’yanchenko issued a similar statement.892 
 
890 “Akhmetov potreboval prekratit’ razgovory o separatizme – gubernator”, Novosti Donbassa, 24 February 2014; 
“Akhmetov sees future of Ukraine in unity and integrity - Donets’k governor” Interfax: Russia & CIS General 
Newswire,  23 February 2014.   
891 “Ukraine’s Donets’k governor says parliament only legitimate power body”, BBC Monitoring Ukraine & Baltics, 24 
February 2014.   
892 “Donets’k Mayor Recognises Verkhovna Rada’s Legitimacy”, Interfax: Russian & CIS General Newswire, 25 
February 2014.  
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At the same time, owing to the poor transparency of information flows between the centre and the 
region, clandestine armed mobilisation began taking place in Donets’k region and those who possessed 
arms and made radical demands took centre stage. Activist from Donets’k told me that by mid-March, 
there were around 37 armed groups in Donets’k (27 07 2019). Elite Member 1 confirmed to me that 
“after Yanukovych fled Kyiv, the people began protesting spontaneously against the radicals of the Right 
Sector, the nationalists, and for the federalisation of Ukraine” (22 07 2019). Most significantly, after the 
Cabinet was formed in Kyiv on 27 February, the elites openly endorsed Pavel Gubarev, later proclaimed 
“people’s governor”, known for his radicalism, and made no attempt to stop the spontaneous armed 
mobilisation. The radical “Donetsk Republic” group appeared at almost all of the pro-Russian meetings 
(Interview with Journalist 1 19 07 2019), and their flags were hoisted on important government buildings. 
The elites began promoting a local referendum on federalisation which was against the law (Interview 
with Journalist 119 07 2019; Activist in Kharkiv interview 16 07 2019).  
The first anti-government meetings in Donets’k began on 22 February, after Yanukovych left Kyiv.893 
From 23 February, there were more anti-government meetings in various parts of Donets’k,894 including 
on the Lenin Square and next to the regional administration building.895 People went through the streets 
with Russian and Communist Party’s flags,896 the flags of Donetsk Republic,897 and disrupted the 
memorial service to the victims of the snipers massacre (20 February in Kyiv).898 The meetings were 
organised by the Russian Bloc, the Communist Party of Ukraine, Gubarev’s Narodnoe Opolchenie, and 
Oplot,899 which is corroborated by the evidence from the video from 23 February where the speaker 
refers to his leader as Yevhen Zhilin.900 The meetings gathered daily, according to user frankensstein, with 
 
893 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=odzC84iFY6c  
894 “Miting v Donetske 23 fevralia 2014. Chto na samom dele dumaiut zhiteli Donetska”, YouTube, 24 February 2014 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2aklurujd9A .  
895 Ibid.  
896 On the video here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2aklurujd9A  
897See photo here: “Fotoreportazh iz tsentra Donetska 23 fevralia: storonniki novoi i staroi vlasti vstretilis’”, Novosti 
Donbassa, 23 February 2014. 
898 “Janukowitsch-Anhänger demonstrieren im Osten der Ukraine”, Euronews, 23 February 2014; A. Smale, “Ukraine: 
Joy in Kyiv Confronts Fury in the East”, The New York Times, 24 February 2014.  
899 “Gruppy grazhdan sobiraiutsia raznykh chastiakh tsentra Donetska. U nikh oruzhie?”, Novosti Donbassa, 23 
February 2014; https://web.archive.org/web/20190531091631/https://vk.com/wall-
67059574?offset=46500&own=1&w=wall-67059574_1 – Gubarev begins organising his meetings from 25 February 
2014. https://vk.com/wall-67059574?offset=46500&own=1&w=wall-67059574_1 ; http://archive.is/UVkNe; 
900 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=odzC84iFY6c ; There was an interesting age dynamics of these meetings 
when younger individuals appealing to direct action such as “seizure of the state administration” would be 
immediately labelled “provocateurs”.   
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up to 300 people continuously guarding Lenin monument on the Lenin Square “to protect Donets’k 
against the Maidan”.901 This was also corroborated by the evidence from a representative of the Russian 
Bloc.902 
Open calls to arms were made at these early Russian Spring meetings. During the meeting on 22 February 
organised by “Oplot” in Donets’k, the leaders voiced concerns over the arrival of “Banderovsty” not only 
to Kharkiv but also to Donets’k.903 The speaker emphasised the extent of violence in Kyiv in graphic 
detail by claiming that his men were “shot” as if in wartime.904 He repeatedly stressed that the Maidan 
activists wanted to come “to kills us” and that “we cannot negotiate with them”. During the Communist 
Party meeting on 23 February, a man from the “Donbas defence” unit in Abakumovo proposed full 
military mobilisation, indicating that his unit might have possessed arms.905 The chief of Donets’k police 
Mykola Kryuchenko claimed that due to the proliferation of rumours about the alleged arrival of 
extremists to Donets’k, some people began forming self-defence groups. He further stated that the police 
was inundated with daily reports that there were unauthorised groups of armed people gathering in the 
city each day.906 Donets’k city mayor Luk’yanchenko claimed that he received pleas for protection from 
various people daily.907 This readiness to defend the city against the “extremists from the Maidan” is 
corroborated in an entry from 23 February from a LiveJournal user, describing a memorial meeting next 
to Taras Shevchenko monument. The protestors claimed they were defending the people of Donets’k 
from “Banderovtsy and Nazi from Kyiv”.908 In addition, recruitment into self-defence units was 
advertised on various LiveJournal pages.909 From 23 February, the so-called “Eastern Front” began 
forming self-defence units on the Lenin Square in Donets’k.910 On 25 February, Eudard Okopov of the 
 
901 “Ne pustit’ Maidan na Donbass – obzor blogov foto video”, Novosti Donbassa, 27 February 2014.  
902 https://donbassrus.livejournal.com/2014/02/25/; http://archive.is/Z7Dz5.  
903 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=odzC84iFY6c  
904 See the video interview with the activists of “Eastern Front” by Novosti Donbassa journalists Oleksyi Matsuka and 
Vitaly Sizov. “V Donetske neskol’ko chelovek otkryli “Vostochnyi Front” – video”, Novosti Donbassa, 22 February 
2014.  
905 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2aklurujd9A 
906 http://peter-slyadek.livejournal.com/2014/02/23/; http://archive.is/hOH03 
907 “Mer Donetska nazval provokatsiiami prizyvi k gorozhanam vziatsia za oruzhie”, Novosti Donbassa, 26 February 
2014.  
908 https://peter-slyadek.livejournal.com/2014/02/23/; http://archive.is/hOH03.  
909 http://alexlotov.livejournal.com/581239.html ; http://archive.is/u4z5I;  https://vk.com/club65054850 ; 
http://archive.is/8gvD5; http://aloban75.livejournal.com/595222.html ; http://archive.is/7XMzJ ;“Donetsk 23 
Fevralia pomianul pogibshih na Maidane i zashchishchal gubernatora – video”, Novosti Donbassa, 23 February 2014. 




“Eastern Front” asked Luk’yanchenko whether he could use barracks to train his followers. 
Luk’yanchenko was reported to have agreed on condition that the groups be supervised by the police.911 
According to my interview with Activist from Donets’k, these groups were most probably connected to 
some local elites (27 07 2019).  
Pavel Gubarev’s Narodnoe Opolchenie probably possessed arms. In Fakel Novorossii, for example, 
Gubarev states that he used the money from his firm’s account to buy arms (Gubarev, 2016, 85).  In a 
post on his Vkontakte page, he claimed to have received information about people who were “arming 
themselves en masse”.912 In an interview to Lenta.ru, he claimed to have a shaky command of disparate 
armed self-defence units.913 Yet, in a post on 28 February, he stated that the Opolchenie would engage 
only in a peaceful protest.914 On 5 March in an interview, he said that his followers were armed.915  
As in Kharkiv, the regional branch of the Communist Party organised the defence of the Lenin 
monument but in contrast to Kharkiv, the radicals from the Donetsk Republic group were allowed to join 
them.916 One can see the Donetsk Republic flags on the photos.917 On 5 March, it was reported that a 
group of potentially armed people called “Donbas self-defence” joined the Communist Party in their 
tents.918 In contrast to Kharkiv, where Kernes prohibited these meetings personally, in Donets’k, after an 
attempt to destroy the tent city, the protestors restored it.919 
The pinnacle of political opportunity for the radicals was reached when Pavel Gubarev was allowed to 
speak at the city council session on 28 February, following the formation of the now Bat’kivshchina-
dominated Cabinet in Kyiv. Gubarev held strong pro-Russian views and believed in an unbridgeable rift 
between the two parts of Ukraine. Anton Shekhovtsov describes Gubarev as a member of the “Russian 
National Unity” party founded in Moscow in 1990 and formerly a member of the Progressive Socialist 
 
911 “Mer Donetska ne razreshil “.Vostochnomu Frontu” zhit’ v kazarmakh i sobirat’ Avtomat”, Ostrov, 25 February 
2014.  
912 https://vk.com/wall-67059574?offset=47260&own=1&w=wall-67059574_332; http://archive.is/Y4dmU.  
913 “Moia populiarnost’ – eto ikh glupost”, Lenta.ru, 5 March 2014.  
914 https://vk.com/wall-67059574?offset=47260&own=1&w=wall-67059574_635; http://archive.is/N187g.  
915 “Narodnyi gubernator” Donetska priznal, chto ego boitsy vooruzheny”, Novosti Donbassa, 5 March 2014.  
916 “Bez psikhov. Meru Donetska ne ochen’ po dushe “Vostochnyi Front””, Ostrov, 25 February 2014.  
917 “Fotofakt. Zhiteli Donetska ne speshat zapisyvat’sia v “Vostochnyi Front”, Ostrov, 25 February 2014.  
918 “Dopolneno. Na ploshchadi Lenina v Donetske pod okhranoi bol’shogo kolichestva militsii nachalsia miting v 
zashchitu edinstva Ukrainy”, Ostrov, 5 March 2014.  
919 “Na ploshchadi Lenina v tsentre Donetska neizvestnye napali na palatki kommunistov”, Novosti Donbassa, 10 
March 2014.  
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Party of Ukraine headed by Natalya Vitrenko (Shekhovtsov 2014).920 Activist from Donets’k described 
Gubarev to me in the following terms: “Gubarev was entirely pro-Russian. He could not tolerate different 
points of view. After the Euromaidan he became very aggressive and even more intolerant”. Activist from 
Donets’k told me that he blamed Gubarev and “his wife Katya” for the war because “they overestimated 
themselves” (27 07 2019). In his book Fakel Novorossii, Gubarev describes the formation of his strong 
pro-Russian views at length. There is some indirect evidence that by the beginning of the first major 
protest on 1 March, Gubarev had already made some key contacts with Strelkov’s group and perhaps 
some Russian activists. For example, in his Vkontakte post on 27 February, he claims to have travelled to 
Moscow. He also says that, in his discussion with the people in Moscow, he discovered that they had a 
“very deep and correct” understanding of what was going on in Ukraine.921 On 27 February, he openly 
stated on his Vkontakte page that “the possibility of an armed civil conflict is very high”. In a string of 
posts on the same day, he made the following statements: “I am sure that, regardless of the methods of 
confrontation, we will eventually inhabit a completely different cultural space”; “it seems that united 
Ukraine has ceased its existence”.922  
On 28 February, Gubarev presented his “ultimatum” at the Donets’k city council meeting.  In the 
ultimatum, Gubarev claimed that the Rada was illegitimate because it was under control of the armed 
groups from the Maidan. He also called the new Cabinet of Ministers and all the acts adopted by the Rada 
illegitimate. He pledged that Donets’k regional governor Shyshatskiy should stop making transfers to the 
State Treasury.923 According to Gubarev, the city council must recognise itself as the only legitimate 
government body in the region, in accordance with the resolutions of the all-southeast congress in 
Kharkiv on 22 February, and dismiss the state security chiefs. Gubarev stated that if the council fails to 
comply with his ultimatum, the Narodnoe Opolchenie would “take measures accordingly”.924  
 
920 “”Opolchentsy potrebovali Donetskii gorsovet uvolit’ “banderovskogo” gubernatora Shishatskogo – video”, 
Novosti Donbassa, 28 February 2014.   
921 https://vk.com/wall-67059574?offset=46460&own=1&w=wall-67059574_328 ; http://archive.is/AKvzv.  
922 Ibid. https://vk.com/wall-67059574?offset=47260&own=1&w=wall-67059574_352 ; http://archive.is/3W1SV. 
923 Ibid.; For the full video “28.02.2014 Pavel Gubarev vystupaet na sessii Donetskogo gorsoveta ot imeni naroda”, 
YouTube, 28 February 2014 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OHXblqMZzYU. 
924 Ibid.   
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At this meeting, Gubarev was endorsed by the former city council secretary and, at the time, the Party of 
Regions’ deputy in the Rada Mykola Levchenko,925 who became a self-styled intermediary between the 
region and the centre and, according to Activist from Donets’k, “made most mistakes; he felt himself a 
[minor] god”. Accordingly, Levchenko said that Gubarev was “90% right”. He reiterated the rumour that 
the “fascists were coming to Donets’k” and blamed the fugitive government for what had happened in 
the country. Gubarev later stated that Levchenko approached him with a hostile intent (allegedly 
Levchenko threatened him with a gun), but the mere fact that Levchenko, an elite member, approached 
Gubarev at all is significant.926 After Gubarev’s speech, on 1 and 3 March, the regional administration 
building was stormed by pro-Russian activists. According to reports and witness testimony, on 3 March, 
they managed to occupy the debating chamber927 and reached the fourth floor of the building.928 The 
governor Shyshatskiy resigned under pressure from Gubarev. According to my interview with Journalist 
1, “There was the regional council’s session behind closed doors during which the deputy chairman of the 
regional council Oleksandr Tret’yak presented his scenario of how things were going to develop from 
now on. For many, the scenario was too apocalyptic, so they refused to believe, but Shyshatskiy believed 
and decided to jump out of the burning plane” (19 07 2019).  Gubarev’s Narodnoe Opolchenie and 
Donetsk Republic then continued to appear at all the meetings, making their radical demands.929 Gubarev 
was proclaimed people’s governor on 1 March. There was no similar development in Kharkiv at the time.  
What followed was a subtle bargaining game between the elites and the radical forces in the region and 
between the elites and the centre. This was confirmed to me in an interview with Journalist 1 who said 
that the elites “bargained to protect their seats, money and avoid responsibility”. To Journalist 1, they 
projected what happened in 2004 onto 2014 but failed to assess the situation properly. “People like 
Levchenko sought to earn some political capital out of the whole situation”. When I asked about 
Akhmetov, Journalist 1 said that “Akhmetov took too long to make the right decisions” (19 07 2019). In 
 
925 “”Regionaly” golosovali za Iatseniuka, chtoby on ikh zashchitil – rasskazal Levchenko video”, Novosti Donbassa, 
28 February 2014; Full video here “Sessiia Donetskogo gorsoveta v priamom efire video”, Novosti Donbassa, 28 
February 2014.  
926 https://vk.com/wall-67059574?offset=46760&own=1&w=wall-67059574_1337 ; http://archive.is/nsR1K.  
927 “Police "evacuate" pro-Russian loyalists from state building in east Ukraine”, BBC Monitoring Newsfile, 5 March 
2014.  
928 “Videofakt. V Donetske zakhvatyvaiut oblastnuiu gosudarstvennuiu administratsiiu”, Ostrov, 3 March 2014.  
929“Prorossiiskie mitinguiushchie polnost’iu perekryli dvizhenie na tsentral’noi ulitse Donetska”, Ostrov, 9 March 
2014; https://vk.com/wall-67059574?day=08032014; http://archive.is/2J7Bv.  
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line with my discussion of concentrated patronage, the elites in Donets’k region fell on their old 
bargaining ploys to retain their concentrated patronage system and accommodate themselves to the new 
governing network. They made a series of decentralisation and federalisation proposals on their own 
terms throughout this period. These were deeply clientelistic demands, among which was the right to 
influence the governor appointments and retain as many taxes as they could in the region. These 
proposals clashed with the proposals made by Volodymyr Hroisman, from Vinnitsa region, an unknown 
quantity for Donets’k elites. Budgetary federalism (Elite Member 1 email exchange 22 07 2019) would 
have allowed the elites to control financial flows between the centre and the region. Also, because under 
Yanukovych Donets’k received a disproportionate amount of resources from the state budget and the 
budgetary sequesterisation decreased, Donets’k regional elites were keen on keeping access to the 
budgetary resources. With the ability of influencing the regional governor appointments, the elites were 
hoping to concentrate around one patron again and limit the presence of other political forces in the 
region. In effect, they were hoping to reduce their transaction costs with the members of rival networks.  
Accordingly, in their appeal to the Verkhovna Rada on 28 February, the deputies of the city council 
demanded the establishment of budgetary federalism and for the Rada not to appoint the heads of the 
regional administrations without the prior discussion with the existing regional councils.930 The most 
startling example of concentrated patronage demands was the decision to conduct the federalisation 
referendum on 1 March. It was clearly against the law and it demonstrated that the local elites did not 
know the law. We might therefore interpret that the Donbas was indeed “a law in itself” because the elites 
attempted to bend the law, as it were. According to the reports, under the pressure from the pro-Russian 
activists, Donets’k city council convened an extraordinary session and proclaimed itself the only legitimate 
body in the region, “until establishing the legitimacy of the laws adopted by the Rada”. Moreover, "with 
the aim of ensuring the calm of citizens on Donets’k territory and protecting them from possible 
aggressive demonstrations by radical nationalist forces," the deputies decided to set up their own 
municipal police. The elites also demanded that the regional council to call a referendum on Donbas's 
 
930 “Donetskii gorsovet vydvigaet trebovaniia k parlamentu”, Novosti Donbassa, 28 February 2014.  
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future. The city council also unanimously supported the initiative to regard Russia as a strategic partner of 
Donbas.931 
These decisions were not constitutional because according to the Constitution from 22.02.2014, only the 
Rada and the President, and not the regional council, could set up a referendum on the territorial changes 
in Ukraine. Additionally, in accordance with Article 72 of the Ukrainian Constitution, the all-Ukrainian 
referendum must be held on request of no fewer than 3 million citizens of Ukraine eligible to vote, on the 
condition that signatures for such a referendum are collected in no fewer than two-thirds of regions, with 
at least one hundred thousand signatures from each region. According to Article 73, the questions of 
territory were decided by an all-Ukrainian referendum.932  
Despite this, the elites were undeterred. During the regional council session on 3 March, 98 deputies 
voted for a referendum.933 Again, they demanded a referendum to be held on the territory of Donets’k 
region and to set up public formations in line with the law of Ukraine "On participation of citizens in 
defending public order and state borders". They were guided by Articles 7, 10, 140, 144 of the 
Constitution of Ukraine and Articles 10, 43 of the law of Ukraine "On local self-government in Ukraine". 
This was highly misleading because Articles 7, 10, 140 and 144 of the Constitution did not say anything 
about the referendum. In fact, Article 144 stated that if the deputies disregard the law in any way, they 
would be punished. The Law on Self-Government stated that a local council cannot make decisions 
outside its purview (Article 7.3).934 Still, on 13 March the governor Shyshatskiy was reported to have 
created a working group to put the referendum forward. According to Novosti Donbassa, the referendum 
working group included Eduard Akopov, the head of the Eastern Front (a self-defence unit), the 
representatives of “Donbas Rus’” organsation and people with radical views, such as Tetiana 
Marmazova.935  
 
931 “Councillors in east Ukrainian city refuse to recognize central government”, BBC Monitoring Newsfile, 1 March 
2014.  
932 “Kontsitutsiia Ukrayiny ot 22.02.2014”, Zakon.Rada, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-
%D0%B2%D1%80/ed20140222.  
933 “Ukraine's Donets’k regional council votes to hold referendum as building occupied”, BBC Monitoring Newsfile, 
3 March 2014.  
 
934 “Pro misteve samovriaduvannia v Ukrayini”, Zakon.Rada, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/280/97-
%D0%B2%D1%80.  
935 “Andrei Shishatskii nachal gotovit’ referendum v Donetskoi oblasti”, Novosti Donbassa, 21 March 2014.  
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Similarly, the elites neglected the Law on Self-Government which stated that any self-defence units had to 
be properly registered. Thus on 4 March, the mayor Luk’yanchenko stated that the elites were going to 
institute self-defence units.936 There had already been several groups of men patrolling the city council 
building; Luk’yanchenko said that these were the representatives of civil society working closely with the 
deputies of the city council guarding the public order.937  
 The radicals continued to access the largesse of the local elites. Gubarev was again allowed to speak at 
the city council session on 3 March, and there was information circulating that Donets’k city council set 
up a referendum for the Donets’k region to become part of Russia.938 It was reported that Donets’k’s 
own self-defence force was being created; and that they began forming the interim government.939 
Gubarev and his Nardonoe Opolchenie then continued to make radical demands. On 4 March, he issued 
the following statement: “The main questions that would be put forward during the referendum are the 
question of the future statehood (Donets’k region as part of a federal Ukraine, Donets’k region as an 
independent Donets’k Republic, Donets’k region as part of the Russian Federation); Who is going to be 
the next governor: Gubarev or Taruta; The language to be used on the territory of Donets’k region.”940 
Radicalisation quickly diffused in the region. On 5 March, during a meeting in Slov’’ians’k, the town 
mayor Nelya Shtepa said that she was willing to give money for a sociological survey to find out what the 
residents of Sloviansk were supporting.941 On the same day there was a meeting for autonomy in 
Slov’’ians’k.942 
The elites converged with Gubarev on their demands for budgetary federalism. In his post on 3 March, 
Gubarev promised to retain 70% of taxes in the region.943 Elite Member 1 confirmed to me his 
statements in the press about the budgetary federalism. He sent me a large list of his publications, many 
 
936 “Mer Donetska schitaet, chto samooborona mozhet stat’ osnovoii munitsipal’noii militsii”, Novosti Donbassa, 4 
March 2014.  
937 “Krepkie obshchestvenniki okhraniaiut Donetskii gorsovet ot prorossiiskikh aktivistov”, Novosti Donbassa, 4 
March 2014.  
938 “Situatsiia v zdanii DONOGA. Shishatskii – spiker. Nachalsia shturm: obnovlenie online video”, Novosti 
Donbassa, 3 March 2014.  
939 “Zakhvatchiki Donestkoi OGA formuruiut “vremennoe pravitel’stvo Donbassa”, Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, 3 March 
2014.  
940 https://vk.com/wall-67059574?day=04032014&w=wall-67059574_9809%2Fall; http://archive.is/UFM7d.  
941 “Miting v Slavianske za edinuiu Ukrainu: Mera Neliu Shtepu uvezli na skoroii video”, Novosti Donbassa, 6 March 
2014.  
942 “V Slavianske prizyvaiut vykhodit’ na miting protiv voiny i za avtonomiiu”, Novosti Donbassa, 5 March 2014.  
943 https://vk.com/wall-67059574?day=08032014&q=70%25&w=wall-67059574_7302 ; http://archive.is/uq0y9.  
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of which described the advantages of budgetary federalism in Ukraine. According to Serhiy Bogachov, the 
representatives of Donets’k region at the Congress on 22 February were supposed to press for budgetary 
federalism and decentralisation of government, so some of the key responsibilities, such as the 
registration of businesses, would be passed to the regional government.944 Serhiy Bogachov continued to 
advocate a referendum throughout this period.945 Accordingly, on 5 March, Donets’k treasury building 
was seized and occupied for a brief period by Gubarev’s group in order to stop budgetary transfers to 
Kyiv.946 People commenting on Gubarev’s page said they disagreed with the continuing practice of 
transferring money to Kyiv to “rebuild the Maidan”.947  
The Party of Regions’ deputies continued to make demands for federalisation in this period. On 13 
March, they issued the following motion: “It is necessary to change the approach to the tax and budgetary 
policies, in accordance with the principles of budgetary federalism, that is the autonomous functioning of 
the budgets at different levels… [We must have] a territorial principle of tax levying: taxes should be paid 
where productive forces are located and the added value is formed…”.948 Similarly, Borys Kolesnikov 
advocated federal solutions for Ukraine throughout this period.949 On 19 March, the governor Shyshatsky 
sent a communique to Kyiv requesting an urgent revision of the law on referendums, to allow a municipal 
police force to be formed, and budgetary laws to be changed.950  
The election of Mykola Levchenko to the position of the chairman of the local Party of Regions on 19 
March951 and his role as an intermediary signalled to the radicals that they could press their radical 
 
944 “Donetskaia delegatsiia v Khar’kove budet trebovat’ detsentralizatsii vlasti i biudzhetnogo federalizma – sekretar’ 
Donetskogo gorsoveta”, Ostrov, 22 February 2014.  
945 “Sekretar’ Donetskogo gorodskogo soveta predlozhil provesti Vseukrainskii referendum o vozmozhnom 






D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%BE&w=wall-67059574_23333; http://archive.is/SqdO6; “200 chelovek 
blokirovali ulitsy vokrug zdaniia Donetskogo SBU i shatali trolleybus – foto / video”, Novosti Donbassa, 6 March 
2014.  
947 https://vk.com/wall-67059574?day=08032014.; https://archive.is/2J7Bv  
948 http://www.ostro.org/Donets’k/politics/articles/439910/  
949 “Konferentsiia partii regionov vse video”, Novosti Donbassa, 22 March 2014.  
950 “Shishatskii trebuet russkii iazyk vtorym gosudarstvennym”, Novosti Donbassa, 31 March 2014.  




demands. Levchenko was famous for his Ukrainophobia. On 6 March Levchenko continued to endorse 
Gubarev at meetings.952 On 12 March, during a Party of Regions conference, Levchenko offered to bail 
out Gubarev, who had been imprisoned by the SBU by that time. Luk’yanchenko promised to discuss this 
at the next meeting of the regional branch of the Party of Regions. 953 On 27 March, Levchenko made his 
own federalisation proposals: “I support the political models of Germany and USA. A federal state 
structure strengthens the state.” He also said that he had already lodged some proposals along 
federalisation lines in the Rada before: “The income tax to remain in the regions, the regional head of the 
Ministry of the Interior and the regional prosecutor to be appointed in agreement with the authority 
representing the community; State Treasury has no right to distribute and use the money of the local 
budgets”.954  
 During this period, the elites fragmented which prevented them from establishing effective control over 
the radicals. This was especially true when it came to the newly appointed governor Serhiy Taruta. In 
effect, the elites were using Gubarev’s “election” as people’s governor to force Taruta out. Activist from 
Donets’k told me in the interview that “Gubarev’s popularity was sky-rocketing; he was even more 
popular than Akhmetov” (27 07 2019). Journalist 1 in an interview with me stated that the power of the 
regional governor in Ukraine usually stemmed from his control over the prosecutor and the local law 
enforcement agents. The governor would use his informal connections with these structures to control 
the region. However, “the appointment of Taruta was very unfortunate,” Journalist 1 said, “Kyiv wanted 
a figure entirely subservient to itself and with poor control of the region. Taruta made a big mistake when 
he accepted this position; his appointment was not confirmed with the local elites as it should have been 
and had been traditionally with the previous governors”. Activist from Donets’k also confirmed to me 
that Taruta’s appointment was unfortunate: “By that time, he had lived abroad for many years and did not 
know the context at all. He could talk a lot but do very little”. Hence, on 4 March, the prosecutor filed a 
complaint with the district administrative court against the city council’s decision to conduct a 
 
952 “V deputata Levchenko stronniki “narodnogo gubernatora” Donetskoi oblasti brosili ogryzkom. A on khotel 
obniat’ Gubareva”, Ostrov, 6 March 2014.  
953 “Luk’yanchenko ne mozhet vziat’ na poruki “narodnogo gubernatora” Gubareva”, Novosti Donbassa, 12 March 
2014.  
954 “Dlia Levchenko vopros federalizatsii seichas ne aktualen”, Novosti Donbassa, 27 March 2014.  
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referendum on 1 March.955 This demonstrates that the elites did not act in concert and that the prosecutor 
was not controlling the situation. The governor Taruta,956 who criticised the Party of Regions for 
corruption,957 in later interviews claimed that he could not make anyone agree on an appropriate course 
of action.958 Taruta stated that the border with Russia has to be closed to stop people with radical ideas 
and GRU from arriving to Ukraine. He and his brother dug out a trench along the 90-mile Donets’k-
Russia border to fend off invasion.959 In his 2015 interview, he stated that on 6 April, when the regional 
administration building was occupied, the siloviki or the SBU stopped controlling the situation.960  
Even after the violence on 13 March, the elites did not prohibit people from conducting their meetings, 
in contrast to their Kharkiv counterparts. On 14 March, Donets’k city council filed a lawsuit with 
Donets’k district administrative court to ban the meetings on 15 and 16 March because of the danger of 
violent clashes.961 On 15 March, the district judge declined the request arguing that there was “no 
evidence of danger”.962 Donbassrus user explained on his blog that it was the Russian Bloc party who 
won the case against the city council in the district court.963 Konstantin Pozhidaev, the head of the local 
police stressed that only the court and the judge could prohibit the meetings; neither the police nor the 
city council could do this.964 
The patterns of protest and protest violence mirrored the actions of the elites. On 16 March the pro-
Russian protestors stormed the prosecutor building in Donets’k and mounted the Russian flag on the 
building. The protestors were planning to storm and occupy the office of Serhiy Taruta.965 On the same 
day, the SBU building was stormed and the flag of the Donetsk Republic and the Russian flag were 
 
955 “Donetskaia prokuratura obratilas’ v sud s trebovaniem otmenit’ reshenie gorsoveta o iazyke, strategicheskom 
partnere i militsii”, Ostrov, 4 March 2014.  
956 “Oligarch tightens Kiev grip on restive Donetsk; battle for Ukraine; Governor's action” 7 March 2014 
957 “Taruta nameknul, chto Shishatskii “vymyl” ogromnye sredstva iz regiona”, Novosti Donbassa, 23 March 2014.  
958 “Interv’iu Sergeiia Taruty: nuzhno zakryt’ granitsu s RF”, Novosti Donbassa, 3 March 2014; 
www.youtube.com/watch?v¼ExyZWfjHbRs. 
959 “Pro-Russian protests diminish in eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk region; New Donetsk governor tamps down 
rumors of fascist rampage - and interest in Moscow”, Washington Post.com, 3 April 2014.  
960 www.youtube.com/watch?v¼ExyZWfjHbRs.  
961 “Mer Donetska prosit sud otmenit’ mitingi 15 i 16 Marta”, Novosti Donbassa, 14 March 2014.  
962 “Sud reshil, chto prorosiiskie mitingi v tsentre Donetska “ne nesut opasnosti”, Novosti Donbassa, 15 March 2014; 
“Court in Ukraine's Donets’k refuses to ban pro-Russian rallies”, BBC Monitoring Newsfile, 15 March 2014.  
963 https://donbassrus.livejournal.com/2014/03/16/; http://archive.is/1FJuF.  
964 “Militsia hochet zapretit’ provedenie mitingov v tsentre Donetska”, Novosti Donbassa , 3 April 2014.  
965 “V Donetske prorossiiskie aktivisty osvobozhdaiut zdanie prokuratury (obnovleno)”, Novosti Donbassa, 16 March 
2014; https://peter-slyadek.livejournal.com/2014/03/17/; http://archive.is/YYXkz.  
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mounted on the building.966 The protestors entered the SBU building freely on 16 March.967 The SBU was 
stormed again on 21 March.968 People continued to protest under Russian flags in Mariupol969 and 
Donets’k.970 Similarly, people began setting up checkpoints.971 There was a recruitment into armed units 
in Slov’’ians’k.972 After 16 March, Donbass People’s Militia organised a checkpoint near Yasinovata traffic 
police on the way to Donets’k. People begin mobilising and checkpoints appear one after another. It was 
reported that by 19 March there were around 10 similar checkpoints.973 
By 31 March 2014, the elites continued to demand radical changes from the Rada.974 Thus Donets’k 
mayor issued the following statement: “The current crisis in the country can be "settled only by amending 
the Constitution"; Council members believe it necessary for "the Constitutional Assembly to resume work 
immediately and start drafting a new version of the constitution that would guarantee decentralisation of 
government by giving the local authorities broader powers and responsibility for the state of affairs in the 
region, the creation of regional and district executive bodies, and the formation (pending parliamentary 
elections) of a two-chamber parliament, where the upper house will express the interests of regions and 
its members will have the right of legislative initiative," the appeal said. 
 
966 https://donbassrus.livejournal.com/2014/03/16/; http://archive.is/1FJuF 
967 “Mitinguiushchie khodili k Donetskomu SBU, potom poshli v ISD i ushli v oblsovet”, Novosti Donbassa, 16 
March 2014.  
968 “Donetskie separatist prodolzhaiut razvlekat’sia – obzor pressy”, Novosti Donbassa, 25 March 2014.  
969 http://www.ostro.org/Donets’k/society/news/440421/  
970 https://vk.com/wall-3223620?day=31032014&w=wall-3223620_45965%2Fall; http://archive.is/AuXTu;  
971 I have collected ample evidence of these checkpoints being set up spontaneously by the people: 
https://vk.com/wall-3223620?day=21032014&w=wall-3223620_41069 ; https://archive.is/MsMgG; 
https://vk.com/wall-67059574?day=31032014&w=wall-67059574_167205%2Fall; http://archive.is/biQl7; 
http://www.interpretermag.com/ukraine-liveblog-day-37-russian-troops-on-the-move/; 
https://archive.is/hXYQw https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01eWab_Wvvc ; 
https://frankensstein.livejournal.com/2014/03/28/; https://archive.is/S8kdv   “Kommunal’shchiki i militsiia 
Gorlovki pytalis’ razblokirovat’ blokpost prorossiiskikh aktivistov”, Novosti Donbassa, 4 April 2014; “Blokposty 
separatistov na donetskikh dorogakh”, Ostrov, 27 March 2014.  
972 https://vk.com/wall-67349914?own=1; http://archive.is/yGBtm; https://vk.com/wall-
65540286?day=28022014&q=%D0%A1%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%B2%D1%8F%D0%BD%D1%81%D0%BA%
20; http://archive.is/j5ljE.  
973 “Gorod na zamke: na v’ezde v Gorlovku mestnymi aktivistami i dobrovol’tsami organizovan blok-post”, 
Gorlovka.ua, 19 March 2014.  
974 “Donets’k regional council demands official status for Russian language Itar-Tass”, ITAR-TASS World Service, 31 
March 2014.  
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This clashed with the proposals made by Hroisman, who vowed to use the Polish example at government 
decentralisation. Hroisman’s proposals contained the provisions to vest regional governors with a 
controlling function. This did not suppose that the regional councils would influence governor 
appointments. Hroisman also proposed to increase the role of the State Treasury in order to control how 
the regional budgets were performing. The process of decentralisation was supposed to be slow and 
would involve all tiers of government. The proposals envisaged to retain 25% but not 50% or 70% of 
regional taxes in the region.975  
The elites in Donets’k, however, continued to make their concentrated patronage demands. On 1 April, 
Shyshatskiy send a letter to Hroisman outlining his own decentralisation proposals:976 “A new 
Constitution that would decentralise the government; the creation of executive committees of the 
regional and district council; the creation of a two-chamber parliament: the upper chamber would express 
the interests of the regions which would lead to the exclusion of lobbying by industrial-financial groups; 
Russian to be the second state language. Budget must be fair: the greatest share of the taxes must remain 
in the region; 50% of the profit tax must remain in the region; the candidates to the positions of the 
governor must first be agreed with the regional authorities”.  
After the regional administration building was stormed and occupied by radical pro-Russian protestors on 
6 April and Donetsk People’s Republic was proclaimed in the captured building on 7 April, Donets’k 
mayor Luk’yanchenko issued the following statement blaming the new government for incorrect policy. 
Again, it contained concentrated patronage demands: "New Ukrainian authorities do not quite 
understand what is happening in the Donbas now," Lukyanchenko said, "Indeed, the capture of 
administrative buildings is illegal and bad. That separatist slogans are voiced in city squares is 
unacceptable. Yet all these problems are a consequence of the new authorities’ incorrect policy, their 
unwillingness to look into problems to understand them. A recent statement by parliament-appointed 
Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk did not contain "specific proposals" to improve the situation, such as 
 
975 “Pravitel’stvo odobrilo reformu po detsentralizatsii vlasti”, Novosti Donbassa, 2 April 2014.  
976 “Idei spikera Donetskogo oblsoveta Shishatskogo o detsentralizatsii vlasti nashli podderzhku u vitse-prem’era”, 
Ostrov, 1 April 2014.  
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the measures to protect the Russian language, ensure election of governors or explain the delegation of 
powers in decentralisation procedure”.977 
10. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have demonstrated how political opportunities were opened for the Anti-Maidan protest 
action in both Kharkiv city and Donets’k region. I have argued that the Russian Spring did not emerge in 
a vacuum and refuted the hypothesis that the ethnic patron Russia had a significant role to play in the 
emergence of the Russian Spring. On the contrary, I have demonstrated that the political opportunities 
for protest were opened by the local elites. In Kharkiv, they were opened because the Euromaidan stood 
in the long line of political protests threatening to unseat the regional elites. Therefore, the elites in 
Kharkiv reacted instrumentally, that is to protect their hold on power, in line with the theoretical 
expectation of the literature on elites (Easter, 2000; Hale, 2015, 47; Sabic, C., and Zimmer, K. 2004, 116) 
and elites and conflicts (Kaufman, 2001).  In Donets’k, they were opened because the elites were 
expecting Yanukovych to stay, which is consistent with the expectations of the literature on patronal 
politics (Hale, 2015). I also discussed the critical juncture – the changes in Kyiv – in detail. In the sections 
that followed, through process tracing, I have demonstrated how moderate pro-federal protest mirrored 
the diffused nature of Kharkiv region. In line with the theoretical literature on process tracing, I discussed 
alternative explanations for why the moderate protest emerged in the region. In the section on the radical 
protest in Donets’k, I have shown how the concentrated patronage claims made by the local elites 
interacted with the radical claims made by the activists in the region. In line with the theoretical 
expectation in the literature on political opportunity, the radicals in Donets’k were given confidence to 











After the events of 6 to 8 April, the pro-federalisation protest movement in Kharkiv subsided slowly. The 
most radical activists were either too intimidated or detained.978  By 3 May, local ordinary people began 
complaining on social media about the lack of direct armed action on the part of the protestors. On 
Apukhtin’s page, people urged the protestors to arm themselves to resist the “junta”. On 23 April, a 
participant commented on Sut’ Vremeni page: “I am ashamed of the lack of [direct] action in Kharkiv; all 
these meetings are useless, we must follow the example of Donetsk and Lugansk”. 979 Another participant 
commented on the same page: “Nothing can be achieved through these peaceful meetings. We have lost 
time. The government doesn’t care about us. A kind word with a pistol has a stronger effect than simply a 
kind word. But there is no leader!!!!”.980 A participant commented on Apukhtin’s page that metro stations 
were closed by the local elites, therefore, the local people could not reach the meeting point.981 By 8 May, 
according to the military analyst Dmytro Tymchuk, the threat of secession in Kharkiv decreased 
significantly. Tymchuk noted positively the work of the local elites and the SBU in countering separatism 
in Kharkiv.982 In Donets’k, the protests culminated in the storming and occupation of the regional 
administration building on 6 April, the arrival of Igor Strelkov in Slov’’ians’k on 12 April 2014 and the 
Ukrainian government’s decision to launch an Anti-Terrorist Operation in Slov’’ians’k. 
On 11 May 2014, Donetsk People’s Republic held a referendum on independence from Ukraine, which 
was supported by an overwhelming majority of the Donbas residents. The validity of these results is 
debated. Since 2014, the Ukrainian government launched several offensives against the rebellious 
republics of Donets’k and Luhans’k, some of which were successful, but many of which have been 
repeatedly repulsed by the separatist and Russian state forces. Since 2015, the “contact line,” that is the 
 
978 https://vk.com/wall-67607008?offset=400&own=1&w=wall-67607008_1526; http://archive.is/ZclCG. 






25354839_13109_r13176 ; http://archive.is/DHTM0.  
981 https://vk.com/wall-67607008?offset=380&own=1&w=wall-67607008_1547; http://archive.is/usquo.  
982 “Ugroza separatizma v Khar’kovskoi oblasti snizilas’ – Sovet natsional’noi bezopasnosti”, 057, 8 May 2014.  
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border between the government-controlled and separatist-controlled territories has calcified, in that no 
side has been making any significant territorial gains. The Ukrainian and separatist forces continue 
attacking each other’s positions; each side reports failed ceasefires almost every day. The conflict has 
claimed over 10,000 lives, and currently, there is no conflict resolution plan on which all parties would 
agree. The rebellious republics have amassed significant resources – even if many are imported from 
Russia, especially military hardware - and demonstrated considerable legislative and state-building 
capacity. They are now deeply entrenched, while the republics’ people are not at all eager to be integrated 
back into Ukraine.983  
In this project, I have demonstrated through the empirical analysis that protest intensity and the 
degree of protest violence should not be automatically linked with armed conflict outcomes. More 
specifically, through protest cataloguing and the analysis of the dynamics of protest, I demonstrated that 
historically Kharkiv city had greater general protest potential than the entire Donets’k region. This 
predisposed the region to further political instability. I also demonstrated that during the Euromaidan and 
the Russian Spring protest waves, protest intensity and protest violence were similar in both regions. 
Kharkiv showed a greater propensity to protest violence during the Euromaidan protest phase. Such 
similarities point to the theoretically important conclusion that the people in both regions were animated 
by similar emotions. Moreover, both regions could have potentially become sites of an armed conflict if 
the Russian non-state actors were guided by these protest dynamics when choosing where to start the 
insurgency.  
I then discussed my independent variable, that is the nature of political patronage in both 
regions. I first presented Ukraine as a state of networks in order to highlight how volatile politics was in 
the centre. The centralised nature of Ukraine and its evolution into a state of networks acted as structural 
constraints on the regional elites. I then presented the second set of structural constraints, that is, the 
nature of the political economy in the regions. These two structural constraints shaped the regions into 
diffused or concentrated patronage regions. The elites, therefore, functioned within a set of tight 
constraints shaped by the combination of the centralised nature of Ukraine and the nature of the regional 
 
983 Tetiana Malyarenko, “Evolving Dynamics and Conflict Potential in Eastern Ukraine”, Policy Memo 569, Ponars 
Eurasia, 1 October 2019.  
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political economy. Actual acquaintance of elites at different levels through patronage eased these 
structural constraints. I then discussed how the elites managed to secure resources for their regions under 
different governing networks and then discussed the aspects of elite survival through learning, especially 
in diffused patronage polities. I then discussed the time lag between the change of the governing network 
and the deal struck between the regions and the centre. I presented how the elites in the concentrated 
patronage polity of Donets’k region developed a set of certain stable bargaining ploys, which helped them 
preserve their concentrated patronage system.  
I then used process tracing and protest cataloguing to discuss the aspects of my intervening variable, 
which is radical or moderate protest. I started with process tracing the Anti-Maidan contention in both 
regions. I demonstrated that the Russian Spring did not emerge in a vacuum and not with the assistance 
of the ethnic patron Russia. Instead, political opportunities for the Anti-Maidan protest were opened by 
the local elites, for a variety of reasons. In Kharkiv, they were opened as part of the local Party of 
Regions’ elites’ response to the Euromaidan. This was because the Party of Regions’ elites were 
challenged by the local opposition parties and ordinary people in the past, which made these elites 
insecure and more aggressive towards protests that were not in their interest. In Donets’k, political 
opportunities were opened for the Anti-Maidan activists because the elites wanted to remain loyal to 
Yanukovych government’s course. Therefore, before the Russian Spring commenced, both regions 
started with similar initial conditions, with the political opportunities being open for the Anti-Maidan.  
I treated the change of the governing network in the centre in February 2014 as the critical juncture. With 
the change of the governing network, the intervening variable also changed: it became radical or moderate 
pro-Russian and pro-federal protest. Depending on the nature of the regional patronage – concentrated 
or diffused – the local elites would encourage radical or moderate protest.   Therefore, I focused on the 
interaction between the local elites and specific types of activists. I refuted the hypothesis that the political 
opportunities for specific types of activism are opened externally by ethnic patrons. Through process 
tracing, I demonstrated that political opportunities were opened locally by the local elites. I also described 
the pro-federal and pro-Russian challengers and demonstrated that they were relatively weak and 
disorganised prior to the Russian Spring. In addition, congruent with the theoretical literature on process 
297 
 
tracing, I discussed alternative explanations of why there is an armed conflict in Donets’k region and no 
armed conflict in Kharkiv.   
The project contributes to the extant theories in a number of ways. Firstly, I provide ample empirical 
evidence that contradicts the main premise of the history and identity approach to the Donbas conflict by 
examining the case structurally similar to Donets’k region, that is, Kharkiv city. The history and identity 
approach overwhelmingly focuses on the dynamics of protest in the Donbas and links it to the region’s 
history and the peculiar political beliefs developed by the region’s residents. It argues that due to the 
widespread dissatisfaction of the Donbas’ residents with the new Kyiv government’s policies after the 
critical juncture in February 2014, a local conflict was bound to occur in the Donbas (Giuliano, 2015a; 
Kudelia, 2014a; Loshkarev and Sushentsov, 2016; Matveeva, 2016; Nicoara and White, 2016; Sakwa, 
2015; A. Wilson, 2016; A. Wilson, 2014). This literature sits within the larger literature on ethnic conflicts 
and the broader literature on emotions and politics which demonstrates how people engage in protest, 
protest violence and conflict as a result of experiencing the emotions of different valence (fear or anger) 
(Pearlman, 2013; Petersen, 2011). These emotions are intersubjective experiences arising from shared 
historical and cultural conditions or “emotional climates” (Baele et al., 2016; Bar‐Tal et al., 2007). The 
empirical literature on the Donbas conflict and the corresponding theoretical literature on ethnic 
conflicts, emotions and politics accord primary importance to the local people and their emotions and 
identities in spurring some countries or regions within countries to conflict. Developing the insight on 
shared “emotional climates” gleaned from the literature on emotions and politics to fit our comparative 
case, it can be argued that areas characterised by similar “emotional climates” are predisposed to similar 
protest dynamics and, by extension, to similar conflict outcomes. I demonstrate in this project that, 
indeed, people can be animated by similar emotions and be predisposed to protest, protest violence and 
eventual conflict in similar ways. In fact, a region that does not become a site of a violent conflict can 
demonstrate a greater propensity to protest violence at different stages of the protest wave. I therefore 
argue that assigning the responsibility for conflict to the local people and their emotions and identities 
fails to explain a violent outcome in one case and a peaceful one in the other.  
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Secondly, I have also refuted the hypothesis that states that foreign actors are to blame for the incipience 
of conflict in a region adjacent to an ethnic patron.984 This approach attributes the responsibility for the 
Donbas conflict to the actions of Russian non-state and state actors, the former acting with the 
connivance of some local actors (Czuperski et al., 2015; Mitrokhin, 2014; Sutyagin, 2015; A. Wilson, 2016; 
A. Wilson, 2014). This literature borrows its conceptual insights from the wider literature on ethnic 
patrons and their role in conflicts in adjacent states, which argues that neighbouring states would 
intervene – covertly or overtly – in local conflicts in adjacent states, especially if there is an ethnic kin that 
straddles borders (Gleditsch and Beardsley, 2004; Salehyan, 2006). Similarly, Laitin and Jenne argue that 
this ethnic kin would radicalise if the ethnic patron sends a sufficiently strong signal that it would 
intervene on behalf of the ethnic kin if the host state fails to satisfy the ethnic kin’s demands (Jenne, 2007; 
Laitin, 2001). By contrast, I have demonstrated through detailed empirical analysis that political 
opportunities for such radicalisation come from elsewhere. I have borrowed insights from the literature 
on political opportunity (Tarrow, 2011; Tilly, 1978) and showed that radical actors do not have to possess 
significant organisational resources to make their demands and that political opportunities are external to 
these actors. It is the local elites who provide them with these political opportunities.   
More specifically, the local elites open political opportunities for specific types of activists and for a 
variety of reasons. The “instrumentalist” or “rationalist” literature on elites and conflicts tells us that elites 
often act in ways that protect their hold on power (de Figueiredo, M., and Weingast, B. 1999; Gagnon, 
1994; Jones, B.,1999; Kaufman, 2001; Wilkinson, 2004; Woodward, S.,1999). I have demonstrated that in 
Kharkiv, the elites acted in such a way during the Anti-Maidan protest wave. The literature on patronal 
politics, by contrast, predicts that elites would want to remain loyal to the course of their patron in the 
centre and open political opportunities for specific types of protest accordingly (Hale, 2015). This took 
place in Donets’k during the Anti-Maidan protest wave. 
My main puzzle, however, was to explain the local elites’ divergent behaviour towards the local political 
protest when the informal governing network changed in Kyiv in February 2014, that is following the 
critical juncture. I have supplemented the conceptual insights offered in the social movements literature 
 
984 It can be argued that the Russians captured the concentrated patronage region of Donets’k after summer 2014 
and Russia is now the most important patron in the republics.  
299 
 
with the concepts derived from the literature on patronage, political clientelism and, specifically, Henry 
Hale’s book Patronal Politics. I engaged with the concepts of patronage and actual acquaintance that lies at 
the basis of Hale’s discussion of patronage and argued that the local elites would open political 
opportunities for radical or moderate protest depending on the type of regional patronage that applies to 
them. This system of regional patronage broadly describes the lines along which resources are delivered to 
the region and the “safeguards” that keep the elites in their seats and their assets protected.  
I have demonstrated that, over time, Ukraine evolved into a more flexible polity or a “state of networks”. 
The literature on the Soviet Union (Easter, 2000) and modern Russia (Kononenko, V.,2011) provided me 
with this key insight. I demonstrated how this introduced a certain degree of volatility in the politics in the 
centre and acted as a structural constraint on the regional elites. With the formal aspects of centre-
periphery relations remaining the same throughout the period in question (the governors were appointed 
by the President), regions developed their own systems of patronage depending on the type of their 
political economy. I therefore effectively “married” the literature on social movements, patronage and 
political economy and demonstrated how regions developed diffused or concentrated patronage systems.  
The diffused patronage region of Kharkiv “plugged into” various patronage channels, especially during 
the period of the divided-executive (Hale, 2015) and secured resources for the enterprises thanks to the 
governors’ lobbying efforts. By contrast, in the concentrated patronage region of Donets’k, owning to the 
nature of the enterprises themselves and other factors, the economy was largely privatised. Concentrating 
patronage and using the resources of actual acquaintance ensured that this property was protected (Hale, 
2015). The concentrated patronage region of Donets’k benefitted from one network’s continuing access 
to power (Easter, 2000; Hale, 2015, 47; Sabic, C., and Zimmer, K. 2004, 116). The most important 
financial patron of Donets’k region, Rinat Akhmetov, was able to secure resources for his enterprises 
when Yanukovych rose to power in the centre. Overall, Yanukovych’s career rise to the centre benefitted 
Donets’k region, which is consistent with the expectations in the literature on networks and Easter’s 
argument, in particular (Easter, 2000, 34). The elites in this region had vested interest in preserving the 
concentrated patronage system.  
I followed by the discussion of the aspects of elite learning (Grzymala-Busse, 2010) in diffused and 
concentrated patronage systems. I demonstrated how the practice of appointing clients from rival 
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networks led to conflicts in the diffused patronage region of Kharkiv and how this contributed to the 
processes of elite learning. This confirmed the theoretical expectation in the literature on informal politics 
in Eastern Europe. Gzymala-Busse writes on elite learning, the iterative process in which different 
networks are engaged, and how this worked for the elites in Poland and Hungary: “The more elites are 
advanced on the basis of pragmatic competence rather than ideological orthodoxy … and the more these 
parties engage in informal negotiation with opponents and policy experimentation, the more diverse and 
useful the skill sets and reputations of elite actors”(Grzymala-Busse, 2010, 327). Similarly, Sherrill 
Stroschein observes in the context of Hungarian and titular majority mobilisations in Romania, Slovakia 
and Ukraine in the late 1980s – early 1990s that iterative processes of learning across mobilised groups 
can lead to moderating effects on contention (Stroschein, 2012, 25). “Repeated, incremental exchanges 
between groups teach lessons,” she writes (Stroschein, 2012, 240).   
By contrast, the elites in the concentrated patronage region of Donets’k were isolated and no elite 
learning took place in their region. This also reduced the transparency of information flows in that the 
regional elites were very rarely scrutinised by the centre. I also discussed the time lag between the change 
of the informal governing network in the centre and a viable deal struck between the centre and the 
regional elites. I have demonstrated that the elites in the diffused patronage systems attempted bargaining 
with the centre only once and this was unsuccessful. By contrast, the elites in the concentrated patronage 
systems had a rich experience of bargaining with the centre in order to preserve access to power and keep 
their concentrated patronage system. When there was an electoral contest preceding the change of the 
governing network, the elites encouraged popular protest in order to coordinate themselves around the 
emerging patrons and make sure their preferred patrons continued accessing power in the centre (Hale, 
2015). This follows from the key insight by Hale on electoral contest: “a victory in a head-to-head high-
stakes contest between rival networks can be among the most powerful shapers of expectations as to 
which network is likely to be dominant in the future” (Hale, 2015, 342).  
My observations about the nature of patronage in Ukrainian regions fit with the arguments advanced by 
scholars of regional elite or patronage systems elsewhere, such as Catherine Boone who writes in the 
context of rural Africa. Boone focuses on the communal structures in Senegal and Ghana where she 
discovers patterns of “concentrated” or “dispersed control over persons and resources” (Boone, 2003, 
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21). In regions characterised by concentrated hierarchy, political control is pooled in the hands of a 
narrow set of actors (Boone, 2003, 21). In such places, rural elites acquire an unparalleled bargaining 
power vis-à-vis the state and the ability to control peasants and mobilise collective action. This 
corresponds to the empirical situation in Ukraine, where regions varied according to their diffusion or 
concentration of patronage, and therefore there was variability in regard to the regional elites’ bargaining 
strategies and capacities. Overall, Boone concludes that “even patron-client relations in Africa vary in 
their legitimacy, staying power, dependence on state resources, and implications for collective action” 
(Boone, 2003, 320), an observation that can be made of Ukrainian politics, too.   
I have taken the observations on diffused and concentrated patronage in Ukraine a step further and 
argued that polities exhibiting concentrated patronage would experience conflict while those exhibiting 
diffused patronage systems would not. In line with the most recent, interactive approaches in the social 
movements literature (Onuch, 2015) (Stroschein, 2012), I focused on the interactions between the local 
elites and local activists as opposed to local people and their identities and emotions. I demonstrated how 
the local elites in the concentrated patronage region of Donets’k opened political opportunities for radical 
protest, which complicated their relations with the centre and invited Russian non-state actors. I argue 
simply that when Strelkov arrived to Donets’k and the Anti-Terrorist Operation began, it was too late to 
bargain. In the context of Yugoslavia, Stroschein observers that military intervention can have a 
detrimental impact on contention. She writes, “military force is more than just an external shock to a 
smooth-running moderation dynamic between groups. It also changes the calculations of elites. Military 
backing for extremist positions reduces the need for elites to obtain public resonance or support of their 
goals. … the presence of weaponry also reduces the ability of masses to mobilize to push agendas counter 
to elites, such as moderate agendas” (Stroschein, 2012, 240). By contrast, in the diffused patronage region 
of Kharkiv, the local elites used their knowledge of the law to defuse radical protest, so that it did not 
disrupt their relations with the emerging patrons in the centre and the competing networks in the region. 
As a result, radical contention failed to emerge in the region and the Russian non-state actors failed to 
appear there to incite a war. The project therefore borrowed key insights from the interactive or 
“relational” (Stroschein, 2012) approaches to political mobilisation and the role of elites. As Stroschein 
writes, “the relational approach to the study of social life … focuses on ties and interactions as primary 
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units of analysis rather than emphasizing individual entities or actors. Prioritizing the dynamics of 
interaction among the elites and masses of each group reveals the general causal mechanisms that drive 
these processes” (Stroschein, 2012, 4).  This project therefore attempted to be as eclectic as possible, in 
line with the literature on process tracing, and endeavoured to adapt conceptual insights from a variety of 




















Appendix 1: Codebook  
Prior to the Russian Spring  










e. Etc.  




d. Etc.  
4. Claim: 
a. Anti-Maidan 
b. Euromaidan  
5. Organisations: 
a. Euromaidan  
b. Communist Party of Ukraine 
c. Progressive Party of Ukraine  
6. Street action: 
a. Streets blocked  
b. Streets not blocked  
c. Protesters hold a march through the streets.  
7. Protest start location: 
a. Shevchenko Monument (unless specified).  
b. Freedom Square 
c. Lenin Square 
d. HOGA 
e. Etc.  
8. Protest end location: 
a. MVD 
b. SBU 





a. Attack by titushki 
b. No attack  
c. Attack by fellow organisation  
11. Number of titushki if known: 
a. 100 
b. 200 
c. If “5 buses” : 100  
304 
 
d. If “several tens” (neskol’ko desyatkov): 30  
e. Etc.  
12. Equipment used or planned to be used by titushki: 
a. Molotov cocktails 
b. Eggs  
c. Etc.  
13. Type of violence: 
a. Egg-throwing  
b. Serious violence against people, e.g. beatings and knifings  
c. Equipment  
d. Transport  
e. Buildings  
14. Number injured: 
a. 2 
b. 3 
c. If “several” (“neskolko”): 5 
d. Etc.  
15. Number killed:  
a. 2 
b. 3 
c. Etc.  
16. Police response: 
a. Detained  
b. Not detained  
c. Responded quickly 
d. Responded slowly 
e. Cooperated with titushki  
f. Used weapons against titushki  
g. Opened proceedings  
h. Not opened proceedings  
17. How many detained: 
a. 20 
b. 30 
c. Etc.  
18. Elite response: 
a. 1 – for some response 
b. 0 – for no response  
c. Kernes speaking to protesters  
19. Elite response 2 or qualitative elite response: 
a. Kernes speaking  
20. Outcome: 
a. Titushki won 
b. Titushki lost 
c. Protesters dispersed 
d.  
Russian Spring  
I coded meetings that began peacefully and then became violent separately. One good example of such a 
meeting is the one organised by Kernes on 1 March 2014. It started off as a peaceful meeting and then 
ended with the storming of the regional state administration building and mass beating of the 
Euromaidan activists barricaded in the building.  
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e. Etc.  




d. If thousands – 3000  
e. If “tens of thousands” : 30,000  
f. Etc.  
4. Demands – it made sense to change this to demands as the Euromaidan demands echoed the 
demands in Kyiv and did not change while the Russian Spring demands constantly changed 
a. Federalisation referendum  
b. Euromaidan  
5. Organisations: 
a. Euromaidan  
b. Communist Party of Ukraine 
c. Progressive Party of Ukraine  
d. Svoboda 
e. Udar 
f. Batkivschina  
6. Street action: 
a. Streets blocked  
b. Streets not blocked  
c. Protesters hold a march through the streets.  
7. Protest start location: 
a. Lenin Square 
b. HOGA – Kharkiv regional administration building  
c. Etc.  
8. Protest end location: 
a. MVD 
b. SBU 





a. Attack by titushki 
b. No attack  
c. Attack by fellow organisation  
d. Attack on the administrative building  
e. Attack on property  
f. Attack on police  





c. If “several tens” (neskol’ko desyatkov): 30  
d. If several hundreds (neskolko soten):300  
e. Etc.  
12. Equipment used or planned to be used by titushki or any other perpetrators of violence: 
a. Molotov cocktails 
b. Eggs  
c. Etc.  
13. Type of violence: 
a. Egg-throwing  
b. Serious violence against people, e.g. beatings and knifings  
c. Equipment  
d. Transport  
e. Buildings  
14. Violence against journalists and their equipment: 
a. 1 – for violence 
b. 0 – for no violence  
15. Number injured: 
a. 2 
b. 3 
c. If “several” (“neskolko”): 5 
d. Etc.  
16. Number killed:  
a. 2 
b. 3 
c. Etc.  
17. Number of police: 
a. 30 if “neskolko desyatkov”.  
18. Police response: 
a. Detained  
b. Not detained  
c. Responded quickly 
d. Responded slowly 
e. Cooperated with titushki  
f. Used weapons against titushki  
g. Opened proceedings  
h. Not opened proceedings  
19. Police response2: 
a. Barricaded themselves in the administrative building  
b. Not detained  
20. How many detained: 
a. 20 
b. 30 
c. Etc.  
21. Elite response: 
a. 1 – for some response 
b. 0 – for no response  
c. Kernes speaking to protesters  
22. Outcome: 
a. Titushki won 
b. Titushki lost 
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c. Protesters dispersed 
23. Symbolic actions and objects used by protesters: 
a. Russian flags 
b. St George ribbon 
c. Posters with Putin and Yanukovych  
24. Legal?  
a. Yes 








Tables: Equalisation grants to Donets’k city and Donets’k region compared, in thousand hryvnia 
2007 (Tymoshenko government) 
Administrative unit Equalisation grant 
or transfer from the 
State 










Donets’k 0 0 149845,3 31,14 
L’viv 0 0 60786,2 17,02 
Kharkiv 0 0 79928,4 9,31 
Donets’k region 3347,1 0,03 0 0 
L’viv region 285982,9 6,60 0 0 
Kharkiv region 204775,8 3,37 0 0 
Source: “Pro derzhavnyii biudzhet Ukrayiny na 2007 rik”, Zakon. Rada; 
https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/489-16 
















Donets’k 0 0 337 739,6 54,43 
L’viv 0 0 86 179,3 10,74 
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Kharkiv 0 0 98 087,3 8,25 
Donets’k 
region 
134 794,7 0,86 0 0 
L’viv region 503 871,1 8,13 0 0 
Kharkiv region 392 815,5 3,98 0 0 
Source: “Pro derzhavnyi biudzhet Ukrayiny na 2008 rik ta pro vnesennia zmin do deiakikh 
zakonodavchykh aktiv Ukrayiny” https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/107-17 












to the State 
Percent from 
total revenue 
Donets’k 0 0 301 153,1 23,56 
L’viv 0 0 60 031,8 7,16 
Kharkiv 0 0 13 571,4 1,08 
Donets’k region 306 195,9 1,75 0 0 
L’viv region 617 487,4 9,13 0 0 
Kharkiv region 488 601,4 4,32 0 0 
Source: “Pro derzhavnyii biudzhet Ukrayiny na 2009 rik”, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/835-
17 











Negative transfer or 






Donets’k 0 0 207 718,1 13,47 
L’viv 0 0 64 778,2  6,22 
Kharkiv 
  
2 626,6 0,15 
Donets’k 
region 
658 385,3 3,19 0 0 
L’viv region 664 528,5 8,37 0 0 
Kharkiv region  397 778,1 2,18 0 0 























Kharkiv 43,670.2 0.22 0 0 
Donets’k 
region 
803,430.1 3.05 0 0 
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L’viv region 841,625.0 9.18 0 0 
Kharkiv region 495,769.5 2.46 0 0 




























810,820.2 2.99 0 0 
L’viv region 1,215,357.2 12.42 0 0 
Kharkiv 
region 
925,456.2 4.44 0 0 
Source: “Pro derzhavnyii biudzhet Ukrayiny na 2013 rik”, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/5515-
17 
The tables below illustrate that the levels of subventions were greater for Donets’k under Yanukovych 
than for other regions.  






Subsidies to poor families Subsidy 1 Subsidy 2 
Donets’k region 3,121,888.9 828,716.0 131,647.9 
L’viv region 2,536,529.0 382,243.5 27,996.8 
Kharkiv region 1,936,889.6 591,913.0 22,681.8 
Donets’k city 0.0 0.0 0.0 
L’viv city 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Kharkiv city 19,707.1 0.0 0.0 





Subsidies to poor families Subsidy 1 Subsidy 2 
Donets’k region 2,436,787.2 877,291.8 105,555.5 
L’viv region 1,935,215.6 336,757.5 21,043.8 
Kharkiv region 1,553,747.5 587,623.5 24,248.1 
Donets’k city 0.0 0.0 0.0 
L’viv city 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Kharkiv city 0.0 0.0 0.0 







Subsidies to poor families Subsidy 1 Subsidy 2 
Donets’k region 1 038 820,7 543 023,6 34 085,9 
L’viv region 832 777,1 200 127,1 13 325,4 
Kharkiv region 632 694,6 437 189,5 21 478,7| 
Donets’k city 0 0 0 
L’viv city 0 0 0 
Kharkiv city 0 0 0 




Appendix III            
Sampling pro-Russian mobilisation groups on vk.com and Odnoklassniki      
I now have an exhaustive list of the archived walls of the pro-Russian self-determination movements and parties on Vkontakte. The list was compiled using 
snowball sampling, that is I looked for a movement’s or party’s vk.com page when the movement or party was referred to in an academic or newspaper 
article or its name figured on another movement’s or user’s vk.com page. Following this, I used Google advanced search engine to find the archived walls.    
For a small number of movements, archived walls do not exist due to the limited functionality of vk.com or content deletion. I had an extensive 
communication with the vk.com support team regarding this, and they said that not all groups have searchable archived walls. On Odnoklassniki, identical 
groups can be found by using the site’s search engine. The only problem is that all these groups will be current, that is there are no archives available for any 
group due to the limited functionality of Odnoklassniki.     
Sampling of posts and comments on vk.com.            
In sampling posts, I excluded most of the picture-based posts (the so-called demotivatory), derogatory posts, rhetorical or “empty” posts and news 
items. I included posts that described action and indicated intention (for the purposes of process tracing) and some kind of constructive interpretation of 
the situation.        Below are the tables with examples of exclusion and inclusion criteria for posts and comments. All of these come from Pavel Gubarev’s 
Narodnoe Opolchenie’s archived wall.     
Examples of posts falling under the exclusion criteria           
Criteria            Example            Reason for exclusion           
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Rhetorical or “empty” posts  
       
         
Translation: To be completely honest, the USA is saving itself from 
a default by using Ukraine. A war will help save the dollar!            
The post does not add any knowledge about the   
behaviour of the activists and their 
interpretation of the events            
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News items           
           
 
Translation: Yanukovych’s press conference in Rostov 
No new information regarding activists, people or 
elites            
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Inclusion criteria examples           
Criteria           Example           Reason for inclusion            
        
      
    
       Offline behaviour:    
intended action and actual  
behaviour     
          
Outline: here Gubarev is describing the situation in Donets’k on 24 February, primarily 
regarding the elites 
       Describes the intended  
and actual action of the  
activists     
The use of evocative 
language points to the 
emotional predisposition  
and cognitive bias of the    
activist     
Comments on the 
behaviour of other actors – 
the elites     
       Offline behaviour     
 
Here Gubarev is inviting local people to join him next to Donets’k Regional Administration 
       Illustrates the offline 
action     
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Offline behaviour           
 
  Here Gubarev is saying that he is planning to talk to the deputies at 
Donets’k city council 
       As above     
     
            
           
In sampling comments, I sampled according to the comment length, the absence of derogatory language, the level of engagement with the situation and 
interpretation, the reference to concrete geographical location and concrete behaviours.            
Exclusion criteria for comments            
Criteria           Example           Reason            
    Length       
     Translation:    
“clowns”            
Too short        
    
Empty  rhetoric + derogatory        
   
            
Translation: The West are the real enemies and we should relate to them accordingly.  
       No new knowledge, no 
illustration of offline behaviour   
          
319 
 
Empty    rhetoric            
 
Brief translation: here the commentator is describing how the Germans were killing Jews and 
Russians “by thousands”.  
No new knowledge    , no 
illustration of offline behaviour  
           
Inclusion criteria for comments            
Criteria           Example           Reason for inclusion            
  
       Constructive 
interpretation of the  
situation    
           
Translation: people, excuse me… I want to understand whom you are defending 
yourselves against…. I feel you are defending yourselves against invented enemies. 
Can you explain? 
       Length; absence of 
derogatory language  
Constructive interpretation 
of the situation    
This particular post was 
followed by a detailed    
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       Offline behaviour and 
concrete grievance     
 
       Indicates concrete    
grievance – “wage arrears” 
in this case     
    
           
      




of people sympathising    
with Narodnoe Opolchenie  
    
Also, this post presented 
one of the few dissenting 
views which can be 
interpreted as a    
disconfirming case (Patton  
2015)    
           
          
 
Translation: we were not invoking separatism. The main idea of the meeting on Saturday was to 
express readiness for “a polite dialogue” but if they try to use force against us, we will answer 
back.  
Indicates offline action         
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Offline behaviour and 
highly emotional  
engagement with the    
situation             
   
            
Translation: today I have been crying for the first time since youth and childhood. I watched this 
crazy “Veche” and the proclamation of the Cabinet of Ministers… 
       This comment comes 
from one of my first 
interviewees resident in 
Donets’k. It indicated a 
highly emotional 
engagement with the 
situation. The participant 
did not deny experiencing 
these emotions in the 
interview.     
    
     
Offline behaviour           
 
Translation: I am in the area of the railway station  
           
     
           
       Indicative of the 
information interpretation   
and emotional 
predisposition     
   
 
Brief translation: here the commentator says that no money should be transferred to Kyiv  
       This illustrates the 
prevalent rhetoric during 
the early phase of the 
protest movement 
following the ouster of 
Yanukovych: the   
dissatisfaction with the    
      
local elites, the need to    
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establish a “peoples’ 
government”     
       
      
 
Triangulation with 





Translation: Natalia, I have a whole programme of questions and suggestions. I will try to pass them 
in Donets’k.  
       This comment 
indicates that the 
commentator lived in  
Donets’k at the time of 
the  mobilisation and was  
engaged in the protest. I 
contacted the 
commentator for the 
purpose of the interview     
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Comment on the 
behaviour of other key  
actors - Local   
elites        
   
    
       
   This illustrates how the 
people of Donets’k 
interpreted the behaviour 
of the local elites and their 
growing dissatisfaction 
with them     
Dissenting views       
 
       
  
Civic journalism     
 
   This tells us what the 
commentator saw himself  
– this can be triangulated    
    
with newspaper reports     
     
      





List of Interviews  
Journalist 1, (former) journalist at Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, 19 07 2019 
Journalist 2, interview in London, 15 08 2018 
Activist in Kharkiv, Interview 16 07 2019 
Activist from Donets’k, Interview 27 07 2019 
Protest Organiser in Kharkiv 1, Interview 1, 24 09 2018; Interview 2, 29 09 2018 
Protest Organiser in Kharkiv 2, Interview, 28 09 2018 
Protest Participant in Kharkiv, 23 08 2018 
Protest Participant in Kharkiv, 24 08 2018 
Elite Member 1, email exchange 22 07 2019 
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